Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. I-II, q. 75, a. 1 and 2; De Malo, q. 1, a. 3.

461. How sin has a cause. — Sin 1° on the part of the act (the material element) has, like any act and any being, an agent cause per se, namely the potency of man, especially the will insofar as it intends some created good; 2° on the part of the inordination (the formal element) it has a cause in the way in which a negation can have a cause:

a) an agent cause per accidens: for to the placement of one effect follows the absence of another, and so a cause intending the placement is, accidentally, the cause of the consequent negation, as fire causing heat consequently causes the privation of cold; thus the will intending a created good opposed to the law simultaneously produces the privation of conformity with the law attached to this good, which however it does not intend but which it causes consequently, accidentally, and beside the intention. Whence the cause of sin of itself on the part of the act is also accidentally the cause of the inordination;

b) it has a deficient cause: for in sin there is not mere negation but privation; but what ought to be in some effect would never be absent except because of the defect of some cause; therefore the will causes sin insofar as it falls short of the direction of the rule of reason and the law of God, i.e. insofar as it does not attend to it or does not use it. Nor is this defect or lack of the rule already sin (although it is a physical imperfection), but that the will with this lack proceeds to choose and act.

462. Sin has four interior causes on the part of the act: two proximate and immediate, reason and will, which are required in every sin; two remote and mediate, sensitive cognition and the consequent appetite, when sin is concerned with a sensible good. In this case imagination begins (at least ordinarily) and proposes the delightful good to the sensitive appetite, and immediately by that very fact the appetite is moved toward it, preceding reason and enticing it to approve and judge it as good. Then reason adverts to various advantages and disadvantages of this delightful good, even that it is or perhaps is against the law of God. Reason nevertheless, falling short of the rule, can approve it: then the will, by consenting to it, completes and perfects (by delight, by desire, or by work) the notion of sin (James I, 14-15).

463. Division of the question. — Sin therefore is from reason directing badly, from appetite inclining under the guidance of imagination, and from will perfecting. Hence we shall say:

1° of ignorance which is the cause of sin on the part of reason;

2° of infirmity or passion which is the cause of sin on the part of the sensitive appetite;

3° of malice (or contempt) which is the cause of sin on the part of the will.

Thus according to that of Isidore, de Summo Bono, bk. 2: « In three ways sin is committed, that is by ignorance, infirmity, and purpose ». For sins are called sins of ignorance, infirmity, or malice, according as the principal cause of them or principle of sinning is ignorance, passion, or malice¹.

(On Sins of Ignorance).

S. Th. I-II, q. 76; De Malo q. 3, a. 6, 7, 8.

464. On the part of reason the cause of sin is ignorance and inconsideration of the intellect, not any whatsoever but that which removes the knowledge (whether universal of right or particular of fact or circumstance) which, if it were present or more fully present, sin would not be done. Whence it is not the cause of sin of itself, but accidentally insofar as it removes that which would impede sin. — But if someone is so disposed that without ignorance he would nevertheless sin, the ignorance would not be the cause of sin: such a one does not sin from ignorance or because of ignorance, but sins with ignorance or ignorantly. Thus if the ignorance is concomitant, or even if it is affected but precisely for the sake of sinning more freely.

For every sin, even one done from malice, ignorance or error is required in the last practical judgment, by which reason erroneously judges such an act to be illicit or to be good for him here and now¹; but sins of ignorance are those which also proceed from a culpably erroneous speculative judgment².

465. Ignorance can be sin (the contrary was condemned in Coelestius and Abelard), not indeed of itself: for it is an intellectual evil, not a moral one, but by reason of a preceding negligence in learning or an actual one in considering (Lk. XII, 48; I Tim. I, 13). Nevertheless not every ignorance is sin: for invincible ignorance, which someone could not repel, is not sin, as is evident from prop. 68 of Baius, and 2 by Alex.

VIII condemned³.; but vincible ignorance is only sin if it is about those things which someone is bound to know, or which are necessary for directing his own acts and without which he cannot rightly exercise the due act.

Whence for sin it does not suffice that ignorance be voluntary, but moreover it is necessary that it be culpable. For which three things are required: 1) in order that it be voluntary 1) that one could have removed it, i.e. that he had the means for it, and 2) that he in some way adverts to it; but in order that it be culpable, moreover 3) that one was bound to prevent the ignorance, i.e. to use means lest ignorance follow: thus ignorance of medical science is not culpable for a farmer and a lawyer, but for a physician.

All however are bound to know a) the articles or fundamental truths of faith, b) the universal precepts of law, namely of the Decalogue and of the Church; c) but each individual [is bound to know] those things which pertain to his state or office, at least those which are common and often occur.

Moreover ignorance can be a special sin. — Vincible ignorance 1) of a thing which we are bound to know habitually or by reason of itself (ignorance of right) is a special sin of omission, distinct from the sins which follow from it, because the ignorance itself is morally evil in itself, and because the sinner thus violates two diverse precepts.

As e.g. if one were voluntarily ignorant of the incarnation or of the malice of adultery or of the five precepts of the Church, and therefore blasphemed Christ, or committed adultery, or ate meat, he would be guilty of a twofold sin.

On the contrary 2) ignorance of a thing which one is bound to know, not indeed permanently and by reason of itself, but transiently and because of the work to be done here and now (ignorance of a particular fact, as e.g. of a circumstance of the act) is not a sin distinct from the sin which follows from it, or to which it exposes, because it is not evil except by reason of the evil effect, and therefore the sinner acts against only one precept and one virtue.

Thus negligence in inquiring whether the present day is a day of fast (even if it were not a day of fast), because from the same precept he is bound both to fast and to inquire.

466. Principles. I. Invincible and antecedent ignorance of itself totally excuses from the whole sin the work which is done from it, because it renders it involuntary (Gen. IX, 21); accidentally it does not entirely excuse if it is not total but partial, because only the circumstance is ignored which, if known, sin would not be done, and yet knowingly sin is done, as e.g. the killing of a man by one who does not know him to be a father (Gen. XXXVIII). Whence it excuses insofar as it is ignorance.

II. Invincible and concomitant ignorance does not entirely excuse: it excuses from the sin of the external work which is done with it because it renders it non-voluntary; but it does not entirely excuse the agent himself, because it does not take away all will of sinning or internal affection for sin, since the work would nevertheless be done if the ignorance were not present, as e.g. he who kills an enemy, thinking him to be a beast, would nevertheless kill if he knew. Such ignorance neither excuses namely entirely, nor accuses.

III. Vincible and consequent ignorance of those things which someone is bound to know, if it is the cause of sin which otherwise would not be done, does not excuse entirely from the sin the work which is done from it, because it remains voluntary (since the ignorance itself is voluntary), but it diminishes it because it renders it involuntary in a qualified sense. Whence it accuses, as being voluntary, and does not excuse from the whole but from so much, as e.g. wounding from drunkenness.

IV. Vincible but affected ignorance, and excited precisely for the sake of sinning more freely, in no way excuses from sin but rather increases it, because it proceeds from a greater will of sinning. Whence it simply accuses.

(On Sins of Infirmity)

S. Th. I-II, q. 77; q. 9, a. 2; De Malo, q. 3, a. 9, 10, 11.

467. On the part of the sensitive appetite the cause of sin is passion, by which man is moved to a sensible good or is drawn back from a sensible evil, against the good or order of reason. Since however passions are certain infirmities of the soul which weaken and impede the use of reason and will, the sins which proceed from them are wont to be called sins of infirmity (Rom. VII, 23; James I, 14).

468. Passion cannot directly draw or move the will, but only indirectly. And indeed

1° on the part of the subject, by a certain subtraction, distracting the strength from the will: for since all the powers proceed from the soul as from one root, it follows that a) the intense exercise of one potency diminishes the power of acting in others, and b) man, while attending intensely to one thing, is less attentive to others. Whence the more intensely the sensitive appetite acts, the more remiss the strength of the will becomes or its movement is impeded¹;

2° by contrariety, on the part of the object or good which reason apprehends, inclining toward a good contrary to reason: a) for to man in passion the good appears which does not appear to him existing outside passion, as to one loving or angry the good appears which does not appear to one at rest, and so passion often tends to an object contrary to reason; moreover b) passion involves a vehement apprehension of imagination, which reason needs in its exercise, and by which in the case it is inclined to consider the object of passion especially and to approve and judge it good. Whence it happens that the judgment of reason and consequently the will often follow passion and act otherwise than if passion were not present²;

3° by bodily alteration, sometimes so transforming the body that imagination depends solely on the disposition of the body and is no longer governed by reason, in which case it totally binds the cognition of reason and impedes its deliberation and use, and consequently sin: thus many because of the abundance of love and anger are turned into madness.

469. The inordinate love of self is the cause of every sin. — For to love someone is to wish good to him; but by sin one inordinately wills good to himself; whence sin proceeds from this, that one inordinately loves himself.

The good which man inordinately desires for himself, however, is threefold:

a) goods delightful according to touch or sense of the flesh, which pertain to the preservation of the individual and of the species, and the inordinate appetite of these is concupiscence of the flesh or natural;

b) goods delightful according to the apprehension of imagination, such as money, external goods, splendor, pomp, ornament of clothing, etc., and the inordinate appetite of these is concupiscence of the eyes or cupidity for those things which appear exteriorly to the senses and thus known please;

c) finally the inordinate appetite of a difficult or arduous, and therefore excellent, good is called pride of life, which is the appetite of excellence.

These three are the cause of all sins (I John II, 16); to these also can be reduced all the passions which are the cause of sin: to the first two all the passions of the concupiscible, to the third all the passions of the irascible.

470. Principles. I. Passion which totally binds the use of reason, impedes deliberation and freedom and accordingly excuses from sin, unless it was voluntarily contracted in cause, as e.g. from drunkenness.

II. Antecedent passion and cause of sin does not entirely excuse from sin but diminishes it because it renders it less free.

III. Consequent passion, as being voluntary and free, in no way excuses nor diminishes, but either is a sign of the magnitude of sin, if it proceeds from it by redundancy, or increases it, if it is directly chosen and excited for the more intense sinning; as was said in the tr. on Hum. Acts. n. 180³.

(On Sins of Malice)

S. Th. I-II, q. 78; II-II, q. 14; De Malo q. 3, a. 12-15.

471. On the part of the will the cause of sin is malice or depravity and perversity (Ps. LI) by which the will, with no ignorance or passion influencing, of itself knowingly and purposefully chooses evil (Job XXXIV, 27), not because it wills evil as evil, which is impossible, but inasmuch as it prefers the privation of a spiritual good to the absence of a temporal good, and loves the lesser good more. Then the will is said to do evil not only choosing but from choice, as happens a) in affected ignorance which it chooses for the sake of sinning more freely; or b) in passion which it studiously excites for the more intense sinning; or c) in an evil habit voluntarily and freely admitted. Which can also be done in venial [sins].

472. Sins from an evil habit are done from malice. — For since a vicious habit is freely acquired, if also at present it is freely preserved by the will not withdrawing it, man who does not act from inadvertence or passion according to the habit, but knowingly and freely uses his habit, sins from malice, because he acts from a will confirmed in evil or from an evil inclination of the will by which it is established in evil. Then the will is said to do evil, not according to habit but from habit. — Nevertheless not every sin from malice is from habit; but man can also without habit purposefully choose evil (as the evil angels and the first man did), whether from an innate or acquired predisposition of body, or from the removal of a hindrance of faith, hope, fear, etc.

473. Principle. It is graver, other things being equal, to sin from malice than from passion (or, a fortiori, from ignorance), because 1) it is done from a movement more proper to the will, since in no way is the will moved by an impulse extrinsic to it (such as passion) but entirely of itself; « whence sin is so much the more aggravated as the malice is more vehement, and is so much the more diminished as the passion is more vehement »; — 2) he who sins from passion, since this quickly passes, easily returns to the good proposed, but he who sins from malice often sins from habit and therefore more lastingly; — 3) he who sins from passion has the will ordinarily ordered to good: for he proposes and seeks good, but sometimes withdraws from the proposal because of passion; but he who sins from malice is badly disposed as to the very end itself, because he has a firm resolve of sinning. The end, however, in moral matters is the first principle. Whence he who sins from malice sins more gravely because a defect of the principle is worst, and more dangerously because he is not easily recalled from sin.

474. Special of malice are sins against the Holy Spirit. — These are those which are done directly against the good which is attributed to the Holy Spirit by appropriation, namely the goodness and love of God, and indeed from malice or choice of evil. Which name taken from Scripture (Mt. XII, 31; Mk. III, 29, Lk. XII, 10), there designates that sin of the Pharisees by which the miraculous works of Christ, done by the power of the Holy Spirit that men might be saved and withdrawn from evil, out of malice they attributed to the devil; which is to fight against the truth manifested and clearly proposed and known. By the Fathers and Scholastics however by analogy it was extended to designate all similar sins, which maliciously despise the means granted by the Holy Spirit to convert man and withdraw him from sin.

For these, therefore, two things are required: a) that they be from malice, i.e. not from a sudden movement of passion (as can also happen for despair, hatred of God, etc.), but from the will alone deliberating and moving itself to evil. But this does not suffice, otherwise all who sinned from habit would sin against the Holy Spirit; but b) a special malice is required, from this, that one despises and casts away the things which could have impeded sin or procured its remission; which means are the effects of the grace of the Holy Spirit in us, and therefore he who thus acts from malice, properly sins against the Holy Spirit. Therefore these are those sins by which man through contempt casts away the means granted by the goodness of the Holy Spirit by which he could have been withdrawn from sin.

475. Six are numbered by the Scholastics as sins against the Holy Spirit. — For man is withdrawn from sin: a) on the part of divine judgment, either 1° by consideration of mercy through hope, which is cast away by despair; or 2° by consideration of justice through fear, which is taken away by that presumption by which one wishes to obtain glory by God's mercy alone and without merits or penitence; b) on the part of the gifts of God, either 3° by the knowledge of truth through faith, against which is set impugnment of the known truth, that with greater license one may sin; or 4° by interior help of grace, against which is set envy of fraternal grace, while someone is grieved not only by the good of neighbor but by the very increase of grace in souls; c) on the part of sin, either 5° by the inordination and baseness of sin, which, by actual grace moving, lead to penitence, and to this is opposed impenitence, which is not the mere death in sin but the resolve of not doing penance; or 6° by the smallness and brevity of the good which is found in sin, which, by actual grace moving, induce man to this, that in sin he not be confirmed, and to this is opposed obstinacy, i.e. a firm resolve of persisting in sin.

Hatred of God, although of itself it is a sin of the greatest malice, is not placed among the sins against the Holy Spirit, because it is more grave than they, and because in some way it is implicitly contained in all.

476. Sin against the Holy Spirit is called irremissible: not as if it could not be remitted by the grace of God, nor because in fact it is never remitted, but it is such by its nature, because it directly excludes those things by which the remission of sins is accomplished, and includes the disposition of obstinacy which of itself is permanent, and while it remains is an obstacle of positive resistance to the action of divine grace. Whence it is remitted most difficultly and rarely and only as it were miraculously, because, despising the gifts necessary for remission, it directly fights against every conversion to God.

477. Observation. — Sins of malice which are from the inclination of habit are never first, because they presuppose the acts from which the habit was caused. Sins against the Holy Spirit ordinarily presuppose other sins, because man is wont to proceed from the more imperfect and lesser sin to the perfect and greater; however someone can, because of the freedom of choice¹, even in the first act sin from contempt against the Holy Spirit.

S. Th. I-II, q. 75, a. 3; De Malo q. 3, a. 3.

478. The exterior cause of sin is that which moves its interior cause, whether the will, or reason, or the sensitive appetite. No one can immediately move the will except God, who is not the cause of sin but permits it; man and the devil move reason by persuading sin; the sensitive appetite is moved by e.g. exterior objects apprehended in themselves or in imagination. Nothing however so moves the will that it necessarily sins.

S. Th. I-II, q. 79; De Malo q. 3, a. 1 and 2.

479. Sin, according to the formal element, insofar as it is privation, aversion, and defect, is not from God, who is not the cause except of being, nor can he move to aversion from himself: for he is the last end which inclines all things to himself. Which is de fide from C. Trid. sess. 6, can. 6, and from C. Araus. II, and Valentinus, and Later. IV.

But according to the material element or conversion: a) insofar as it is being, it is from God as from the first being by essence, and insofar as it is act, it is from God as from the first cause moving and applying all others to act; b) insofar however the material element is joined to a defect (or insofar as it is the foundation of privation), it is not from God but from a deficient cause, namely free choice: for the act of sin can be considered inadequately insofar as it retains something of the order of reason to good, and under this aspect it is not evil but good and is from God; also adequately, insofar as it does not have enough of the order of reason but deviates from it, and thus it is evil and is not from God but from the will falling short of the order. Just as whatever there is of motion in a limping is from the motive power of the soul, but that a defect of limping is joined to the motion, is not from the motive power but from the indisposition of the shin: so whatever there is of perfection and act in sin, is from God; but that this act is with a defect, is from free choice falling short of the order of reason: for God would move to a perfect act if free choice were not defectively disposed¹.

480. God is not the cause of sin, as defined by C. Trid. sess. 6, can. 6: a) not a cause directly and of himself, as is evident from the preceding; nor b) a cause accidentally or indirectly, although he could prevent sin, by giving motion or efficacious grace for good, and sometimes does not prevent, by not granting this grace or even withdrawing it from those who place an obstacle: for he is not bound to give such grace and to prevent sin, which he nevertheless permits according to wisdom and justice (cf. Ps. V, 5; Ecclus. XV, 21; Rom. IX, 14; James I, 13; Deut. XXXIII; Wis. XIV, 9 together with XI, 25).

S. Th. I-II, q. 80; De Malo q. 3, a. 3, 4, 5.

481. The devil is not the cause of sin except indirectly: a) by way of persuader, not indeed directly moving the intellect which he does not intend to illuminate, because the more it were illuminated the more it would be withdrawn from the deception which the devil desires; but internally instigating or working in the senses and imagination by which he wills to cloud the intellect, and moving the sensitive appetite; b) sometimes externally proposing to the senses an object as suave, pleasant, etc., or even visibly appearing (I Thes. III, 5; I Pet. V, 8).

482. Are all sins from the temptation of the devil? — All sins, although they proceed indirectly from the devil (I John III, 8), inasmuch as [he is] the cause of original sin (from which we are inclined to sin), nevertheless do not all proceed directly from his instigation, but either from the sollicitations of the world, i.e. of sinners, or from the very nature of man vitiated, or from the will alone.

483. Temptation is wont to be called the sollicitation or incitement to sin. Which word originally and in a broad sense sounds the same as examination or testing: « to tempt is to take an experiment about something » (I q. 114, a. 2), to the end that something may be known, and this is the temptation of testing which can also be attributed to God, who tests the faithful by afflictions and extraordinary commands and explores their virtue and constancy (Deut. XIII, 3), not that he himself may know what they are but that man may show it (I Tim. VI, 9). In the present however the word is taken in a stricter sense and there is question only of the temptation of seduction, which is the incitement to sin whether internal or external: this is not from God (James I, 13), although he permits temptation (I Cor. X, 13), but proceeds from our corrupted nature, also from the world, especially from the demon. And it can be grave or light according as it vehemently incites the will or not; its force however depends on the nature of the thing, on the vividness of representation, on the intensity of appetite.

Since however by its nature it is only the sollicitation to evil, of itself it is not sin itself, but it can be the cause of sin, the consent of the will being added; whence the following principles about it can be stated.

484. Principle I. To feel temptation is not sin but to consent: not the feeling or pleasure, but the consent and complacency. To feel, i.e. to have intellectual awareness of the sollicitation, indeed to be moved by the delight of evil and so to experience and feel (even by the inferior faculties) that it is pleasing and agreeable; this is not yet sin; but voluntarily to adhere to the evil to which one is sollicited: for only the free act from the consent of the will is morally evil. Which is altogether certain from common doctrine, which is moreover proved from the Council of Trent itself, sess. 5, can. 5 and from the condemnation of prop. 50 of Baius.

Which, that it may be more easily applied in practice, it is well in the process of temptation to distinguish three stages. There are namely:

a) suggestion or the mere representation, or mere idea of evil: the simple proposition of evil through imagination and intellect, and this, however wicked and long-lasting, is not sin because in it the will has no part;

b) undeliberate delight, arising from suggestion in the sensitive or even rational appetite, by which the temptation pleases: for frequently and connaturally from suggestion, especially if it is vivid, intense, or long continued, there arises delight, indeed an organic pleasing impression and a sensible commotion, by which one is affected toward the pleasing object: this also, until deliberation of reason intervenes, is no sin, because such a movement is not deliberate nor free;

c) free consent of the will: after reason has perceived the wicked suggestion and also the delight in the appetite arising from it, and its malice, if the will immediately rejects both, there is no sin: for this is not in the intellect alone, or in the sensitive appetite, or in the spontaneous inclination of the rational appetite, but in the free will which adheres to evil; but if it freely consents to the delight or in it has complacency for itself or admits it, approves it or retains it because it pleases or adheres to it, then sin will be present.

485. Principle II. Rashly and without just cause to provoke temptation or to expose oneself to it is illicit, more or less according to the gravity of the danger.

For temptation involves some danger of sinning, more or less grave. But to expose oneself to the danger of sinning without sufficient reason is not licit (n. 177). Therefore it is also illicit to expose oneself to temptation without a just cause; which must be proportionate to the gravity of the temptation, i.e. to the incitement and danger of sinning, considered not only absolutely and in itself, but also relatively to diverse individuals. And indeed:

a) It is gravely illicit without sufficient reason freely to expose oneself to a grave temptation of a graver sin, which namely involves a proximate danger of gravely sinning.

b) It is licit from a grave just cause to expose oneself to a grave temptation with a proximate danger of gravely sinning, provided due precautions are used to remove the danger and at the same time there is a founded hope of overcoming the temptation.

c) It is lightly illicit without just cause lightly to expose oneself to a light temptation of gravely sinning or to a grave temptation of lightly sinning.

486. Observation. — For avoiding and overcoming temptations, suitable remedies are to be used:

A. Before temptation: 1) watchfulness to prevent many and graver ones (I Pet. V, 8; Mk. XIII, 37), for which it is necessary a) to flee occasions, b) to avoid idleness and useless wanderings of mind, from which often dangerous phantasms arise, c) also positively to convert the powers of the soul and the passions to good, useful, and religious things;

2. prayer (Mt. XXVI, 41; VI, 13; Lk. XI, 4), for which are required a) humility (James IV, 6), b) trust (Phil. IV, 13), and c) fervor;

3. to which can usefully be added the practice of meditation, as e.g. of the passion of Christ, of the last things, of the presence of God, by which we are moved to pray more fervently and to flee sin and occasions.

B. In temptation one is to resist: 1) immediately and from the beginning, when the enemy is still weak and victory is easier;

2. strenuously and strongly: for if we hesitate and waver, or only mildly resist, the enemy becomes bolder and attacks more sharply;

3. perseveringly, until he has been fully conquered.

Thus a) by praying, b) by working strenuously, c) not arguing with the enemy, d) by turning the mind to the work of virtue, e) and turning it away from vice.

C. After temptation is ended or overcome, it is expedient: 1) humbly to give thanks to God, to whom alone the victory is to be attributed; nor ever to be downcast but confidently to flee to the mercy of God; 2) not to examine oneself longer about consent given or refused, lest a new temptation be provoked;

3. to open graver temptations to a prudent and pious spiritual director, and to seek his counsel.

S. Th. II-II, q. 62, a. 7; De Malo q. 13, a. 4, ad 19.

487. Man is the cause of sin: a) by transmitting original [sin], of which Dogmatics treats;

b) by suggesting and persuading actual sin to others, which is done by * scandal, namely both of the world (i.e. of evil men) by perverse and false principles, and by its evil works and examples by which it draws the weak, and by threats by which it terrifies the timid, and by the allurements of exterior goods which excite concupiscence (Mt. XVIII, 7; II Tim. III, 1-10; Rom. XII, 2; I John V, 19; II, 16). Scandal formally and principally is against charity, and therefore specifically of its malice is spoken of in the tr. on charity;

c) by cooperating with others, which can be done in 9 ways (6 positive and 3 negative): by commanding, by counseling, by consenting, by praising and blaming, by patronizing, by participating, by not warning, by not standing in the way, by not revealing. These are metonymically wont to be called the sins of another (I Tim. V, 22), because namely they are committed by others, yet are imputed to us, because in some way we are their cause inasmuch as we have cooperated to them as authors, helpers, or non-preventers. Whence they are at once another's and one's own, because committed by others, by reason of the cooperation they become one's own.

488. Cooperation in the sin of another is every concurrence given to the evil action of another¹.

A. By reason of the manner in which it is done: I. some is properly so called and directly voluntary, which is done by a positive act (the 6 former ways); II. some is improperly so called and indirectly voluntary, which is done by the omission of an action preventing the sin of one who can prevent it and is bound to do so (the 3 negative ways): this is called negative, the former positive.

Positive is twofold: 1) broadly so called, which is done by a moral influence on the will of the other who carries out the evil action (so that his will is moved to sin or is in some way determined): it is identified with direct scandal, which is not a mere occasion but also a true moral cause of another's sin, and is done by command, counsel, and seduction, by request and consent, by praise, by moral patronage;

2. strictly so called, which is done by a real influence on the evil effect itself, helping another to produce it, or partially causing with another principally acting the act or evil effect, which is done by participation or by real patronage (it is called a) immediate when the cooperator carries out with the principal agent the act of sin itself, as e.g. by helping a thief in taking another's thing, as if two by carrying one thing together steal it; b) mediate when the cooperator supplies something (matter, facility, means) which serves the principal agent for executing or more easily executing the evil work, as e.g. by handing over a ladder for stealing or by opening a window for a thief. This can be more or less proximate or remote, according as the medium supplied by its nature or by circumstances influences more or less and has a greater or lesser connection with the sin of the principal agent, as e.g. to hold the ladder for one ascending or to provide an infidel an idol is called proximate, to hand over a ladder or to sell the matter from which an idol is to be made, remote cooperation.

B. By reason of intention it is divided into formal when the cooperator consents to the evil will of the principal agent and intends his sin (as is done in direct scandal); and material when he does not intend the sin but does something foreseeing that the principal agent will abuse it for committing sin. The same act, therefore, can for diverse intention be formal or material cooperation: thus an innkeeper if he provides drink to someone with the end that he get drunk, is formal cooperation; but material only if for the sake of gain he provides drink to one who is foreseen to be going to get drunk².

489. Principles. Cooperation in evil generally is illicit because it is to place the cause of an evil effect; which cannot be licit, unless the action in itself is not evil, but at least indifferent, the intention is right, and the good effect is produced as immediately and equally as the evil compensating effect (n. 173). Hence:

a) Formal cooperation is always illicit, because it does not proceed from a right intention but intends the sin of the principal agent, and therefore is always sin of the same species as that, as consent in it and approval of it.

b) Immediate cooperation even merely material is illicit, because it is not an indifferent action but evil, indeed it is always sin of the same species as the sin of the principal agent, because it is to carry out with him and to do the very prohibited work; — unless sometimes there is question of goods of fortune the taking away of which the owner can consent to.

c) Mediate merely material cooperation, although not always and necessarily, yet of itself and ordinarily is illicit, because it is a sounding-evil act which is not licit except because of an extrinsic cohonesting reason: for if the effect or end is evil and prohibited, also the means for obtaining it will of themselves and ordinarily (unless there be an excusing reason) be prohibited; for if the means are voluntarily employed, also the effect will be voluntary in cause; if the means are culpably employed, the effect will be culpable in cause. Which is sin against the virtue which is injured by the sin of the principal agent (although not of the same lowest species), and at the same time against charity when, by omitting the cooperation, we can prevent the sin of neighbor.

d) Mediate merely material cooperation accidentally is licit, if there is present a proportionately grave reason³. Thus according to the rule handed down above about an action from which a twofold effect arises: it is licit to place a cause in itself good or indifferent, which has a twofold effect equally immediate: one good which alone is intended, and the other evil, provided a proportionately grave reason for acting is had (n. 173). Of these four conditions, the two middle ones in this cooperation are verified from the nature of the thing always; whence it is to be said that this cooperation is licit, if the action is not in itself evil (which is not always easy to determine), and if there is present a proportionately grave reason or sufficient cause of cooperating.

490. A proportionately grave reason or sufficient cause of cooperating is present, if the good end or effect, i.e. the utility and necessity of acting, compensates the evil effect or rather the influence on the evil effect: as e.g. if no other means is lacking, it is licit to mediate cooperate in the sin of another to avoid his greater sin (such as drunkenness that he not blaspheme), and to the harm of neighbor to avoid either his greater harm or one's own equal harm; of two evils the lesser is to be preferred.

Whence so much the graver a cause is required as the cooperation is graver, i.e.

a) as the sin to which one cooperates is graver, both in itself and with respect to the harm which it inflicts on the honor of God, the common good, or a third party, as e.g. a graver cause is required for cooperating in a sin of injustice than in another, because the cooperation is done not only to the spiritual harm of the sinner but also to the temporal harm of a third party, likewise for cooperating in homicide than in theft;

b) as the cooperation is nearer, i.e. as it more influences the sin of another or is more closely connected with it, as e.g. a graver cause is required for ordering characters in printing an evil book than for preparing papers, for sharpening the sword of killing than for the matter from which it is made;

c) as it is more probable that, if you do not cooperate, the other will not sin, as e.g. a greater cause is required for selling arms, wine, evil books, etc., if it is the only shop than if there are many who sell these things, for providing meat in a father's house than in a tavern.

491. Special practical rules can therefore be established as follows:

1st Proximate cooperation in an action which is gravely harmful to the public good whether of religion or of the commonwealth, is excused for no harm from mortal sin, because it is a perversion of order: to prefer a private good to the public and common good.

2nd If the evil action does not gravely harm the public good, proximate cooperation in it (especially if it is necessary for the execution of sin) will not be excused except for a grave cause or inconvenience; indeed if the cooperation is gravely harmful to an innocent third party, a very grave inconvenience is required, namely the fear of at least an equal harm.

3rd Remote cooperation, if the other is already equipped for sinning, is excused by a light cause; unless, by denying consent, the sin could be prevented: then indeed a notable fear of detriment is required.

492. Applications to cases. — That the doctrine above set forth, and in moral matter the everyday applications, may be better understood, it is well to illustrate it with some examples from approved authors about the cooperation of merchants and servants, which pertains to many matters, and therefore is more suited to general theology than other applications which pertain to special virtues.

A. About the cooperation of merchants: 1° To sell things indifferent in themselves and not destined for evil (painted papers, wine, arms, knives, meat on Friday, feminine ornament) is licit for the sole reason of gain, even if in general many are foreseen to abuse them: for the cooperation is sufficiently remote and the abuse cannot altogether be prevented.

2° If however this or that person is foreseen in particular to be the one to abuse:

a) the sale is not licit except for a cause proportionate to the grave sin, because the cooperation is proximate; hence it will not be licit to sell ornament to a girl who herself will use it for lust (or drink to one who will get drunk), even if among others it would equally be bought; unless to avoid notable harm or inconvenience or for a moderately grave cause (the loss of a fat client, the decrease of buyers, a grave quarrel, true blasphemy);

b) When by not selling, the sin is foreseen to be able to be prevented, a far graver cause is required; wherefore it is not licit, except perhaps for a most grave cause, to sell an evil book to an innocent person who otherwise would not be perverted.

c) If finally the other is to abuse to the harm of a third party, a fear of equivalent harm is required, as e.g. it is not licit to sell arms to one who will kill except to avoid one's own death or an equivalent evil, and scarcely ever will it be licit to sell things to those who, after making them adulterated, are truly harmful to others going to sell them, because this is gravely harmful to the public good.

3° Things not indifferent but destined for evil use, of themselves or by institution, and scarcely having another use, such as poison, truly obscene images, abortive means, it is not licit to sell unless it is clear that the danger of abuse is absent, or unless a very grave proportionate cause excuses.

4° Things which of their own nature have no other use than evil and which man without sin cannot use, it is never licit to sell, such as theatrical clothing manifestly base or instruments destined for preventing generation, a drug uniquely destined for abortion, the insignia of the Masonic sect; unless it were certain that someone seeks them for another end and will not abuse them.

B. About the cooperation of servants: 1° To hand over clothes, to prepare a horse or carriage for the master going forth to sin, to open the door for the concubine, to bring a torch, to prepare a bed, to bring an evil book or journal, to prepare meat on a forbidden day, to set out wine for the master going to get drunk, etc., is licit for the sole reason of service, because they are indifferent services and the cooperation in sin is remote.

2° To accompany the master or to carry him by car to the place of sin, as e.g. to the concubine, is not licit for the sole reason of service or gain, but there must be added the fear of some notable detriment (such as being ill-treated, expelled from the house, a grave quarrel) because the cooperation is nearer.

But if by the accompaniment of the servant the master becomes bolder in sinning, otherwise not going to sin, according to S. Alphonsus bk. II, n. 64, he will never be able to accompany him, according to others however he can because of the very great harm. And cases similar to this are: to keep watch while the master sins with his mistress and to warn him if anyone intervenes; — secretly to take information about the place in which such a girl is wont to frequent — to paint an image of a person basely loved — to offer a shoulder to one ascending to a non-consenting [virgin].

3° To carry gifts or love-letters to the concubine, according to S. Alphonsus, bk. II, n. 67, is illicit because, since they directly excite to sinning, it is intrinsically evil: for it is cooperation in the sin of the master and direct scandal to the concubine. Many authors however think this to be an indifferent work, which however will not be licit except to avoid grave harm, because the cooperation is sufficiently near; but it would be intrinsically evil to write at the same time and carry very base love-letters, or to approve them before such a person.

4° To offer a shoulder, to hold a ladder, to force open a window that the master may be able to ascend to deflower a virgin, will not be licit except for fear of death or equivalent evil, because the cooperation is altogether proximate and most injurious to an innocent third party (cf. Innoc. XI, prop. 51 condemned).

C. Especially about the cooperation of a servant in usuries: 1° He who helps the usurer only in counting money, writing accounts, or in carrying the pledge, can be excused for the sole reason of service.

2° Not so the servant who in the name of the master exacts usuries, because the exaction is a nearer cooperation in the sin of the usurer, even if he exacts amicably.

3° If he were to exact by force or threats, he would not only sin but would also be bound, the master failing, to restitution.

S. Th. I-II, q. 75, a. 4; q. 84; De Malo, q. 8.

493. One sin can be the cause of another just as one human act can be the cause of another. This happens in three ways: 1° it can be the material cause of another, insofar as it supplies and prepares matter for another, as gluttony prepares matter for lust, and avarice for litigation, because it multiplies temporal goods which are the matter of litigation; — 2° it can be the efficient cause of another: a) accidentally, insofar as it removes grace, or charity, or shame, or submission, or whatever else withdraws from sin and would impede it: thus from drunkenness or anger all sins can arise because they remove the judgment of reason by which man is restrained from sin¹; b) of itself, insofar as by some sin, as e.g. lust, man is disposed by way of inclination or habit to similar acts or sins of the same species; — 3° and principally it can be the final cause of another, inasmuch as because of the end of that sin, one commits another sin, as if one steals in order to fornicate. And because the end in moral matters gives species or form, thus one sin is also the formal cause of another, because it gives form to another: for if one steals because of fornication, the theft is as it were material, the fornication as it were formal (q. 75, a. 4).

494. The capital sins are those which for the most part are the cause of several other sins especially final, because they have a very desirable object or end; whence because of it other sins are easily committed. They are called capital from head, which is said metaphorically of that which is the beginning and directing and in some way leading of others: for they are the beginning or cause of other sins, as was said; they are directive because they are their final cause: for by the end human acts are directed. Whence the capital [sins] are as it were leaders, and the vices which arise from them as it were armies (q. 84, a. 3).

The capital sins therefore are not the greatest, since several other sins are graver than they, as e.g. those which are directly against God or directly opposed to the theological virtues; nor are they necessarily mortal, even if deliberately done, as is evident about anger and gluttony which are often venial.

495. There are seven capital sins², as is shown in the following way: The capital sins are those which have very desirable ends and therefore principal for moving the appetite³; but something moves the appetite directly of itself and thus moves to pursuing good, another indirectly through another and thus moves to fleeing good, inasmuch as one flees good because of an evil adjoined.

Now the good which man most desires can be:

1. excellence of praise and honor, which is a good of the soul, which is inordinately desired by vainglory;

2. food and drink, which is a good of the body by which the individual is preserved, which is inordinately desired by gluttony;

3. the use of venereal things, which is a good of the body by which the human species is preserved, which is inordinately desired by lust;

4. external goods, which is inordinately desired by avarice⁴.

But the good which man flees because of an evil adjoined which he most fears, is

5. one's own spiritual good which because of the bodily labor adjoined is inordinately fled by sloth;

6. or the good of another which impedes one's own excellence and so is an evil, which is inordinately fled by envy;

7. or against which anger rises (q. 84, a. 4).

496. Pride is the beginning of every sin, according to Ecclus. IX, 15, not only in historical order, because the Angels and the first man were guilty of it, but also from the nature of the thing, because it is the final cause of all sins: for all sins can and are by nature to arise from it, inasmuch as the temporal goods which man seeks in other sins, he can will because of the proper excellence

because that incidentally pertains to sin itself: « One sin is ordered to the end of another in two ways: in one way on the part of the sinner himself whose will is more prone to the end of one sin than of another, but this is accidental to sins. Whence according to this sins are not called capital. In another way from the very relation of the ends of which one has a certain agreement with another, so that in several things they are ordered to itself... and according to this the capital vices must be assumed ». Q. D. de Malo 8, a. 1; cf. I-II, q. 84, a. 4.

which is the end of pride. And because the end is first in the order of intention, and intention precedes execution by means, it is rightly called the beginning of every sin. Pride therefore is the final cause of all sins, and accordingly is not a capital sin, from which only several vices arise, but rather the cause of all the capital [sins], and the mother and queen of all vices⁵.

497. Avarice is the root of all sins, according to the Apostle I Tim. VI, 10, or the cause, not indeed final (as pride) but of disposition to all, because through riches man acquires the facility and ease of perpetrating, and the occasion of desiring any sin whatever, inasmuch as for having any temporal goods whatsoever he can be helped by money, according to that of Ecclus. X, 19: To money all things obey. Whence it is the root or first sin in the order of execution, because it provides opportunity and gives the means of perpetrating all things; and therefore just as the root provides nourishment to the tree, so money nourishes the desire of every sin, and in this sense any sin can arise from avarice⁶.

Avarice, insofar as it is the root of all sins, is not a capital sin, but insofar as it is also the final cause of several, it is rightly numbered among the capital [sins].

498. Observation. — The capital sins are not those which are opposed to the fundamental or cardinal virtues, because « the same notion of origin is not in the virtues and in the vices. For virtues are caused through the order of the appetite to reason, or even to the unchangeable good, which is God; vices, however, arise from the appetite of changeable good. Whence it is not necessary that the principal vices be opposed to the principal virtues » (a. 4, ad 1).

S. Th. II-II, q. 162, 130, 131, 132; De Malo q. 8 and 9.

499. Pride is the inordinate appetite of proper excellence¹. It is called

1° appetite, because pride resides in the appetite, namely principally in the will, if it seeks excellence in spiritual things, secondarily in the irascible which tends to a sensible arduous and excellent good,

2° inordinate: to desire excellence of itself is not evil, but against the order of reason is that one tend above what one is, as the proud man does: « for right reason has this, that the will of each is borne toward that which is proportioned to him » (II-II, q. 162, a. 1);

3° of excellence: both relative, by which one wills to excel others, at least implicitly contemning them; and absolute, by which one simply wills to excel above what he is, even without thinking of others;

4° proper: the special object from which pride receives its species is the loftiness of one's own person: for it is not in this or that matter but commonly and in all things that the proud man behaves as lofty. Pride therefore desires a certain universal excellence and by this is distinguished from presumption, ambition, and vainglory, which inordinately desire some particular excellence either in works, or in honors and dignities, or in fame and glory.

500. Pride of itself is contrary to charity and therefore is mortal sin: for the proud man exalts himself above what he is, i.e. above what is appointed for him by God, whence at least implicitly in pride is included the contempt of God, inasmuch as man does not wish to be subject to God and his rule. But this is to turn away from God, which is against charity,

whereby we are converted to God, and therefore of itself is mortal sin. — That contempt, if it is explicit, formal, and perfect, from the intention of contemning God because he disdains to be subject to God and his law and it seems to him injurious to his proper excellence, is always mortal. But if it is implicit, however, without the intention of contemning God, it can indeed be mortal, namely in a grave matter; but it is often venial not only from indeliberation but also from the lightness of the matter.

Now, according to Gregory (Mor. bk. 23, c. 4), in four ways specifically diverse, on the part of the object, pride is committed: 1° by esteeming the goods which one has to have from oneself not from God, or acting as if he would esteem them to have from himself; — 2° by esteeming that he has received them from God but because of his own merits, or acting as if it were so²; — 3° by attributing to himself goods which he does not have; — 4° in goods which he has, willing, other things being equal, to be preferred by them more than is fitting. The two former ways, since they include formal contempt of God, are mortal sin; the two latter are often only venial, unless they are done with grave irreverence toward God, or render one prepared to sin mortally, or there is present grave contempt of neighbor or notable detriment.

501. Daughters of pride. — « Those vices which of themselves are by nature ordered to the end of some capital vice are called its daughters » (II-II, q. 132, a. 5). All vices indeed are by nature ordered to the end of pride; some however, because they seek a special excellence, have an object very near to the object of pride, and therefore immediately, proximately, and more frequently than other sins arise from it according to the notion of end, and immediately serve it; whence those alone are called its daughters. There are however three: 1) presumption which is the inordinate appetite of excellence in works, namely by undertaking something above one's strength; 2) ambition which inordinately desires the excellence of dignity and honor undue or greater than is due; 3) vainglory which inordinately tends to fame and glory, i.e. to the vain manifestation of excellence.

Presumption, ambition, and vainglory of themselves are venial sins, because they are not against charity, but an excessive appetite of a thing in itself good or indifferent. Accidentally they become mortal (more often vainglory), either because they proceed from a mortally evil cause, as e.g. from affection for mortal sin; or because as effects they have mortal sin, as if they are done with notable harm or injury to neighbor, or if one because of them is prepared to commit mortal sin; or by reason of matter, as if one seeks honor or glory from mortal sin (cf. tr. on Fortitude).

502. Vainglory is the inordinate appetite of glory and fame, i.e. the appetite of vain glory, or of vain manifestation and estimation by others of one's own excellence whether true or feigned. Which is done in three ways: a) seeking glory for a thing which is not glory or not worthy of such glory, as for an evil, false, feigned, fragile thing, for riches, trifles, etc.; b) seeking it from those who cannot discern what is worthy of glory, as e.g. from one whose judgment is not certain; c) seeking it and not referring glory to the due end, namely to the honor of God or the salvation of neighbor or our own utility.

From vainglory seven vices more commonly arise, and therefore are called its daughters. For by vainglory is sought the manifestation of one's own excellence, which can be done: a) directly: 1° either in words by boasting, by which one glories in a work committed; or in deeds 2° by presumption of novelties, by which one devises novelties which excite the admiration of others; and 3° by hypocrisy, by which one does good to appear good, although he is not; — b) indirectly one seeks the manifestation of one's excellence, showing oneself not to be lesser than others, and this is done: 4° as to intellect by obstinacy, by which one adheres too much to one's own opinion; 5° as to will by discord, by which one does not wish to depart from his own will to agree with others; 6° as to speech by contention, by which one litigates noisily; 7° as to deed by disobedience, by which one does not wish to execute the precept of a superior.