Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. I-II, q. 75, a. 4; q. 84; De Malo, q. 8.

493. One sin can be the cause of another just as one human act can be the cause of another. This happens in three ways: 1° it can be the material cause of another, insofar as it supplies and prepares matter for another, as gluttony prepares matter for lust, and avarice for litigation, because it multiplies temporal goods which are the matter of litigation; — 2° it can be the efficient cause of another: a) accidentally, insofar as it removes grace, or charity, or shame, or submission, or whatever else withdraws from sin and would impede it: thus from drunkenness or anger all sins can arise because they remove the judgment of reason by which man is restrained from sin¹; b) of itself, insofar as by some sin, as e.g. lust, man is disposed by way of inclination or habit to similar acts or sins of the same species; — 3° and principally it can be the final cause of another, inasmuch as because of the end of that sin, one commits another sin, as if one steals in order to fornicate. And because the end in moral matters gives species or form, thus one sin is also the formal cause of another, because it gives form to another: for if one steals because of fornication, the theft is as it were material, the fornication as it were formal (q. 75, a. 4).

494. The capital sins are those which for the most part are the cause of several other sins especially final, because they have a very desirable object or end; whence because of it other sins are easily committed. They are called capital from head, which is said metaphorically of that which is the beginning and directing and in some way leading of others: for they are the beginning or cause of other sins, as was said; they are directive because they are their final cause: for by the end human acts are directed. Whence the capital [sins] are as it were leaders, and the vices which arise from them as it were armies (q. 84, a. 3).

The capital sins therefore are not the greatest, since several other sins are graver than they, as e.g. those which are directly against God or directly opposed to the theological virtues; nor are they necessarily mortal, even if deliberately done, as is evident about anger and gluttony which are often venial.

495. There are seven capital sins², as is shown in the following way: The capital sins are those which have very desirable ends and therefore principal for moving the appetite³; but something moves the appetite directly of itself and thus moves to pursuing good, another indirectly through another and thus moves to fleeing good, inasmuch as one flees good because of an evil adjoined.

Now the good which man most desires can be:

1. excellence of praise and honor, which is a good of the soul, which is inordinately desired by vainglory;

2. food and drink, which is a good of the body by which the individual is preserved, which is inordinately desired by gluttony;

3. the use of venereal things, which is a good of the body by which the human species is preserved, which is inordinately desired by lust;

4. external goods, which is inordinately desired by avarice⁴.

But the good which man flees because of an evil adjoined which he most fears, is

5. one's own spiritual good which because of the bodily labor adjoined is inordinately fled by sloth;

6. or the good of another which impedes one's own excellence and so is an evil, which is inordinately fled by envy;

7. or against which anger rises (q. 84, a. 4).

496. Pride is the beginning of every sin, according to Ecclus. IX, 15, not only in historical order, because the Angels and the first man were guilty of it, but also from the nature of the thing, because it is the final cause of all sins: for all sins can and are by nature to arise from it, inasmuch as the temporal goods which man seeks in other sins, he can will because of the proper excellence

because that incidentally pertains to sin itself: « One sin is ordered to the end of another in two ways: in one way on the part of the sinner himself whose will is more prone to the end of one sin than of another, but this is accidental to sins. Whence according to this sins are not called capital. In another way from the very relation of the ends of which one has a certain agreement with another, so that in several things they are ordered to itself... and according to this the capital vices must be assumed ». Q. D. de Malo 8, a. 1; cf. I-II, q. 84, a. 4.

which is the end of pride. And because the end is first in the order of intention, and intention precedes execution by means, it is rightly called the beginning of every sin. Pride therefore is the final cause of all sins, and accordingly is not a capital sin, from which only several vices arise, but rather the cause of all the capital [sins], and the mother and queen of all vices⁵.

497. Avarice is the root of all sins, according to the Apostle I Tim. VI, 10, or the cause, not indeed final (as pride) but of disposition to all, because through riches man acquires the facility and ease of perpetrating, and the occasion of desiring any sin whatever, inasmuch as for having any temporal goods whatsoever he can be helped by money, according to that of Ecclus. X, 19: To money all things obey. Whence it is the root or first sin in the order of execution, because it provides opportunity and gives the means of perpetrating all things; and therefore just as the root provides nourishment to the tree, so money nourishes the desire of every sin, and in this sense any sin can arise from avarice⁶.

Avarice, insofar as it is the root of all sins, is not a capital sin, but insofar as it is also the final cause of several, it is rightly numbered among the capital [sins].

498. Observation. — The capital sins are not those which are opposed to the fundamental or cardinal virtues, because « the same notion of origin is not in the virtues and in the vices. For virtues are caused through the order of the appetite to reason, or even to the unchangeable good, which is God; vices, however, arise from the appetite of changeable good. Whence it is not necessary that the principal vices be opposed to the principal virtues » (a. 4, ad 1).

S. Th. II-II, q. 162, 130, 131, 132; De Malo q. 8 and 9.

499. Pride is the inordinate appetite of proper excellence¹. It is called

1° appetite, because pride resides in the appetite, namely principally in the will, if it seeks excellence in spiritual things, secondarily in the irascible which tends to a sensible arduous and excellent good,

2° inordinate: to desire excellence of itself is not evil, but against the order of reason is that one tend above what one is, as the proud man does: « for right reason has this, that the will of each is borne toward that which is proportioned to him » (II-II, q. 162, a. 1);

3° of excellence: both relative, by which one wills to excel others, at least implicitly contemning them; and absolute, by which one simply wills to excel above what he is, even without thinking of others;

4° proper: the special object from which pride receives its species is the loftiness of one's own person: for it is not in this or that matter but commonly and in all things that the proud man behaves as lofty. Pride therefore desires a certain universal excellence and by this is distinguished from presumption, ambition, and vainglory, which inordinately desire some particular excellence either in works, or in honors and dignities, or in fame and glory.

500. Pride of itself is contrary to charity and therefore is mortal sin: for the proud man exalts himself above what he is, i.e. above what is appointed for him by God, whence at least implicitly in pride is included the contempt of God, inasmuch as man does not wish to be subject to God and his rule. But this is to turn away from God, which is against charity,

whereby we are converted to God, and therefore of itself is mortal sin. — That contempt, if it is explicit, formal, and perfect, from the intention of contemning God because he disdains to be subject to God and his law and it seems to him injurious to his proper excellence, is always mortal. But if it is implicit, however, without the intention of contemning God, it can indeed be mortal, namely in a grave matter; but it is often venial not only from indeliberation but also from the lightness of the matter.

Now, according to Gregory (Mor. bk. 23, c. 4), in four ways specifically diverse, on the part of the object, pride is committed: 1° by esteeming the goods which one has to have from oneself not from God, or acting as if he would esteem them to have from himself; — 2° by esteeming that he has received them from God but because of his own merits, or acting as if it were so²; — 3° by attributing to himself goods which he does not have; — 4° in goods which he has, willing, other things being equal, to be preferred by them more than is fitting. The two former ways, since they include formal contempt of God, are mortal sin; the two latter are often only venial, unless they are done with grave irreverence toward God, or render one prepared to sin mortally, or there is present grave contempt of neighbor or notable detriment.

501. Daughters of pride. — « Those vices which of themselves are by nature ordered to the end of some capital vice are called its daughters » (II-II, q. 132, a. 5). All vices indeed are by nature ordered to the end of pride; some however, because they seek a special excellence, have an object very near to the object of pride, and therefore immediately, proximately, and more frequently than other sins arise from it according to the notion of end, and immediately serve it; whence those alone are called its daughters. There are however three: 1) presumption which is the inordinate appetite of excellence in works, namely by undertaking something above one's strength; 2) ambition which inordinately desires the excellence of dignity and honor undue or greater than is due; 3) vainglory which inordinately tends to fame and glory, i.e. to the vain manifestation of excellence.

Presumption, ambition, and vainglory of themselves are venial sins, because they are not against charity, but an excessive appetite of a thing in itself good or indifferent. Accidentally they become mortal (more often vainglory), either because they proceed from a mortally evil cause, as e.g. from affection for mortal sin; or because as effects they have mortal sin, as if they are done with notable harm or injury to neighbor, or if one because of them is prepared to commit mortal sin; or by reason of matter, as if one seeks honor or glory from mortal sin (cf. tr. on Fortitude).

502. Vainglory is the inordinate appetite of glory and fame, i.e. the appetite of vain glory, or of vain manifestation and estimation by others of one's own excellence whether true or feigned. Which is done in three ways: a) seeking glory for a thing which is not glory or not worthy of such glory, as for an evil, false, feigned, fragile thing, for riches, trifles, etc.; b) seeking it from those who cannot discern what is worthy of glory, as e.g. from one whose judgment is not certain; c) seeking it and not referring glory to the due end, namely to the honor of God or the salvation of neighbor or our own utility.

From vainglory seven vices more commonly arise, and therefore are called its daughters. For by vainglory is sought the manifestation of one's own excellence, which can be done: a) directly: 1° either in words by boasting, by which one glories in a work committed; or in deeds 2° by presumption of novelties, by which one devises novelties which excite the admiration of others; and 3° by hypocrisy, by which one does good to appear good, although he is not; — b) indirectly one seeks the manifestation of one's excellence, showing oneself not to be lesser than others, and this is done: 4° as to intellect by obstinacy, by which one adheres too much to one's own opinion; 5° as to will by discord, by which one does not wish to depart from his own will to agree with others; 6° as to speech by contention, by which one litigates noisily; 7° as to deed by disobedience, by which one does not wish to execute the precept of a superior.

S. Th. II-II, q. 118; de Malo q. 13.

503. Avarice is the inordinate appetite of riches: for by the name of riches come all exterior goods insofar as they are useful to man and can be estimated in money.

Avarice is twofold: 1) the inordinate appetite of riches in unduly receiving and retaining, which is opposed to justice and therefore is often gravely evil; 2) the inordinate affection for riches by which they are loved or desired too much or please too much in delight, which is opposed to liberality, and of itself is lightly evil, unless because of the affection for riches one does not fear to commit some mortal sin, or places in riches the last end.

504. From avarice seven vices more frequently arise, as from a final cause, which are called its daughters. Insofar as it is immoderate in retaining, there arises 1) hardness of heart or inhumanity against mercy toward neighbor; insofar as it is immoderate in receiving, there arises 2) in affection: unrest or superfluous solicitude about acquiring goods; in effect: 3) violence, when one uses force to acquire goods, 4) fallacy, and 5) perjury, when one uses deceit in words or symbols, or things confirmed by oath, 6) fraud and 7) treachery, when one uses deceit in deed or with respect to things, or with respect to persons, as is evident of Judas who out of avarice betrayed Christ.

S. Th. II-II, q. 153 and 148.

505. Lust is the inordinate appetite of venereal things, which is of itself mortal, as will be said in the tr. on Temperance. Since the appetite of lust is most vehement, it follows that it most impedes the use of the superior powers, i.e. of intellect and will, because it distracts strength from them, and moves to objects opposed to reason.

From lust many vices arise. — For:

a) In the intellect it produces 1) blindness of mind in the consideration of the end and its goodness, or alienation from heavenly thoughts; 2) precipitation in counsel and deliberation about the choice of means; 3) inconsideration in the judgment about things to be done which befit one's state or person; 4) inconstancy in commanding the execution of the judgment, or in good resolutions. Whence it most overturns prudence.

b) In the will it produces about the end: 5) love of self with respect to the delight of the flesh which it inordinately desires; 6) hatred of God, inasmuch as he forbids the desired delight; about the means: 7) affection for the present age, i.e. excessive love of the present life because of its pleasures; and 8) horror and despair of the future age, i.e. of spiritual goods, because while one is too detained by carnal delights, he does not care to arrive at spiritual ones, but loathes them and despises them¹.

506. Gluttony is the inordinate appetite of food and drink, which is only venial, unless, by reason of the effect, it inflicts grave harm on body or soul, as e.g. on health, or on the use of reason, or on virtue if it is the cause of grave sin (cf. tr. on Temperance).

From gluttony several vices arise. — Gluttony by immoderate taking of food or drink produces a disturbance of the inferior part and so impedes reason, and consequently those things which ought to be directed by reason. Hence it produces 1) in the soul a) as to reason whose sharpness is dulled by the immoderation of food and drink: dullness of mind or stupidity as to speculative matters; — b) as to appetite which, the rudder of reason being lulled, is inordinately affected: unseemly joy or vague and disordered about those things which, according to the right judgment of reason, are not by nature to cause any delight; — as to exterior acts: c) loquacity, by which man cannot restrain his words; and d) buffoonery, by which he cannot restrain or compose external gestures; — 2) in the body however it produces uncleanness, i.e. the inordinate emission of any superfluities whatsoever (especially of seed): for although it is useful, as e.g. vomiting after superfluous eating, nevertheless it is vicious that one subject himself to this necessity by immoderate food or drink.

S. Th. II-II, q. 36 and 158; de Malo q. 10 and 12.

507. Envy is the inordinate sadness about the good of another, esteemed as one's own evil, inasmuch as that good seems to diminish one's own excellence. Which of itself can also be mortal, as being directly against charity, because just as charity rejoices in the good of neighbor, so envy is saddened by it (cf. tr. on Charity). It is principally about those goods in which there is glory and in which men love to be honored and to be in opinion, such as dignities, magistracies, insignia of titles, riches, beauty, ornament, celebrity of name, eloquence, learning, friendships, piety, virtues, etc. especially wisdom and happiness; but this sin is wont to be found especially among the ambitious and women, and among those who are in some way equal, or at least in some approach, as e.g. in condition, knowledge, virtue, etc.: for such wish to be equal to one another or to be preferred.

508. From envy five sins generally arise, because it endeavors to do something against neighbor. In this that it endeavors to do, there is something as it were beginning and principle, something as means, and something as end. The principle is that one intend to diminish the glory of another, which is done secretly by whispering, openly by detraction. The means is that he who wishes to diminish the glory of another, either can and then is born exultation in adversities, i.e. joy in the evils of neighbor; or cannot and then arises affliction in prosperities, which is not envy itself, but its daughter, when the prosperities of neighbor happen against the endeavor of the envious one who strives to impede them. Finally the end is in the very hatred of neighbor, for as delight causes love, so sadness causes hatred.

509. Anger is the inordinate appetite of vengeance. It is called inordinate, because anger of itself is not evil but indifferent, as being a passion; whence to desire vengeance according to right reason, as e.g. that another be corrected, that the order of justice be preserved, that reason may execute justice more strongly, that others be terrified, is good and praiseworthy (cf. tr. on Temperance).

Anger can be evil in two ways: 1) on the part of the object a) by desiring unjust vengeance on him who did not deserve it, or beyond what he deserved; b) by desiring vengeance not according to legitimate order, but to be carried out by one's own authority; c) by desiring it not for the due end, but as e.g. from hatred that one may satisfy the evil of one's own soul. This anger of itself is mortal, because it is contrary to charity and justice, although it admits lightness of matter, if the vengeance is small. — 2) On the part of the manner anger is evil, if it is too ardent interiorly, or is manifested too much exteriorly. This of itself is venial, because it is a mere excess of an indifferent thing; yet it becomes mortal because of an effect prohibited under grave matter, such as scandal, blasphemy, notable detriment of health, etc.

It is to be noted however that anger is not necessarily inordinate because it is great, but because it is too great; whence a vehement movement is good provided it is proportioned to the quality of the fault, the condition of the sinner, and other circumstances, as is evident in Christ driving the traders from the temple.

510. From anger six sins more commonly arise. — Insofar as it is in the heart, from it are born 1) indignation against the man against whom one is angry, while he considers him unworthy to have done him such injury; and 2) swelling of mind by which the angry man fills his soul, meditating and devising various means of vengeance; — insofar as it is in the mouth, from it arise 3) clamor or the inordinate and confused speech by which man shows his anger in words, 4) blasphemy by which he bursts forth into words injurious to God, and 5) contumely or injurious speech against neighbor; — insofar as it proceeds even to deed 6) from it arise quarrels, by which name are comprehended all harms such as woundings, homicides, beatings, etc. which are inflicted on neighbors in anger.

S. Th. II-II, q. 35; de Malo q. 11.

511. Sloth is sadness about a spiritual good especially divine; it is torpor, coldness, languor, tepidity, weariness about spiritual things, because they impede quiet and bodily delight. Hence sloth prefers to do nothing, and thence is born flight, horror, detestation of spiritual goods. Which sadness is sin, both 1) by reason of the object: for to be saddened about evil is good, but to be saddened about that which apparently is evil but truly is good, is sin, because good does not deserve to be saddened about; — and 2) by reason of the effect: for it withdraws man from due works (cf. tr. on Charity).

512. Sloth is twofold: 1) that by which we are saddened about the good of any virtue whatsoever; and this is not a special sin even if it is done because of the bodily labor adjoined, but it is a circumstance of every sin, because every vice flees the opposite spiritual good even inasmuch as it impedes bodily quiet. Whence it is mortal or venial according as the sin of which it is the circumstance is grave or light; — 2) that by which we are saddened about a spiritual good by excellence to which all other things are ordered, namely about the divine good, not in itself but inasmuch as it is internal to us and pertains to us and seems evil to us, as e.g. about blessedness or about the friendship of God, and about the means to it, namely about the sacraments, the grace of God, good works, the divine precepts, etc. inasmuch as they require labor. This is a special sin, because it has a special object, and is directly contrary to a special act of a special virtue: for it is opposed to the joy about the divine good in which charity delights. Whence of itself it is mortal sin, because according to its proper notion it is opposed to charity: for just as envy is mortal sin, because it is saddened about the good of neighbor in which charity rejoices, so a fortiori sloth, which is saddened about the divine good. It can however be venial, if it is not perfectly deliberate, or even when it is concerned with goods not necessary for salvation.

513. From special sloth six sins arise. — From sadness indeed it happens that man flees those things about which he is saddened, indeed that he fights them, and that he passes to other things about which he delights. From sloth man flees the divine goods: 1) the last end, eternal salvation or the hoped-for divine good, which is done by despair; he flees also 2) the spiritual good to be done or the means to the end common and ordinary, which is torpor about precepts; 3) he flees arduous means, as e.g. of counsel, by pusillanimity. — He fights 4) the contrary spiritual goods, detesting them, which is called malice; or also 5) he fights priests and God-fearing men who induce others to spiritual goods, and is indignant against them; and this is rancor. — Finally 6) because of sadness he passes to exterior delightful things, in which the carnal mind delights, and this is wandering of mind about illicit things.

514. Observation. — Several other sins arise from the capital vices; what we have handed down are those which more frequently and more immediately arise from them, and which therefore are called their daughters. Others, through these as means, are not so frequently born from them, as envy from vainglory, anger from envy, and sloth from anger, and from sloth avarice, gluttony, and lust. Thus Gregory the Great, Mor. bk. XXXI, c. 45 (P. L. LXXVI, 620-622).