Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis
Benedictus Henricus Merkelbach (1871–1942)
Summa Theologiae Moralis ad mentem D. Thomae et ad normam iuris novi
First published 1935
Volume I (De principiis) of Benedictus Henricus Merkelbach's Summa theologiae moralis sets out the foundations of Catholic moral theology within a Thomistic framework. It treats human acts, conscience, law, sin, and merit in relation to the canon law of its period. The present edition follows the Paris text published by Desclée de Brouwer in 1935 and includes the Latin text with an English translation. It comprises the first volume of the three-volume Summa.
Prologus
Introductio I: Theologia Moralis Generalis: Introductio
Tractatus I: Tractatus de ultimo actu humanorum fine seu de beatitudine
Introductio
Quaestio I: DE FINE ULTIMO IN COMMUNI
Quaestio II: DE BEATITUDINE OBIECTIVA
Quaestio III: DE BEATITUDINE FORMALI
Quaestio IV: DE QUALITATIBUS BEATITUDINIS
Quaestio V: DE MODO OBTINENDI BEATITUDINEM
Tractatus II: De actibus humanis in se
Introductio
Pars I: De actibus humanis secundum esse materiale et psychologicum
§ I: De conditione actuum humanorum
Caput I: De elemento subiectivo actus humani
Quaestio I: De voluntario
Articulus I: De voluntario in se
Articulus II: De voluntario tum positivo et directo, tum negativo et indirecto
Articulus III: De voluntario in se et in causa
Quaestio II: De impedimentis voluntarii seu de involuntario
Articulus I: De violentia
Articulus II: De metu
Articulus III: De concupiscentia
Articulus IV: De ignorantia
Quaestio III: De libero
Quaestio IV: De impedimentis liberi
Articulus I: De passionibus
Articulus II: De habitu et consuetudine
Articulus III: De impedimentis liberi remotioribus
Caput II: De elemento obiectivo actus humani
Quaestio I: De elemento essentiali seu obiecto
Quaestio II: De elemento accidentali seu de circumstantiis
§ II: De distinctione actuum humanorum
Quaestio I: De actibus elicitis
Quaestio II: De actibus imperatis
Pars II: De actibus humanis secundum esse morale
§ I: De moralitate actus humani in genere
Quaestio I: De essentia et speciebus moralitatis
Quaestio II: De fundamentis moralitatis
Articulus I: De intrinseca differentia boni inter et mali
Articulus II: De norma moralitatis
Articulus III: De fundamento obiectivo moralitatis
Articulus IV: De falsis systematibus circa fundamenta moralitatis
Articulus V: De facultate apprehensiva moralitatis
Quaestio III: De principiis seu fontibus moralitatis
Quaestio IV: De distinctione specifica inter actum bonum et malum
Quaestio V: De distinctione specifica inter varios actus bonos vel malos
Articulus I: De obiecto
Articulus II: De circumstantiis
Articulus III: De fine
§ II: De moralitate actuum humanorum in specie
Quaestio I: De bonitate et malitia actus interioris
Quaestio II: De bonitate et malitia actus exterioris
Quaestio III: De bonitate et malitia effectus externi
Quaestio IV: De bonitate et malitia passionum
Quaestio V: De bonitate et malitia circumstantiarum
Pars III: De actibus humanis secundum esse supernaturale et meritorium
Quaestio I: De merito praesertim supernaturali
Quaestio II: De conditionibus meriti supernaturalis
Tractatus III: De conscientia in generali
Introductio
Quaestio I: De conscientia morali secundum se in esse psychologico
Quaestio II: De conscientia prout est regula actuum moralium
Articulus I: De rectitudine conscientiae
Articulus II: De conscientiae certitudine
Quaestio III: De conscientia christiana prout est regula actuum supernaturalium
Tractatus IV: De legibus in genere
Introductio
§ I: De lege secundum esse psychologicum
Pars I: De lege in genere
Quaestio I: De ipsa lege in se
Articulus I: De essentia legis
Articulus II: De promulgatione legis
Quaestio II: De distinctione legum
Quaestio III: De effectibus legis
Articulus I: De vi directivâ seu obligatione legis
Articulus II: De vi coactivâ seu sanctione legis
Pars II: De lege aeterna quae est fundamentum omnis legis
Quaestio I: De essentia legis aeternae
Quaestio II: De potestate legis aeternae
Quaestio III: De mutabilitate legis aeternae
§ I: De legibus quae regunt actus morales
Pars III: De lege naturali
Quaestio I: De essentia legis naturalis
Quaestio II: De potestate legis naturalis
Articulus I: De vi directivâ seu obligatione legis naturalis
Articulus II: De vi coactivâ seu sanctione legis naturalis
Quaestio III: De mutabilitate legis naturalis
Quaestio IV: De Lege Humana in Se
Articulus I: De Auctore legis civilis
Articulus II: De Qualitate legis humanae
Articulus III: De Efformatione legis humanae
Articulus IV: De Divisione legis humanae
Quaestio V: De Potestate Legis Humanae
Articulus I: De Materia legis humanae
Articulus II: De Obligatione legis humanae
Articulus III: De Subditis legis civilis
Articulus IV: De Impletione et Interpretatione legis humanae
Quaestio VI: De Mutabilitate Legis Humanae
Caput I: De Lege Vetere
Quaestio I: De Lege Vetere Secundum Se
Quaestio II: De Potestate Legis Veteris
Quaestio III: De Mutabilitate Veteris Legis
Caput II: De Lege Nova
Quaestio I: De Essentia Legis Novae
Quaestio II: De Potestate Legis Novae
Quaestio III: De Lege Ecclesiastica Secundum Se
Articulus I: De Auctore legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus II: De Materia et Qualitate legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus III: De Efformatione legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus IV: De Divisione legis ecclesiasticae
Quaestio IV: De Potestate seu Obligatione Legis Ecclesiasticae
Articulus I: De Quantitate seu Gravitate Obligationis
Articulus II: De Qualitate et Extensione Obligationis legis praeceptivae
Articulus III: De Qualitate et Extensione Obligationis legis poenalis
Articulus IV: De Qualitate et Extensione Obligationis legis irritantis
Articulus V: De Subditis legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus VI: De Impletione legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus VII: De Interpretatione legis ecclesiasticae
Quaestio V: De Mutabilitate Legis Ecclesiasticae
Articulus I: De Ignorantia
Articulus II: De Impotentia
Articulus III: De Dispensatione
Articulus IV: De privilegio
Articulus V: De cessatione finis
Articulus VI: De abrogatione et derogatione
Articulus VII: De consuetudine
Tractatus V: De peccatis in genere
Introductio I: De Peccatis in Genere
Quaestio I: De essentia peccati
Articulus I: De notione et conditionibus peccati
Articulus II: De peccato omissionis negative voluntario
Articulus III: De peccato commissionis externo, indirecte aut in causa voluntario
Articulus IV: De elementis constitutivis peccati
Articulus V: De definitione peccati
Quaestio II: De distinctione peccatorum
Articulus I: De distinctione specifica
Articulus II: De distinctione numerica
Quaestio III: De comparatione et gravitate peccatorum
Quaestio IV: De subiecto peccati
Articulus I: De motibus seu peccatis sensualitatis
Articulus II: De consensu in delectationem seu de delectatione morosa
Articulus III: De consensu in actum seu de desiderio et gaudio
Pars I: De causis peccatorum
Quaestio I: De causis peccati interioribus
Articulus I: De ignorantia causa peccati ex parte rationis
Articulus II: De passione causa peccati ex parte appetitus sensitivi
Articulus III: De malitia causa peccati ex parte voluntatis
Quaestio II: De causis peccatorum exterioribus
Articulus I: De deo permittente
Articulus II: De diabolo tentante
Articulus III: De homine cooperante
Quaestio III: De peccato quod est causa alterius peccati
Articulus I: De modo quo unum peccatum alterum causat
Articulus II: De superbia et inani gloria
S. Th. II-II, q. 162, 130, 131, 132; De Malo q. 8 and 9.
499. Pride is the inordinate appetite of proper excellence1. It is called
1° appetite, because pride resides in the appetite, namely principally in the will, if it seeks excellence in spiritual things, secondarily in the irascible which tends to a sensible arduous and excellent good,
2° inordinate: to desire excellence of itself is not evil, but against the order of reason is that one tend above what one is, as the proud man does: « for right reason has this, that the will of each is borne toward that which is proportioned to him » (II-II, q. 162, a. 1);
3° of excellence: both relative, by which one wills to excel others, at least implicitly contemning them; and absolute, by which one simply wills to excel above what he is, even without thinking of others;
4° proper: the special object from which pride receives its species is the loftiness of one's own person: for it is not in this or that matter but commonly and in all things that the proud man behaves as lofty. Pride therefore desires a certain universal excellence and by this is distinguished from presumption, ambition, and vainglory, which inordinately desire some particular excellence either in works, or in honors and dignities, or in fame and glory.
500. Pride of itself is contrary to charity and therefore is mortal sin: for the proud man exalts himself above what he is, i.e. above what is appointed for him by God, whence at least implicitly in pride is included the contempt of God, inasmuch as man does not wish to be subject to God and his rule. But this is to turn away from God, which is against charity,
whereby we are converted to God, and therefore of itself is mortal sin. — That contempt, if it is explicit, formal, and perfect, from the intention of contemning God because he disdains to be subject to God and his law and it seems to him injurious to his proper excellence, is always mortal. But if it is implicit, however, without the intention of contemning God, it can indeed be mortal, namely in a grave matter; but it is often venial not only from indeliberation but also from the lightness of the matter.
Now, according to Gregory (Mor. bk. 23, c. 4), in four ways specifically diverse, on the part of the object, pride is committed: 1° by esteeming the goods which one has to have from oneself not from God, or acting as if he would esteem them to have from himself; — 2° by esteeming that he has received them from God but because of his own merits, or acting as if it were so2; — 3° by attributing to himself goods which he does not have; — 4° in goods which he has, willing, other things being equal, to be preferred by them more than is fitting. The two former ways, since they include formal contempt of God, are mortal sin; the two latter are often only venial, unless they are done with grave irreverence toward God, or render one prepared to sin mortally, or there is present grave contempt of neighbor or notable detriment.
501. Daughters of pride. — « Those vices which of themselves are by nature ordered to the end of some capital vice are called its daughters » (II-II, q. 132, a. 5). All vices indeed are by nature ordered to the end of pride; some however, because they seek a special excellence, have an object very near to the object of pride, and therefore immediately, proximately, and more frequently than other sins arise from it according to the notion of end, and immediately serve it; whence those alone are called its daughters. There are however three: 1) presumption which is the inordinate appetite of excellence in works, namely by undertaking something above one's strength; 2) ambition which inordinately desires the excellence of dignity and honor undue or greater than is due; 3) vainglory which inordinately tends to fame and glory, i.e. to the vain manifestation of excellence.
Presumption, ambition, and vainglory of themselves are venial sins, because they are not against charity, but an excessive appetite of a thing in itself good or indifferent. Accidentally they become mortal (more often vainglory), either because they proceed from a mortally evil cause, as e.g. from affection for mortal sin; or because as effects they have mortal sin, as if they are done with notable harm or injury to neighbor, or if one because of them is prepared to commit mortal sin; or by reason of matter, as if one seeks honor or glory from mortal sin (cf. tr. on Fortitude).
502. Vainglory is the inordinate appetite of glory and fame, i.e. the appetite of vain glory, or of vain manifestation and estimation by others of one's own excellence whether true or feigned. Which is done in three ways: a) seeking glory for a thing which is not glory or not worthy of such glory, as for an evil, false, feigned, fragile thing, for riches, trifles, etc.; b) seeking it from those who cannot discern what is worthy of glory, as e.g. from one whose judgment is not certain; c) seeking it and not referring glory to the due end, namely to the honor of God or the salvation of neighbor or our own utility.
From vainglory seven vices more commonly arise, and therefore are called its daughters. For by vainglory is sought the manifestation of one's own excellence, which can be done: a) directly: 1° either in words by boasting, by which one glories in a work committed; or in deeds 2° by presumption of novelties, by which one devises novelties which excite the admiration of others; and 3° by hypocrisy, by which one does good to appear good, although he is not; — b) indirectly one seeks the manifestation of one's excellence, showing oneself not to be lesser than others, and this is done: 4° as to intellect by obstinacy, by which one adheres too much to one's own opinion; 5° as to will by discord, by which one does not wish to depart from his own will to agree with others; 6° as to speech by contention, by which one litigates noisily; 7° as to deed by disobedience, by which one does not wish to execute the precept of a superior.