Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. I-II, q. 72; de Malo, q. 2, a. 6.

432. Principle I. Sins are specifically distinguished immediately and proximately according to diverse formal objects, or a morally distinct species. For sin is not a simple privation but a voluntary act deprived of due rectitude, whence just as other human acts, sins will have their species immediately from the object: thus idolatry, homicide, and gluttony are distinguished (a. 1). — Since however the end or good is the proper object of the will, it follows that sins are specifically distinguished according to diverse ends (ad 1), whether of the agent (as e.g. to steal out of vengeance or out of fornication), or especially intrinsic to the work itself (as e.g. gluttony for pleasure, theft for money; — gluttony from love of delicious food or from love of much food).

433. Principle II. Sins are not specifically distinguished immediately and proximately, as opposed to the diverse virtues from which they withdraw (as Scotus taught) or to the diverse precepts (as Vasquez said): for the privation which is had in sin, namely a withdrawal from virtue or law, is not intended by the sinner but is beside his intention, whence it is not of itself and directly the object of the will and human act, nor therefore gives the evil act its species (a. 1).

S. Thomas noted that it comes to the same thing, that sins are distinguished in species either according to objects or according to the virtues to which they are opposed, because the virtues themselves are distinguished in species by their objects (ad 2); — or also according to precepts, because these differ according to a diverse object, motive, and end, and also according to diverse virtues, since they are given for this, that we may work according to virtue. Sins, therefore, although they do not immediately take their species from the law which they transgress, or from the virtue from which they withdraw, yet remotely and mediately they can be said to receive their species from them¹.

434. Practical rules are usually laid down as follows, by which the specific distinction of objects and accordingly of sins is easily discerned:

1st, altogether universal, to which all others can be reduced: Sins are diverse which are concerned with formally diverse objects; but objects are formally diverse not according to physical being but according to moral being, i.e. according to a special agreement or repugnance with right reason and the eternal law: hence to steal a sheep or a horse or money is the same sin in species, although the objects are materially diverse, because they agree in one moral notion, in taking another's good; — on the contrary homicide, adultery, and theft, because they contain a diverse repugnance to reason, since they injure a different right to life, to wife, to external goods (a. 1 and ad 3).

2nd: Those sins are diverse which are opposed to diverse virtues: for each virtue has its own proper goodness. Hence theft, fornication, and perjury are distinguished because they are opposed to justice, chastity, and religion (ad 2).

3rd: Those sins are diverse which are opposed to the same virtue but in a contrary way, that is by excess and defect, as presumption and despair of hope, prodigality and avarice to the virtue of liberality: for they are placed from an opposite motive and withdraw from the virtue in a diverse notion (a. 8).

4th: Those sins are diverse which are opposed to the same virtue, not in a contrary way but in a diverse way, on account of a special repugnance with right reason and law; in other words, which are against diverse goods, rectitudes, honesties, offices of the same virtue, as e.g. homicide and theft, theft and robbery, contumely and detraction, real, personal, and local sacrilege, violation of vow and of oath, idolatry and magic, perjury and blasphemy: for then a diverse goodness is injured and in the objects there is a deformity of a distinct notion is had.

5th: Those sins are diverse which are repugnant to formally diverse precepts, i.e. given for a diverse motive or intrinsic end, but not those which are repugnant to many precepts given for the same intrinsic motive, even if they are given by diverse legislators. Hence one who is bound by vow and by the precept of the confessor to fast on Ember Friday, if he does not fast, commits a threefold sin specifically distinct against temperance, religion, and the virtue of penance; — on the contrary, he who omits the holy day falling on a Sunday, or does not fast on Ember Saturday falling on a vigil, because each precept is of the same notion on the part of the end or intrinsic motive; likewise there is only one sin which is forbidden by natural, divine, ecclesiastical, and civil law, such as homicide.

435. Circumstances only per se aggravate sin. — For many pertain to the same object and the same matter, as e.g. from the same motive a prodigal gives when, where, to whom he ought not, and an illiberal man takes when, where it is not fitting, and more than is fitting. — They change species however if they include a special and distinct deformity with reason or proceed from a special motive; but then they do not remain circumstances but become as it were a secondary object of the act and have the character of a specific difference. Thus theft of a sacred thing is specifically distinguished from simple theft, likewise the various sins of gluttony such as eating too much or food that is too delicious (a. 9).

436. Corollaries. — A. Therefore sins are specifically distinguished: a) carnal and spiritual sins, because they tend to formally diverse objects: for carnal sins, namely gluttony and lust and what is reduced to them, have as their end carnal pleasure which is perfected in bodily touch, spiritual [sins have] spiritual pleasure which is consummated in the knowledge of something, as the other five capital [sins] (a. 2).

b) Likewise sins against God, against oneself, and against neighbor, for the objects and virtues by which man is ordered to God, to neighbor, and to oneself are specifically diverse. It is to be noted that every sin which is against neighbor and against oneself is also against God: but here under the name of sin against God comes that which is proximately, immediately, and specially against him, without being against neighbor and oneself (a. 4).

B. Sins are not specifically distinguished: a) because they differ according to liability to punishment, namely mortal and venial. For the will of the sinner does not intend the punishment of sin, but this is accidental and beside his intention. Since therefore the liability to punishment is not the object of the sinful act but follows accidentally, it does not cause a difference of species.

Mortal and venial sin differ infinitely on the part of inordination or privation, not however on the part of conversion to a created good, on the part of the act and object, from which nevertheless they have their species. Nothing therefore prevents mortal and venial sin being found in the same moral species, just as the first movement in the genus of adultery, or theft of 10 cents, is venial (a. 5).

Likewise b) because they are sins of heart, mouth, and work: although indeed per accidens they differ in completed species if they are consummated and perfect either in thought, or in word, or in work, such as heresy, blasphemy, and idolatry, because then they have diverse ends or objects; per se however they indicate only degrees of one species of sin, whose 1st beginning is in the affection of the heart, 2nd degree in the manifestation of the mouth, 3rd in the consummation of the work, as e.g. the desire, proposal, and perpetration of adultery; to conceive in the heart anger toward another, to express it in harsh words, and to strike him (a. 7).

Hence 1) they are not distinguished when they are joined together; 2) but if one or another degree is found separately and the will does not proceed further and does not carry out the sin, then they are distinguished in incomplete species, because then they are related as incomplete and complete species in the same way as a part of a movement and the whole movement, an imperfect work and a complete one, as e.g. the laying of a foundation and the building of a house. Thus internal lust, imperfect lust of the mouth, sight, or touch, and consummate or perfect lust of deed (ad 3).

Likewise c) because they are sins of commission and omission: although indeed according to physical being they are distinguished in species and even in genus, according to moral being they are not necessarily distinguished in species, because they can be concerned with the same object, tend to the same end, and proceed from the same motive, such as to rob another's goods and not to restore them, to watch and to sleep against the precept of a superior, to omit Mass or to steal for adultery, etc. (a. 6).

S. Th. II Sent., d. 42, q. 1, a. 1; de Malo, q. 2, a. 6, ad 12.

437. Principles. — Sins are multiplied in number, not indeed from many or diverse deformities or malices, and therefore that which is multiple in species is not necessarily multiple in number, because one and the same act can have several moral species, as e.g. theft of a sacred thing; — but

1. from the moral multiplication of acts: for sin is not a simple privation but rather an act deprived of due order; — also

2. from the moral multiplication of objects: for acts are distinguished according to objects, for an act is nothing other than a tendency to an object.

Hence a twofold practical rule is usually established.

438. The first rule is: There are as many sins as there are total moral objects, i.e. morally not united but distinct and not coalescing into one object. Hence:

a) External acts physically many which are considered by reason and commanded by the will as coordinated as incomplete or integrating parts of one complete object, according as they are concerned with things of the same notion, are one sin, such as repeated acts to take several and even diverse goods of the same person, several evil oaths or blasphemies or various contumelies or heresies uttered in one impulse, several impure touches exercised on the same person in the same impulse, several canonical hours of one day omitted, and probably diverse sacraments (such as of the sick) to one person, or several sacraments (such as of the Eucharist or Penance) to several persons sacrilegiously administered without moral interruption, because they are one administration; — on the contrary, external acts complete in themselves are many sins, such as to steal Peter's horse and then Paul's money, to detract from one and immediately afterward from another, three acts of fornication even had one immediately after another, an office omitted for 3 days, 3 Masses sacrilegiously celebrated on the Nativity of the Lord, several sacrilegious administrations of sacraments.

b) External acts physically many which are intended as subordinated to one principal action as means to one end are one sin, as e.g. one who sacrilegiously consecrates and communicates in the same sacrifice, who for fornication gives gifts, utters obscene words, exercises impure touches, works the sin itself and immediately after has complacency in it, who, wishing to kill an enemy, buys arms, lays snares, and strikes¹; — on the contrary, if they are not subordinated to the principal complete act: thus one who without the intention of fornication exercises impure touches and finally comes to fornication commits two sins, as one who, after fornication, after some interval again touches impurely.

c) An external act physically one by which diverse persons or matters are touched is probably one sin, such as to kill or scandalize several in one action, to steal or detract from several in one act or before several, to blaspheme against several saints, to consecrate several hosts sacrilegiously in the same sacrifice, etc.: for an external act has unity in itself and therefore tends to several in the manner of one; whence these are conceived and intended as one adequate object²; — on the contrary, if one explicitly intended distinctly and singly to touch those things, in the manner of several, because then they are intended as many and distinct objects: for the act physically one will then be morally multiple.

d) The will inefficacious intending several objects of the same notion, such as several external acts even complete, is probably one sin, as morose delight about 3 women, hatred of 3 persons, inefficacious desire to fornicate even with three, to omit several hours, a fast, Mass for a week, a month, a year, inefficacious choice of diverse evils even to several: for then these are considered in the manner of one as one pleasing or displeasing object; — on the contrary, if several complete acts are intended by an efficacious will or resolve, because then they are considered in the manner of several, as several effects to be obtained or caused.

It is to be noted that several acts, or several evil effects of one act, which constitute only one sin, are not for that reason less evil than if they were several sins: for this one sin is so much the graver as it contains more malices, and is as evil as several sins because in malice it equals several.

439. The second rule is: There are as many sins as there are morally interrupted and repeated acts even about the same object. Acts are morally interrupted, however, when virtually or in effect they are not considered to remain. Which happens in three ways:

1° by retraction or contrary will, whether explicit or equivalent, by placing an act incompatible with the former;

2° by cessation from the act voluntarily and freely, without the resolve to proceed further³, as e.g. by ceasing from an attempt which is not ordered to another attempt, by turning aside to other things because of weariness or fatigue;

3° by involuntary or natural cessation, which is had from involuntary distraction, forgetfulness, occupation, etc., as e.g. by reading a letter, sleep, drunkenness, and the like, when the former will does not remain virtually and cannot be considered the cause of the later about the same object. The sign, however, by reason of which the former will is rightly considered to remain virtually, is that the will returns to the same object as if spontaneously and without new deliberation; on the contrary, if new deliberation is necessary. Whence a brief involuntary cessation ordinarily is not a moral interruption; how great precisely the delay required for moral interruption, however, cannot be defined by a general rule but is to be left to the prudent determination of an arbitrator, with attention to the intensity of the act and the nature of the distraction. Hence:

a) Merely internal acts (morose delights, inefficacious desires or hatreds, envies, rash judgments, doubts concerning faith, despairings) do not long persevere, so that if the physical interruption is notable it is considered moral: for the same affection cannot last amid diverse occupations and distractions except for a short time, regularly certainly not beyond 2 or 3 hours; indeed this seems much.

b) Internal acts to be completed exteriorly, as being ordered to external work, last longer, especially if they have begun to be executed; otherwise they are considered to persevere only for some days: for the same internal impulse, even of a vehement one, does not last longer, at least generally, for some, such as efficacious hatreds, desires of a base thing and of vengeance, often because of vehemence last long, even the will of not restoring, because it is ordered to an effect in itself perpetual.

c) External acts are interrupted if they are absolute and complete, i.e. if they are not subordinated to the principal action nor done in the same impulse, as was said in rule 1st under a) and b).

440. Practical corollaries. — 1° He who commits a single sin which is concerned with several objects is not bound of himself to declare the number of objects in confession; — but he is bound to declare the plurality, saying e.g. I scandalized several or many, I inefficaciously desired several women, I absolved several sacrilegiously, I detracted from the household, etc.; otherwise he would lead the confessor into error, who would rightly think that the act is concerned with one object only, and thus in fact would accuse that sin of him, like one who would say: I stole a gold coin in place of 20.

2° In acts subordinated to one principal action, this alone, and not the means, is to be declared, unless they contain mortal malice specifically distinct, as e.g. theft for fornication. But if the principal action has not followed, the intention of committing it is to be declared; — the means employed are not to be declared if in themselves they are indifferent (as e.g. to buy arms, to walk about) because they are not evil except by the malice of the intention; they are to be declared if in themselves they are evil, as e.g. if they manifest the internal intention, but in a general and confused way, as e.g. I employed impure means for fornication or I tried to procure it; they are to be declared in a distinct way if they contain mortal malice specifically distinct, as e.g. a maleficium or the cooperation of another to inflict harm.

3° Penitents who cannot determine how many interrupted times they consented to the internal temptation, should declare the time during which they persevered in evil will, as e.g. for a day I hated, for a month I desired the girl, adding as far as possible whether the angers or interruptions were frequent. From the time the confessor indeed, with attention to the disposition of the person, the nature of the thing, and the circumstances, can in some way conjecture the interruption.

4° He who in one impulse places several acts of the same notion, should declare one, saying e.g. I touched a woman, I blasphemed, I swore, I detracted, etc.: for it is one act morally.

5° That the sacrament of penance not be made burdensome, nor may the faithful and confessors be tormented by scruples, questions are not to be made about the species and number of sins unless grave motives are present. Penitents, however, are bound to confess the species and number according to the knowledge which they had of these, at least in a confused way, at that moment when they committed the sin, but not according to theological knowledge if they did not have it: for nothing is willed unless foreknown.