659. Faith according to the name (πίστις from πείθω, πείθομαι, fido, I am persuaded) primarily and by origin designates a voluntary trust or confidence, given either to an authority (or to a truth) or to the testimony of another through our intellect¹], or to his goodness or promise through the will itself²].

From the derivation of this latter meaning, faith is also taken: a) for fidelity in a promise³]; b) for the promise itself and the vow⁴]; c) for the things promised⁵].

From the derivation of the former meaning, faith is also taken: a) for truth in bearing witness⁶]; b) for the things witnessed themselves, e.g. for the doctrine to be believed, as in Eph. IV, 5 : « One Lord, one faith », and in the Athanasian Creed : « This is the Catholic faith... »; c) for the trust placed either in one's own opinion, when full evidence is lacking, or in the dictate of one's own conscience, as in Rom. XIV, 23 : « Whatsoever is not of faith (i.e. from the persuasion of conscience) is sin »; in which sense too a person is said to be in good or bad faith.

660. Faith in the strict sense is said of a voluntary assent of the intellect (actual faith), or of a habit inclining to the giving of such an assent (habitual faith)

on account of the sole authority or testimony of another. If that authority be human, it is called human faith; if it be divine, it is called divine faith.

Divine faith can be given about things merely natural; in the present order, however, in which we are destined for a supernatural end, it is about supernatural and divine things (and about other things in relation to eternal life), and so it is more strictly divine not only by reason of the motive but also by reason of the matter, and is therefore called theological.

661. Theological faith is described by the Apostle, in Heb. XI, 1 : Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the argument of things not seen. It is called

1° the substance of things hoped for, i.e. the first in us inchoation of beatitude, and the first foundation (which stands under other things and so grounds them), as S. Thomas explains; or, more conformably to the Greek text : a firm and certain subsistentia (ὑπόστασις) of beatitude in our mind, inasmuch as faith makes us so certain of the things hoped for as if they were already present and possessed by us;

2° the argument (ἔλεγχος), metonymically for its effect, namely, the conviction it causes;

3° of things not seen (οὐ βλεπομένων) : faith is the argument, i.e. the full conviction, the certain persuasion, of things which are seen neither by the senses nor by the mind, but are admitted on account of God's authority.

That this description is a true definition is shown by S. Thomas, II-II, q. 4, a. 1 (cf. De Verit., q. 14, a. 2), and so from his time in the schools it has been customary to explain it as the classical definition. For by this definition faith is distinguished from all others:

a) by what is said the substance of things hoped for, it is distinguished from faith taken in a common sense, e.g. from human faith, which is not ordered to hoped-for beatitude;

b) by what is said the argument, it is distinguished from opinion, suspicion, and doubt, in which the intellect is not fully convinced nor firmly adheres to any truth;

c) finally, by what is said of things not seen, it is distinguished from science and from the intellect of principles, by which things appear to the intellect. Hence if one wished to put the Apostle's doctrine into the form of a definition, one could say : « faith is a habit of mind by which eternal life is begun in us, making the intellect assent to things unseen ».

662. The Vatican Council explains the Apostle's definition, while setting forth the nature of faith (Const. Dei Filius, c. 3) : « This faith, which is the beginning of human salvation, the Catholic Church professes to be a supernatural virtue, whereby, by the inspiring and aiding grace of God, we believe the things revealed by Him to be true, not for the intrinsic truth of those things perceived by the natural light of reason, but for the authority of God Himself revealing, who can neither deceive nor be deceived. For faith, as the witness of the Apostle, is the substance of things hoped for... ». The following are indicated:

1. the genus to which faith belongs : a supernatural virtue;

2. the proper act of the virtue of faith by which it is distinguished from other virtues : whereby we believe the things revealed to be true;

3. the matter about which it is concerned : things revealed by God;

4. the motive of faith : on account of the authority of God revealing;

5. the cause of faith : the inspiring, i.e. preventing, and aiding grace.

That this definition is real and adequate will be shown throughout the whole treatise⁷].

The treatise on faith does not, as some have thought, belong to dogmatic theology, but to moral theology. For to believe is a human act by which one must tend toward the supernatural end. And therefore, although the principal objects of faith are merely speculative or dogmas to be merely believed, which are treated in dogmatic theology, faith itself is something practical, which is to be known only insofar as it is at the same time to be done and brought into practice. Hence the entire treatise, as such, belongs to moral theology.

663. Division of the treatise. — The treatise on faith comprises five parts:

The 1st Part treats of the object of faith, which is better known than the act of faith, and so must first be explained : 1) of the formal object; 2) of the material object : a) of the material object in itself; b) of its conditions; c) of its evolution; d) of the Church proposing it.

The 2nd Part treats of the act of faith, which is better known than the habit of faith : A. of the interior act : 1) of its essence; 2) of its analysis, namely both a) of the act of faith itself, and b) of the pious affection of credulity, and c) of the judgment of credibility, i.e. of the preambles of faith; 3) of the necessity of the act of faith; B. of the exterior act or confession of faith.

The 3rd Part treats of the habit of faith : 1) of faith itself : a) in relation to the subject, b) in relation to the other supernatural virtues, c) in relation to the other intellectual habits; 2) of those who have faith; 3) of the cause and effects of faith; 4) of the gifts corresponding to faith.

The 4th Part treats of the vices and sins opposed : 1) of sins directly opposed to interior faith : a) of infidelity; b) of heresy and apostasy; 2) of sins indirectly opposed to faith : a) of communication with infidels and heretics; b) of co-operation toward infidelity and heresy; c) of the reading or publication of prohibited books; d) of the admission or profession of doctrine which is dangerous for faith; 3) of blasphemy, which is directly opposed to the confession of faith.

The 5th Part treats of the precept of faith.

Summa Theologiae Moralis I. — 33 PART ONE.

ON THE OBJECT OF FAITH.

S. Th. II-II, q. 1, a. 1.

664. The object of faith is the first truth, God, as will be proved below. He Himself is the first truth in a threefold way : a) in being, because His essence is the first being, and therefore the first eternal truth; b) in knowing, because by His wisdom from eternity He knows all things as they are; c) in saying, because by His veracity from eternity He has the highest propensity to say what is true, if He speaks.

665. The object of faith is twofold: material and formal. — For in every power and habit, as in every act, we distinguish the object:

1. The material object, or that which is actually attained, the matter about which the act is actually concerned, e.g. for cognition, that which is known, such as a conclusion. Further, the material object is twofold : for there is something which is attained first, through itself, and by reason of itself, which is therefore called the primary material object, and for the sake of which other things are attained, which are called the secondary material object.

2. There is the formal object, or that through which, by means of which, the material object is immediately attained, or the proximate motive on account of which it is attained, e.g. for cognition the medium through which something is immediately known, such as the syllogism by which the conclusion is known.

Let there be an example in vision : the secondary material object is the things seen, the primary is the colored, the formal is the light.

666. Observations. — 1st Lest confusion arise, it should be noted that some theologians call the primary material object the formal-quod object; but these call the formal object the formal-quo, or the formal motive, i.e. the formal reason⁸].

2nd In catechisms, the material object is designated by the particle what, e.g. when one is asked what we ought to believe, and the formal object is expressed by the particle why or wherefore, e.g. why we ought to believe.

ON THE FORMAL OBJECT OF FAITH.

S. Th. II-II, q. 1, a. 1 ; De Verit., q. 14, a. 8.

667. Thesis. The formal object of faith is the authority of God revealing, or the first truth in saying. — The formal object of faith is that on account of which that which is believed is believed. This, as the Vatican Council defines (sess. 3, c. 3, can. 3), is the authority of God revealing, who can neither deceive nor be deceived ; authority indeed not in commanding but in affirming and witnessing, that is, the truth of God in saying, and indeed the truth of God as revealing. These words indicate two things :

1° That God, when He speaks, by reason of His infinite perfection says nothing but the truth, and so has the right that we believe Him, whence the formal object of faith is said to be the first truth in saying.

2° But it is not enough that God, when He speaks, says what is true ; for faith it is also required that He has in fact spoken : hence the formal object of faith is said to be the authority of God as revealing, or the first revealing truth. For if one asks anyone why he believes, he will answer because God has said so (in 2°) ; and he believes what God has said, because God in speaking is true (in 1°). — But :

3° For the authority of God, whereby He is true in saying, it is not enough that God is infinitely true, i.e. that He cannot deceive anyone out of malice, but it is also required that He be infinitely wise, i.e. that He cannot be deceived in knowing out of ignorance. Hence theologians say that the formal object of faith is the first truth in saying, inasmuch as it presupposes the first truth in knowing. The immediate and ultimate motive of faith, however, is only the first revealing truth.

668. That the authority of God revealing is the formal object of faith is proved:

1. By reason : By divine faith we believe God in the same way as by human faith we believe a man. But by human faith we believe on account of the authority of the man in bearing witness : for if one asks anyone : why do you believe this? he will answer : because Peter said it ; and if one asks : why do you believe what Peter said? he will answer : because Peter is truthful in speaking.

2. From the manner of speaking of Holy Scripture : a) faith is said to be from hearing the word of God (Rom. X, 14 ; Jer. VII, 28), and the faithful are said to receive faith as the word or testimony of God (1 Thess. II, 13) ; — b) by faith we believe God (Gen. XV, 6) : to believe is to receive the testimony of God, just as to believe men is to receive the testimony of men (1 John V, 5-13) ; and indeed divine faith is compared to the faith given to witnesses in a trial (John V, 36 ; VIII, 17) ; — c) the prophets of the Old Testament, when they demand faith, appeal to the authority of God (Thus says the Lord), and Christ Himself explicitly to His truth and veracity (John VII, 16, 28 ; VIII, 26) ; whence by believing we signify that God is truthful (John III, 33). From all of which it is evident that we believe God in the same way as we believe men, and that faith is founded on the testimony and authority of God speaking. — And so d) faith is called the obedience and captivity of the intellect in obedience to Christ (2 Cor. X, 5) : for when a man by faith admits not what he himself but what Christ sees, because he voluntarily trusts Christ, therefore by the will the intellect is held captive to Christ's intellect, subjects itself to Him, and honors Him.

3. From Tradition : the same is taught clearly and openly by the Fathers from the beginning : Athenagoras, Leg. pro Christianis, n. 7 ; S. Theophilus of Antioch, ad Autolyc. I, 8 ; Clement of Alexandria, Strom. II, c. 2, n. 8 ; S. Chrysostom, in Mt. hom. I, n. 82 ; hom. 36 in Gen. 15, n. 6 ; Theodoret, Graec. affect. serm. I ; S. Cyprian, De Mortalitate, n. 6 ; S. Ambrose, in Luc. IV, 71 ; S. Augustine, ep. 47, n. 7 ; De Spiritu et Littera, XXXII, n. 5 ; S. Leo the Great, serm. 27, c. 1.

The arguments brought forward prove that faith is founded equally on revelation or testimony and on the truth of God, and therefore that not only the truth of God in saying is the formal object of faith, but that revelation also pertains to it, or is a motive positively influencing faith, and is not a mere condition without which the motive is applied, as Scotus taught. And indeed :

a) That which formally constitutes God as a witness, and which renders God's authority formally moving, pertains to the motive of faith. But revelation actually formally constitutes God as a witness and renders His authority formally moving, for an authority not speaking does not move the hearer. Therefore the formal motive of faith is the first truth as actually witnessing ; otherwise it would move in the first act, not in the second act.

b) For the partial motive is that by which reason sees the connection between the authority of God and the truth to be believed, just as the link of the conclusion with the principle moves one to scientific assent ; but this connection in the present case is the fact of revelation. Therefore revelation is a partial motive.

c) The adequate formal object is that which infallibly shows the revealed truth. Neither God's authority alone nor revelation alone shows this. Therefore the adequate formal object is both together. We do not believe, namely, only because God is truthful, nor only because God has revealed, but on account of both¹].

669. Faith is a theological, or purely divine, virtue, which accordingly has God alone as its formal object : for by habitual grace and the theological virtues we share in the life and operations proper to God Himself, which have God alone as their object. Hence the sole motive of faith is the truth of God revealing alone, nor can any created thing enter into its formal object, just as must be said also of the other theological virtues. Hence the following are not to be heard :

1. Those who, with De Lugo, hold that the formal object of faith is partially the proposition of the Church, saying that we believe because God has revealed, and this because the Church says so. For the proposition made by the Church is not the cause or motive why we believe, but only the ordinary means by which we know what has been revealed by God²]; having known which, we adhere to the revealed truths on account of God's authority alone. Thus when a teacher says : this is the opinion of Scripture or of S. Thomas, you believe the opinion not on account of the teacher but on account of the authority of Scripture or of S. Thomas.

Thus also the contents of a king's letter are not believed on account of the authority of the messenger.

2. Nor are those to be heard who, like Mazzella, teach that extrinsic revelation enters into the formal object of faith ; because for faith it is required that God has in fact spoken, as was said in n° 667. For God's speech can be considered either actively, as it is in God Himself the conception of a truth which He orders and directs to us and the will and command to reveal it, and thus it is nothing but God Himself and pertains to the motive of faith ; or it can be considered passively, as it is the manifestation and sign of this conception and will in creatures (an external voice, an imaginary vision, or an intelligible species infused in us), and this is not the formal object of faith but only a condition without which it would not be possible : for because we are not able to inspect God's speech, i.e. His intellect and will, therefore we need, in order to know it, signs external to God, which nevertheless are not the cause or motive why we believe, but a condition without which faith is not possible.

Thus the letter by which someone testifies is not the motive of believing, but only the condition of knowing his judgment and testimony internally.

670. Corollary. — Hence it appears that the opinions of the older theologians are false, among whom

1. Cajetan placed the formal object of faith in the divine essence, or God's truth in being, and William of Paris in God's supreme dominion : these are the ultimate ontological reason of the motive of faith itself, but not the proximate motive which moves to assent, or on which our intellect's assent rests ;

2. Báñez and Sylvester Maurus at least partially placed it in the light of faith, whether habitual or actual : grace causes as by an efficient cause, but it is not the motive of believing ;

3. Ripalda placed it, for revealed promises, in the fidelity of God : but this pertains to the motive of hope.

ON THE MATERIAL OBJECT OF FAITH.

S. Th. II-II, q. 1, a. 1 and 2 ; a. 6, ad 1 ; De Verit., q. 14, a. 8.

671. Thesis I. The material object of faith is everything revealed by God. — The material object of faith is that which is believed on account of the authority of God revealing. This, as the Vatican Council teaches (sess. 3, c. 3), is everything and only what has been revealed by God. — It is proved :

The material object of faith is everything which can be attained through the formal object, which is the authority of God revealing. Now the authority of God extends equally to all revealed things, and God is equally worthy of faith, whether He makes manifest truths of greater moment or things of lesser moment ; on the other hand, the authority of God in speaking cannot extend to those things which He does not reveal. Therefore everything and only what God has revealed is the material object of faith.

672. Thesis II. The primary or principal material object of faith is God Himself as the supernatural end, or the first truth in being. — The primary or principal material object is that which is believed through itself and by reason of itself, and for the sake of which other things are believed. This is God Himself as the supernatural end ; for all other things, such as the humanity of Christ, the sacraments, and other things contained in Scripture, « fall under faith only insofar as they have some order to God », so that we may know Him more fully as the supernatural end and tend to Him more perfectly. Hence the primary material object is said to be God as He is the first truth in being.

Although the object of faith is the first truth which is altogether simple, since nevertheless we do not see it in itself, but conceive it in our own way according to some of its perfections, we distinguish in the object of faith a multiplicity of things, just as in God Himself we distinguish many perfections and attributes, which are really identical with the divine essence and with one another.

673. The secondary object of faith. — The following pertain to it :

1. those things which of themselves directly lead to the supernatural end, and which are called the matters of faith and morals : they are the object of faith properly and of themselves ;

2. those things which of themselves are indifferent to the supernatural end and without which the Christian doctrine about faith and morals is incomplete, but which in fact along with that doctrine were attested in Holy Scripture for its manifestation, e.g. the history of Abraham or the captivity of the Jewish people, and other such things which can be known by natural reason ; these too must be believed, but they are the object of faith only improperly and accidentally (q. 1, a. 6, ad 1).

674. Corollary on private revelations. — Since divine authority is equal in particular revelations directed to a private person and in public revelation, it follows that the former are an object of divine faith, and can be believed provided one is certain of them. In such a case, at least the person to whom they were directed is obliged to believe ; if he omits this, he commits a sin of infidelity, discerning God's authority, which subverts faith in him ; but for others it probably suffices that they do not despise them.

For private revelations, if approved by the Church, are not proposed to be believed with divine faith ; but the Church only declares 1) that they contain nothing contrary to faith and morals, 2) that there are sufficient indications that they may be prudently, piously, and without superstition believed with human faith; from which it follows 3) that it is not lawful to despise them.

675. The object of faith implicitly revealed. — Not only those things which are explicitly, i.e. in themselves, expressly and distinctly, are matters of divine faith, but also those which are implicitly revealed pertain to divine faith.

For some things are said to be revealed :

1. Formally and immediately, though implicitly, i.e. really and by a proper concept, although not expressed and distinct but in a confused way, and not by proper but by equivalent terms : these are the things which are contained in what is explicitly revealed as a part in a whole, e.g. the definition and the essentials of the defined thing in the defined thing (actual metaphysical whole and metaphysical parts, e.g. man = rational animal ; sacrament = practical sign of grace) ; — or the particular in the universal (potential whole and subjective parts, e.g. every man, John) ; — or the elements and essential properties in the whole (actual physical or integral whole, and constitutive or integral parts, e.g. man = body and soul ; head, brain, heart ; capable of laughter) ; — or the essential forces and powers in the essence (power whole and potential parts, e.g. soul, intellect, and will) ; — or one correlative, contradictory, or contrary in the other (e.g. John is the son of Zebedee, this one is the father of John). These are the object of faith because they are equivalent and as to the sense are said by God, and so truly, really, and properly are contained in revelation : He who reveals the whole, implicitly reveals the parts.

2. Things are said to be revealed virtually and mediately implicitly which are contained in revelation as effect in cause, and as consequence or conclusion in its principles. These are not the object of divine faith since they are not immediately and in themselves revealed¹], but only mediately, namely in the medium from which they can be deduced : for they are not admitted because God said them, but only on account of something else which God said, i.e. not solely on account of the word of God but also on account of the connection with what He said. He who enunciates the principle or cause does not enunciate the consequence or effect. They are nevertheless the object of the assent of scientific theology ; and if they are infallibly defined by the Church, they are to be admitted altogether as true and they are the object, not of divine faith, but of theological assent or even of ecclesiastical faith²] — Hence :

a) A conclusion from one revealed premise and from another naturally known premise is revealed and an object of faith, if the second only shows that the conclusion is contained formally implicitly in the first, e.g. Christ is a man, therefore He has a body or is a rational animal ; — Every man begotten from Adam contracts original sin, therefore Peter contracts it ; and also, as it seems, a conclusion whose knowledge depends on a contingent fact, e.g. Every legitimately elected pontiff is the vicar of Christ, therefore Pius XI is the vicar of Christ ; — this child rightly baptized has grace, this consecrated host contains Christ. In these examples, however, there is no true syllogism, because the process does not have illative force ; it is not a conclusion properly so called through a true demonstration and deduction of a new truth, but a merely explicative conclusion and a simple declaration of those things which were already actually contained in the premises.

b) A conclusion from one revealed premise and from another naturally known premise, if it is equally contained in each and is equally and truly deduced from each, is not revealed nor an object of faith, because it is not admitted solely on account of God's authority but on account of the deduction, e.g. Christ is God-man, but a God-man can never lack grace or the beatific vision ; — the B.V. is the Mother of Christ, but S. Anna is the mother of the B.V., therefore she is the grandmother of Christ ; — Christ died under Pontius Pilate, therefore under Tiberius. Then there is a true syllogism, a true and properly so-called deduction, and a true illative conclusion of those things which were contained in the premises only virtually and by force of the connection ; a conclusion of a distinct truth, not revealed, but connected with revelation. The conclusion, as the logicians say, follows the weaker part.

c) A conclusion from two revealed premises, according to many³], is revealed and an object of faith, both because the conclusion is formally contained in the two premises which in this case are revealed, and because God knows their connection and the conclusion, but he who enunciates two premises while seeing the conclusion intends to enunciate this and manifests it in a sufficient manner. These arguments, however, do not seem to prove : not the first, because a properly so-called conclusion is contained in the premises not formally but only virtually, which are the true means of arriving at the conclusion ; otherwise the conclusion would not express a new truth, nor would the reasoning be a means of increasing knowledge⁴], — not the second, because for a conclusion to be enunciated properly and formally, it is not enough that one know it in the premises and intend to say it, but it is also required that the connection with them be manifested in some way by human speech, namely, that one enunciate the premises not separately but as premises, inasmuch as they are compared to one another and lead to the conclusion. Therefore, for God, who uses human speech for men, to reveal a conclusion, it is not enough that He know the connection with the principles and see the consequence, but it is also required that He express this connection or consequence, and place one premise immediately after the other⁵].

Such conclusions, then, from two revealed premises, do not seem necessarily and always to be revealed ; for if they were, from them others could be deduced, and from these again others, and so revelation would extend itself as it were to infinity. In fact, however, they are often revealed, and the object of faith, either because they themselves are expressly revealed, or because one premise only shows what is contained formally implicitly in the other, in which case there is not a truly demonstrative syllogism but a merely explicative one, as was said under a) ; e.g. There is one God ; but the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are God ; therefore they are one God ; — All the Apostles received the Holy Spirit ; Peter is an apostle ; therefore d) All the foregoing conclusions, if they are looked at as conclusions, i.e. inasmuch as they have a nexus with premises also revealed and are deduced from them, are not the object of faith but of the assent of theological science, because then they are not admitted on account of the motive of faith, the authority of God revealing, but on account of the motive of science, namely, on account of the nexus with the principles and the rational deduction.

676. The object of faith in itself and in relation to us ; divine and Catholic faith. — The object of faith can be distinguished :

1. The object of divine faith in itself, is that which in fact is revealed and so in itself pertains to faith.

2. The object of faith in relation to us, is that which moreover is sufficiently proposed as revealed and whose revelation is known by us with certainty. Hence particular propositions whose knowledge depends on a contingent fact, e.g. this host contains Christ, this child has grace, often will not be the object of faith in relation to us when the existence of the fact is not known by us with absolute certainty⁶] : for then the nexus with the revealed proposition does not appear.

3. The object of Catholic or universal-for-all faith, and to be believed by all, is that which pertains to the public revelation directed by God to all men and to the universal Church (contained in Scripture and Tradition), and moreover which the Church proposes as divinely revealed and commands all to believe. Hence private revelations cannot pertain to Catholic faith, and the Immaculate Conception of the B.V. before the definition was an object of divine faith, but not of Catholic faith (Vat. Counc., sess. 3, c. 3 ; Codex Iuris Canonici 1323, § 1).

Hence something can a) be of faith in itself, and not in relation to us, if we are not certain that it is revealed : so today the question is raised whether the assumption of the B.V.

b) be of faith for one and not for another, e.g. a private revelation ;

c) be of faith only probably, if there is doubt about the revelation ; indeed probably of Catholic faith, if there is doubt about the Church's proposition ; d) begin to be of Catholic faith, after the definition ; indeed cease to be of Catholic faith in relation to us, if the definition or its sense is no longer certain.

Explicit faith, therefore, can grow.

S. Th. II-II, q. 1, a. 3, 4, 5 ; I-II, q. 67, a. 3 and 5 ; De Verit., q. 14, a. 9.

677. Two conditions are required for the object of faith. — For something to be capable of being believed, it is required that it be at once true and obscure or non-evident. Hence theologians say that there are two material conditions of the object of faith, namely, that it be true and obscure, and two proper states of faith on the part of the object : infallibility and obscurity.

678. The infallibility of faith. — First it is required that the material object of faith be true (Num. XXIII, 19 ; Heb. VI, 18) : faith cannot be of what is false, since, as the Vatican Council defines (sess. 3, c. 4), the assent of faith is not « a vain motion of the mind, but a firm and certain assent of the intellect », given to revealed truth « on account of the authority of God, who can neither deceive nor be deceived ».

a) Not on the part of God revealing, because He cannot say what is false : for if God, by Himself or through another, could say what is false, this would happen either because He did not know the truth, or because, knowing it, He was unwilling to declare it, or because He could not, through the fault of His nature, declare it. But all of this is impossible to God, since He is infinitely wise, infinitely good, and infinitely powerful.

b) Nor on the part of the man believing : for nothing is attained and believed by the habit of faith except on account of the authority and testimony of God, who is Himself the first truth. Therefore if faith were of something false, it would not be of it on account of God's authority, and so the principal and proper motive of faith would be lacking, and faith would not be a virtue.

Faith is an intellectual virtue which does not deal with what is false, which is an evil of the intellect : for no one makes bad use of a virtue. Hence if someone were to assent to what is false, which through even invincible ignorance he thinks to have been revealed by God, such a person does not assent out of the supernatural habit of theological faith on account of God's authority, because God revealed it, but only by a natural act on account of error, because he falsely thinks God revealed it. Nor does God, by grace, concur with such an act, by which the intellect adheres to what is false. Hence faith is infallible.

679. The obscurity of faith. — Secondly, it is required that the material object of faith be obscure or non-evident : for faith is « the argument of things not seen », Heb. XI, 1. Unde, nisi obiectum materiale sit obscurum seu non evidenter cognitum, proprie non est fides. — Hinc formaliter distinguitur fides a scientia et ab intellectu evidenti.

a) All theologians unanimously admit that the material object of faith is formally non-evident, by reason of the motive, inasmuch as it is attained through the authority of God who is not seen. This is necessary, otherwise the assent would not be properly by faith but would be the assent of science or of evident cognition.

b) All likewise hold that something cannot be believed and at the same time seen with the beatific vision, according to 1 Cor. XIII, 9-10.

c) They likewise grant that those things of which faith is principally about are altogether obscure and not evident : for the beatific vision and other mysteries are not seen in themselves by the intellect of the wayfarer, but only darkly and as in a mirror (1 Cor. XIII, 12).

d) They dispute whether other objects which can be known naturally, but which nevertheless are revealed, can be believed by those who also have an evident rational cognition of these objects, e.g. whether he who has full evidence of the existence of God, or of creation, or of providence, etc., can still admit these on account of the authority of God who has revealed even these.

680. How evidence impedes faith. — In this question :

1° It is certain that he who has evidence of some thing this can believe it implicitly, inasmuch as he ought to believe in a general way everything which God has revealed and cannot exclude any of it, and this is the meaning of the Vat. Council, sess. 3, c. 3.

2° Indeed explicitly but at another moment than he has the evident cognition : for he who, e.g., now demonstrates the existence of God, can at another time admit it by faith, namely, when he is not actually considering the demonstration. For then, although no doubt can occur concerning the existence of God, since the evidence can be produced, nevertheless, before that evidence is actually produced, the assent is not the assent of science but of faith.

3° Hence in the same man, concerning the same truth, there can be at the same time the habit of faith and the act of science, the act of faith and the habit of science, indeed even the habit of faith and the habit of science, by which at the same time he is disposed for believing and for knowing, not simultaneously but at different times.

4° For it seems to be said with S. Thomas¹], that at the same moment in which one makes an evident demonstration of some truth, or most fully remembers a prior demonstration, so that one has plain evidence of the truth, one cannot at this moment accept the same truth on account of divine testimony. — It is proved :

a) Internal experience shows that we never admit, nor can admit, what we see with our eyes on the testimony of another, even one most worthy of faith ; likewise it is clear that no one believes, nor can believe, the first principles, e.g. the principle of contradiction, which are seen with the mind ; whence in heaven faith is brought to nothing when God's vision comes ; the same seems to be said of that moment in which someone, having made the demonstration, sees with the mind the conclusion with evidence of the existence of God or of another natural truth : for immediate and mediated evidence are of the same kind. The law of our intellect, namely, is that we cannot believe what we see.

b) By reason : The intellect cannot at the same moment perfectly rest in the truth and at the same time not rest. But he who has altogether evident cognition, rests perfectly in the truth and indeed necessarily ; he who believes does not rest in it, for there remains for him the possibility and freedom of doubting or of not assenting. Therefore at the same moment one cannot hold the same truth by faith and by evidence²],

c) By a reply to the chief argument of the adversaries : The same truth can at the same time be admitted on account of a twofold motive : namely, evidence and authority. For it is easy to distinguish : if those motives do not require a contrary disposition of the intellect, I grant ; if they require a contrary disposition, I deny. For otherwise in the same way would be demonstrated the possibility of faith in heaven, or the compatibility of science and opinion.

681. Observation. — From this it does not follow that the merit of faith is diminished, if someone does not believe revealed rational truths of which he has evidence. For, as S. Thomas notes, q. 2, a. 10, ad 2 : « The demonstrative reasons brought forward for those things which are preambles to faith (but not for the articles), although they diminish the formal notion of faith, because they make what is proposed appear evident, do not however diminish the formal notion of charity, by which the will is prompt to believe them, even if they do not appear, and therefore the notion of merit is not diminished ».

S. Th. II-II, q. 1, a. 6 and 7 ; De Verit., q. 14, a. 11.

682. Notions. — By theologians these three are distinguished : dogma, point, and article of faith.

A point of faith is a truth revealed by God.

A dogma of faith is a revealed truth proposed by the Church to be believed.

An article of faith¹] is a revealed truth perfectly distinct from others, and therefore 1) principal or primary among things to be believed, and 2) of a special kind not seen. It is called

1° principal among things to be believed, i.e. either God Himself, the supernatural end to be possessed in beatitude, or something supernatural which belongs to the attainment of that end (and the rest are not articles of faith properly so called, nor is faith given to them as such, although they may be materially contained in the articles of faith or the truths contained in the articles), e.g. that there is a God ; that God rewards and punishes ; that the Incarnation, Passion, Resurrection, etc., of Christ have taken place. Hence article of faith is divided into principal and secondary ; the principal is divided into mystical (the Trinity, the Incarnation), and moral (the remission of sins through baptism, the resurrection of the body, etc.).

2° of a special kind not seen, i.e. obscure, and therefore having a particular difficulty in believing ; whence that Christ suffered for us is an article, but that there is a God is not an article, since it can be known by natural reason (although in us it is known only through faith and through faith takes on the formal note of an article), for difficulty of belief flows from obscurity.

683. Principles. On the growth of the object of faith and the progress of faith.

I. The material object of Catholic faith, i.e. to be held by all, has not grown, through the succession of ages, as to the substance of the articles. For the whole doctrine revealed is reduced to two chief heads, revealed from the beginning, in which all things are contained implicitly as in a brief introduction : objectively, namely, on the part of the thing, though not logically and in relation to us, neither formally nor virtually ; namely, that God exists as a supernatural end, and that He has providence over man's salvation, as the Apostle says in Heb. XI, 6 : « He who comes to God (i.e. tending to the supernatural end, for in the present order the end is not natural but supernatural, to be attained by the beatific vision) must believe that He is, and that He rewards those who seek Him ».

II. Until the times of Christ and the Apostles faith grew by an objective evolution which was made through new revelations. For of the two fundamental articles the explanation or objective evolution grew through new revelations, such as the Trinity, predestination, and all eternal things for the first ; all things temporally disposed for salvation, namely Redemption and in this the Incarnation, Passion, Resurrection, and sacraments of Christ for the second. So until Christ, who to His Apostles, either through Himself or through the Holy Spirit whom He sent, revealed all things, according to John XVI, 13 : « When He, the Spirit of truth, has come, He will teach you all truth ». Hence in the Apostles the public revelation was consummated and complete (Council of Trent, sess. 4 ; prop. 21 of the Syllabus).

III. From the time of the Apostles faith has not grown in itself by objective evolution, but only by subjective evolution in the minds of men. No more new revelations were made, and therefore the object of faith has not grown simply and in itself ; nevertheless it can be said that it has grown in a certain respect and in relation to us, i.e. according to the explanation or subjective evolution, inasmuch as its knowledge has grown in us, either through a new more distinct or insistent proposition, by which it grew in the mind of the Church, or through more perfect knowledge, deeper insight and understanding, by which it grew in the mind of each of the faithful. It is, says Albert the Great, III Sent. d. 25, a. 1, « rather a progress of faith about faith than of faith in faith ». — Moreover, the subjective evolution of the Church, as to the faithful, is objective evolution, not indeed of the revelation itself or of the revealed truth, but of its proposition and explanation.

A. Subjective explanation in the mind of the Church (and consequently of the faithful) under the assistance of the Spirit of truth takes place in three ways :

1. By a distinct and accurate declaration and scientific exposition of those things which are explicitly but obscurely and confusedly revealed, when revelation is given in general and obscure terms, which need to be developed into distinct propositions, and the truths contained in those propositions are deduced and explained. Thus the principal truths are deduced from revelation, both speculative and practical, and theology is built up.

Thus e.g. Christ is God and man, therefore He has two natures and one person ; There is one God, Father, Son, Holy Spirit, therefore there are three persons and one nature ; likewise the terms : transsubstantiation, consubstantial, definition ex cathedra, Mother of God.

2. By the explicit proposition of those things which are formally implicitly revealed, when revelation conceived in general terms is unfolded into explicit propositions, when, namely, what was contained in revelation only in a general and confused way is brought out and proposed distinctly.

E.g. grace is necessary for every work of salvation, therefore also for the beginning of faith ; The Mother of God is most holy, therefore she has no original sin ; Christ is God and perfect man, therefore He has a divine and human will (and works) ; the particular rights and offices of the Sovereign Pontiff in primacy.

3. By a clear, insistent, and theoretical preaching of those things which were revealed incidentally or in practice and custom, when revelation, given at first by being done rather than by being explained, is later explicitly and theoretically proposed.

Thus e.g. the validity of the Baptism of children or of baptism conferred by heretics from the practice of baptizing or not rebaptizing ; the sacramental character from the custom of not rebaptizing ; the presence of Christ under either species from the practice of adoration or communion ; the infallibility of the Holy Pontiff from the practice of defining or imposing an irreformable sentence ; Christ and the Apostles, by venerating Mary, show her to be most worthy.

So also the very dogma of the evolution of dogma becomes known from use : they explained dogmas, condemned errors, defined formulas, etc. ; therefore revealed doctrine can legitimately be expounded and explained.

B. Subjective explanation in the mind of each of the faithful grows in a twofold way :

Summa Theologiae Moralis I. — 34 1. according to the logical way or the speculative explanation of concepts, by means of science, in the same way as was said for the faith of the Church ;

2. according to the affective way and connaturality, under the influence of the gifts of the Holy Spirit teaching us, as it were experimentally, the truths of faith ; by which we experience and, as it were, feel the truth and the true sense of revealed doctrine.

684. Corollaries. — I. Since revelation was closed in the Apostles, it follows that nothing can pertain to Catholic faith which was not revealed to them either explicitly or at least formally implicitly. Hence what some modern writers say about the evolution or increase of living faith or of dogma as if from a seed, cannot be understood of the revealed truths themselves, but at most of the subjective explanation and of theological science about them.

II. It also follows that the sense of a dogma cannot become other, different, or contrary than that which the Church has once proposed or by which it has once understood it. « Hence that sense is perpetually to be retained which holy Mother Church has once declared » (Vat. Counc., sess. 3, c. 4, can. 3).

III. Although the number of revealed truths does not grow, the number of dogmas nevertheless grows, i.e. of revealed truths proposed by the Church to be believed. For the Church can infallibly propose as dogmas truths which are formally implicitly contained in other truths already explicitly defined as divinely revealed, e.g. the Immaculate Conception of the B.V. and the bodily Assumption of the B.V.

IV. To the foregoing doctrine is opposed 1) the error of Hermes and Frohschammer who think that, by the help of scientific progress, we can at some time arrive at demonstrating and penetrating the mysteries ; which is contrary to the Vat. Counc., sess. 3, c. 4 ; — likewise 2) the doctrine of Günther and Loisy who maintain that, by the help of the progress of science, the sense of dogmas can change and become other than that which the Church has defined ; which was condemned in the Vat. Counc., sess. 3, c. 4 and can. 3, and by the encyclical Pascendi of Pius X, 7 Sept. 1907, and in prop. 21, 22, 23 and 26 of the Syllabus, condemned 3 July 1907 ; — a fortiori 3) the opinion of those who said that revelation was not closed at the time of the Apostles (Syllabus, prop. 20), or that a new and more perfect economy of the Holy Spirit is to be expected : so the Montanists, Manichaeans, Fraticelli, Swedenborg, Anabaptists, Irving.

V. Once an explicit and clear proposition has been made by the Church, the Church guards this explanation ; whence in itself there cannot be a regression or obscuration in the explanation proposed by the Church as to the defined truth (cf. condemned prop. 95 of the Quesnel and I Synod of Pistoria). Nevertheless a regression in itself can occur as to the understanding of the faithful : thus at the beginning of the 19th century the knowledge of theological science was less than²]

in the 13th century in the time of S. Thomas ; likewise exceptionally and accidentally as to the subjective explanation of the Church, if the definition or proposition of the Church should fall into total oblivion or its sense become doubtful, which, however, will rarely happen and only as to secondary truths. Let this be said, with leave to a better judgment.

S. Th. II-II, q. 1, a. 8, 9, 10.

685. Principle I. The Church infallibly proposes the object of faith. — So that those things which are truly and really in revealed doctrine may be made known to all, Christ instituted the Church, which might be recognized by all as its own, and which would be the authentic organ for infallibly proposing all things which are to be believed with divine and Catholic faith as divinely revealed (Vat. Counc., sess. 3, c. 3 ; Codex Iuris, can. 1322, § 1).

Moreover, there is a twofold manner in which the Church uses in infallibly proposing or defining the truths of faith : one extraordinary and solemn, which she employs in the definitions of Ecumenical Councils and of the Holy Pontiff speaking ex cathedra ; the other ordinary and daily, which the Church spread throughout the world employs, inasmuch as by ordinary and universal magisterium, i.e. by the daily and universal preaching and doctrine of the Holy Pontiff and the bishops, she proposes certain truths as revealed and defines them to be believed (cf. treatise on the Church ; Vat. Counc., l.c. ; Codex Iuris, can. 1323).

686. Principle II. The Church is infallible not only in defining the object of faith itself but also connected truths and facts, and proposes sacred doctrine in various degrees. — The Church is infallible not only in defining revealed doctrine itself ; to protect it perfectly she also infallibly proposes truths (and facts) necessarily connected with it insofar as they are connected ; although she does not command these to be believed with divine faith ; — moreover she does not always define revealed truths themselves from the very beginning as revealed and to be believed, but sometimes as certain and true, or only as safe and to be held. Hence sacred doctrine can be proposed in various degrees : 1° Defined and to be believed by faith, or a dogma of faith, when the Church infallibly and explicitly proposes it as revealed and to be believed ; to this is directly opposed a heretical proposition.

2° Certain, when the Church only proposes or defines it as certain ; to this is directly opposed an erroneous doctrine. Doctrina certa

a) either certain by faith, if it be revealed ; and to this is opposed error in faith or in revealed doctrine ;

b) or theologically certain, if it is not revealed but is deduced from something revealed ; and to this is opposed theological error.

3° Common and safe, if it is admitted by all and held as the only one conformed to revelation, but not proposed as certain ; to this is directly opposed a temerarious proposition ;

4° Probable or more probable, when it is likely, i.e. there is a grave or more grave reason for judging that it is revealed or deduced from revelation ; and to this is opposed a less probable or improbable opinion.

By some a certain doctrine is sometimes called proximate to faith (to which is opposed proximate to heresy), when namely it is already so commonly and certainly proposed as revealed that it is proximately definable as a dogma of faith, e.g. the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of the B.V. in the state immediately before the definition ; — or even, according to others, when it has been declared by the Church at least as certain, but it is doubtful whether it is of defined faith.

687. Principle III. The Church is also infallible in condemning and rejecting propositions opposed to the doctrine of faith. — The Church teaches not only positively, by proposing or commending doctrine on account of its conformity with the doctrine of faith ; but also negatively, by condemning or censuring it on account of some opposition to the doctrine of faith. Propositions, moreover, are opposed to the doctrine of faith in various ways :

A. Some are opposed directly because of the very doctrine asserted :

1° A heretical proposition, which is directly opposed (contrarily or contradictorily) to defined revealed doctrine, e.g. Christ is not the Son of God, the soul is not immortal, etc. ;

2° Erroneous, which is directly and immediately opposed to certain doctrine, whether it is revealed, proposed by the Church not as revealed but as certain, and then it is error in faith, e.g. Christ does not have grace ; or it is deduced from what is revealed, and then it is theological error, e.g. Christ is not impeccable ; the Son does not proceed from the Father by way of intellect.

3° Temerarious, not only negatively because it affirms without any reason and authority, but positively and contrarily because it so affirms directly against the common and safe doctrine which is admitted by all as the only one conformed to revelation (though not by necessary connection), e.g. the Church is not infallible in the canonization of saints ; God does not wish to save all children.

4° Improbable which has no grave reasons in its favor, and is directly opposed to probable doctrine, e.g. S. Joseph was immaculately conceived.

To these may be added a proposition proximate to heresy, in the way that was explained in the preceding n°.

B. Others are opposed to the very expression of Catholic doctrine, because of the form of the assertion :

1° Smacking of heresy is a proposition, or one suspected of heresy, which can have a true sense, but nevertheless from the circumstances gives occasion for thinking or suspecting some heresy in the mind of the one enunciating it, e.g. faith justifies ; it is ridiculous to carry the Eucharist in procession ; Christ is less than the Father ; Christ is the most perfect man.

2° Smacking of error or suspected of error : e.g. the Congr. of the Index is harmful.

3° Sounding badly, which has a true sense, but unfitting words, inasmuch as it expresses doctrine against the common and ordinary manner of speaking, e.g. in God there are three relative essences ; the B.V. is a divine mother.

4° Offensive to pious ears, which although it is neither false nor sounding badly, nevertheless says something unbecoming and unworthy, which diminishes the piety and reverence of the faithful, e.g. a proposition explaining the shameful members of Christ, or speaking unbecomingly of the delivery of the B.V., or this : S. Mary Magdalene, harlot, pray for us.

688. Principle IV. The Church uses the Creed as a practical way of proposing faith by ordinary and universal magisterium. — This Greek word signifies both a collection, or the assembling of many, and also a token, a distinctive sign, a watchword. Rightly, therefore, the brief collection or sum of the articles of faith, which is proposed to all to be believed as the sign of their profession, was so called. Now the creeds were composed for three purposes : chiefly a) that by the profession of the creed the faithful might be distinguished from infidels and heretics ; likewise b) for the easier instruction of the faithful ; and c) that uniformity in faith might be preserved throughout the whole world.

There are three creeds of great renown in the Church, of which one explains another, and explicitly, more distinctly, and more fully, expounds the same doctrine according to the necessities of different times, and against various errors, so that the faithful might be fortified against them :

The first, of the Apostles¹], which is divided by some into 14, by others into 12, articles, the latter division having become common among the faithful, and having been preserved in the Catechism of the Council of Trent.

The second, of the Fathers, which was drawn up in the First Council of Nicaea, but was enlarged in the First Council of Constantinople and in the course of time.

The third is called that of S. Athanasius, because they once erroneously thought it had been drawn up by him²]; it is not a creed except insofar as it has been received by the authority of the Roman Pontiff.

ON THE ACT OF FAITH.

ON THE INTERIOR ACT OF FAITH.

ON THE ESSENCE OF THE ACT OF FAITH.

S. Th. II-II, q. 2, a. 1 ; De Verit., q. 14, a. 1.

689. What it is to believe. — To believe, says S. Augustine, De Praed. SS. c. 2, is to think with assent. He is properly said to think who inquires with the intellect, not having full evidence of the truth ; but assent is the firm adherence of the intellect. To believe, therefore, is to assent, i.e. firmly to adhere to a thing as true, while not having evidence of it. Since, however, the intellect is not determined of itself except by evidence, it follows that when it believes, it is determined by the will. To believe, therefore, is an act elicited by the intellect, commanded by the will. Hence :

1. In the broadest sense, we are said to believe those things about which we have only a practical certitude, which excludes not every doubt but only a prudent one, namely, a conviction which suffices for acting prudently, although we do not have perfect evidence ; as many admit the existence of God on grounds which are not altogether evident to them¹],

2. More properly, we believe those things which are not evident to us, but which we admit on account of the testimony of men, even when they are not worthy of faith ; and therefore not on account of the testimony alone : for then we would admit everything they say, but on account of the evidence of the testimony (evidence in the witness, as the Scholastics say), because it is certain to us that this their testimony is in fact true. Such is often historical certainty.

3. Most properly, we believe those things which are not evident to us, but which we admit without doubting solely on account of the testimony or authority of another, i.e. because he himself is worthy of faith and deserves that we trust him (evidence of credibility), even if it does not appear that the testimony is true. Thus a child trusts his mother and an unlearned person a learned one. This is faith properly so called, because through it in the proper sense we trust another, and because for it especially it is required that the intellect be determined by the will ; hence no one believes unless willing. Of this faith it is true to say that it honors the one who testifies : for we could not believe unless we acknowledged the excellence of him to whom we believe.

690. What it is to believe God. — According to the foregoing explanation, to believe God is to admit those things which God has said, precisely because He has authority, i.e. the dignity and right that we acquiesce in Him as speaking. It is therefore the firm assent of the mind to truths revealed by God, on account of the authority of God Himself revealing. That this is the true notion of the act of faith we have already proved, when we treated of the formal object ; whence it is defined by S. Thomas, q. 2, a. 9 : « The act of the intellect assenting to divine truth from the command of the will moved by God through grace ».

691. Opposed errors. — To the foregoing definition is opposed :

1. The error of the Rationalists, Semi-rationalists, and Modernists, who do not have faith except

a) as rational science or philosophical knowledge of God (Günther) ; — or even

b) as religious truth, or a simple rational persuasion about divine things (Abelard, Wegscheider, Hermes), or any rational cognition whatsoever of God and divine things (Deists) ; — or

c) as an innermost religious instinct of the soul (i.e. of truths above the sensible), blind, e.g. from the Holy Spirit, leaning on the imagination and the senses, not on a rational motive (Pietists, Jacobi and the Sentimentalists, Fideism, Pseudo-mystics and Methodists) ; — or

d) as a mere spiritual instinct of religious dependence, vividly perceived, which coheres with rational nature (Schleiermacher), or a natural religious sense, whose motive is the conformity of religious truths with our aspirations and higher demands (Ritschl, Sabatier, Liberal Protestants) ; — or

e) as the sole exigency and irrefragable postulation of practical reason, as a common inclination of human nature (Reid, the Scottish school), the approval of religious truths on account of the practical truth of moral life (Kant, Harnack) or on account of the inclination of the whole man (Renouvier) ; — or

f) as a religious conscience and religious sense about divine things arising from the need of the divine (Modernists).

In one word, opposed is : a faith purely rational (a and b), a faith affective (c and d), a faith moral (e), a faith affective-moral (f). Cf. Vat. Counc., sess. 3, c. 2 and 3 ; and prop. 23 condemned by Innocent XI : « Faith, broadly so called, by a motive like to the testimony of creatures, suffices for justification ».

2. Also the doctrine of Protestants who are called orthodox. They distinguish a) the faith of miracles, or a great confidence in God which is obtained by a miracle (1 Cor. XIII, 2), b) the faith of dogmas, or historical faith in the narratives of the Gospel, and c) the faith of promises : that this is a trust in special mercy, and that it is justifying faith, they falsely contend (cf. treatise on grace) ; that the former is a simple knowledge and apprehension of revealed things, but not indeed an assent or firm judgment by which we hold them as true, they maintain, contradicting the Apostle who says that faith is the conviction of things not seen. Hence the Councils have declared that by faith we believe true things : so Trent, sess. 6, c. 6 and 9, or that we believe them to be true : so Vat., sess. 3, c. 3.

ON THE ANALYSIS OF THE ACT OF FAITH.

S. Th., in III Sent., d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 2.

692. Analysis or resolution of the act is its reduction to principles, both objective and subjective, i.e. to the motive and efficient causes which concur in its production. Now divine faith, as human faith, comprises several acts, for the act of faith itself presupposes two others : for it is the assent of the intellect commanded by the will, and so presupposes the motion and command of the will ; but the will cannot move the intellect to assent and command the assent of the intellect, unless the intellect itself previously judges that such an assent is to be given, whence it presupposes a judgment of credibility on the part of the intellect. Hence

1. three acts are required for believing : a) a judgment of credibility, by which we judge that such or such a truth, e.g. the Incarnation, is to be believed ; b) a pious affection of credulity, by which we will to believe that truth ; c) the act of faith itself, by which we properly believe, i.e. adhere to that truth and judge it to be true ;

2. consequently the question why we believe can be understood in a threefold sense, namely, a) dispositively : why do we judge that some truth is to be believed ? — b) affectively : why do we command the assent to that truth ? — c) formally : why do we adhere to it ? Therefore the analysis of this threefold act is to be undertaken.