Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. I-II, q. 89; q. 88, a. 3; De Malo q. 7, a. 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9.

551. Thesis. There are venial sins distinct from mortal. — Thus teaches the Church against the Jovinians and Pelagius (cf. C. Milev., can. 7, and C. Afric. in ep. 95 of S. Aug., and lib. 50 of hom., hom. 19), and it is de fide against Protestants from C. Trid. sess. 6, c. 11, can. 7, 23, and 25; and sess. 14, c. 5, can. 7. Cf. prop. 20 condemn. of Baius.

It is evident a) from Scripture which teaches that there is a kind of sins which are essentially small and distinct from the graver (Mt. XXIII, 24; Lk. VI, 42), — that there is not one just on earth who does not sin (Eccl. VII, 21), — that all offend in many things (James III, 2), — and that even the most holy have sin (I John I, 8), — indeed that upon the edifice of faith and charity wood, hay, and straw can be built (which therefore do not take away charity) which will not impede salvation, but nevertheless are to be burned, i.e. punished (I Cor. III, 11-15).

b) The Fathers distinguish from capital sins (i.e. greater) and middling, minute and light sins not to be transmitted to public penance. Cf. Augustine c. Pelagium, cp. 108.

c) From reason: 1) Not every inordination takes away the principle of order, nor every infirmity the principle of life; therefore not every sin takes away the order of subjection to the last end, or charity which is the principle of life. — 2) In every society light offenses intervene which do not dissolve friendship; therefore also in the society and friendship which man has with God. Man namely understands that certain things are prohibited by God, not so however that they dissolve friendship, and he would be prepared to leave them if they dissolved friendship.

Just as therefore man, constituted in the state of mortal sin, can, while remaining habitually turned away from God, do some good works without however referring them to God loved above all things; so likewise man, existing in the state of grace, can, while remaining habitually converted to God, elicit acts venially evil which, although they are not referred to God, are not for that reason referred to a creature as to the last end (q. 89, a. 1 and 2).

552. Objection: He who by deliberate act prefers his own will to the will of God, loves something above God. But to love something above God is to make it equal to the last end, and therefore no longer to be subject to God as last end. Therefore every sin by its nature is mortal and contains aversion from God. — I answer and distinguish: he who prefers his own will to the will of the uncreated God, loves something above God, concedo; he who prefers a thing to the will of the thing willed and prescribed by God, subdistinguish: if the prescribed thing is necessary for adherence and subjection to God, concedo; if it is outside the order of subjection and adherence to God, nego. Venial sin is outside the subjection and friendship of God, it is not subjected to God nor loves God, although it does not cast away the subjection and friendship of God.

553. Venial sin disposes to mortal. — All venial sins, because they impede fervor, i.e. the exercise of charity, indirectly dispose to mortal sins of themselves, 1°) inasmuch as they remove the subjection of God which impeded the soul from tending to the object contrary to God: « for from this that one is accustomed not to subject his will in smaller things to due order, man is disposed to this, that he also not subject his will to the order of the last end » (q. 88, a. 3; — Ecclus. XIX, 1; Lk. XVI, 10); 2°) inasmuch as they impede the helps of God which would withdraw from mortal sin.

Venial sins directly dispose to acts of the same species mortal, namely:

1°) Venial from its genus directly dispose to mortal per accidens, inasmuch as he who habitually commits venial is disposed to love that even as last end and to sin mortally because of it;

2°) Venial from lightness of matter and from imperfection of the voluntary act dispose directly to mortal of the same species: thus a small theft (or detraction) disposes directly to a great one, and a semi-full consent in lust to fully voluntary lust (ibid.).

554. An angel cannot sin venially. — For his intellect, since it is not discursive, does not know means except as connected with the end; whence his will cannot will means except in order to the end, and accordingly in him there cannot be inordination about means, without there being simultaneously inordination about the end itself. Whence the good Angels do good, the evil evil in all things, namely out of charity, or out of pride (q. 89, a. 4).

Likewise in the state of innocence venial sin was impossible: for then the inferior part was perfectly subject to reason, whence venial sin from imperfection of the act, or an act imperfectly subjected to deliberation, was impossible; likewise reason was perfectly subject to God, whence venial sin of itself and from its genus was impossible, or an act which is not subjected to the end God, before man has cast away perfect subordination to God, which is mortal (q. 89, a. 3).

555. Observation. — Venial sin cannot be committed before the use of reason is sufficient for mortal sin. Not indeed venial from its genus or of itself, because man knows grave and perfect sin more easily and sooner than light and qualified sin. — Nor venial from indeliberation, because for such sin it does not suffice that man deliberates imperfectly but that he does it while he can deliberate perfectly; otherwise, since the deliberation is not perfect but imperfect, it would not be voluntary and imputable to him. But perfect deliberation before the full use of reason is impossible. Thus Cajetan, in I-II, q. 89, a. 6, conformably to the doctrine of S. Thomas, in II Sent., d. 42, q. 1, a. 5, ad 7.