Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis
Benedictus Henricus Merkelbach (1871–1942)
Summa Theologiae Moralis ad mentem D. Thomae et ad normam iuris novi
First published 1935
Volume I (De principiis) of Benedictus Henricus Merkelbach's Summa theologiae moralis sets out the foundations of Catholic moral theology within a Thomistic framework. It treats human acts, conscience, law, sin, and merit in relation to the canon law of its period. The present edition follows the Paris text published by Desclée de Brouwer in 1935 and includes the Latin text with an English translation. It comprises the first volume of the three-volume Summa.
Prologus
Introductio I: Theologia Moralis Generalis: Introductio
Tractatus I: Tractatus de ultimo actu humanorum fine seu de beatitudine
Introductio
Quaestio I: DE FINE ULTIMO IN COMMUNI
Quaestio II: DE BEATITUDINE OBIECTIVA
Quaestio III: DE BEATITUDINE FORMALI
Quaestio IV: DE QUALITATIBUS BEATITUDINIS
Quaestio V: DE MODO OBTINENDI BEATITUDINEM
Tractatus II: De actibus humanis in se
Introductio
Pars I: De actibus humanis secundum esse materiale et psychologicum
§ I: De conditione actuum humanorum
Caput I: De elemento subiectivo actus humani
Quaestio I: De voluntario
Articulus I: De voluntario in se
Articulus II: De voluntario tum positivo et directo, tum negativo et indirecto
Articulus III: De voluntario in se et in causa
Quaestio II: De impedimentis voluntarii seu de involuntario
Articulus I: De violentia
Articulus II: De metu
Articulus III: De concupiscentia
Articulus IV: De ignorantia
Quaestio III: De libero
Quaestio IV: De impedimentis liberi
Articulus I: De passionibus
Articulus II: De habitu et consuetudine
Articulus III: De impedimentis liberi remotioribus
Caput II: De elemento obiectivo actus humani
Quaestio I: De elemento essentiali seu obiecto
Quaestio II: De elemento accidentali seu de circumstantiis
§ II: De distinctione actuum humanorum
Quaestio I: De actibus elicitis
Quaestio II: De actibus imperatis
Pars II: De actibus humanis secundum esse morale
§ I: De moralitate actus humani in genere
Quaestio I: De essentia et speciebus moralitatis
Quaestio II: De fundamentis moralitatis
Articulus I: De intrinseca differentia boni inter et mali
Articulus II: De norma moralitatis
Articulus III: De fundamento obiectivo moralitatis
Articulus IV: De falsis systematibus circa fundamenta moralitatis
Articulus V: De facultate apprehensiva moralitatis
Quaestio III: De principiis seu fontibus moralitatis
Quaestio IV: De distinctione specifica inter actum bonum et malum
Quaestio V: De distinctione specifica inter varios actus bonos vel malos
Articulus I: De obiecto
Articulus II: De circumstantiis
Articulus III: De fine
§ II: De moralitate actuum humanorum in specie
Quaestio I: De bonitate et malitia actus interioris
Quaestio II: De bonitate et malitia actus exterioris
Quaestio III: De bonitate et malitia effectus externi
Quaestio IV: De bonitate et malitia passionum
Quaestio V: De bonitate et malitia circumstantiarum
Pars III: De actibus humanis secundum esse supernaturale et meritorium
Quaestio I: De merito praesertim supernaturali
Quaestio II: De conditionibus meriti supernaturalis
Tractatus III: De conscientia in generali
Introductio
Quaestio I: De conscientia morali secundum se in esse psychologico
Quaestio II: De conscientia prout est regula actuum moralium
Articulus I: De rectitudine conscientiae
Articulus II: De conscientiae certitudine
Quaestio III: De conscientia christiana prout est regula actuum supernaturalium
Tractatus IV: De legibus in genere
Introductio
§ I: De lege secundum esse psychologicum
Pars I: De lege in genere
Quaestio I: De ipsa lege in se
Articulus I: De essentia legis
Articulus II: De promulgatione legis
Quaestio II: De distinctione legum
Quaestio III: De effectibus legis
Articulus I: De vi directivâ seu obligatione legis
Articulus II: De vi coactivâ seu sanctione legis
Pars II: De lege aeterna quae est fundamentum omnis legis
Quaestio I: De essentia legis aeternae
Quaestio II: De potestate legis aeternae
Quaestio III: De mutabilitate legis aeternae
§ I: De legibus quae regunt actus morales
Pars III: De lege naturali
Quaestio I: De essentia legis naturalis
Quaestio II: De potestate legis naturalis
Articulus I: De vi directivâ seu obligatione legis naturalis
Articulus II: De vi coactivâ seu sanctione legis naturalis
Quaestio III: De mutabilitate legis naturalis
Quaestio IV: De Lege Humana in Se
Articulus I: De Auctore legis civilis
Articulus II: De Qualitate legis humanae
Articulus III: De Efformatione legis humanae
Articulus IV: De Divisione legis humanae
Quaestio V: De Potestate Legis Humanae
Articulus I: De Materia legis humanae
Articulus II: De Obligatione legis humanae
Articulus III: De Subditis legis civilis
Articulus IV: De Impletione et Interpretatione legis humanae
Quaestio VI: De Mutabilitate Legis Humanae
Caput I: De Lege Vetere
Quaestio I: De Lege Vetere Secundum Se
Quaestio II: De Potestate Legis Veteris
Quaestio III: De Mutabilitate Veteris Legis
Caput II: De Lege Nova
Quaestio I: De Essentia Legis Novae
Quaestio II: De Potestate Legis Novae
Quaestio III: De Lege Ecclesiastica Secundum Se
Articulus I: De Auctore legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus II: De Materia et Qualitate legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus III: De Efformatione legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus IV: De Divisione legis ecclesiasticae
Quaestio IV: De Potestate seu Obligatione Legis Ecclesiasticae
Articulus I: De Quantitate seu Gravitate Obligationis
Articulus II: De Qualitate et Extensione Obligationis legis praeceptivae
Articulus III: De Qualitate et Extensione Obligationis legis poenalis
Articulus IV: De Qualitate et Extensione Obligationis legis irritantis
Articulus V: De Subditis legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus VI: De Impletione legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus VII: De Interpretatione legis ecclesiasticae
Quaestio V: De Mutabilitate Legis Ecclesiasticae
Articulus I: De Ignorantia
Articulus II: De Impotentia
Articulus III: De Dispensatione
Articulus IV: De privilegio
Articulus V: De cessatione finis
Articulus VI: De abrogatione et derogatione
Articulus VII: De consuetudine
Tractatus V: De peccatis in genere
Introductio I: De Peccatis in Genere
Quaestio I: De essentia peccati
Articulus I: De notione et conditionibus peccati
Articulus II: De peccato omissionis negative voluntario
Articulus III: De peccato commissionis externo, indirecte aut in causa voluntario
Articulus IV: De elementis constitutivis peccati
Articulus V: De definitione peccati
Quaestio II: De distinctione peccatorum
Articulus I: De distinctione specifica
Articulus II: De distinctione numerica
Quaestio III: De comparatione et gravitate peccatorum
Quaestio IV: De subiecto peccati
Articulus I: De motibus seu peccatis sensualitatis
Articulus II: De consensu in delectationem seu de delectatione morosa
Articulus III: De consensu in actum seu de desiderio et gaudio
Pars I: De causis peccatorum
Quaestio I: De causis peccati interioribus
Articulus I: De ignorantia causa peccati ex parte rationis
Articulus II: De passione causa peccati ex parte appetitus sensitivi
Articulus III: De malitia causa peccati ex parte voluntatis
Quaestio II: De causis peccatorum exterioribus
Articulus I: De deo permittente
Articulus II: De diabolo tentante
S. Th. I-II, q. 80; De Malo q. 3, a. 3, 4, 5.
481. The devil is not the cause of sin except indirectly: a) by way of persuader, not indeed directly moving the intellect which he does not intend to illuminate, because the more it were illuminated the more it would be withdrawn from the deception which the devil desires; but internally instigating or working in the senses and imagination by which he wills to cloud the intellect, and moving the sensitive appetite; b) sometimes externally proposing to the senses an object as suave, pleasant, etc., or even visibly appearing (I Thes. III, 5; I Pet. V, 8).
482. Are all sins from the temptation of the devil? — All sins, although they proceed indirectly from the devil (I John III, 8), inasmuch as [he is] the cause of original sin (from which we are inclined to sin), nevertheless do not all proceed directly from his instigation, but either from the sollicitations of the world, i.e. of sinners, or from the very nature of man vitiated, or from the will alone.
483. Temptation is wont to be called the sollicitation or incitement to sin. Which word originally and in a broad sense sounds the same as examination or testing: « to tempt is to take an experiment about something » (I q. 114, a. 2), to the end that something may be known, and this is the temptation of testing which can also be attributed to God, who tests the faithful by afflictions and extraordinary commands and explores their virtue and constancy (Deut. XIII, 3), not that he himself may know what they are but that man may show it (I Tim. VI, 9). In the present however the word is taken in a stricter sense and there is question only of the temptation of seduction, which is the incitement to sin whether internal or external: this is not from God (James I, 13), although he permits temptation (I Cor. X, 13), but proceeds from our corrupted nature, also from the world, especially from the demon. And it can be grave or light according as it vehemently incites the will or not; its force however depends on the nature of the thing, on the vividness of representation, on the intensity of appetite.
Since however by its nature it is only the sollicitation to evil, of itself it is not sin itself, but it can be the cause of sin, the consent of the will being added; whence the following principles about it can be stated.
484. Principle I. To feel temptation is not sin but to consent: not the feeling or pleasure, but the consent and complacency. To feel, i.e. to have intellectual awareness of the sollicitation, indeed to be moved by the delight of evil and so to experience and feel (even by the inferior faculties) that it is pleasing and agreeable; this is not yet sin; but voluntarily to adhere to the evil to which one is sollicited: for only the free act from the consent of the will is morally evil. Which is altogether certain from common doctrine, which is moreover proved from the Council of Trent itself, sess. 5, can. 5 and from the condemnation of prop. 50 of Baius.
Which, that it may be more easily applied in practice, it is well in the process of temptation to distinguish three stages. There are namely:
a) suggestion or the mere representation, or mere idea of evil: the simple proposition of evil through imagination and intellect, and this, however wicked and long-lasting, is not sin because in it the will has no part;
b) undeliberate delight, arising from suggestion in the sensitive or even rational appetite, by which the temptation pleases: for frequently and connaturally from suggestion, especially if it is vivid, intense, or long continued, there arises delight, indeed an organic pleasing impression and a sensible commotion, by which one is affected toward the pleasing object: this also, until deliberation of reason intervenes, is no sin, because such a movement is not deliberate nor free;
c) free consent of the will: after reason has perceived the wicked suggestion and also the delight in the appetite arising from it, and its malice, if the will immediately rejects both, there is no sin: for this is not in the intellect alone, or in the sensitive appetite, or in the spontaneous inclination of the rational appetite, but in the free will which adheres to evil; but if it freely consents to the delight or in it has complacency for itself or admits it, approves it or retains it because it pleases or adheres to it, then sin will be present.
485. Principle II. Rashly and without just cause to provoke temptation or to expose oneself to it is illicit, more or less according to the gravity of the danger.
For temptation involves some danger of sinning, more or less grave. But to expose oneself to the danger of sinning without sufficient reason is not licit (n. 177). Therefore it is also illicit to expose oneself to temptation without a just cause; which must be proportionate to the gravity of the temptation, i.e. to the incitement and danger of sinning, considered not only absolutely and in itself, but also relatively to diverse individuals. And indeed:
a) It is gravely illicit without sufficient reason freely to expose oneself to a grave temptation of a graver sin, which namely involves a proximate danger of gravely sinning.
b) It is licit from a grave just cause to expose oneself to a grave temptation with a proximate danger of gravely sinning, provided due precautions are used to remove the danger and at the same time there is a founded hope of overcoming the temptation.
c) It is lightly illicit without just cause lightly to expose oneself to a light temptation of gravely sinning or to a grave temptation of lightly sinning.
486. Observation. — For avoiding and overcoming temptations, suitable remedies are to be used:
A. Before temptation: 1) watchfulness to prevent many and graver ones (I Pet. V, 8; Mk. XIII, 37), for which it is necessary a) to flee occasions, b) to avoid idleness and useless wanderings of mind, from which often dangerous phantasms arise, c) also positively to convert the powers of the soul and the passions to good, useful, and religious things;
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prayer (Mt. XXVI, 41; VI, 13; Lk. XI, 4), for which are required a) humility (James IV, 6), b) trust (Phil. IV, 13), and c) fervor;
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to which can usefully be added the practice of meditation, as e.g. of the passion of Christ, of the last things, of the presence of God, by which we are moved to pray more fervently and to flee sin and occasions.
B. In temptation one is to resist: 1) immediately and from the beginning, when the enemy is still weak and victory is easier;
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strenuously and strongly: for if we hesitate and waver, or only mildly resist, the enemy becomes bolder and attacks more sharply;
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perseveringly, until he has been fully conquered.
Thus a) by praying, b) by working strenuously, c) not arguing with the enemy, d) by turning the mind to the work of virtue, e) and turning it away from vice.
C. After temptation is ended or overcome, it is expedient: 1) humbly to give thanks to God, to whom alone the victory is to be attributed; nor ever to be downcast but confidently to flee to the mercy of God; 2) not to examine oneself longer about consent given or refused, lest a new temptation be provoked;
- to open graver temptations to a prudent and pious spiritual director, and to seek his counsel.