Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

According to moral being, i.e. in relation to the last end and the rule of morals, operative habits are good and virtues, or evil and vices, according as they agree or do not agree with rational nature and its last end¹.

in the treatise on sins: for as many as there are sins specifically complete and diverse, so many habits caused by them and inclining to them, or vices, can also be had. It remains therefore that we speak specially of good habits and virtues.

S. Th. I-II, q. 55; 56, a. 3; 57, a. 1; 65, a. 2; De Virt. q. 1, a. 1 and 2.

576. Virtue according to the name (ἰσχύς, δύναμις, deugd) is derived from force, and therefore designates the perfection of an operative potency or a complete potency¹. Hence

1. natural potencies, since they are altogether determined to one, of themselves are perfectly disposed to operation, and therefore are called virtues of nature (a. 1). But

2. potencies indifferent to many and diverse things, as rational potencies, of themselves can be better disposed through habit, and therefore in them the potency is distinguished from its perfection; and virtue in them is habit (a. 1). Since however

3. true perfection consists only in good, it follows that virtue is a good operative habit (a. 3). Whence Aristotle: Virtue is that which makes the one having it good and his work good (II Eth., c. 6; VII Phys., c. 3);

4. we treat of human virtue, which is proper to man, and which therefore is a good rational operative habit (a. 2).

577. Virtue is defined by words gathered from S. Augustine²: A good quality of mind by which one lives rightly, which no one uses badly, which God works in us without us. There is indicated

1°) genus: quality, because it is of the genus of habits; better however it would be called habit, which is the proximate genus;

2°) specific difference: good, by which it is specifically distinguished from evil habits;

3°) subject: of mind, because human virtue resides in reason or in the potency moved by reason; 4°) the end of virtue, namely operation: a) by which one lives rightly, i.e. by which man operates conformably to reason, that it may be indicated to be a properly operative habit, and it is distinguished from habits which always are disposed to evil; b) which no one uses badly, by which it is distinguished from habits which are sometimes for good, sometimes for evil, as opinion or human faith. Whence virtue cannot be a productive principle of an evil act, and the act of virtue cannot be evil, for virtue does not influence an evil act. No one namely can make virtue produce an evil act, no one can, using virtue as a principle, produce an evil work; — one can however use virtue badly as an object, when e.g. one is proud of it or hates it, but that act does not proceed from virtue as from an operative principle;

5°) the efficient cause is added: which God works in us without us, i.e. without our effecting, but not without our consenting as adults, or by the help of grace disposing us; which is true of the supernatural infused virtue of which Augustine speaks. If these last words are removed, the definition common to all acquired and infused virtues is had (a. 4).

That this definition is real, i.e. that such virtues exist in fact, will be shown throughout the treatise.

578. Virtue renders the potency perfect. — Hence:

1. Not every good habit is a virtue, but that only which includes no imperfection; whence opinion, human faith or hope, continence and constancy³ are not virtues (q. 58, a. 3, ad 2).

2. Neither are those good habits virtues which serve the action of the principal potency: for as long as the principal potency, which consummates the work, is not well disposed to operation, man will not yet be perfectly disposed to it, nor therefore will the operation be perfect. The habit therefore which is in the principal potency, consummative of a good work, is alone called virtue. Whence it is said by Aristotle: a disposition of the perfect to the best⁴, i.e. a stable disposition of a potency perfectly instructed for best exercising its operation.

579. The notion of virtue is analogous, which therefore does not equally perfectly belong to all, nor is said in the same sense of all. For some virtues render man perfect under some respect only and therefore are called virtues in a qualified sense; — some render man simply good inasmuch as he is man, and therefore are called simply and properly so called; to them in the full sense belongs Aristotle's definition: virtue is that which makes the one having it good and his work good. Hence:

A. In the natural order and for philosophers: merely intellectual virtues (arts and sciences) which render man good under some respect only, namely with respect to the good of one potency, e.g. which make a good architect, a good philosopher, etc., are called virtues in a qualified sense; but moral virtues render man simply perfect under the notion of good (namely the honest), namely with respect to the good of the whole man, and make a good man, and therefore are called virtues simply so called or virtues simply human. Of which there is a twofold difference:

a) the former, although they give aptitude for operating well, do not however incline to using their aptitude, whence he who does not use his art, is not for that reason considered an imperfect artist; the latter incline man to use his aptitude rightly, whence he who does not perform just or temperate acts does not have justice or temperance;

b) the former do not render man morally good, nor incline to living honestly; on the contrary the latter, whence they reside in the will or in the potency as moved by the will (q. 57, a. 1; 56, a. 3).

B. In the supernatural order and for theologians: virtues in a qualified sense are those which render man good with respect to a particular end (or the last in some genus) e.g. temperate, just, believing, etc.; virtues simply and properly so called are those by which man is perfect as to the supernatural last end. Whence natural and philosophical virtues, even strictly so called, are not in a perfect state of virtue nor are called by theologians virtues simply so called, unless in fact they are habitually ordered to the last end, which is done by charity: then they are called perfect or formed; but if they are present in a man turned away from the last end, they are called imperfect or unformed, since the ultimate or supreme perfection or form of morality is lacking to them. Formed virtues are virtues in the fullest sense (q. 65, a. 2).

580. Observation. — Just as in a good or evil human act (and in a passion), so also in a moral habit, virtue and vice, a twofold element can be distinguished:

1°) the material and physical, which is the mere inclination or physical propensity to acting well or ill;

2°) the formal or moral, which is rational ordination, namely a permanent deliberate adhesion to the object as good or evil, which perfects the habit in the moral being of virtue or vice.

Whence when a sinner is converted, that which has the character of the formal of vice is taken away from the evil habit, but not the material propensity although it is diminished and impeded; whence vice remains only as to the material, in a certain state of destruction. And likewise when a virtuous man sins gravely against the object of virtue, he loses the formal of virtue, but the good acquired habit remains as to its material⁵.

581. Corollary. — The doctrine proposed is contradicted by the followers of Americanism, whose ideas among some also in Germany, France, and England are found latent. They are said to distinguish two kinds of virtues, namely active virtues and passive, or: forces, such as independent of self, properly personal cult, vital, duties toward neighbor; and feminine, as humility, patience, meekness, self-denial, full confidence in God; — moreover natural virtues seem rather to have the active ones which respond more fitly to the customs and necessities of the present age, but the Christian and supernatural ones rather passive, which do not so much fit the present time as they did the middle ages.

Which doctrine was condemned by Leo XIII, in the letter of 22 Jan. 1899 to Card. Gibbons. And rightly; for it contradicts:

1° Scripture, where Prov. XVI, 32: « Better is the patient than the brave »; and Christ, our exemplar, is presented as meek and humble (Mt. XI, 29), and obedient (Phil. II, 5, 8), and crucified for the mortification of the flesh, wherefore those who are Christ's have crucified their flesh with the vices and concupiscences (Gal. V, 24).

2° Reason. For a) virtue cannot be passive, for, as Leo XIII says, « virtue is the perfection of potency..., the end of potency is act, and nothing else is the act of virtue than the good use of free choice »;

b) moreover that natural virtues are to be preferred to supernatural ones and are of greater efficacy or fecundity, cannot be understood, because nature, with grace added, does not become weaker, but is perfected. Whence also the saints from humility, obedience, abstinence became powerful in deed and word.

3° Experience. It is evident that to exercise passive virtues is of greater labor than to acquire active virtues; moreover it is established that the exercise of those virtues has brought great fruits both to individuals and to society, as Leo XIII shows.

4° Finally the very doctrine of the connection of virtues among themselves, with which it squares badly and can scarcely agree⁶.

S. Th. I-II, q. 56; De Virt. q. 1, a. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7.

582. Principle I. Virtues are in the potencies of the soul. — Since virtue is 1) an operative habit, and 2) the perfection of an operative potency, and 3) a disposition to the best end, but the end is operation or the worked thing, it follows that it is in the operative potency of the soul as in a subject.

583. Principle II. In the intellect considered in itself there are only virtues in a qualified sense, by which man is perfect under some respect: thus science and art; but inasmuch as it is moved by the will, in it also are virtues simply and properly so called by which man is perfected for the last end: prudence and the virtues annexed to it, and in the supernatural order divine faith (q. 56, a. 3).

584. Principle III. In the will are virtues simply so called, but not all. — For in the will:

a) There are not the habits by which we are inclined to choose the good of our reason, proportioned to the will: for the will is appetite, whence by its nature, without habit, it sufficiently tends to its own good; it is rational appetite, therefore it tends to the good of reason, i.e. the honest. Whence in the will there is no virtue for choosing the good of reason in the passions (q. 56, a. 6).

b) There are however in the will habits for resisting passions, namely continence for resisting passions impelling to the delightful good against right reason, and constancy for resisting passions withdrawing from the good of reason because of sadness and arduousness; which however are not called virtues, because they do not render man perfect: for they do not make it so that the passions obey reason (q. 58, a. 3, ad 2).

c) There are in the will virtues simply so called, by which we are well ordered to an extrinsic good, which exceeds the proportion of the will either with respect to the individual, as the good of another to which justice orders, or with respect to the species or human nature, as the divine or supernatural good which is communicated to us, to which theological hope and charity order: for to these goods the will is not sufficiently inclined by its nature, and therefore the virtues which order the affection of man to God or neighbor are in the will (q. 56, a. 6).

585. Principle IV. In the sensitive appetite are true virtues. — For in the sensitive appetite

a) considered in itself there are not habits, nor therefore virtues;

b) inasmuch however as it is moved by reason and is the immediate principle of human acts, in it are habits by which the passions obey and are conformed to reason, as fortitude, temperance, meekness, etc.;

c) moreover those habits are virtues simply so called, because they include no imperfection, and because the good work is consummated in the sensitive appetite, namely the passion itself regulated (q. 56, a. 4).

586. Principle V. In other potencies there are not virtues. — In the internal senses indeed there are good habits, but those are not virtues, because the good work is not consummated in the internal senses, and therefore those habits are subordinate to others: thus the habit of good memory subserves the virtue of science, and good thought [subserves] prudence. In the other potencies of man (external senses, vegetative or locomotive forces) there are not properly operative habits, nor therefore virtues (a. 5).

S. Th. I-II, q. 57-63; De Virt. q. 1, a. 12.

587. Principles. Virtues are distinguished:

1. By reason of the subject or potency in which they principally are, into intellectual which are in the intellect, and moral (or appetitive) which are in the appetite.

2. By reason of the nature to which they have order, into natural which are fitting to human nature as such, and to the natural end; and supernatural which are fitting to the divine nature participated in us, and to the supernatural end: the beatific vision; of which will be spoken in the 3rd part.

3. By reason of the cause, into acquired which are acquired by our natural acts, in the way explained in part 1, q. 3, n. 567; and infused of themselves, which God alone can give us.

4. By reason of the object and matter about which they are concerned, intellectual are divided into speculative and practical, and moral according to various objects; likewise supernatural are distinguished into theological which are concerned with God himself, and moral which order our life: these last, just as the natural virtues strictly so called which render man morally good, are distinguished into cardinal which are concerned with the principal matter, and annexed which are concerned with the secondary matter.

It is to be noted that virtues can be distinguished from several heads; in fact, however many there are, they are distinguished by reason of the object which gives the lowest species.

Specially we shall say in the present about the intellectual, moral, and cardinal virtues.

S. Th. I-II, q. 57; De Virt. q. 1, a. 6 and 7.

588. Principle. Five distinct species of intellectual virtues are enumerated:

A. Three are in the speculative intellect which stops at the contemplation of truth, by which namely it is perfected for knowing the true:

1°) Habit of principles, by which it is disposed for knowing first principles, whether speculative: then it is called simply intellect (νοῦς), or practical: then it is called synderesis.

2°) Science (ἐπιστήμη), which is perfected for knowing conclusions evident in some genus of knowable things through their proper causes.

3°) Wisdom (σοφία), which is perfected for knowing conclusions of any genus whatsoever through the highest causes, by which it also judges of the principles.

B. In the practical intellect, which orders truth to work, there are two, by which it is perfected for directing and regulating human operations:

4°) Art (τέχνη), which directs transient operations, by which one makes something in exterior matter, as to build, to cut, etc.

5°) Prudence (φρόνησις), which directs operations remaining in the agent itself, as to will, to love, to be angry, etc.

Art is defined as right reason of the makeable, which directs the works themselves or effects to be made according to certain rules; prudence as right reason of the doable, which directs human acts.

589. In what sense they are virtues. — The four former are virtues in a qualified sense, because they do not incline to acting honestly: for they give only aptitude for operating well, not good use, because this pertains to the appetite, whence the work of art can be morally most evil; — on the contrary, prudence by which human reason is well disposed for ordering human acts in the appetite, as means to the honest end, is a virtue simply so called.

This virtue is most necessary for man. For for living honestly, it does not suffice that man wills some good end (what he does), but also that he order suitable means to the end is most required (how he does it). For the due end man is disposed in the appetite through moral virtue; but for the means being conveniently ordered to the end, reason also must be well disposed, moved by the will, which is done by prudence: for precisely about the means to be chosen to deliberate, and to judge, and to command are acts of reason; for doing these rightly prudence disposes us well.

590. Corollary. — Hence, although prudence according to essence and by reason of subject is an intellectual virtue, by reason of matter which is the honest human act it agrees with the moral virtues. Whence it is numbered among them, when they are opposed to the theological virtues.

S. Th. I-II, q. 58-60; De Virt. q. 1, a. 4, 5, 12.

591. Moral virtue is named from mores i.e. inclination to acting, which properly pertains to the appetite; whence moral virtue is the habit by which the appetite is well disposed to be conformed to reason. In fact it is the habitual conformity to right reason. Since however to choose is the act proper to the human appetite, hence moral virtue is an elective habit according to right reason, and is defined by Aristotle, Eth. VI, c. 6: an elective habit consisting in a mean with respect to us, determined by reason as the wise man will determine¹. It is called

1°) elective habit, because choice is the proper act of moral virtue, and because moral habit is the principle of choice;

2°) consisting in a mean with respect to us: this is the object or term of this action. The moral good which is the object of virtue is a mean between excess and defect, which is to be estimated not in itself, but with respect to the one choosing, so that he chooses what is fitting for him according to right reason, neither more nor less;

3°) determined by reason: this is the cause of goodness. For it is reason which determines the mean between excess and defect, that it be good. And because it happens that reason is not always right but also sometimes erroneous, is added: as the wise man, i.e. prudent, will determine; reason namely through prudence will rightly estimate what is good or evil in the acts of the appetite (q. 58, a. 1 and 59, a. 1).

592. Principle I. Moral virtues are necessary. — For both the rational and sensitive appetite does not obey reason entirely at its nod, but can contradict it, because it is properly operative i.e. has its own movements and actions. Whence for operating well it is required that not only the intellect through prudence, but also the appetite be well disposed, to obey reason, through the habits of moral virtues; otherwise it would be moved as if by force and with sadness (q. 58, a. 2).

593. Principle II. Moral virtue is not one in species but multiple, both by reason of the subject or diverse potency in which it is, and by reason of the object (formal principle), which can be related in diverse ways to reason, to which it can participate more or less, and so it says a diverse relation to the directing reason (q. 59, a. 2 and 4; q. 60, a. 1).

For reason directs both the operations of the will by which man is disposed, even externally, toward another, and the passions of the sensitive appetite, both concupiscible and irascible, that they may consent to reason and so man be well disposed internally, in relation to himself. Whence in three ways: and a) by reason of the matter about which principally², and b) by reason of the subject in which they are (will, concupiscible appetite, irascible appetite), and c) by reason of the formal object (good according to commensuration toward another, or good according to mere commensuration toward the agent whether as delightful, or as arduous) the virtues are specifically distinguished — virtues about operations of the will — virtues about passions of the concupiscible, — and virtues about passions of the irascible (q. 60, a. 2).

594. Principle III. Diverse are the virtues about operations. — All the virtues which are about operations agree in the general notion of what is due to another. But the notion of what is due is not of one notion in all: in one way something is due strictly by pact, in another way not strictly by promise or benefit received; in one way something is due to an equal, in another to a superior, in another to a lesser. Whence according to diverse notions of what is due, there are diverse virtues about operations, e.g. justice, religion, piety, gratitude, truthfulness, etc. (q. 60, a. 3).

595. Principle IV. Diverse also are the virtues about the passions of the concupiscible or irascible, not indeed because the passions are diverse, but when they say a diverse relation to reason.

Hence a) the same virtue is concerned with contrary passions between which it holds the mean, e.g. fortitude between fear and daring (q. 60, a. 4);

b) moreover diverse passions in a certain order to one another and to one [end] can be ordered, and in the same way be repugnant to reason (or agree with it), as happens for the passions of the concupiscible: love, desire, and delight of the same good (and consequently also for hatred, flight, sadness of the opposite evil); whence all these passions pertain not to different virtues but to the same virtue, e.g. temperance (a., 4); c) on the contrary, when passions are ordered to a diverse good of reason, and so say a diverse relation to reason, as happens for the passions of the irascible, which « are not of one order but are ordered to diverse things. For daring and fear are ordered to some great danger; hope and despair to some good that is arduous; anger however to overcoming some contrary which has brought harm. And therefore about these passions there are diverse virtues, namely... fortitude about fears and audacities, magnanimity about hope and despair, meekness about angers » (q. 60, a. 4);

d) a fortiori when they pertain to diverse potencies, because then they are concerned with diverse objects, whence other virtues are concerned with the passions of the concupiscible (good as such), others with the passions of the irascible (good as arduous), e.g. temperance and fortitude, love of honor and magnanimity, liberality and magnificence, temperance and meekness, etc.³ (a. 5).

596. Corollaries. — From what has been said it follows:

1° « That of all human operations the first principle is reason,..., whence just as the appetite (rational or sensitive) is the principle of a human act according to this that it participates reason in some way, so the moral habit has the character of human virtue inasmuch as it is conformed to reason » (q. 58, a. 2).

2° Hence, just as intellectual virtue is rational by essence, so moral virtue is rational by participation, inasmuch as the appetite whether the superior of the will or the inferior of the sensitive life participates reason (q.60, a. 1; q.56, a. 4 and ad 1; a. 6, ad 2; q. 58, a. 2; q. 59, a. 4, ad 2; q. 61, a. 2).

3° Moral virtues can be without the intellectual virtues of wisdom, science, and art; not however without prudence, which is necessary for rightly taking the means to the end and which itself presupposes the intellect of practical principles (q. 58, a. 4).

4° Intellectual virtues can be without moral virtues; not however without these is prudence. For that the work be the work of the virtue of prudence, it must be done for the right end, or for good; the right end the moral virtue procures (a. 5).

S. Th. I-II, q. 61; De Virt. q. 5, a. 1; q. 1, a. 12, ad 26.

597. Principle I. Certain virtues are called cardinal, as it were principal on which others are founded: thus metaphorically from the hinge on which the door turns; whence those are so called on which as on hinges the moral life turns and on which the whole right human life is founded¹. Since they are principal in human life, they are not merely intellectual virtues and in a qualified sense, but they are simply so called and moral, which alone contain the rectitude of the appetite and which excel the intellectual ones with respect to good.

That there are four cardinal virtues is proved:

1. By reason of the object: The good of reason which is the object of virtue, can be considered either in the very act of reason which considers it, or in the various matters in which it must be produced, namely in operations and in passions. Some passions however impel to something contrary to reason, others withdraw from what reason dictates. Thus therefore there will be one principal virtue which makes good in reason itself: prudence; and one which makes good in operations: justice; and one which moderates and represses the passions impelling to the contrary of reason: temperance; and one which strengthens us against the passions withdrawing from the order of reason: fortitude.

2. By reason of the subject: There are four faculties of the soul in which virtues reside and in each a principal virtue ought to be present: in reason therefore is prudence; in will justice; in concupiscible temperance; in irascible is fortitude, 598. The cardinal virtues are not always understood by all in the same sense. — For some take them in a generic sense, as general modes which are found in several, indeed in all virtues²; either

a) as four genera or collections of virtues, under which all others are contained as species, so that whatever virtue makes good in the consideration of reason is called prudence (e.g. eubulia), and whatever virtue makes rectitude in operations is called justice (e.g. religion, piety, gratitude), and whatever virtue restrains and represses passions is called temperance (e.g. meekness, humility), and whatever virtue makes firmness of soul against certain passions is called fortitude (e.g. magnificence, magnanimity); — or even

b) as general conditions required for every virtue, inasmuch as every virtue must be prudent, and just, and strong, and moderate.

But, although these are true, nevertheless they do not describe the proper nature of the cardinal virtues in the strict sense.

599. Principle II. The cardinal virtues are to be taken in a specific sense and are special virtues, which have a determined matter and are distinguished from all others. For:

a) In each genus of virtues (of which was said above) there is something greatest, principal, and more difficult, about which there is a special virtue: thus in the act by which reason considers, the chief and more difficult is to command well rather than to take counsel and judge well; in operations toward another, the principal is the rectitude of strict equality in which rectitude most shines forth, namely in commutations and distributions; likewise it is more difficult to restrain the more vehement delights, namely the delights of touch, and to strengthen man against the greatest dangers, namely the dangers of death. Whence there are four principal virtues, inasmuch as they are concerned with the principal matter: prudence strictly so called which is preceptive of good, justice properly so called which is about due actions among equals, temperance properly so called which represses the concupiscences of the delights of touch, and fortitude strictly so called which strengthens against the dangers of death.

b) Since however he who is well disposed to doing the principal, and more difficult, by that very fact has a certain inchoate disposition and facility for what is less difficult, according to the adage: He who can do more, can do less (just as he who can restrain the concupiscences of the flesh, which is more difficult, by that very fact is more able to restrain other passions, which is easier; and he who is just can already become liberal, grateful, pious, which otherwise he could not), hence he who has these four special virtues has, at least according to a beginning, all the other moral ones, and therefore they are the foundation of all the others, and are rightly called cardinal³.

The others are called annexed which are concerned with secondary acts or matters, or potential parts, as it were not having the whole power of the principal virtue.

S. Th. I-II, q. 64, a. 1, 2, 3 ; De Virt. q. 1, a. 13.

600. Adage : « Moral virtue is in a mean » :

1. It is not to be understood of a mean according to essence and the notion of habit, as if it signified that virtue is essentially between two extreme vices, one of which is opposed to it by excess, the other by defect : for this is false of the virtue of justice, to which only injustice is opposed. For the rest, by the same sin one sins at once by excess and by defect, for he who gives to one less than he owes, gives to another or to himself more than he can ; and if anyone gives to another more than he owes, he is no longer just but liberal.

2. But it is to be understood causally, of a mean according to effect and the notion of object, and it signifies that virtue has for its object a mean between excess (more) and defect (less) in its proper matter : for it makes our appetite choose operations or passions neither more nor less, but precisely in the measure which right reason dictates : thus for temperance, excess in the matter consists in using pleasures more than is fitting, defect in not using them when one should ; the mean, which is the object of temperance, is to use pleasures, as, when, in the manner,... one ought.

It is proved : The good of moral virtue is in adequation or conformity to the rule, i.e. to right reason, without departing from it. But adequation is a mean between excess, by which something exceeds the measure, and defect, by which it falls short of it or does not attain it. Therefore the good of moral virtue is in a mean.

But if virtue is called the ultimate of a potency, which indicates a summit, not a mean ; — this is to be understood according to the perfection of the act, for thus virtue is at the summit of perfection ; not however according to the quantity of the matter, for thus virtue is in a mean.

3. But the sense is not of a mean by reason of the subject and according to the sole measure of our weak condition, namely that virtue is to be exercised moderately so that man cannot tend toward any maximum ; — for the maximum is sometimes conformed to reason, as is clear of fortitude, magnanimity, virginity, etc., and yet in this case virtue is still in a mean, because excess is to tend toward that maximum when one ought not.

601. The mean of virtue is the mean of reason, because it is conformity to the measure of right reason, which measure it does not exceed and from which it does not depart : between excess and defect, adequation to the measure holds the mean. Hence it is defined : the property of virtue whereby it so moves about its matter as to beware of excess and defect. Reason constitutes, dictates, and imposes that mean upon the moral virtues through prudence ; whence S. Thomas says that « that mean belongs to prudence as regulating and measuring, to moral virtue as measured and regulated » (a. 3) ; therefore prudence is in the mean because it itself is the measure of moral virtue.

602. The mean of reason is sometimes the mean of the thing, namely in justice, inasmuch as reason dictates to justice that it pay what is due to equality, or give a thing equal to the person of another or to the thing (whether arithmetically or proportionally), neither more nor less.

For reason determines the mean of virtue in its proper matter. But justice is about operations which consist in external things without regard to the diverse conditions of the agent. Therefore the mean of justice consists in a thing determined according to itself, without regard to the agent, inasmuch as it gives to each one what is due, neither more nor less. And thus the mean of reason is the mean of the thing.

But in the other moral virtues, which are about interior passions, the mean of reason is taken by comparison to us, whence it varies according to persons, qualities, circumstances, and diverse attitudes toward passions. Thus excess in drinking for one is not for another.

603. Observations. — 1°) Even the intellectual virtues are in the mean of the thing. The good of the intellect is the true, which depends on things which are the measure of our intellect. « Thus therefore the good of an intellectual virtue consists in a certain mean by conformity to the thing itself, according as it says that a thing is what it is or is not what it is not ; in which the notion of the true consists. Excess is taken according to a false affirmation by which what is not is said to be ; defect however is taken according to a false negation by which what is is said not to be » (a. 3).

2°) Moreover the practical intellectual virtues have the character of a rule with regard to our works, and so they are in the mean of reason just as the rule itself which imposes a mean. Thus prudence imposes a mean on the acts and moral virtues, and art on artifacts.

3°) Certain theologians say that the virtues of Religion and Penitence are not in a mean, but this is false : for although under one respect excess cannot be given in their matter, inasmuch as the worship rendered to God and satisfaction for sins cannot be excessive in quantity, under other respects however : quality, manner, time, etc. in their matter excess is given.

S. Th. I-II, q. 65, a. 1 ; De Virt. q. 5, a. 2.

604. Principle I. Imperfect moral virtues are not connected. — For the inchoations of moral virtues, which dispose us to choose this or that in certain circumstances, whether they are in us from nature because of a disposition of the body, or come from custom, are not connected, as experience shows : for one can be prompt to liberality who is not prompt to chastity. Those inclinations are sometimes called imperfect virtues ; but they are not true and properly so called virtues, because they do not render one perfect.

605. Principle II. Perfect moral virtues are connected, which incline us to do good steadfastly and in all circumstances, notwithstanding any difficulties. Thus according to the mind of SS. Augustine and Thomas, against Scotus. For :

a) Moral virtue, which is the habit making a good choice, cannot be without prudence, because for choosing rightly the intention of the due end, to which moral virtue disposes, is not sufficient, but good counsel, judgment, and precept about the good means to the end are also required, to which prudence disposes : for to do evil for the sake of a good end is morally evil ; whence for always acting rightly a perfect prudence is required.

b) Prudence cannot be without moral virtues ; for :

1° For the honest ordering of means, the intention of some good end is required, to which moral virtue disposes : for to order good means to an evil end is morally evil ; and the ordering of means will not be always and in all circumstances honest unless in all circumstances the intention of the due end be had, to which we are disposed only through all the perfect moral virtues.

2° Each one judges how to order according as he is affected ; therefore moral virtues are necessary that man may judge always well and in every case¹.

c) Which besides experience confirms, for a judge well disposed to justice but greedy of money, on money being offered, will judge unjustly ; and a woman chaste but timid, from fear of some evil, will consent to fornication ; and many brave, liberal, devout,... from lack of prudence choose badly the means to the end of virtue².

Hence prudence and moral virtues are mutually included, and therefore through prudence all virtues are connected. Prudence is of the essence of the definition of moral virtue, and moral virtue is of the definition of prudence insofar as this must be for a good end.

606. Observation. — The merely intellectual virtues are neither all connected among themselves nor with the moral virtues, because they are about diverse matters not ordered to one another, as is clear from the diverse sciences and arts ; all however depend on the intellect of principles, but this in turn does not depend on the others.

S. Th. q. 66, a. 1-5 ; De Virt. q. 5, a. 3.

607. The equality of virtues is threefold and can be understood :

1°) equality according to species ; 2) equality in the same species of virtue according to itself, as to those things to which it extends or according to its extension to diverse objects ; 3) equality in the same species according to degree and intensity, or according to the participation of virtue in the subject.

608. Principle I. According to species, virtues are not equal, but some are more perfect than others according as they have nobler objects.

A. Comparing intellectual and moral virtues :

1. The speculative intellectual virtues, because their object is the universal, are therefore as habits (or entities) simply nobler according to object or species than the moral virtues, whose object is the particular good ; moreover among the intellectual virtues wisdom excels, whose object : the highest cause, is the noblest of all. Whence wisdom judges of all the intellectual virtues and orders them, and therefore is called architectonic.

2. But the moral virtues and prudence are nobler in a qualified sense (under one respect, namely in relation to act), inasmuch as they more dispose for operating : for they not only give aptitude for operating well, but also dispose for using their aptitude well by. Whence as virtues they are more perfect.

B. Among the cardinal virtues : 1) the more perfect is prudence, which is in the reason, and therefore has as object the good of reason itself essentially, while the others are about the good of reason participated in others ; — 2) next is justice : a) because it is in the will, which is a potency closer to reason and therefore participates reason more ; and b) because it not only well orders man in himself but also toward another ; — 3) fortitude is preferred to temperance because the good of reason shines forth more in it, since its motive is not pleasing in itself ; moreover fortitude subjects the sensitive appetite to reason about what is greatest in man, namely about life itself and death ; — while 4) temperance is about those things which immediately serve life¹.

C. Comparing the special moral virtues, after prudence religion and penitence excel, which approach more closely to God.

609. Principle II. According to extension, prudence and the perfect moral virtues, as being connected, are equal, because they cannot be augmented extensively, since they dispose for doing good in all circumstances ; therefore in all men, and in the same man even at different times, according to extension they are equal (a. 1). — The contrary is to be said of the inchoations of virtues, and of the intellectual virtues, because they are not connected.

610. Principle III. According to intensity, the perfect moral virtues, because they are connected, are equal in the same man at the same time ; whence if one is increased, all are increased proportionally, as the fingers of the hand are unequal in quantity, but are equal in proportion when they are increased proportionally. This is to be understood a) on the part of prudence and according to the formal of virtue which is the ordering of reason to the good : for through prudence they adhere equally to the good of reason or the mean, which for all is established equally well by one and the same prudence. « The reason existing equally perfect in one and one and the same, the right mean must be constituted proportionally according to reason in every matter of the virtues » ; whence they conform equally to reason. However b) they are not always increased according to the material, i.e. according to the inclination and proneness of the subject to its proper acts, for man can be more prompt to certain virtues, whether from disposition of the body, or from custom, or from a gift of grace (a. 2).

However they can be unequal according to intensity in different men and in the same man at different tem-[^1. insidiatnr good works ; obedience, not on the part of the object, but on the part of him to whom it renounces ; fortitude because it defends and protects the common good, the adequation of which justice makes : it is the administration of justice ; liberality inasmuch as it intends the supplement and splendor of justice : thus an adornment of justice and in some sense greater, but simply it is less because it is ordered under the principal virtue of justice.]

poribus : for thus they are not connected. « But if virtue is considered on the part of the participating subject, thus it happens that virtue is greater or lesser, whether at different times in the same, or in different men ; because for attaining the mean of virtue, which is according to right reason, one is better disposed than another, either because of greater custom, or because of a better natural disposition, or because of a more perspicacious judgment of reason, or also because of a greater gift of grace » (a. 1).

611. Observation. — The merely intellectual virtues, because they are not connected, are not equal according to extension or intensity.

S. Th. I-II, q. 67, art. 1-2 ; De Virt., q. 5, a. 4.

612. Principle. In the blessed there remain those virtues which include no imperfection repugnant to their state. — Whence the moral virtues remain, not indeed

a) as to the material element or inclination to their acts, for in the future life there will be no exchanges and distributions of goods, nor dangers of death, nor pleasures of foods and venereal things, etc. ; — but

b) as to the formal, which is conformity to right reason, or as to their essence, inasmuch as the appetite, whether rational or sensitive, will in all things and altogether be conformed to reason ; whence those virtues will exercise other acts, conformed to the heavenly life. The same is to be said of prudence, which moves about the same matter as the moral virtues. Whence, according to Augustine, De Trin., b. XIV, c. 9, « it will be of prudence to prefer or equal nothing to God, of fortitude to cleave firmly to Him, of temperance to be delighted by no harmful defect », likewise of justice to be subject to God. — However

c) before the resurrection they will be only in root, temperance, fortitude, and the other virtues about passions, because they are in the sensitive appetite, concupiscible and irascible ; which appetite cannot be without a body.

The same is to be said of the souls of purgatory ; in the damned however no virtue properly so called or perfect can be.

613. Corollary. — Likewise the intellectual virtues remain according to the formal element, or essence, because their subject, the intellect, is incorruptible, and always preserves the intelligible species on which the intellectual virtues depend. Not however according to the material, i.e. according to the images of imagination which we use in the sciences, nor according to the acts of this life, because for these images are required which cannot be without a body. And in this sense the Apostle says, I. Cor. XIII, 8 : knowledge shall be destroyed,*, namely as to the manner of working of this life, but it will have another act.