Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. I-II, q. 73; de Malo, q. 2, a. 7, 8, 9, 10.

441. Principle I. Not all sins are equal. — For sin is not a pure and simple privation but retains something of the order of reason to good; whence just as sickness is greater or lesser according as it deprives more or less of health, so sin is more or less grave according as it withdraws more or less from the rectitude of reason.

It is de fide against the Stoics and Jovinian (cf. prop. 20th of Baius).

It is proved 1) from Scripture: John XIX, 11; I John V, 16; Mt. V, 22; Ezech. XVI; Jer. VII; Lam. IV;

2. from the unequal punishments of sins: When the punishments of sins are unequal, the sins themselves are also unequal, because the inequality of punishment supposes an inequali-

Summa Theologiae Moralis I — 24 ty of guilt. But punishments are unequal; therefore also sins (cf. Deut. XXV; Lk. X, 12-14);

3. from the unequal species of sins: Species are related as numbers. But sins are specifically distinct. Therefore unequal in the notion of sin, and therefore the gravity of them is not the same (a. 2).

442. Principle II. The fundamental or principal gravity of sins:

1° is taken immediately from the objects from which sins have their fundamental or first moral species. For just as sickness is so much the graver as it injures a nobler principle or organ of life, so sin is so much the graver as it is done against a nobler end or object (a. 3).

Hence sins directly against God are in themselves or according to species (i.e. other things being equal, without regard to circumstances) graver than sins against Christ the man, and these than those which are done against worship and sacred things, and these than those which are done against oneself and neighbor; moreover suicide is greater than homicide, and this than adultery and fornication which are against the mere propagation of life, and these than theft which is against external goods.

2° is taken mediately from opposition to the virtues. Hence a) those sins are in themselves graver which directly repel against their principal object the more worthy virtues, so that the greatest sin against the most worthy virtue is greater than the greatest sin against an inferior virtue: therefore the greatest sin is hatred of God which is against charity; follow sins directly against faith, against hope, against religion, against penance, and against the cardinal virtues in order (a. 4).

We said: which directly repel against the principal object; for indirect opposition to a more worthy virtue or direct opposition about a secondary object can be less than direct opposition to the primary object of an inferior virtue, as e.g. the omission of an act of charity, or scandal or envy is less than heresy, the reading of a heretical book than despair.

b) Among sins which repel against the same virtue, those are in themselves graver which withdraw more from the principal inclination of the virtue, whence avarice is a greater sin than prodigality, timidity than audacity, intemperance than insensibility, and generally the sin of commission than of omission, as e.g. perjury than violation of an oath.

c) Likewise those are in themselves graver which are opposed to a greater rectitude, good, or office of the same virtue, as e.g. homicide than adultery, and this than detraction, and this than theft; likewise blasphemy is graver than perjury, and this than sacrilege.

3° is also taken mediately from opposition to precepts: in themselves they are graver if they are opposed to more worthy precepts, i.e. given for a more noble motive or by a more worthy legislator, or more necessary, as e.g. other things being equal, a sin against divine law is greater than against human.

443. Principle III. The accidental and secondary gravity of sins, which can happen that a sin in itself graver from its object is in fact less grave and vice versa, is taken from the circumstances (C. Trid. sess. 14, c. 5, can. 7):

1° from the part of the agent or cause: sin is so much the graver as the free will which is the proper cause of sin is greater; the signs of which are most often the intensity and duration of the act (a. 6). Hence sins from malice, because they are more from the will, are graver than sins from infirmity or passion, and these than sins done from ignorance;

2° from the part of the act, whether the circumstances change the species (as e.g. theft of a sacred thing; various sins of lust according to their nature), or multiply the notion of sin in the same species (such as a prodigal who gives when and to whom he ought not, or one who utters diverse contumelies), or increase or diminish the deformity of sin (such as one who steals much, scandalizes many or absolves sacrilegiously, omits several hours of one day): for sin is from the defect of some due circumstance (a. 7).

Hence a) sin is aggravated according to the condition and dignity of the person against whom it is committed, because this is as it were the object of sin; whence sins against persons joined to God or to sin or to many are graver (III Kings XIX, 14; Mic. VII, 6). Examples are: the killing of a priest (Zech. II, 8), of a father (Ecclus. XIV, 5), or of a king or public person (Exod. XXII, 28), whose injury redounds to many (a. 9).

b) Deliberate sins are graver in a person of greater knowledge or virtue, both because he more easily resists sin, and because of ingratitude and scandal, and because of the special repugnance of sin to such a person, as e.g. injustice in a king, fornication in a priest, idolatry in a faithful person. But sins which are committed by stealth because of the infirmity of human nature are lesser, inasmuch as such a person is less negligent in restraining them (a. 10).

c) Sins against neighbor are so much the graver as the greater harm follows from them, especially if it was intended for its own sake; even if it was not intended in itself but nevertheless foreseen, at least confusedly, nor was there a just cause for permitting it¹ (a. 8).

444. Corollary. — Any spiritual sin is not of greater guilt than any carnal sin; but, other things being equal, considering only the difference of spirituality and carnality, spiritual sins are graver: 1° from the part of the subject, because carnal sins are consummated in carnal appetite, to which it principally pertains to be converted to a bodily good, and therefore they have more of conversion to a created good; spiritual sins, on the other hand, are more in reason and will, to which it pertains to be converted to God and to be turned away from him, whence they have more of the aversion from which guilt proceeds; — 2° from the part of him against whom it is committed: he who sins with a spiritual sin sins against God or neighbor, he who sins with a carnal sin sins of himself against his own body, of which he unduly makes use; — 3° from the part of the motive: carnal sins are lesser because we are more impelled to them, which diminishes freedom. Nevertheless carnal sins are of greater infamy because they consist in a delight common to us and the brutes, and are of greater adhesion and danger because of the delight attached (a. 5).

445. Observations. — 1. All sins are not connected. Indeed all mortal sins contemn the same author of the law, God, and agree in aversion, and therefore are contrary to charity (which is the end of the law) and deprive of grace and incur the guilt of the same punishment, according to what James says, II, 10: « Whosoever shall keep the whole law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of all », i.e. guilty of that guilt and punishment which is found in all; whence one mortal sin cannot be forgiven without the other. Nevertheless the sinner does not intend to turn away from God and withdraw from that which is according to reason, but rather to tend to certain desirable goods; but such goods are diverse, nor are they connected, indeed sometimes they are contrary, and accordingly one can be desired without the other, as James himself witnesses, II, 11 (a. 1).

2. From the sixteenth century many speak of 4 sins which in Scripture are called crying to heaven, because, as many think, they are committed directly against the supreme goods necessary to every society as its foundation. This, however, is sufficiently founded neither in Scripture nor in reason, as the distinguished prof. Leroux shows in the journal Revue Eccl. de Liége, May 1914.