Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. I-II, q. 74, a. 7, 9.

456. Morose delight, desire, and joy are distinguished: the first regards the present time because it is concerned with the object insofar as it is here and now present to our knowledge; desire regards the future because it is an act of the will wishing an evil thing; joy finally regards the past and is the complacency or approval of the evil work done by the one rejoicing or by others. In other words, morose delight is consent in the mere delight thought of as present and not in the act itself¹; desire is also² consent in the future act and to be placed; joy in the past act and placed³.

By reason of the object desire is twofold: efficacious or absolute, which is called resolve, when one resolves to perform a work; inefficacious or conditional, when one wills that the work be performed by himself or by another under some given condition, as e.g. if nothing stood in the way, if he could, if it were licit, etc. This is not conditional on the part of the will but on the part of the object: for it is not a merely interpretative will which one does not have but which he would have if he knew something (this does not exist), but it is the actual will which he has here and now and by which he now decides and intends that he would wish the work to be performed if the condition were given.

457. Principle I. Absolute desire and joy have the same species and gravity of malice, mortal or venial, as the work about which they are concerned, to be done or done, with all known circumstances (Mt. V, 28): for the interior act of the will has its malice from the exterior act as from its object, for desire tends to the work really to be placed and accordingly not as represented in the intellect as delightful but as it is on the part of the thing, and joy is about the past work insofar as it was, and each tends to all the circumstances which are in the work and are not separable from it in the concrete. Whence, in difference from morose delight, desire contracts the malice of all circumstances, even those which are not had as delightful nor are the motive of the will.

As e.g. he who desires to sin with a married woman, not because she is married, but because she is beautiful, is guilty of adultery, and he who wills to steal a sacred thing, not because it is sacred but because it is precious, is guilty of sacrilege. « In practice however it not rarely happens, that desires are not referred to the altogether determined object, but rather to something generic. E.g. someone desires to take vengeance on his enemy, without determining the manner in which he wishes this vengeance; or someone desires carnally to sin with a person of the other sex, without being conscious to himself of the special act to be committed. In these cases it suffices to confess: I willed to take vengeance on my enemy, or I willed to sin with a person of the other sex » (Prümmer, Th. M. I, n. 403).

458. Principle II. Conditional desire, under a condition which takes away all malice from the object, of itself is not sin, but more often is idle and sometimes dangerous. Hence:

a) in all things prohibited by positive right alone, desire under condition is licit: if it were not prohibited;

b) in things prohibited by natural right, naturally or ordinarily or outside a state illicit, but in some case or state licit, the desire under the condition of this state or case is licit (although dangerous), as e.g. I would kill Peter if God commanded, I would take a wife if I were not a religious, I would hang a thief if I were a judge, I would have copulation with her if she were my wife;

c) things prohibited by natural right essentially evil, which are never licit, are never licitly desired, because malice cannot be separated from them, as e.g. if it were not a sin, I would blaspheme, commit sodomy, perjure myself, take vengeance, etc.: for an impossible condition cannot take away malice.

Such locutions however more often only signify a natural inclination toward such an object, without affection for it, so that the meaning is: I am inclined to blaspheme but I do not wish to because of the law of God, and then they are not sin; — on the contrary, if it were a true desire or consent in the work, or if the meaning were: I would wish blasphemy not to be sin, which would still be worse than the simple desire of blasphemy.

459. Principle III. Conditional desire, if the condition partially takes away the malice of the object, is sin, but less than absolute desire: it takes on namely the malice which remains in the object, it does not contract that which was taken away. Thus if one should say: if I were not a priest I would fornicate, he would contract the malice of fornication, not of sacrilege, because the condition takes away the latter malice.

460. Principle IV. Conditional desire, if the condition, as being irrelevant to morality, in no way takes away the malice of the object, takes on this malice with all its circumstances.** — The reason is that even conditional desire consents and tends to the external work according to itself and as it is on the part of the thing. Thus if one should say: I would fornicate if there were no hell, if I could secretly take vengeance.