Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. I-II, q. 74, a. 6, 7, 8; De Ver. q. 15, a. 4.

452. Morose delight, which is nothing other than consent in the delight about an evil object, is defined: a simple love or voluntary complacency about an object or illicit work, exhibited by knowledge as present, without the desire of execution.

It is not directly concerned with the external work but with the work exhibited to us by imagination. For he who delights imagines to himself the act of sin as present (as e.g. the killing of an enemy, theft, fornication) and about that act represented to himself he has complacency as if he were carrying it out (as e.g. actually killing, stealing, or fornicating), without the will, however, to carry it out.

It is called delight, because the mere thought about an evil thing is not sin (except accidentally insofar as it includes the danger of sinning and inclines to sin), but delight about an evil thing thought of (a. 8); it is called morose, not because it requires a delay of time, for it can be perfected in a single moment, but because deliberating reason, rather than repelling the delight, dwells on it insofar as the evil thing is pleasing and agreeable to man (a. 6, ad 3).

453. Principles. I. Morose delight is sin: for no one delights except in that which seems to him good and conformed to his nature; therefore he who delights in an evil thing has it as good for himself, and accordingly his affection tends to an evil thing.

II. Morose delight is a grave or light sin according to the object: if it is about a venially evil object it is venial, if about a gravely prohibited object it is always mortal: for that one deliberately wills that his affection be conformed to a work which of itself is mortal, is mortal sin (a. 8); — Prov. XV, 26; Wis. I, 3; Mt. XXIII, 27).

III. Morose delight, — although it is less evil than the evil work itself (from which it is distinguished as an incomplete from a complete species) or than its proposal, — nevertheless, because it tends to the same object thought of, has the malice of the same species as the work (to be declared in confession), provided also insofar as the work is thought of as delightful or moves to delight. Merely internal delight indeed is morally of the same notion as delight actually perceived which arises from the work.

Thus delight about homicide, about adultery as adultery, about sodomy as sodomy, or about false testimony differs in species from delight about wounding, fornication, pollution, or lying.

Probably however morose delight does not contract the malice of circumstances, which reason indeed adverts to but from which in the delight it abstracts and about which the delight is not concerned, or whose delightfulness the appetite is not moved by. For delight tends to the object not as it really is, but as it exists in the intellect, and accordingly does not tend to circumstances which reason does not represent as delightful, and which are not the motive of delight.

Hence if one delights about the killing of a priest, not because he is a priest, or about the theft of a sacred thing, not because it is sacred but because it is precious, he does not contract the specific malice of sacrilege but only of homicide or theft; and if he delights about copulation with a married woman, but not as married but as a beautiful woman, he does not contract the specific malice of adultery but only of fornication.

454. Corollaries. — Morose delight is about the object or evil work alone. Hence:

a) Delight, not indeed about the evil thing thought of, but about the thought itself or about the manner in which the evil thing is done, is good, venially or mortally evil, according as the thought itself or the manner itself is good, lightly or gravely evil. Examples are: to delight in the knowledge of the crimes of a penitent, in knowledge acquired idly or out of curiosity, in the knowledge of a secret or hidden crime from detraction; — or in an ingenious, industrious, subtle, wonderful, new, or ridiculous manner (as e.g. of the flexibility of a drunkard), of the copulation of marriage had contrary to the manner or natural position, of the manner against nature in sins of lust.

Similarly it is done about pictures and obscene comedies because of the artistry, about the subtle or artful manner in which a thing was stolen, about the Attic salt with which a fictitious narrative was seasoned, about the singular or ingenious cunning in fraud, about the eloquence of one detracting, about the dexterity of one fighting, about the fall of a man from a horse because of ridiculous circumstances, about the manner in which women quarrel among themselves or in which base deeds are narrated, about obscene statues because they are very artful, about lubricious spectacles because they are represented with great art, about the most beautiful or charming manner of narrating lubricious things.

b) Delight about an evil work, abstracting from its being evil, or about a work materially evil, is licit if the work is prohibited only by positive right, unless one delights in it insofar as it is prohibited by law, as e.g. about the eating of meat on a forbidden day, about the omission of morning prayer, about the omission of Mass: for this work in itself objectively is not intrinsically evil; — on the contrary, it is illicit if the work is prohibited by the law of nature, because then the work in itself is intrinsically evil, as e.g. about material fornication, involuntary homicide, involuntary procured pollution, about material perjury for liberation (cf. prop. 15 condemned by Inn. XI).

Since however mere natural pollution, proceeding from nature merely exonerating itself, is not materially evil, it is not a sin to delight in it for a good end or even to desire it by a simple affection, but not for the sake of pleasure.

c) Delight about an evil work because of a good effect is evil, as e.g. about the killing of a father for the inheritance, about the omission of Mass for utility, about procured pollution for the quieting of concupiscence: — but it is licit about the good effect alone or about the fact that the evil work had good effects, as e.g. about an inheritance from homicide, about offspring from fornication, about the glory of martyrs, about the cessation of scandal from the killing of a seducer; or even about the evil of neighbor, not indeed as it is evil to him but insofar as it is more good for him or for others, the order of charity being preserved, so that the evil which is avoided outweighs or equals the evil of neighbor which pleases.

As e.g. about a bodily evil for the good of the soul, about the infirmity of neighbor that he may be converted, about the evil of one for the common good, about the death of a persecutor of the Church or of an evil-doer for the example of others; on the contrary it is illicit to delight in the evil of neighbor for a lesser good, as e.g. about the death of a father for the inheritance, as is evident from propp. 13, 14, 15 condemned by Innocent XI.

d) Delight about a work at some time licit but at the time of delight illicit, if this is prohibited by positive right alone, ordinarily is not evil because positive law does not prohibit delight but only the work, as e.g. on a day of abstinence one may delight about the eating of meat, but not precisely as prohibited. But if the prohibited work is by the law of nature, the delight is evil if it is about the work absolutely and as of the present, as e.g. for betrothed about copulation now to be had; it will not be evil if it is under the condition of the time when it will be licit, as e.g. about copulation to be had in marriage.

It is to be noted, however, that this latter can be done if the delight is in the rational appetite, but not if it is in the sensitive appetite: for the rational appetite tends to the object proposed by reason, but reason can propose it under the condition of future or of past and so abstracts from the malice; — on the contrary, the sensitive appetite tends to the object proposed by the internal senses, but sense proposes it without any condition or abstraction from malice and therefore absolutely as present and as it is in itself; whence the delight is borne to the object not as it is under condition but as it is in itself, and accordingly as it is in the present absolutely evil. Evil therefore would be a sensible delight had here and now about hatred and vengeance at another time legitimate, but not so a spiritual delight or of the will, which can be under the condition of injury inflicted.

Hence for practice 1) with the rational, but not the carnal, appetite, the betrothed can delight about future copulation and desire it, likewise the widowed can delight about past and rejoice, likewise a spouse who has made a vow of chastity while the other has not made one;

2. for others unbound, although the same of itself is not illicit, ordinarily it is illicit accidentally, because it will not happen without movements of concupiscence which they cannot excite and to the permitting of which they can have no reason;

3. on the contrary spouses, even in the absence of a partner, can delight carnally about copulation had or to be had (provided it is not principally for the sake of delight but for an honest end and there is no danger of pollution), because here and now copulation is licit for them, even if accidentally it is impossible.

455. Observations. — A. It is to be noted that the delights all of which we have spoken about in the preceding number, in practice are to be avoided, both because they are often idle and therefore venial sins, and because they are very dangerous, especially when there is question of matters of lust or of vengeance, because there is an easy transition to delight about the evil work itself.

B. Conjectural criteria for discerning whether the delight was about the mere thought or manner or about the evil thing itself, are enumerated as follows:

a) The affection or good intention of the agent. For if from a good motive and sincere intention one studies or speaks about evil things (as e.g. a confessor, doctor, artist, etc.), it can be presumed that the delight is about the thought and not about the thing thought of; on the contrary, if the delight arose from a vicious affection, from too curious and useless reading or consideration.

b) The occasion from which the delight arises. If it arises from study, confession, preaching, etc., it can be presumed that the delight is about the thought; on the contrary, if it proceeds from a base occasion such as taken vengeance or a sin committed.

c) The habitual inclination of the agent. If one is habitually inclined and more often sins, as e.g. in matters of lust, then the thoughts are presumed to be no longer merely theoretical, but about the evil things themselves; on the contrary, in a timid man.

d) The manner or vehemence of the delight. If the thought (or manner) delights equally in licit and illicit, it is a sign that the delight is not about the evil thing; on the contrary, if it is such as is perceived from the very base thing itself when it is present, suppose with a similar commotion of appetite, it is an indication that the delight is not about the mere knowledge (or manner), but also about the thing itself.

e) Sufficient cause. For if one without any cause or out of mere curiosity delights about the manner in which the evil thing is done or represented, it is sin (at least venial); but if he does so because he is bound to attend to such things, it is not sin¹.

C. Just as delight about an evil thing is evil, so in the same way sadness about a good thing: the latter truly hates good as the former loves evil. Hence:

1. Sadness about a good which is under grave precept, is grave sin.

2. Sadness about a good which is under light precept, is light sin.

3. Sadness about a good which of itself is not precept, as e.g. about a vow made or to be made, about a priesthood received or to be received, does not exceed the light, provided the will to fulfill the obligation contracted is retained. Whether it is a light or no sin depends on the motive for which one is saddened, whether namely it is reasonable or not; ordinarily, however, with the work already chosen, such sadness lacks a reasonable motive.

4. Sadness not about the good work itself, but about the mere circumstances of a good action, as e.g. about the inconvenience and labor, is not sin².