Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. I-II, q. 75, a. 1 and 2; De Malo, q. 1, a. 3.

461. How sin has a cause. — Sin 1° on the part of the act (the material element) has, like any act and any being, an agent cause per se, namely the potency of man, especially the will insofar as it intends some created good; 2° on the part of the inordination (the formal element) it has a cause in the way in which a negation can have a cause:

a) an agent cause per accidens: for to the placement of one effect follows the absence of another, and so a cause intending the placement is, accidentally, the cause of the consequent negation, as fire causing heat consequently causes the privation of cold; thus the will intending a created good opposed to the law simultaneously produces the privation of conformity with the law attached to this good, which however it does not intend but which it causes consequently, accidentally, and beside the intention. Whence the cause of sin of itself on the part of the act is also accidentally the cause of the inordination;

b) it has a deficient cause: for in sin there is not mere negation but privation; but what ought to be in some effect would never be absent except because of the defect of some cause; therefore the will causes sin insofar as it falls short of the direction of the rule of reason and the law of God, i.e. insofar as it does not attend to it or does not use it. Nor is this defect or lack of the rule already sin (although it is a physical imperfection), but that the will with this lack proceeds to choose and act.

462. Sin has four interior causes on the part of the act: two proximate and immediate, reason and will, which are required in every sin; two remote and mediate, sensitive cognition and the consequent appetite, when sin is concerned with a sensible good. In this case imagination begins (at least ordinarily) and proposes the delightful good to the sensitive appetite, and immediately by that very fact the appetite is moved toward it, preceding reason and enticing it to approve and judge it as good. Then reason adverts to various advantages and disadvantages of this delightful good, even that it is or perhaps is against the law of God. Reason nevertheless, falling short of the rule, can approve it: then the will, by consenting to it, completes and perfects (by delight, by desire, or by work) the notion of sin (James I, 14-15).

463. Division of the question. — Sin therefore is from reason directing badly, from appetite inclining under the guidance of imagination, and from will perfecting. Hence we shall say:

1° of ignorance which is the cause of sin on the part of reason;

2° of infirmity or passion which is the cause of sin on the part of the sensitive appetite;

3° of malice (or contempt) which is the cause of sin on the part of the will.

Thus according to that of Isidore, de Summo Bono, bk. 2: « In three ways sin is committed, that is by ignorance, infirmity, and purpose ». For sins are called sins of ignorance, infirmity, or malice, according as the principal cause of them or principle of sinning is ignorance, passion, or malice¹.

(On Sins of Ignorance).

S. Th. I-II, q. 76; De Malo q. 3, a. 6, 7, 8.

464. On the part of reason the cause of sin is ignorance and inconsideration of the intellect, not any whatsoever but that which removes the knowledge (whether universal of right or particular of fact or circumstance) which, if it were present or more fully present, sin would not be done. Whence it is not the cause of sin of itself, but accidentally insofar as it removes that which would impede sin. — But if someone is so disposed that without ignorance he would nevertheless sin, the ignorance would not be the cause of sin: such a one does not sin from ignorance or because of ignorance, but sins with ignorance or ignorantly. Thus if the ignorance is concomitant, or even if it is affected but precisely for the sake of sinning more freely.

For every sin, even one done from malice, ignorance or error is required in the last practical judgment, by which reason erroneously judges such an act to be illicit or to be good for him here and now¹; but sins of ignorance are those which also proceed from a culpably erroneous speculative judgment².

465. Ignorance can be sin (the contrary was condemned in Coelestius and Abelard), not indeed of itself: for it is an intellectual evil, not a moral one, but by reason of a preceding negligence in learning or an actual one in considering (Lk. XII, 48; I Tim. I, 13). Nevertheless not every ignorance is sin: for invincible ignorance, which someone could not repel, is not sin, as is evident from prop. 68 of Baius, and 2 by Alex.

VIII condemned³.; but vincible ignorance is only sin if it is about those things which someone is bound to know, or which are necessary for directing his own acts and without which he cannot rightly exercise the due act.

Whence for sin it does not suffice that ignorance be voluntary, but moreover it is necessary that it be culpable. For which three things are required: 1) in order that it be voluntary 1) that one could have removed it, i.e. that he had the means for it, and 2) that he in some way adverts to it; but in order that it be culpable, moreover 3) that one was bound to prevent the ignorance, i.e. to use means lest ignorance follow: thus ignorance of medical science is not culpable for a farmer and a lawyer, but for a physician.

All however are bound to know a) the articles or fundamental truths of faith, b) the universal precepts of law, namely of the Decalogue and of the Church; c) but each individual [is bound to know] those things which pertain to his state or office, at least those which are common and often occur.

Moreover ignorance can be a special sin. — Vincible ignorance 1) of a thing which we are bound to know habitually or by reason of itself (ignorance of right) is a special sin of omission, distinct from the sins which follow from it, because the ignorance itself is morally evil in itself, and because the sinner thus violates two diverse precepts.

As e.g. if one were voluntarily ignorant of the incarnation or of the malice of adultery or of the five precepts of the Church, and therefore blasphemed Christ, or committed adultery, or ate meat, he would be guilty of a twofold sin.

On the contrary 2) ignorance of a thing which one is bound to know, not indeed permanently and by reason of itself, but transiently and because of the work to be done here and now (ignorance of a particular fact, as e.g. of a circumstance of the act) is not a sin distinct from the sin which follows from it, or to which it exposes, because it is not evil except by reason of the evil effect, and therefore the sinner acts against only one precept and one virtue.

Thus negligence in inquiring whether the present day is a day of fast (even if it were not a day of fast), because from the same precept he is bound both to fast and to inquire.

466. Principles. I. Invincible and antecedent ignorance of itself totally excuses from the whole sin the work which is done from it, because it renders it involuntary (Gen. IX, 21); accidentally it does not entirely excuse if it is not total but partial, because only the circumstance is ignored which, if known, sin would not be done, and yet knowingly sin is done, as e.g. the killing of a man by one who does not know him to be a father (Gen. XXXVIII). Whence it excuses insofar as it is ignorance.

II. Invincible and concomitant ignorance does not entirely excuse: it excuses from the sin of the external work which is done with it because it renders it non-voluntary; but it does not entirely excuse the agent himself, because it does not take away all will of sinning or internal affection for sin, since the work would nevertheless be done if the ignorance were not present, as e.g. he who kills an enemy, thinking him to be a beast, would nevertheless kill if he knew. Such ignorance neither excuses namely entirely, nor accuses.

III. Vincible and consequent ignorance of those things which someone is bound to know, if it is the cause of sin which otherwise would not be done, does not excuse entirely from the sin the work which is done from it, because it remains voluntary (since the ignorance itself is voluntary), but it diminishes it because it renders it involuntary in a qualified sense. Whence it accuses, as being voluntary, and does not excuse from the whole but from so much, as e.g. wounding from drunkenness.

IV. Vincible but affected ignorance, and excited precisely for the sake of sinning more freely, in no way excuses from sin but rather increases it, because it proceeds from a greater will of sinning. Whence it simply accuses.

(On Sins of Infirmity)

S. Th. I-II, q. 77; q. 9, a. 2; De Malo, q. 3, a. 9, 10, 11.

467. On the part of the sensitive appetite the cause of sin is passion, by which man is moved to a sensible good or is drawn back from a sensible evil, against the good or order of reason. Since however passions are certain infirmities of the soul which weaken and impede the use of reason and will, the sins which proceed from them are wont to be called sins of infirmity (Rom. VII, 23; James I, 14).

468. Passion cannot directly draw or move the will, but only indirectly. And indeed

1° on the part of the subject, by a certain subtraction, distracting the strength from the will: for since all the powers proceed from the soul as from one root, it follows that a) the intense exercise of one potency diminishes the power of acting in others, and b) man, while attending intensely to one thing, is less attentive to others. Whence the more intensely the sensitive appetite acts, the more remiss the strength of the will becomes or its movement is impeded¹;

2° by contrariety, on the part of the object or good which reason apprehends, inclining toward a good contrary to reason: a) for to man in passion the good appears which does not appear to him existing outside passion, as to one loving or angry the good appears which does not appear to one at rest, and so passion often tends to an object contrary to reason; moreover b) passion involves a vehement apprehension of imagination, which reason needs in its exercise, and by which in the case it is inclined to consider the object of passion especially and to approve and judge it good. Whence it happens that the judgment of reason and consequently the will often follow passion and act otherwise than if passion were not present²;

3° by bodily alteration, sometimes so transforming the body that imagination depends solely on the disposition of the body and is no longer governed by reason, in which case it totally binds the cognition of reason and impedes its deliberation and use, and consequently sin: thus many because of the abundance of love and anger are turned into madness.

469. The inordinate love of self is the cause of every sin. — For to love someone is to wish good to him; but by sin one inordinately wills good to himself; whence sin proceeds from this, that one inordinately loves himself.

The good which man inordinately desires for himself, however, is threefold:

a) goods delightful according to touch or sense of the flesh, which pertain to the preservation of the individual and of the species, and the inordinate appetite of these is concupiscence of the flesh or natural;

b) goods delightful according to the apprehension of imagination, such as money, external goods, splendor, pomp, ornament of clothing, etc., and the inordinate appetite of these is concupiscence of the eyes or cupidity for those things which appear exteriorly to the senses and thus known please;

c) finally the inordinate appetite of a difficult or arduous, and therefore excellent, good is called pride of life, which is the appetite of excellence.

These three are the cause of all sins (I John II, 16); to these also can be reduced all the passions which are the cause of sin: to the first two all the passions of the concupiscible, to the third all the passions of the irascible.

470. Principles. I. Passion which totally binds the use of reason, impedes deliberation and freedom and accordingly excuses from sin, unless it was voluntarily contracted in cause, as e.g. from drunkenness.

II. Antecedent passion and cause of sin does not entirely excuse from sin but diminishes it because it renders it less free.

III. Consequent passion, as being voluntary and free, in no way excuses nor diminishes, but either is a sign of the magnitude of sin, if it proceeds from it by redundancy, or increases it, if it is directly chosen and excited for the more intense sinning; as was said in the tr. on Hum. Acts. n. 180³.

(On Sins of Malice)

S. Th. I-II, q. 78; II-II, q. 14; De Malo q. 3, a. 12-15.

471. On the part of the will the cause of sin is malice or depravity and perversity (Ps. LI) by which the will, with no ignorance or passion influencing, of itself knowingly and purposefully chooses evil (Job XXXIV, 27), not because it wills evil as evil, which is impossible, but inasmuch as it prefers the privation of a spiritual good to the absence of a temporal good, and loves the lesser good more. Then the will is said to do evil not only choosing but from choice, as happens a) in affected ignorance which it chooses for the sake of sinning more freely; or b) in passion which it studiously excites for the more intense sinning; or c) in an evil habit voluntarily and freely admitted. Which can also be done in venial [sins].

472. Sins from an evil habit are done from malice. — For since a vicious habit is freely acquired, if also at present it is freely preserved by the will not withdrawing it, man who does not act from inadvertence or passion according to the habit, but knowingly and freely uses his habit, sins from malice, because he acts from a will confirmed in evil or from an evil inclination of the will by which it is established in evil. Then the will is said to do evil, not according to habit but from habit. — Nevertheless not every sin from malice is from habit; but man can also without habit purposefully choose evil (as the evil angels and the first man did), whether from an innate or acquired predisposition of body, or from the removal of a hindrance of faith, hope, fear, etc.

473. Principle. It is graver, other things being equal, to sin from malice than from passion (or, a fortiori, from ignorance), because 1) it is done from a movement more proper to the will, since in no way is the will moved by an impulse extrinsic to it (such as passion) but entirely of itself; « whence sin is so much the more aggravated as the malice is more vehement, and is so much the more diminished as the passion is more vehement »; — 2) he who sins from passion, since this quickly passes, easily returns to the good proposed, but he who sins from malice often sins from habit and therefore more lastingly; — 3) he who sins from passion has the will ordinarily ordered to good: for he proposes and seeks good, but sometimes withdraws from the proposal because of passion; but he who sins from malice is badly disposed as to the very end itself, because he has a firm resolve of sinning. The end, however, in moral matters is the first principle. Whence he who sins from malice sins more gravely because a defect of the principle is worst, and more dangerously because he is not easily recalled from sin.

474. Special of malice are sins against the Holy Spirit. — These are those which are done directly against the good which is attributed to the Holy Spirit by appropriation, namely the goodness and love of God, and indeed from malice or choice of evil. Which name taken from Scripture (Mt. XII, 31; Mk. III, 29, Lk. XII, 10), there designates that sin of the Pharisees by which the miraculous works of Christ, done by the power of the Holy Spirit that men might be saved and withdrawn from evil, out of malice they attributed to the devil; which is to fight against the truth manifested and clearly proposed and known. By the Fathers and Scholastics however by analogy it was extended to designate all similar sins, which maliciously despise the means granted by the Holy Spirit to convert man and withdraw him from sin.

For these, therefore, two things are required: a) that they be from malice, i.e. not from a sudden movement of passion (as can also happen for despair, hatred of God, etc.), but from the will alone deliberating and moving itself to evil. But this does not suffice, otherwise all who sinned from habit would sin against the Holy Spirit; but b) a special malice is required, from this, that one despises and casts away the things which could have impeded sin or procured its remission; which means are the effects of the grace of the Holy Spirit in us, and therefore he who thus acts from malice, properly sins against the Holy Spirit. Therefore these are those sins by which man through contempt casts away the means granted by the goodness of the Holy Spirit by which he could have been withdrawn from sin.

475. Six are numbered by the Scholastics as sins against the Holy Spirit. — For man is withdrawn from sin: a) on the part of divine judgment, either 1° by consideration of mercy through hope, which is cast away by despair; or 2° by consideration of justice through fear, which is taken away by that presumption by which one wishes to obtain glory by God's mercy alone and without merits or penitence; b) on the part of the gifts of God, either 3° by the knowledge of truth through faith, against which is set impugnment of the known truth, that with greater license one may sin; or 4° by interior help of grace, against which is set envy of fraternal grace, while someone is grieved not only by the good of neighbor but by the very increase of grace in souls; c) on the part of sin, either 5° by the inordination and baseness of sin, which, by actual grace moving, lead to penitence, and to this is opposed impenitence, which is not the mere death in sin but the resolve of not doing penance; or 6° by the smallness and brevity of the good which is found in sin, which, by actual grace moving, induce man to this, that in sin he not be confirmed, and to this is opposed obstinacy, i.e. a firm resolve of persisting in sin.

Hatred of God, although of itself it is a sin of the greatest malice, is not placed among the sins against the Holy Spirit, because it is more grave than they, and because in some way it is implicitly contained in all.

476. Sin against the Holy Spirit is called irremissible: not as if it could not be remitted by the grace of God, nor because in fact it is never remitted, but it is such by its nature, because it directly excludes those things by which the remission of sins is accomplished, and includes the disposition of obstinacy which of itself is permanent, and while it remains is an obstacle of positive resistance to the action of divine grace. Whence it is remitted most difficultly and rarely and only as it were miraculously, because, despising the gifts necessary for remission, it directly fights against every conversion to God.

477. Observation. — Sins of malice which are from the inclination of habit are never first, because they presuppose the acts from which the habit was caused. Sins against the Holy Spirit ordinarily presuppose other sins, because man is wont to proceed from the more imperfect and lesser sin to the perfect and greater; however someone can, because of the freedom of choice¹, even in the first act sin from contempt against the Holy Spirit.