Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. I-II, q. 74; de Malo, q. 2, a. 2 and 3; q. 7, a. 6.

446. The subject of sin is the potency which is the principle of the evil act remaining in itself. Moreover sin is present in various subjects: a) properly and formally it is in the will: for sin is a voluntary act, but a voluntary act most properly is the immanent act of the will (a. 1); b) however not only acts of the will are voluntary, but also acts which are commanded by the will or not repressed by it; whence sin also resides in reason and in the inferior faculties insofar as they are moved by the will; c) nevertheless it is not in the exterior members, because their actions are transient. Therefore one sin in number can consist of several partial acts which are in diverse subjects: but these acts, because one is ordered to another, constitute one in moral order: one sin (a. 2).

447. Sin is usually attributed to the principal potency, when it is elicited by several potencies. By the Scholastics it is attributed to the potency operating principally¹, because an action is more attributed to the principal and first agent than to the secondary or as it were instrumental agent. By the moderns, however, today it is usually attributed to the potency in which it is consummated. Hence by reason of the subject three internal sins are distinguished:

1. in the sensitive appetite, insofar as it is moved by reason and will, movements of concupiscence or sins of sensuality, which are perfected by the passions of the sensitive appetite;

2. in reason, morose delight, when deliberating reason does not repress the movement of imagination, sensitive appetite, will, but about it, by thinking and representing evil to itself as present, dwells on the delight: for then the will does not tend to the act and the delight naturally following, but consents in the delight alone as thought and represented, and sin is perfected in reason;

3. in the will itself, desire or joy, when the will consents not only in the thought-of delight but also in the evil work itself, whether to be placed or placed, which intention is perfected in the will itself.

It is to be noted, however, that several of these sins are more often joined together.

because it is not a pure instrument, but is an active faculty which has its own acts, to which it can be moved by reason and will or repressed by them, yet so that it also resists them. It has therefore a certain principality of operating in comparison with the exterior members; but it is not always the principal operator in comparison with reason and will. For c) mortal sin, which requires perfect deliberation of reason and full consent of the will, is attributed only to reason and will, which operate principally and whose work it is to be converted to the end or to be turned away from it (a. 4; Q. de Ver. 25, a. 5). But b) the inordinate movement of concupiscence which does not occur with full deliberation, but with only some advertence of reason, imperfectly or indirectly voluntary, is attributed to the sensitive appetite as principally operating, because reason and will do not operate principally but imperfectly in them (a. 3, ad 3). They are called sins of sensuality. — 3) Every sin is from deliberating reason; moreover it can be in reason in two ways: a) insofar as it errs in the knowledge of something which it can and ought to know, b) insofar as it commands or does not restrain the inordinate movement of other potencies (a. 5). When deliberating reason does not restrain the inordinate movement of appetite, but about it dwells on the delight, the sin of morose delight or consent in delight is committed, which is attributed to reason as principally operating, namely as first mover and directing (a. 6). — 4) In deliberating reason there can be consent not in the delight of the work alone but also in the act or work itself, future or past: then there is present the sin of desire or of joy, which is attributed either to reason as judging and pronouncing and directing sentence, or to the will which consents, and so sin is completed (a. 7, ad 1).

S. Th. I-II, q. 74, a. 3 and 4; De Malo q. 7, a. 6 and 8; De Verit. q. 25, a. 5.

448. Movements of sensuality or of concupiscence are called the inordinate movements of the sensitive appetite rising up against the order of reason, such as movements of sensible love or aversion, of anger, of gluttony, of delight, of sadness, of hope, of fear, of despair, of daring, etc., and especially of lust.

They are distinguished by theologians¹:

1. first-first movements which precede all advertence of reason, and these are not formal sins, which is de fide for the baptized, from C. Trid. sess. 5, can. 5; and it is certain for the infidels from the condemnation of propp. 50th and 51st of Baius;

2. second-first movements (so called because they are second after the first-first, and first among the moral and free), which occur with semi-full or some advertence, and these are venial sins;

3. deliberate movements which occur with full advertence of intellect and are deliberately admitted or stirred up by the will: these are voluntary

either a) directly and in itself when the will positively consents to them, and then they are mortal sins, if they are gravely inordinate or prohibited under grave matter; or b) indirectly voluntary when the will only omits to restrain them while it can and ought;

or c) voluntary in positive cause when the will only places the cause from which they are foreseen to follow.

449. Indirectly voluntary movements are those to which the will neither positively consents nor resists, but toward which it is negatively disposed and which it only permits. About these it must be said:

1° Man certainly sins in them, because reason and will fail in their duty of directing and restraining the movements of the inferior potencies, nor can man be indifferent to whether his movements and acts are inordinate or not. But the appetite of evil is a deformity, and accordingly to be expelled. Which if reason adverts to, it ought to deliberate about it and show displeasure and remove the deformity as far as possible, according to Gen. IV, 7: Under you shall be its appetite, and you shall rule over it. But he who is negatively disposed is equivalently considered to consent. Yet

a) of himself he does not sin gravely, because positive and full consent of the will is lacking²;

b) accidentally he would sin gravely, if from it there were a proximate danger of consenting to gravely prohibited movements, as often happens in more vehement venereal commotions, and in vehement hatred or appetite of vengeance³.

2° Man is bound to resist them positively, as much as is necessary and morally possible for not consenting and restraining the movements:

a) Ordinarily however not directly, i.e. by contrary or violent acts, because it is not necessary or is too difficult, or even excites the movements more⁴.

Direct resistance is made by suppression of imagination, by an act of love in place of hatred, of hope in place of despair, by compression of the members, by a violent movement of the head, by chastisement of the body through afflictions, vigils, the discipline, as e.g. by throwing oneself naked on thorns or into cold water, etc.

b) But generally he is bound to resist indirectly, by applying the mind to other incompatible things, especially those which more strongly affect the mind.

As e.g. by interrupting the work, by pursuing business, by an external occupation requiring special attention, by praying, meditating, etc.

c) Sometimes, if there is present a just cause of not resisting otherwise nor of restraining the movement, sufficient positive resistance by a simple act of displeasure suffices, at least implicit⁵, which act is not to be repeated frequently, since, until they are retracted, it is considered to persevere morally.

Thus if one has experienced that other resistance is useless for restraining the movements, or would rather excite and increase them; or if the movements have their origin in a necessary cause or in a useful action, as will be indicated n° seq. under c), and it is too troublesome to repel them, as e.g. because of long duration; or if the movements are light and transient, both because the causes exciting such movements are very frequent, and accordingly the obligation of restraining them would be too difficult, and because they are better and more efficaciously restrained by contempt: for the solicitude of preventing them is wont to excite the imagination and increase the movements. All of which are easily verified in the scrupulous, who therefore shows sufficient displeasure, simply by despising the movements.

Man, however, in the aforesaid circumstances, ought to bring safeguards and care lest he consent to the movements.

450. Movements voluntary in cause, which are not intended and to which the will does not consent, but which are only in positive cause willed from which they are foreseen to follow, are only sin insofar as the cause influences them. Hence:

a) It is a grave sin without sufficient reason to place a cause which of itself gravely influences movements prohibited under grave matter, such as venereal movements, great unjust anger, great hatred; even if accidentally they do not follow.

As e.g. the reading for a long time of very impious and persuasive things against religion, priesthood, public order, etc., exciting to hatred, anger, vengeance; reading very base, conversation or reading casting into despair or suicide, frequenting of companions who stir up to this, long duration of touch or sight of an unchaste part, likewise morose delight protracted of vengeance or lust. Hence S. Alphonsus says that even the movement of pollution is not mortal unless it comes from a cause of itself mortal in the genus of lust: 1) it must be mortal, because since pollution is not willed in itself but only in cause, it will be evil to that degree to which the cause itself is evil (understand: to which the cause is evil insofar as it is cause; but every cause, and the only cause, which of itself gravely influences movements prohibited under grave matter, unless there is present a reason excusing because of some good effect compensating the evil, is mortal insofar as it is cause); 2) it must be mortal in the genus of lust, because otherwise it would influence pollution not gravely but only lightly, as e.g. drunkenness.

b) It is a light sin without just cause to place an action lightly influencing even vehement movements prohibited under grave matter (even into pollution itself), provided they do not please nor is a proximate danger of consent present. A light influence indeed into a grave matter is a light thing.

Such is conversation not long with an impious man or with a girl; sight, touch not very base, reading little impious or little base. A sufficient reason for permitting these will be any reasonable cause of necessity, utility, or fittingness.

c) It is no sin from a just cause to place an action from which inordinate movements are foreseen to follow (even pollution), provided a proximate danger of consent is always absent.

In the matter of lust a just cause is, for a priest, to hear confessions and to study base things; for a surgeon, to look at and touch unchaste parts, likewise for one serving the sick or in baths; for all, to kiss women according to the custom of the country, to touch oneself out of necessity, to ride for the sake of recreation or utility, to lie down in a more comfortable position, to take moderately warm foods and drinks.

451. Observation. — In the preceding we have spoken according to natural law alone; for sometimes a cause which for someone influences lightly or in no way, is also prohibited under grave matter by positive law, as e.g. by the law of the index of books.

S. Th. I-II, q. 74, a. 6, 7, 8; De Ver. q. 15, a. 4.

452. Morose delight, which is nothing other than consent in the delight about an evil object, is defined: a simple love or voluntary complacency about an object or illicit work, exhibited by knowledge as present, without the desire of execution.

It is not directly concerned with the external work but with the work exhibited to us by imagination. For he who delights imagines to himself the act of sin as present (as e.g. the killing of an enemy, theft, fornication) and about that act represented to himself he has complacency as if he were carrying it out (as e.g. actually killing, stealing, or fornicating), without the will, however, to carry it out.

It is called delight, because the mere thought about an evil thing is not sin (except accidentally insofar as it includes the danger of sinning and inclines to sin), but delight about an evil thing thought of (a. 8); it is called morose, not because it requires a delay of time, for it can be perfected in a single moment, but because deliberating reason, rather than repelling the delight, dwells on it insofar as the evil thing is pleasing and agreeable to man (a. 6, ad 3).

453. Principles. I. Morose delight is sin: for no one delights except in that which seems to him good and conformed to his nature; therefore he who delights in an evil thing has it as good for himself, and accordingly his affection tends to an evil thing.

II. Morose delight is a grave or light sin according to the object: if it is about a venially evil object it is venial, if about a gravely prohibited object it is always mortal: for that one deliberately wills that his affection be conformed to a work which of itself is mortal, is mortal sin (a. 8); — Prov. XV, 26; Wis. I, 3; Mt. XXIII, 27).

III. Morose delight, — although it is less evil than the evil work itself (from which it is distinguished as an incomplete from a complete species) or than its proposal, — nevertheless, because it tends to the same object thought of, has the malice of the same species as the work (to be declared in confession), provided also insofar as the work is thought of as delightful or moves to delight. Merely internal delight indeed is morally of the same notion as delight actually perceived which arises from the work.

Thus delight about homicide, about adultery as adultery, about sodomy as sodomy, or about false testimony differs in species from delight about wounding, fornication, pollution, or lying.

Probably however morose delight does not contract the malice of circumstances, which reason indeed adverts to but from which in the delight it abstracts and about which the delight is not concerned, or whose delightfulness the appetite is not moved by. For delight tends to the object not as it really is, but as it exists in the intellect, and accordingly does not tend to circumstances which reason does not represent as delightful, and which are not the motive of delight.

Hence if one delights about the killing of a priest, not because he is a priest, or about the theft of a sacred thing, not because it is sacred but because it is precious, he does not contract the specific malice of sacrilege but only of homicide or theft; and if he delights about copulation with a married woman, but not as married but as a beautiful woman, he does not contract the specific malice of adultery but only of fornication.

454. Corollaries. — Morose delight is about the object or evil work alone. Hence:

a) Delight, not indeed about the evil thing thought of, but about the thought itself or about the manner in which the evil thing is done, is good, venially or mortally evil, according as the thought itself or the manner itself is good, lightly or gravely evil. Examples are: to delight in the knowledge of the crimes of a penitent, in knowledge acquired idly or out of curiosity, in the knowledge of a secret or hidden crime from detraction; — or in an ingenious, industrious, subtle, wonderful, new, or ridiculous manner (as e.g. of the flexibility of a drunkard), of the copulation of marriage had contrary to the manner or natural position, of the manner against nature in sins of lust.

Similarly it is done about pictures and obscene comedies because of the artistry, about the subtle or artful manner in which a thing was stolen, about the Attic salt with which a fictitious narrative was seasoned, about the singular or ingenious cunning in fraud, about the eloquence of one detracting, about the dexterity of one fighting, about the fall of a man from a horse because of ridiculous circumstances, about the manner in which women quarrel among themselves or in which base deeds are narrated, about obscene statues because they are very artful, about lubricious spectacles because they are represented with great art, about the most beautiful or charming manner of narrating lubricious things.

b) Delight about an evil work, abstracting from its being evil, or about a work materially evil, is licit if the work is prohibited only by positive right, unless one delights in it insofar as it is prohibited by law, as e.g. about the eating of meat on a forbidden day, about the omission of morning prayer, about the omission of Mass: for this work in itself objectively is not intrinsically evil; — on the contrary, it is illicit if the work is prohibited by the law of nature, because then the work in itself is intrinsically evil, as e.g. about material fornication, involuntary homicide, involuntary procured pollution, about material perjury for liberation (cf. prop. 15 condemned by Inn. XI).

Since however mere natural pollution, proceeding from nature merely exonerating itself, is not materially evil, it is not a sin to delight in it for a good end or even to desire it by a simple affection, but not for the sake of pleasure.

c) Delight about an evil work because of a good effect is evil, as e.g. about the killing of a father for the inheritance, about the omission of Mass for utility, about procured pollution for the quieting of concupiscence: — but it is licit about the good effect alone or about the fact that the evil work had good effects, as e.g. about an inheritance from homicide, about offspring from fornication, about the glory of martyrs, about the cessation of scandal from the killing of a seducer; or even about the evil of neighbor, not indeed as it is evil to him but insofar as it is more good for him or for others, the order of charity being preserved, so that the evil which is avoided outweighs or equals the evil of neighbor which pleases.

As e.g. about a bodily evil for the good of the soul, about the infirmity of neighbor that he may be converted, about the evil of one for the common good, about the death of a persecutor of the Church or of an evil-doer for the example of others; on the contrary it is illicit to delight in the evil of neighbor for a lesser good, as e.g. about the death of a father for the inheritance, as is evident from propp. 13, 14, 15 condemned by Innocent XI.

d) Delight about a work at some time licit but at the time of delight illicit, if this is prohibited by positive right alone, ordinarily is not evil because positive law does not prohibit delight but only the work, as e.g. on a day of abstinence one may delight about the eating of meat, but not precisely as prohibited. But if the prohibited work is by the law of nature, the delight is evil if it is about the work absolutely and as of the present, as e.g. for betrothed about copulation now to be had; it will not be evil if it is under the condition of the time when it will be licit, as e.g. about copulation to be had in marriage.

It is to be noted, however, that this latter can be done if the delight is in the rational appetite, but not if it is in the sensitive appetite: for the rational appetite tends to the object proposed by reason, but reason can propose it under the condition of future or of past and so abstracts from the malice; — on the contrary, the sensitive appetite tends to the object proposed by the internal senses, but sense proposes it without any condition or abstraction from malice and therefore absolutely as present and as it is in itself; whence the delight is borne to the object not as it is under condition but as it is in itself, and accordingly as it is in the present absolutely evil. Evil therefore would be a sensible delight had here and now about hatred and vengeance at another time legitimate, but not so a spiritual delight or of the will, which can be under the condition of injury inflicted.

Hence for practice 1) with the rational, but not the carnal, appetite, the betrothed can delight about future copulation and desire it, likewise the widowed can delight about past and rejoice, likewise a spouse who has made a vow of chastity while the other has not made one;

2. for others unbound, although the same of itself is not illicit, ordinarily it is illicit accidentally, because it will not happen without movements of concupiscence which they cannot excite and to the permitting of which they can have no reason;

3. on the contrary spouses, even in the absence of a partner, can delight carnally about copulation had or to be had (provided it is not principally for the sake of delight but for an honest end and there is no danger of pollution), because here and now copulation is licit for them, even if accidentally it is impossible.

455. Observations. — A. It is to be noted that the delights all of which we have spoken about in the preceding number, in practice are to be avoided, both because they are often idle and therefore venial sins, and because they are very dangerous, especially when there is question of matters of lust or of vengeance, because there is an easy transition to delight about the evil work itself.

B. Conjectural criteria for discerning whether the delight was about the mere thought or manner or about the evil thing itself, are enumerated as follows:

a) The affection or good intention of the agent. For if from a good motive and sincere intention one studies or speaks about evil things (as e.g. a confessor, doctor, artist, etc.), it can be presumed that the delight is about the thought and not about the thing thought of; on the contrary, if the delight arose from a vicious affection, from too curious and useless reading or consideration.

b) The occasion from which the delight arises. If it arises from study, confession, preaching, etc., it can be presumed that the delight is about the thought; on the contrary, if it proceeds from a base occasion such as taken vengeance or a sin committed.

c) The habitual inclination of the agent. If one is habitually inclined and more often sins, as e.g. in matters of lust, then the thoughts are presumed to be no longer merely theoretical, but about the evil things themselves; on the contrary, in a timid man.

d) The manner or vehemence of the delight. If the thought (or manner) delights equally in licit and illicit, it is a sign that the delight is not about the evil thing; on the contrary, if it is such as is perceived from the very base thing itself when it is present, suppose with a similar commotion of appetite, it is an indication that the delight is not about the mere knowledge (or manner), but also about the thing itself.

e) Sufficient cause. For if one without any cause or out of mere curiosity delights about the manner in which the evil thing is done or represented, it is sin (at least venial); but if he does so because he is bound to attend to such things, it is not sin¹.

C. Just as delight about an evil thing is evil, so in the same way sadness about a good thing: the latter truly hates good as the former loves evil. Hence:

1. Sadness about a good which is under grave precept, is grave sin.

2. Sadness about a good which is under light precept, is light sin.

3. Sadness about a good which of itself is not precept, as e.g. about a vow made or to be made, about a priesthood received or to be received, does not exceed the light, provided the will to fulfill the obligation contracted is retained. Whether it is a light or no sin depends on the motive for which one is saddened, whether namely it is reasonable or not; ordinarily, however, with the work already chosen, such sadness lacks a reasonable motive.

4. Sadness not about the good work itself, but about the mere circumstances of a good action, as e.g. about the inconvenience and labor, is not sin².

S. Th. I-II, q. 74, a. 7, 9.

456. Morose delight, desire, and joy are distinguished: the first regards the present time because it is concerned with the object insofar as it is here and now present to our knowledge; desire regards the future because it is an act of the will wishing an evil thing; joy finally regards the past and is the complacency or approval of the evil work done by the one rejoicing or by others. In other words, morose delight is consent in the mere delight thought of as present and not in the act itself¹; desire is also² consent in the future act and to be placed; joy in the past act and placed³.

By reason of the object desire is twofold: efficacious or absolute, which is called resolve, when one resolves to perform a work; inefficacious or conditional, when one wills that the work be performed by himself or by another under some given condition, as e.g. if nothing stood in the way, if he could, if it were licit, etc. This is not conditional on the part of the will but on the part of the object: for it is not a merely interpretative will which one does not have but which he would have if he knew something (this does not exist), but it is the actual will which he has here and now and by which he now decides and intends that he would wish the work to be performed if the condition were given.

457. Principle I. Absolute desire and joy have the same species and gravity of malice, mortal or venial, as the work about which they are concerned, to be done or done, with all known circumstances (Mt. V, 28): for the interior act of the will has its malice from the exterior act as from its object, for desire tends to the work really to be placed and accordingly not as represented in the intellect as delightful but as it is on the part of the thing, and joy is about the past work insofar as it was, and each tends to all the circumstances which are in the work and are not separable from it in the concrete. Whence, in difference from morose delight, desire contracts the malice of all circumstances, even those which are not had as delightful nor are the motive of the will.

As e.g. he who desires to sin with a married woman, not because she is married, but because she is beautiful, is guilty of adultery, and he who wills to steal a sacred thing, not because it is sacred but because it is precious, is guilty of sacrilege. « In practice however it not rarely happens, that desires are not referred to the altogether determined object, but rather to something generic. E.g. someone desires to take vengeance on his enemy, without determining the manner in which he wishes this vengeance; or someone desires carnally to sin with a person of the other sex, without being conscious to himself of the special act to be committed. In these cases it suffices to confess: I willed to take vengeance on my enemy, or I willed to sin with a person of the other sex » (Prümmer, Th. M. I, n. 403).

458. Principle II. Conditional desire, under a condition which takes away all malice from the object, of itself is not sin, but more often is idle and sometimes dangerous. Hence:

a) in all things prohibited by positive right alone, desire under condition is licit: if it were not prohibited;

b) in things prohibited by natural right, naturally or ordinarily or outside a state illicit, but in some case or state licit, the desire under the condition of this state or case is licit (although dangerous), as e.g. I would kill Peter if God commanded, I would take a wife if I were not a religious, I would hang a thief if I were a judge, I would have copulation with her if she were my wife;

c) things prohibited by natural right essentially evil, which are never licit, are never licitly desired, because malice cannot be separated from them, as e.g. if it were not a sin, I would blaspheme, commit sodomy, perjure myself, take vengeance, etc.: for an impossible condition cannot take away malice.

Such locutions however more often only signify a natural inclination toward such an object, without affection for it, so that the meaning is: I am inclined to blaspheme but I do not wish to because of the law of God, and then they are not sin; — on the contrary, if it were a true desire or consent in the work, or if the meaning were: I would wish blasphemy not to be sin, which would still be worse than the simple desire of blasphemy.

459. Principle III. Conditional desire, if the condition partially takes away the malice of the object, is sin, but less than absolute desire: it takes on namely the malice which remains in the object, it does not contract that which was taken away. Thus if one should say: if I were not a priest I would fornicate, he would contract the malice of fornication, not of sacrilege, because the condition takes away the latter malice.

460. Principle IV. Conditional desire, if the condition, as being irrelevant to morality, in no way takes away the malice of the object, takes on this malice with all its circumstances.** — The reason is that even conditional desire consents and tends to the external work according to itself and as it is on the part of the thing. Thus if one should say: I would fornicate if there were no hell, if I could secretly take vengeance.