Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. I-II, q. 87; q. 72, a. 5; Suppl. q. 99, a. 1; De Malo q. 1, a. 4 and 5; q. 7, a. 1 and 8; C. Gent. III, 140-146; II Sent. d. 24, a. 2, ad 5.

521. The third effect of sin is the liability to punishment i.e. the debt of punishment to be paid for sin, or the obligation to undergo punishment. For:

a) That the law may be observed by men, it must have a coercive power through fear of punishment, otherwise it is required that a proportionate punishment be sanctioned by law (n. 237). But sin is against the eternal law of God. Therefore it induces before God the debt of a punishment proportionate to it.

b) Justice requires that the equality of order violated be repaired. But the sinner violates the equality of order, while preferring his own will to the divine will and satisfying it against the order of God. Therefore justice requires that the equality be repaired, and man be compelled against his will to suffer something according to the ordination of the will of God, « namely that he who indulged his own will more than he ought, acting against the command of God, according to the order of divine justice suffer something against that which he would, willing or unwilling » (q. 87, a. 6); which is punishment.

c) He who rises up against some order must be repressed by the prince of the order. But by sin man acts not only against the order of reason, and sometimes against the order of a human legislator, but also against the order of God. Therefore he incurs a threefold punishment, one from himself which is the remorse of conscience, another sometimes from man, a third from God (q. 87, a. 1; — Exod. XVIII; Ps. XXXI; Mt. XII, 36; XXV; Rom. II, 9).

522. Punishment is an afflictive evil inflicted in vengeance for sin against the will of the sufferer, or the privation of a delightful good which the will suffers unwillingly against natural appetite¹.

Another is 1) concomitant, which the fault itself, as efficient cause, brings with it from within (Wis. V, 7; 2-13; Lk. XV, 18), as e.g. privation of health, of shame, remorse of conscience, privation of grace as stain; — 2) another is inflicted, which is inflicted from without by God or man as efficient cause and whose fault is the meritorious cause, as e.g. privation of grace as physical deprivation of the supernatural principle by God. This regards either only past sin, and then is a) either punishment simply and strictly so called or merely vindicative, if evil is inflicted from justice alone uniquely in vengeance of the violated order, namely in punishment of one's own sin (Ezech. XVIII, 20) and to restore the order of justice violated, as e.g. the punishment of the future life; or b) satisfactory, if evil either inflicted by a judge or self-inflicted by the sinner is voluntarily undergone, for one's own or even for another's sins, to compensate the injury inflicted on God, as e.g. sacramental penance, fasting, evil sent by God: this, involuntary in a qualified sense, is voluntary simply, which diminishes the notion of punishment; — or c) regards also future sin, and then is medicinal, if evil is inflicted or tolerated even out of mercy, as a remedy of salvation, as is censure: namely for the emendation and cure against future sins either of him who is punished or of others, as e.g. the punishment of the present life inflicted by God.

523. Thesis I. Mortal sin of itself induces the guilt or debt of eternal punishment, inasmuch as it induces an inordination of itself irreparable. It is of faith.

It is proved 1) from Scripture: Mt. XXV, 41, 46; Mk. IX, 42; Is. LXVI, 24; Apoc. XIV, 11; XX-XXII; II Thes. I, 9;

2. from Tradition, namely of the Athanasian Creed, and from the definition of the Council of Lateran IV (chap. Firmiter), and of Trent, sess. 6, can. 24 and 25; sess. 14, can. 5;

3. by reason: Mortal sin induces an inordination of itself irreparable; therefore eternal punishment is due to it. Proof: Mortal sin takes away the principle of moral life by which it could be repaired, namely the ordination to the last end (in the present order: grace and charity) by which man adheres to God and by which he can obtain pardon from God by satisfying. But the principle of life, in this case the ordination to the last end (or charity), no one can recover by his own powers. Therefore mortal sin of itself is irreparable, so that by its nature its disorder remains forever. The cause remaining, the effect remains. Therefore the disorder of sin remaining, the guilt of punishment remains, and therefore mortal sin by its nature can be punished forever² (q. 87, a. 2).

It is confirmed: a) The first principle of moral life is ordination to the last end, as the soul is the principle of animal life, and truths evident of themselves are the first principles of intellectual life. But sickness can be repaired because something of the vital principle remains, but death which removes the principle of life from nature cannot be repaired by nature; similarly error in conclusions can be repaired from reduction to principles, but error in first principles is irreparable. Therefore similarly sin which averts from the last end or inordination about the last end is irreparable for man; although it can be repaired by the power of God.

b) The sinner voluntarily puts himself in a state from which, unless divinely helped, he cannot be rescued. Whence from this very fact that he wills to sin, as much as in him lies, he binds himself to remain always in sin, and consequently implicitly wills to remain in sin forever. As one who would take out his own eyes would deserve to be without sight forever, so he who voluntarily turns away from God deserves to be deprived of God forever.

c) The sinner makes his last end and perfect happiness to consist in a creature against God, and accordingly wills to order his whole life to it and always to adhere to it; he prefers the fruition of the created good to the eternal fruition of the last end, and accordingly much more would have willed to enjoy that created good forever. And therefore he implicitly has the will of sinning forever, and in his own [will] he deserves to be punished forever since he has sinned against the eternal good². — For he totally turns away from God, the last end, and renounces him. But he who renounces the end because he adheres to another, deserves never to obtain it, because the last end is by its nature perpetual. Whence he who renounces it, renounces forever.

d) The sinner despises eternal life and rejects charity which is the bond by which he is united to the heavenly society; therefore he deserves to be excluded from it forever.

We have proposed the argument for the present order in which ordination to the last end is done by grace and charity; but it holds also in the natural order, because no creature can offer condign satisfaction for sin, nor therefore by itself recover the due ordination to the end, as is usually shown in the tr. on the Incarnate Word (n. 536).

524. Thesis II. The punishment of mortal sin is twofold: pain of loss and pain of sense. — For sin consists in aversion from God and undue conversion to a created good. Inasmuch as it is aversion from God, an infinite good, it justly deserves to be deprived of an infinite good (pain of loss: I Cor. VI, 9; Mt. XXV, 41; Apoc. XXI-XXII); inasmuch as it is undue conversion to a creature, a finite good, it justly deserves the punishment of affliction from creatures (pain of sense: Is. LXVI; Mk. IX, 42; Apoc. XIV, 11; Mt. XXV, 41). Since however sin is not of infinite gravity on the part of conversion, an infinite punishment of acerbity is not required (a. 4).

525. Thesis III. Venial sin of itself deserves only temporal punishment. — For, since it does not take away the ordination to the last end and charity by which it could be repaired, of itself it is reparable and therefore of itself it does not deserve eternal punishment, but temporal. Accidentally however, according to S. Thomas, it is punished with eternal punishment, if it is committed irremissibly because it is joined with mortal sin (a. 5).

526. Thesis IV. Fault being remitted, not every punishment is always remitted, as is proved in the tr. on Penance, and is evident from the definition of C. Trid. sess. 6, c. 14, can. 30 and sess. 14, can. 22; but satisfactory can remain, because the sinner cannot be converted to God unless his will accept the order of divine justice, according to which « he who indulged his own will more than he ought, acting against the command of God, suffer something against that which he would, willing or unwilling » (a. 6). Whence it is required « that he himself spontaneously assume punishment for himself in recompense of past fault, or also patiently bear that inflicted by God » (Wis. X; Gen. III; II Kings XII, 13).

Hence, although « the stain removed, the wound of sin is healed as to the will, punishment is still required 1) for the healing of the other powers of the soul, which by the preceding sin were disordered, so that namely they may be cured by contraries. Punishment is required 2) to restore the equality of justice; and 3) to remove the scandal of others, so that those who were scandalized by the fault may be edified by the punishment » (ad 3).

527. Observation. — It is to be noted that punishment does not correspond to fault according to the dignity of him against whom one sins (because thus for any sin an infinite intensive punishment would be due), but according to the disposition and inordination of the sinner, — and indeed a) the quantity of punishment or acerbity corresponds to the quantity of fault, which is not infinite simply but in varying degree greater or lesser according to diverse gravity; b) the duration of punishment corresponds not to the quantity but to the duration of fault, not on the part of the act which passes but on the part of perpetual inordination (a. 4, ad 3, coll. a. 3, ad 1; IV Sent. d. 46, q. 1, a. 3, ad 6).

528. The evil of fault and the evil of punishment differ³:

a) fault is prior to punishment, because it induces punishment; b) fault is according to the will (to work evil), punishment against the will (to suffer evil); c) fault is evil in the action or a deficient act, punishment is evil in the agent inasmuch as he is deprived of a permanent perfection; d) fault is opposed to honest good, punishment to delightful good. Hence:

1. The evil of fault is greater than the evil of punishment, whence it is never licit to commit sin, even venial, to avert any punishment, even of hell.

2. The same according to the same cannot be at once punishment and fault, but under a different respect it is not repugnant. Thus the privation of habitual grace is at once sin and punishment: it is habitual sin inasmuch as it is voluntary privation of ordination to God or habitual aversion from him; it is punishment inasmuch as it is privation of ornament granted by God, and indeed in two ways: as privation of brightness and inherent stain it is concomitant punishment, as physical removal of supernatural life by God it is inflicted punishment. In other words: morally, as voluntary lack or habitual aversion of the sinner from God, which is passively in man, it is sin; actively and physically, as the aversion of God withdrawing grace from man is punishment.

3. It is understood why sin, according to S. Thomas (a. 2), cannot be the punishment of sin of itself or by reason of fault, both because sin is voluntary, punishment against the will; and because punishment is intended by a judge, but God can in no way intend fault.

Accidentally however and indirectly it can be the punishment of sin: a) by reason of the antecedent or on the part of the cause (which is the removal of a hindrance), inasmuch as God, in vengeance of preceding sin, withdraws grace which would prevent sin (Rom. I; II Thes. II); b) by reason of the concomitant, namely on the part of the substance of the act or the material element, inasmuch as the act of sin brings difficulties and afflictions, whether it be an interior act as happens in anger, envy, etc., or an exterior act if man must sustain great labors or expenses and undergo dangers to perpetrate sin; c) by reason of the consequent or on the part of the effect, inasmuch as sin is called punishment because of consequent effects, such as anxieties of conscience, infamy, poverty, diseases, etc.

In these last two ways sin is not only the punishment of preceding sin, but also of itself.

529. Every punishment is for fault (a. 7 and 8). — And indeed: 1° Punishment strictly so called, i.e. merely vindicative, is for the proper fault of him who is punished: for no one is punished simply and properly for the sin of another (Ezech. XVIII, 20). 2° Satisfactory punishment can also be for the sin of another, since one can bear the punishment of another, inasmuch as one joined to another by the bond of charity assumes the punishment due to the sins of others (Gal. VI, 2). 3° Likewise medicinal punishment, if it is bodily and of the present life, can be inflicted for the sin of another on those who are his: thus children are punished for parents, subjects for masters, citizens for the city or king (or vice versa), inasmuch as they are in some way their things, in which case the punishment is as to him for whom it is inflicted, not as to those who are punished; unless however they have been partakers of his fault (original or actual) or have imitated the sin, because then they are punished for their own and for another's sin (Exod. XX, 5; Mt. XVIII, 32). 4° Indeed every painfulness is in some way for fault, at least original. Painfulness is not true punishment because it is not inflicted for sin, but for a greater good, namely a spiritual one, to be obtained (cf. prop. 72 of Baius); but since it has the likeness of punishment, because it is an afflictive evil tempered by natural appetite, as e.g. the miseries of the B. V. or of the Saints (Heb. XII, 6; Ps. XXXIII, 20). Painfulness is inflicted by God a) for the exercise of virtue and greater merit (Tob. XII, 13); b) to turn away from sin (Lk. XXIII, 31); c) as an example of virtue and patience for others (Tob. II, 12); d) in punishment of another's sin, as if parents are punished in their children; e) that God may show that there is another life; f) that the glory of God or grace may shine forth more (John IX, 3).