Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. I-II, q. 88, a. 1; q. 72, a. 5; De Malo q. 7, a. 1 and 2.

530. Thesis. There are in fact mortal sins distinct from venial. — It is de fide from universal preaching, confirmed in the Council of Lyon II, profession of faith of Mich. Palaeologus, by Benedict XII const. Benedictus Deus, by the Council of Florence, in the decree of union, and by Trent, sess. 6, c. 5 and 15, can. 23, 25 and 27, and sess. 14, c. 1 and 5, can. 7.

Mortal and venial sin differ in many ways:

1°) as to the liability to punishment: for mortal deserves eternal punishment, but venial temporal punishment. True, says S. Thomas (de Malo q. 7, a. 1), « this difference follows the notion of mortal and venial sin, but does not constitute it. For sin is not such because such punishment is due to it, but rather conversely because sin is such, therefore such punishment is due to it »;

2°) as to the effect, for mortal sin deprives of grace which is the supernatural life of the soul, and therefore it is of itself irreparable and is called mortal (with grace the connected gifts are simultaneously taken away: charity, infused moral virtues, gifts of the Holy Spirit, sacramental graces; likewise the right to heaven and the merits of good works); but venial does not take away (nor diminish) grace which is the principle of pardon and forgiveness, and therefore it is of itself reparable and is called venial¹. But neither is this the constitutive difference: for from this, that some sin is grave, as effect it has the privation of grace and is irreparable, and not conversely. Whence 3°) in the very notion of inordination is to be sought the fundamental and intrinsically constitutive difference. For inordination is twofold: « One by subtraction of the principle of order; another by which, the principle of order being preserved, inordination is made about those things which are after the principle.... The principle of all order in moral matters is the last end... Whence when the soul is disordered by sin about the last end itself, up to aversion from God to whom it is united by charity, it is mortal sin »; when however without aversion from the end, inordination is made only about those things which are to the end, then it is venial sin (q. 72, a. 5). In other words: in mortal [sin] man sets up for himself a last end opposed to God, and turns away from God and averts himself from him (against the order of the end); in venial he inordinately adheres to those things which are to the end, and by this act only does not tend to God (outside the order of the end). From this difference, as from a root, the two former follow.

531. Mortal and venial sin differ on the part of the formal element or privation. — For in both there is an undue conversion to a created good which cannot be referred to the last end, and according to this they can belong to the same species (e.g. theft). In mortal however man is so converted to the created good as if it were his total last end, whence to the conversion is joined the privation of every order to God as to the end, and this privation is aversion or withdrawal from God; on the contrary in venial man is converted to the creature, not as to the last end, but performs some act by which he cannot tend to God, and therefore to the conversion is joined only the privation of actual tendency to God, although the habitual order to Him remains, and this privation is only a retardation or removal from the end. Whence on the part of privation mortal and venial differ infinitely and in the whole genus, for, as S. Thomas says (q. 87, a. 5, ad 1), « the last end differs infinitely from those things which are to the end ».

In other words, in both there is an act tending to something prohibited by law, but the deformity with the law is very different. For law primarily prescribes the very essence of the moral order,

or the very order of subjection to God the last end, secondarily (as complement of order) it prescribes the manner by which this may be done, namely that nothing be done except for this end. Whence something can be against the law in two ways: 1°) simply and perfectly, because it averts from God the supreme good and destroys the essence of the moral order, the very subjection to the last end, and in this way mortal [sin] is against the law; 2°) imperfectly and in a qualified sense, because although it does not contain aversion from the last end, nevertheless it is not referable to the last end God to whom we and all our actions are bound to refer: in this latter way venial sin is against the law; but because it is not against the law of subjection to God but against only the manner which the law intends, it is better said to be beside the law. In mortal therefore there is deformity with the essential and primary ordination of the law prescribing what is altogether necessary to the end, and therefore it is called against the law, i.e. against the end of the law which is charity by which we are subject and united to God; in venial there is only deformity with the accidental and secondary ordination of the law which prescribes something useful for the end, and therefore it is called beside the law, i.e. beside the end of the law, but against only the means to the end, without overturning the subjection to the end. And therefore the notion of sin is analogous (ad 1).

532. Hence the revealed and theological doctrine is understood, about the nature of mortal sin:

A. In Scripture: 1°) Christ himself teaches that there are sins absolutely grave, which are the cause of grave punishment and indeed of eternal damnation: « He who says to his brother: fool, shall be liable to the hell of fire » (Mt. V, 22); « Depart from me, cursed, into the eternal fire » (Mt. XXV, 41-42). Whence also the Apostles affirm that certain sins exclude from the kingdom of heaven (I Cor. VI, 9-10; Gal. V, 19-21; Rom. VI, 23; VIII, 13; James I, 15) and deprive the soul of supernatural light and the life of divine love (John III, 20; I John II, 9; III, 14).

2°) There are nevertheless sins relatively more grave one than another: « He who betrayed me to you has the greater sin » (John XIX, 11; cf. Jer. VII, 26); indeed some so grave that by their nature and as it were without a miracle of God they are said to be « unremissible » (Mt. XII, 31; Mk. III, 29). On the contrary, others are of themselves very light (Mt. XXIII, 24; Lk. VI, 42), so that they are often committed even by the just (James III, 2; I John I, 8).

3°) From which are understood both the malice of mortal sin which is in aversion from God (Jer. II, 13; Ezech. XVIII, 24), and its effect, because it deprives of the grace of God and of charity and of divine life, and inflicts on the soul death and eternal damnation.

Man namely who by grace is a) an adoptive son of God (John I, 12; Eph. I, 5; I John III, 1-2; Rom. VIII, 14-16); b) partaker of the divine nature, i.e. like God, holy and son of light (II Pet. I, 4; I John III, 2; Eph. IV, 25; V, 8); c) God's friend and temple (John XV, 14-15; I Cor. III, 16-17; VI, 19; John XIV, 23); d) worthy of eternal life and heir (Col. I, 12-13; Rom. VIII, 17; Tit. III, 7); e) capable of meriting it (John XV, 1-5; Mt. X, 42; Rom. VIII, 17; II Cor. IV, 17; II Tim. IV, 8; Heb. X, 35; VI, 10); — by mortal sin becomes a) son and servant of the devil (I John III, 8; John VIII, 44; II Pet. II, 19); b) partaker of his works, in which he walks in darkness and is unclean (I John I, 7-9; III, 8; Eph. V, 8; Col. I, 13; Heb. IX, 14); c) God's enemy (Rom. V, 10); d) worthy of hell (Mt. XXV, 41, 46; Mk. IX, 42; Apoc. XIV, 11, XX-XXII); e) incapable of meriting eternal life (John XV, 5-6).

B. Among the Fathers: 1°) In the first three centuries not explicitly but only confusedly was the distinction between mortal and venial sin maintained. They distinguished a) between greatest sins and lesser; b) between greatest and middle which were expiated by public penance, and smallest which were remitted by contrition, almsgiving, prayer, and other means of this kind. But in the 2nd and 3rd centuries three sins were considered as most grave: apostasy, adultery, and homicide, so that, in some Churches at least, pardon was not granted for them, at least before the article of death.

Which is evident from the testimony of Tertullian and S. Cyprian.

2°) From the 4th century the distinction between grave sins which are expiated by public penance, and light sins for which private penance suffices, is already had explicitly. Of which the witnesses are S. Ambrose and S. Augustine for the Latin Church; S. Gregory Thaumaturgus and S. Basil for the Greek Church.

3°) Afterwards around the 6th century especially rules by which are discerned the grave or capital sins and the light or minute are handed down, because the gravity of many had not been perceived up to that point. The enumeration can be found in Caesarius of Arles and in the Penitential books.

C. Among the Scholastics scientific analysis and deeper investigation is undertaken. They not only declare that those sins are distinguished by reason of effect and punishment, but by intrinsic nature, namely in the very notion of inordination by comparison namely to the last end, and to the eternal law, as was explained above.

533. Observations. — 1°a The aversion from God which constitutes actual mortal sin is not to be confused with the privation of grace. The latter is habitual aversion and effect of mortal sin; the former is inordination in the very evil act by which we act against charity and exclude it, namely actual deformity with charity and actual withdrawal from the end, which is the cause of the privation of grace: actual privation of habitual ordination. The former is the pure and total privation of charity, the other is not pure privation but a tendency to good with privation. Whence S. Thomas, de Malo q. 2, 9, ad 2: « The death of the soul is the privation of grace by which the soul is united to God; but the privation of grace is not essentially the fault itself but the effect of fault. Whence sin is called the death of the soul not essentially but effectively; essentially however it is a deformed or inordinate act ».

2°a He who sins mortally has himself as end to which, and as end which the created good itself, in which he inordinately delights and toward which he tends as to the last end; namely he loves his own good even to the contempt of God, or the convenience, comfort, excellence, abundance, wisdom of the sinner as disposed by himself, not as ordered by God, but connoting the privation of God.

3°a He who sins venially cannot refer that act to God: for that would be most injurious to God, — nor does he refer it to some created good as to the last end because then he would sin mortally; — but he simply refers it to happiness in common and abstractly willed. It is good in common under the notion of complete good, or one's own good according to the whole latitude, abstracting from the honest or delightful, good universally comprehending all the good of man.

4°a Since on the part of privation mortal and venial sin are of diverse order and differ in the whole genus and infinitely, it follows that all venial sins, even taken together, do not constitute one mortal, because they do not include properly so called aversion from God. Whence of himself he would not sin mortally who proposed to commit all venial [sins]; nor accidentally because of the danger of thus falling into mortal, because that proposal leads remotely only to mortal.

5°a Mortal [sin] being about the last end, venial however about those things which are to the end, is not to be so understood that the proximate object of the gravely sinful act is always the last end, the supreme good (or that mortal sin is always directly against God); but the proximate object of the lightly sinful act is always some means to the last end, a created good namely, whereas manifestly there are mortal sins which are proximately about means to the end, such as homicide, theft, etc., which holds when the means are necessary for the end. But understand that mortal sin is inordination about the end because it destroys the due order or conjunction with the last end; venial sin is inordination about the means alone which namely are not necessary for the end, because the will adheres too much to created goods, without however withdrawing from the last end. Therefore inordination about means necessary for the end is also about the end itself; but inordination about means not necessary is not inordination about the end.

S. Th. I-II, q. 84, a. 2; q. 87, a. 4; II-II, q. 162, a. 6; q. 34, a. 2; q. 195, a. 1, ad 1; III, q. 1, a. 2 and ad 2; Suppl. q. 99, a. 1; III Sent. d. 20, q. 1, a. 2; II Sent. d. 42, q. 1, a. 2, 5 and ad 2; De Verit. q. 28, a. 2 and ad 5; de Malo q. 2, a. 9, ad 5.

534. Mortal sin is the gravest evil, whether considered on the part of God, or on the part of man. A. As to God:

1°) It is the greatest injury done to the Supreme Good, by which man makes the last end and seeks happiness in a creature and prefers it to God, despises, dishonors, turns away from, and hates him, despises his love and friendship, and so violates the right of God which requires that we refer all our actions and all the creatures we use to him; whence sin implicitly contains the malice of hatred of God¹, of irreligion, of contumely toward the all-present God (Ps. L, 6) and of idolatry (John XII, 43; Rom. II, 23; Is. LII, 5; XLIII, 24; Ezech. XXXVI, 20; Ps. CXXXVIII, 8; Ps. I, 6; I Kings II, 30; Lev. VI, 2; XXVI, 15; Phil. III, 19; Gal. V; C. Trid. sess. 6, c. 5).

2°) It is rash disobedience and bold rebellion against infinite majesty, and offense and contempt of the supreme legislator, of almighty lord, judge and king, of his very will and law, which it contradicts and refuses obedience and subjection; whence it implicitly contains the malice of pride (Gen. II, 16; III, 1; Heb. II, 2; Jer. II, 20; Is. XXXIII, 14; Wis. V, 2-15; I John III, 4; Job XV, 25; Gal. VI, 7).

3°) It is the greatest ingratitude toward the distinguished benefactor, whose benefits we use to offend him: against the Father creating, preserving, providing, and adopting us as sons and calling us to eternal life; against the Son brother and redeemer (Heb. VI, 5) whose death's cause he renews; against the Holy Spirit sanctifying, friend and inhabitant of our soul. Whence it implicitly contains contempt of the friendship and presence of him whom we cast away from us, and the malice of sacrilege because it violates the soul consecrated to God, and of infidelity toward the covenant (Ezech. II, 3; Jer. XXXI, 32; Is. I, 2; Heb. X, 26-31; Eph. IV, 3) with God, the duty and the offices thence following (Is. V; Jer. II, 32; III, 1; II Kings XII, 7; Heb. VI, 6; I Cor. III, 17; VI, 19; II Cor. VI, 16).

B. As to man it is:

1°) T urpitudo, dishonor and folly (Ps. XLVIII, 13; LXVIII, 6; Wis. V, 2-13), as being an evil against our nature and reason (q. 71, a. 2).

2°) Spiritual suicide, as depriving of supernatural light and life (I John III, 15, 20; II, 9; III, 14; Tob. XII, 10).

3°) Deformity depriving the soul of natural and supernatural beauty, whence it dishonors the one acting and renders him worthy of contempt (Ps. XLVIII, 13).

4°) Slavery of the devil (I John III, 8; Jer. II, 19; Rom. VI, 6; II Pet. II, 19), because man does the work of the devil and subjects himself to him consenting, and thus renders himself more liable to temptations.

535. Observations. — 1°) The aforesaid malices are not found in mortal sin of themselves except implicitly, and therefore are at most voluntary in cause and virtually; whence they are not to be explained in confession, as being the condition of every sin; unless one were to intend explicitly and formally some of them in himself, because then there would be sin of the species intended.

2°) Several malices of mortal sin are also found in venial sin, but only analogically, imperfectly, and in a qualified sense (a. 1, ad 1). Whence, if it is a light evil in respect of mortal sin, in itself however it is very grave.

536. In what sense mortal sin is infinite. — Mortal sin:

1°) On the part of conversion is not infinite, because both the act of man and the created good toward which it tends are finite.

2°) On the part of aversion from the Infinite good:

a) is not of infinite malice: for infinite evil is pure evil, without any mixture of good; whence for sin to have infinite malice, man would have to tend to evil inasmuch as it is evil; which is impossible;

b) nor as it is an offense or injury of the infinite God, does it seem simply infinite: for the gravity of offense seems to be measured not only from the dignity of the offended God but also on the part of the offending man. But the will tends to the object as it is in the intellect, and therefore by sin does not offend God as he is in himself simply infinite but as he is known very imperfectly by the intellect. Therefore by sin an injury simply infinite is not inflicted on God.

c) Yet that offense is infinite in a qualified sense, and especially relatively to our reparation: for it is contempt of an infinite person; but injury is estimated also from the dignity of the offended person, satisfaction however only from the dignity of the satisfying person, and on the other hand the distance between God and men is infinite; therefore the injury of sin is estimated infinitely more than every reparation of man (even made by grace and charity). Therefore man cannot satisfy de condigno for sin. And so

d) mortal sin is of itself of infinite duration, because by its nature it is irreparable, and its malice in us remains without end and lasts forever. Whence eternal punishment of infinite duration is also due to it.

537. The gravity of mortal sin is described in Scripture. — A. In the Old Testament: 1°) From the beginning sin is presented as disobedience or transgression of the divine precept, which is strictly punished (Gen. II, 16; III, 11; 14-19; IV, 9-16; VI, 5-7; 11-13).

2°) After the election of the people of Israel and the promise of the divine law by Moses, sin is considered as rebellion against the supreme Legislator and King of the elect people (Exod. XIX, 5-8; XXIV, 3, 7), and as contempt of the law of the Lord (Lev. XXVI, 15). Among sins the chief is idolatry (Exod. XX, 3-5), which is also severely punished (Exod. XXXII, 30-35); but other graver offenses are punished with the penalty of death (Lev. XVIII, 29; XX, 6-27).

In order that the rude and uncultivated people might be turned away from sin: a) especially and above all the law had the sanction of the promise of temporal goods for those keeping it, and for those violating it threats of grave evils (Deut. VII, 11-26; X, 12-22; XI, 13-28); — b) there was added also the motive of gratitude and love toward God (Deut. XI, 1; VIII, 2-20); — c) as also of solidarity, inasmuch as God would punish the sins of individuals even in their posterity or in the nation (Exod. XX, 5).

3°) From the time of the Prophets sin is more expressly presented as offense of God, of neighbor, or of one's own reason:

a) toward God it is ingratitude, contempt of benefits and of the Father, and infidelity (Is. I, 2; Jer. II, 4-37; III, 1);

b) toward neighbor it is injustice (Amos II, 7);

c) toward ourselves, folly (Tob. XII, 10; Wis. V, 2-13; X, 8).

wherefore the Prophets insist on interior penitence of heart by which the mercy of the Lord will be obtained (Joel, II, 12-13; Ps. L, 19).

B. In the New Testament: 1°) Christ, who came that, as the Lamb of God, he might take away the sins of the world (John I, 29), supposes the nature of sin as known, but denounces the gravity of certain sins, and the extension of sin to certain acts which were reputed as honest: namely the malice of hypocrisy, scandal, infidelity, and blasphemy against the Holy Spirit (Mt. XXIII, 5-32; XVIII, 16; XII, 31-32; Mk. III, 29; XVI, 16; Lk. XVII, 1-2). And he urgently proclaims the inordination of interior sin of the heart (Mt. XV, 19-20).

2°) S. Paul especially shows the effects of sin. It is namely slavery from which we are freed by grace (Rom. VI, 17-18); it is the cause of death (Rom. V, 12; VI, 23; VIII, 13), and of darkness (Col. I, 13; Eph. V, 8; II Cor. VI, 14); it is a transgression that will be punished by a terrible judgment (Heb. II, 2), inasmuch as the sinner tramples under foot the Son of God and grieves the Spirit (Heb. X, 26-31; Eph. IV, 30).

3°) S. John, however, the beloved disciple of him who appeared to take away our sins (I John III, 5) and whom we have as advocate with the Father, where he is the propitiation for our sins (II, 1-2), illustrates not only the effects but rather the causes of sin: they are iniquity (V, 17; I, 9); the devil: he who does sin is of the devil (III, 8; cf. John VIII, 44); and the world, because the whole is placed in the wicked one (V, 19) and all that is in it is concupiscence of the flesh, and concupiscence of the eyes, and pride of life (II, 16). But the sinner walks in darkness and lacks light (I, 6; II, 9, 11), remains in death and does not have eternal life in himself (III, 14-15; V, 12), nor the charity of God (III, 17; IV, 8, 20). Two sins especially he says are to be avoided: sin against the love of neighbor (II, 9-11; III, 15-17; IV, 8), and sin against Christ, by denying his divinity (II, 22; IV, 15; V, 10-12). This is sin unto death (V, 16-17), so grave that prayers are not offered for him who committed it (16).

S. Th. I-II q. 88, a. 2 and 6; De Malo q. 7, a. 1 and 3.

538. Conditions required for mortal sin. — In perfect or mortal sin there are two elements: a) objective, namely grave malice, b) subjective or the act perfectly deliberate and voluntary. Hence three conditions are required for it:

1°a) gravity of malice in the object, otherwise it would not be gravely evil; it also suffices that there be gravity in the object, i.e. in the thing or action as apprehended, and grave malice in the thing or action as it is in itself is not necessarily required: for it suffices that man in fact will grave evil. Therefore there must be present grave transgression of law in itself or at least from false estimation;

2°a) grave advertence to the malice, for if the gravity is not adverted to, man cannot will it, and the offense will be light; and indeed full advertence or perfect deliberation, otherwise the malice would not be perfectly willed and the condition would fail;

3°a) perfect consent of the will: for no one is considered to convert himself to something as to the last end and to love it above all things and to separate himself entirely from God, except through a perfectly human and voluntary act. Then in as much as something is sin, it is voluntary; therefore if it is imperfectly voluntary, sin is imperfect. Finally it is repugnant to divine goodness to punish man with eternal punishments without full consideration and consent on his part.

539. The malice of the object, whose gravity we must advert to, is understood either as grave in itself, i.e. from the object, or from circumstances, as from the end, scandal, peril adjoined, etc. as will be said in art. 5. That the gravity (or lightness) of malice may be easily discerned, the following rules are wont to be handed down by theologians:

1°a is taken from Scripture: when some sin is afflicted with grave appellations, it is to be judged mortal, e.g. if it calls it crime, wickedness, iniquity, abomination, or says it to be worthy of death, hateful to God, to bring death, to exclude from the kingdom of heaven, to cry to heaven, or if a curse is applied to it, e.g. woe (Lev. XXIV, 14, 16, 17, 23; Prov. VI, 16; Is. V, 20; Rom. I, 18 sq., I Cor. VI, 8-VII; Gal. V, 19; Eph. V, 3); — on the contrary sin is reputed only venial, when Scripture uses milder words, as with the name of mote, straw, hay, etc. (I Cor. III, 12; Mt. XXIII, 24; Lk. VI, 41), or rebukes it with a lighter correction (Prov. X, 19; Mt. XII, 36).

2°a is taken from Tradition: mortal are those which are held as such in Pontifical and Conciliar decisions, or from the morally unanimous consensus of the Holy Fathers or Doctors, or even from the practice of God-fearing men. However about the ancient Fathers one must carefully attend what was their manner of speaking (e.g. whether perhaps exaggerated in the manner of an orator), and what was the discipline of those times (e.g. whether perhaps grave punishment for lesser fault or vice versa).

3°a is taken from reason: sins are mortal which take away the order to the last end, or dissolve the charity of God or of self or of neighbor; such are those by which the subjection and reverence of man to God is taken away (e.g. blasphemy, superstition of a false deity); — or by which grave harm is incurred to one's own corporal or spiritual salvation, which is a necessary condition for the last end, the love and glory of God; — or by which those things are taken away without which human society cannot be preserved, which is a means necessary for man to attain the last end, such as rebellion, homicide, adultery, theft, disobedience in a matter of great moment: for men could not live together if these were perpetrated everywhere and indifferently, as we said distinguishing the primary and secondary precepts of natural law (n. 251, C).

Or also: mortal sins are those which are directly opposed to the primary precepts of natural law, or which violate the moral order primarily intended by nature. For the observance of the primary order is a necessary condition for attaining the last end. Therefore a substantial violation of the primary order is mortal sin. Hence mortal are: a) those which violate the very order to God or take away subjection to Him (blasphemy, perjury), but not those which are only against the manner of subjection; — b) those which violate the order of man to himself, and are a direct disposition of himself or of his faculties against the very ordination of rational nature, or without due subordination to the human species and the common good (suicide, drunkenness, pollution), but not those which are only against the manner of disposing; — c) those which violate the order toward neighbor, while notably inflicting harm or offense on one who is gravely unwilling (homicide, adultery, theft), but not those which only do not observe the due manner or by which neighbor is not much unwilling (n. 251, A, b).

Disobedience however in a grave matter is had also in positive law; whence those are mortal which are done against a law prescribing under grave matter: for then by that very fact man acts against those things without which human society cannot be preserved, for the violation of a precept which is of great moment for the common good is born to notably harm society. But law obliges under grave matter when the matter is grave, i.e. much conducive to an end of great moment, and at the same time the legislator wishes to prescribe under grave matter; about which is to be judged according to the rules handed down in the tr. on Laws, n° 343.

In practice let not that be called mortal whose grave malice does not certainly appear.

540. Advertence of the intellect is present 1°) to grave malice, if man understands something to be so evil or prohibited by God that together with his love, or friendship, or grace, or conjunction to him as end it cannot consist, or at least understands this implicitly, e.g. knowing something to be very base, strictly prohibited, notably disturbing the moral order, very opposed to the divine will, inducing the enmity of God, worthy of grave punishment, etc., or whatever else distinctive of grave sin he perceives in some way¹.

Hence S. Thomas, q. 88, a. 2, ad 1: « from this very fact that someone chose that which is repugnant to divine charity, he is convicted of preferring it to divine charity; and consequently of loving it more than God. And therefore some sins generically which of themselves are repugnant to charity, have that something is loved above God; and thus are by their genus mortal ».

There is required however 2°) full advertence or perfect deliberation, which however is not the greatest possible, but that by which man, fully master of himself, is wont to attend to a matter of sufficiently great moment. And indeed:

a) Subjectively obscure and imperfect does not suffice, but full and perfect is required, by which man, wakeful, with mind free, nor impeded by any notable distraction or carried away by disturbance, adverts to the gravity of the malice whether immediately, at the moment when the evil act is placed, or mediately, when the cause is placed from which the evil effect is foreseen to follow, at least in confused manner.

b) Objectively indeed distinct is not required but confused suffices: for it is not required that grave malice be apprehended distinctly, but it suffices that it appear in confused manner, by doubting about it or suspecting it, or by adverting that there is danger of it, or that there is obligation to attend to it or to attend more, and this whether at the moment when the evil is done or at the moment when the cause is placed from which it is foreseen to follow: then indeed if one nonetheless chooses it, he already fully wills it even if it is grave evil (n. 214), and therefore in fact wills grave evil, and so despises the love of God and the last end and loves it more, and implicitly and virtually chooses also aversion from God and leaves the last end (a. 2, ad 1). Hence confused advertence is not for that reason obscure, but can be full and perfect².

c) Reflex is not required, by which man knows that he adverts, but direct advertence to the malice itself suffices, such as is also drawn from habitual knowledge and can scarcely be absent in those things which are habitually known and frequently recalled to memory: thus if a sacred person sins against chastity, although he does not explicitly think of sacrilege, he nevertheless adverts to it implicitly or in act exercised, since he knows that he is and not another who perpetrates such things; likewise he who willingly lingers in base thoughts which usually induce pollutions or who is accustomed to deal familiarly with women. Likewise for full advertence duration of time is not required, nor is this a sign of it.

Conjectural signs of imperfect advertence are handed down by theologians as follows: a) if occupied with another thing and distracted you have grasped the thing to be evil only slightly and superficially; b) if half-asleep or half-delirious you were not yet perfectly master of yourself; c) if unmindful after the deed you scarcely remember what you did; d) if, when you consider better, you judge, according to your habitual disposition, that you would not have done the deeds if you had so apprehended them; e) if you were so carried away by distraction or passion that you were occupied with the knowledge only of utility, harm, advantage or disadvantage to be perceived from the work, not of its malice; f) or if you labored or were disturbed by most vehement passion (of anger, fear, sadness), apprehension, agitation of nerves or mania, or pathological state, so that you almost did not know what you were doing (which often happens in evil thoughts, detractions, sins from which damages or dangers for others follow).

Imperfect advertence is ordinarily present and therefore is presumed in the half-asleep, those just waking up, suddenly terrified, half-mentally-ill, half-drunk, young children (before the seventh year), childish old people, the very scrupulous; — on the contrary full advertence, at least confused but sufficient, is supposed in the customary and hardened sinners.

541. The consent of the will is full, when from full deliberation or advertence of mind, he chooses the act whether directly and immediately when the transgression is here and now placed, or mediately or indirectly when a positive cause or omission is placed from which the transgression is foreseen to follow, at least in confused manner. — On the contrary the consent is semi-full if the will follows a semi-full advertence of intellect, or if it indolently with some torpor repels the suggestion of evil less than it ought, as if the passion of the sensitive appetite is moved but the will tepidly resists.

Conjectural signs of imperfect consent are handed down by theologians as follows: a) if one, fully adverting to the temptation, immediately repels it; b) if adverting more fully, he is immediately grieved or saddened; c) if, as soon as he is grieved, he still finds himself so habitually constituted that he would rather die than sin mortally; d) if he could easily have executed the sin and did not execute it; e) if a God-fearing man (or one who is wont to be so affected that he would rather die than expressly sin mortally) doubts whether he consented; f) if one proceeded very timidly and in suspense, he remembers; g) if he was half-asleep, not fully master of himself, he judges that he would not have done the deed, if he had been fully awake; h) if he doubts whether he was master of himself, awake, not drunk.

In doubt: imperfect consent is presumed in God-fearing men and in those who are wont to be so disposed that they would rather die than sin mortally, because if they had perfectly consented, ordinarily they would not doubt; — on the contrary it is presumed perfect in those who are of laxer conscience and easily fall into some sin: these, if they had resisted the temptation better than usual, would certainly know it.

542. Corollaries. — 1. He who knows that he is acting badly, but does not know whether the evil is grave or light: a) if he adverts to the danger of grave sin at least in confused manner and doubts about this, he sins gravely because he deliberately exposes himself to the danger of gravely offending God: for he knows that his action perhaps gravely offends God and nevertheless does not abstain from it (cf. tr. on Consc^a, n. 214);

b) if however he thinks nothing at all about gravity or lightness, he does not sin gravely, because he apprehends grave malice in no way.

2. He who deliberates about committing grave sin, whether namely he ought to consent to sin, but so that he does not consent: a) if the deliberation is true and full, so that, the gravity of the malice being proposed, he inquires whether he would will the gravely evil thing or not, he sins gravely, because he compares God with a creature, doubtful whether he prefers God or the creature, esteeming that it can happen that the created good is placed before the divine friendship; which is injurious to God;

b) if the deliberation is imperfect, or only some hesitation or omission of resistance against the temptation from negligence or torpor, it does not exceed venial sin³.

S. Th. I-II, q. 88, a. 2; De Malo, q. 2, a. 8; q. 7, a. 3.

543. Mortal and venial sin are some by their genus and of themselves, some accidentally. — Mortal sin is divided into mortal of itself or by genus, and mortal accidentally: the former, of itself, by its own notion, from its proper object or matter, from the specific notion of itself can be mortal; the latter is not mortal except from the part of the agent or act a circumstance acceding to the species. Mortal of itself is divided into mortal from the whole genus which by its species is always mortal, and mortal from its genus which in its species admits lightness of matter.

Also venial sin is divided into venial of itself and venial accidentally: the latter by its notion and from the object is mortal, and is not venial except by a circumstance acceding from the part of the agent, such as imperfect advertence; the former is venial by its notion and from the object, and is divided into: venial by its genus which of itself, from its proper object and from the specific notion of itself cannot be mortal, and venial from lightness of matter which although from its specific notion and proper matter it can be mortal, because of the small quantity of matter about which it is concerned is venial.

Leaving aside therefore the sins which are grave and light accidentally, the celebrated division remains into mortal from the whole genus, mortal from its genus, and venial from its genus¹. This distinction is of itself, according to the proper matter and species of sins, whence also the word: genus, here signifies species.

544. Mortal sins from the whole genus are called those which have no light matter, because in any part of the matter about which they are concerned, the full notion of inordination is preserved². They are mortal from the quality of the matter, whence the whole genus is mortal. Such are:

a) sins which are directly against God the infinite good, or against some divine perfection, i.e. by which imperfection or defect of perfection is directly imputed to God, whether they are directly opposed to the theological virtues as infidelity, heresy, despair, and hatred of God; or are against religion: explicit cult of a creature, i.e. idolatry or divination or magic at least with explicit pact with the devil, temptation of God strictly so called, blasphemy and perjury; or there is any explicit and formal contempt of God³;

b) sins which, if in them there were lightness of matter, the genus of man would greatly entice to sin with its great harm, such as lust directly and of itself voluntarily admitted outside marriage; and the direct breaking of the sacramental seal which would soon turn men away from the sacrament of Penance;

c) sins whose matter is a thing grave in the indivisible, or whose malice in any matter equally repugns a grave end intended by law, such as simony of natural right, homicide, duel, the delight of lust on its own account sought outside marriage which is always directly opposed to the very order and primary end of nature, violation of the fast before communion, omission of paschal communion or of the mixture of water with wine in Mass, simulation of a sacrament, etc.

545. Mortal sins from its genus are those which can be mortal or venial according as their proper matter about which they are concerned is grave or light, contains a grave or light inordination; whence they are mortal from the quantity of matter, and the genus contains mortal and venial. Such are those which are concerned with a finite and divisible good:

a) sins against the virtue of religion or precepts of the first tablet which are not directly against God, but only against worship, such as undue cult of God, temptation of God broadly so called, sacrilege, violation of a vow or promissory oath, unjust oath, violation of the Lord's day, omission or defect in prayer, celebration or hearing of Mass, etc.

b) sins which injure the rights of others concerning goods of person, honor, riches; or inflict grave detriment on the sinner in intrinsic goods such as mutilation of body, drunkenness, detriment of health; likewise sins which are directly against the charity of neighbor such as hatred and envy; in one word sins against the precepts of the second tablet, excepting homicide and lust voluntary of themselves;

c) sins against grave precepts of the Church whose matter is divisible, such as violation of fast or abstinence, simony of ecclesiastical right, reading of a prohibited book, omission in the canonical hours, etc.

546. Venial sins from its genus are those which, the same matter remaining, are never mortal, because whatever be the quantity of matter about which they are concerned, they do not contain grave inordination. They are venial from the quality of matter, and the whole genus is venial. Whence they are not mortal unless the malice of another species accedes. Such are generally:

a) sins against one's own good committed, especially against the virtues annexed to fortitude or temperance (e.g. against magnanimity, magnificence, patience, perseverance, modesty, studiousness, etc.), which, grave harm being excluded, consist in immoderate appetite or excessive use of an honest or indifferent thing, e.g. food, drink, sleep, laughter, use of marriage, goods, money, cult, clothing, praise, honor, delights, fear, sadness, etc.; likewise curiosity, idleness, trifles, loquacity, impatience, obstinacy, inconstancy in resolve, etc.

b) sins against certain annexed virtues of justice, which are not concerned with strict debt nor with notable good of neighbor, namely against truth and fidelity, affability, gratitude (by omission), liberality, etc.

S. Th. I-II, q. 88, a. 4, 5, 6; De Malo q. 2, a. 8; q. 7, a. 3 and 4.

**547. The conversion of mortal sin into venial, and vice versa, is not to be so understood as if the same sin in number of mortal sin which now in the concrete exists with all its circumstances could become venial; but that the act of sin which by genus, by its notion, in the abstract is mortal, can be only venially evil as in the concrete here and now it exists with its circumstances; and vice versa.

548. Mortal sin of itself or by genus can become venial, not indeed accidentally from a venially evil circumstance added to the act, because a light deformity added rather increases than diminishes sin; but:

a) If it is mortal from the whole genus, it becomes venial only from the disposition of the agent which subtracts something from the act: 1) from erroneous conscience which without grave negligence judges to be venial what is mortal; 2) from imperfect deliberation; and 3) from imperfect consent.

b) If it is mortal from its genus, it becomes venial from the three aforesaid ways, and moreover 4) from lightness of matter or on the part of the object, e.g. theft.

Venial sins from imperfect deliberation or imperfect consent are called venial from imperfection of the act: for they are imperfect human acts. According to S. Thomas imperfect deliberation and imperfect consent are possible in any matter.

549. Venial sin of itself becomes mortal, whether a) on the part of the agent because of a circumstantially or dispositionally mortal evil, — or b) on the part of the act because of a circumstance which changes the species and adds grave malice specifically distinct; — or c) from coalescence, multiplication or aggravation of matter. And indeed:

1°) from erroneous conscience which judges or doubts to be mortal what is only venial;

2°) by reason of the last end, when the sinner makes his last end in venial sin, i.e. when he is prepared to sin mortally because of that sin which of itself is venial, e.g. to omit Mass to play excessively or to steal something small;

3°) by reason of an adjoined end, as if one utters a slight lie or a slightly dishonest word to fornicate, or commits a slight theft for homicide;

4°) from formal and perfect contempt of the precept or of the prescriber, by which man violates the precept precisely because it is a precept, whatever it be whether grave or light, — or because the superior as superior prescribes, whatever he prescribes¹; 5°) by reason of grave scandal, as if you foresee that by a dishonest word you are to be an occasion of gravely sinning to another;

6°) by reason of the danger of neighbor falling into mortal sin, to which the sinner would expose himself without sufficient caution or necessity, e.g. conversation with a woman for a weak man: moreover, of what mortal sin he exposes himself to the danger is to be declared in confession;

7°) by reason of notable harm which from sin is foreseen to follow for neighbor, e.g. if a slight theft would place another in extreme necessity, or a quarrel would arise from too much loquacity;

8°) by reason of matter coalescing or multiplied, as is to be specially explained.

The seven former ways also hold for venial sin from its genus; the last only for venial sin from lightness of matter.

550. The rule for discerning whether venial sin from lightness of matter becomes mortal from aggravation and multiplication of matter is as follows: Several small matters can coalesce and are morally united into one grave, when they pertain to the same in number precept and to one transgression of the precept.

Thus minute thefts coalesce into one gravely unjust detention or damnification, likewise several small eatings, or omissions in the hours, on the same day taken together into one violation of the fast, or serious omission of the breviary; — on the contrary several small eatings or omissions on different days do not coalesce because they do not pertain to the same precept in number, nor do several light excesses in drink on the same day coalesce: since they do not consist in a permanent thing they do not pertain to one and the same transgression; they can however coalesce into one harm to health or family because in the notion of harm they are something permanent.

He who by several light transgressions arrives at grave matter, if he intended this from the beginning, commits one mortal sin; but if he did not intend it, he commits as many venial sins as there were light transgressions, the last excepted which is mortal because by it grave matter is completed: for by this act he wills the small matter inasmuch as it is united with others to compose grave matter.

Light transgressions following already completed grave matter, if they were intended from the beginning, constitute one mortal sin with the preceding ones but aggravate it externally; — but if they were not intended, they do not constitute a new mortal sin unless they pertain again to a new grave quantity: but if however they are considered as one thing with the preceding grave matter, they include mortal sin of joy or approval of it.

S. Th. I-II, q. 89; q. 88, a. 3; De Malo q. 7, a. 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9.

551. Thesis. There are venial sins distinct from mortal. — Thus teaches the Church against the Jovinians and Pelagius (cf. C. Milev., can. 7, and C. Afric. in ep. 95 of S. Aug., and lib. 50 of hom., hom. 19), and it is de fide against Protestants from C. Trid. sess. 6, c. 11, can. 7, 23, and 25; and sess. 14, c. 5, can. 7. Cf. prop. 20 condemn. of Baius.

It is evident a) from Scripture which teaches that there is a kind of sins which are essentially small and distinct from the graver (Mt. XXIII, 24; Lk. VI, 42), — that there is not one just on earth who does not sin (Eccl. VII, 21), — that all offend in many things (James III, 2), — and that even the most holy have sin (I John I, 8), — indeed that upon the edifice of faith and charity wood, hay, and straw can be built (which therefore do not take away charity) which will not impede salvation, but nevertheless are to be burned, i.e. punished (I Cor. III, 11-15).

b) The Fathers distinguish from capital sins (i.e. greater) and middling, minute and light sins not to be transmitted to public penance. Cf. Augustine c. Pelagium, cp. 108.

c) From reason: 1) Not every inordination takes away the principle of order, nor every infirmity the principle of life; therefore not every sin takes away the order of subjection to the last end, or charity which is the principle of life. — 2) In every society light offenses intervene which do not dissolve friendship; therefore also in the society and friendship which man has with God. Man namely understands that certain things are prohibited by God, not so however that they dissolve friendship, and he would be prepared to leave them if they dissolved friendship.

Just as therefore man, constituted in the state of mortal sin, can, while remaining habitually turned away from God, do some good works without however referring them to God loved above all things; so likewise man, existing in the state of grace, can, while remaining habitually converted to God, elicit acts venially evil which, although they are not referred to God, are not for that reason referred to a creature as to the last end (q. 89, a. 1 and 2).

552. Objection: He who by deliberate act prefers his own will to the will of God, loves something above God. But to love something above God is to make it equal to the last end, and therefore no longer to be subject to God as last end. Therefore every sin by its nature is mortal and contains aversion from God. — I answer and distinguish: he who prefers his own will to the will of the uncreated God, loves something above God, concedo; he who prefers a thing to the will of the thing willed and prescribed by God, subdistinguish: if the prescribed thing is necessary for adherence and subjection to God, concedo; if it is outside the order of subjection and adherence to God, nego. Venial sin is outside the subjection and friendship of God, it is not subjected to God nor loves God, although it does not cast away the subjection and friendship of God.

553. Venial sin disposes to mortal. — All venial sins, because they impede fervor, i.e. the exercise of charity, indirectly dispose to mortal sins of themselves, 1°) inasmuch as they remove the subjection of God which impeded the soul from tending to the object contrary to God: « for from this that one is accustomed not to subject his will in smaller things to due order, man is disposed to this, that he also not subject his will to the order of the last end » (q. 88, a. 3; — Ecclus. XIX, 1; Lk. XVI, 10); 2°) inasmuch as they impede the helps of God which would withdraw from mortal sin.

Venial sins directly dispose to acts of the same species mortal, namely:

1°) Venial from its genus directly dispose to mortal per accidens, inasmuch as he who habitually commits venial is disposed to love that even as last end and to sin mortally because of it;

2°) Venial from lightness of matter and from imperfection of the voluntary act dispose directly to mortal of the same species: thus a small theft (or detraction) disposes directly to a great one, and a semi-full consent in lust to fully voluntary lust (ibid.).

554. An angel cannot sin venially. — For his intellect, since it is not discursive, does not know means except as connected with the end; whence his will cannot will means except in order to the end, and accordingly in him there cannot be inordination about means, without there being simultaneously inordination about the end itself. Whence the good Angels do good, the evil evil in all things, namely out of charity, or out of pride (q. 89, a. 4).

Likewise in the state of innocence venial sin was impossible: for then the inferior part was perfectly subject to reason, whence venial sin from imperfection of the act, or an act imperfectly subjected to deliberation, was impossible; likewise reason was perfectly subject to God, whence venial sin of itself and from its genus was impossible, or an act which is not subjected to the end God, before man has cast away perfect subordination to God, which is mortal (q. 89, a. 3).

555. Observation. — Venial sin cannot be committed before the use of reason is sufficient for mortal sin. Not indeed venial from its genus or of itself, because man knows grave and perfect sin more easily and sooner than light and qualified sin. — Nor venial from indeliberation, because for such sin it does not suffice that man deliberates imperfectly but that he does it while he can deliberate perfectly; otherwise, since the deliberation is not perfect but imperfect, it would not be voluntary and imputable to him. But perfect deliberation before the full use of reason is impossible. Thus Cajetan, in I-II, q. 89, a. 6, conformably to the doctrine of S. Thomas, in II Sent., d. 42, q. 1, a. 5, ad 7.