Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

556. Object of the Treatise. — Moral theology considers human acts by which man is moved to God the supernatural last end: for it is the science of human acts in relation to God the supernatural end from revealed principles. Hence it treats of the last end itself and of the human acts by which we attain the end or happiness, and of all things which pertain to them. Now acts need rules (exemplary cause) by which they must be conformed, namely both the proximate rule or conscience, and the remote or laws; to which if they are not conformed, they are evil and are called sins. But acts also have principles (efficient) from which they are produced: the extrinsic is God through grace; the intrinsic are potencies and habits. Whence after the treatises on the end, on human acts in themselves, on conscience, on laws, on sins, — the doctrine on grace from dogmatic theology and the doctrine on the powers of the soul from psychology being presupposed, — the consideration of habits rightly follows, especially of the good ones, of which the chief are virtues.

557. Division of the Treatise. — Just as in a human act there can be distinguished physical being, moral being, supernatural being, so also in a habit. Hence the treatise is divided into three parts, and each into four questions.

Part 1 is on habits according to physical and psychological being, or on habits in general, i.e. on their 1. essence, 2. subject, 3. cause, 4. distinction;

Part 2 is on habits according to moral being or acquired virtues, i.e. on their 1. essence, 2. subject, 3. distinction into intellectual, moral, cardinal, 4. properties: mean, connection, equality, duration; Part 3 is on habits according to supernatural being and on infused virtues, i.e. on their 1. existence and essence, 2. distinction into theological virtues, moral, gifts of the Holy Spirit, 3. cause, 4. properties, as above.

558. The treatise is simultaneously theological and philosophical. — The first part is purely philosophical, which provides the notions necessary for understanding the other parts. The third part is wholly theological, as treating of the supernatural element. The second part is simultaneously philosophical, resting on human reason; and theological, because in part it is confirmed by divine revelation or by the authority of the Church and is used as a means to explain the supernatural habits¹.

S. Th. I-II, q. 49; Q. D. de Virt. 1, a. 1.

559. Habit (ἕξις, hexis) is named from the verb to have, whence it signifies a quality or mode by which a thing is disposed in such or such a way in itself or in relation to another. In many ways however something can be disposed; whence the meaning of the word is restricted to indicate only the first species of quality, i.e. the mode by which a thing is disposed in relation to its nature and consequently to its end, and therefore well or ill; namely a perfect and permanent mode which adheres firmly to the thing and therefore is with difficulty lost: thus it is distinguished from a simple disposition which is a mode easily lost by which a thing is disposed in relation to its nature. Habit is therefore a quality difficult to move, according to which the subject is well or ill disposed in itself or in relation to another; — or a stable disposition determining the subject to being well or ill disposed in itself or in relation to operation, in being or in operating.

« Habit, says S. Thomas, C. G. IV, 77, differs from potency in this, that by potency we are able to do something, but by habit we are not rendered able to do something, but fit or unfit for what we are able to do well or ill. By habit therefore there is not given nor taken away from us a certain ability, but this we acquire by habit, that we do something well or ill ».

560. Habit is divided a) into good and evil habit, according as it is a mode agreeing with nature or not agreeing;

b) into substantive or entitative, and operative, according as it is a mode by which nature is well or ill disposed in itself, with respect to being, — or by which it is well or ill disposed in relation to another, with respect to its operation, or by which it is disposed to act suitably or not suitably to its end.

The former immediately inheres in the substance and is principally ordered to being, and not to operating, except mediately inasmuch as being itself is ordered to operating: such are beauty, health, sickness, and sanctifying grace; — the other immediately inheres in an operative potency and therefore is immediately ordered to operation: such are fitness and unfitness, knowledge and art, virtue and vice. « Something is well or ill disposed in two ways: namely in itself or by relation to something. As that which is healthy is well disposed in itself, but that which is robust is well disposed to do something » S. Thom., in V Metaph. lect. 20.

561. Necessity of habits. — That there are operative habits is established by experience: for operations at first very difficult afterward become very easy, as is evident from one who plays the cithara, or dances, or writes, or reads, or studies science, or exercises himself in temperance or drunkenness. — They are necessary in those things which are indifferent: for habit is good or evil; whence nothing has a habit except what can in many and diverse ways be disposed in relation to its nature in itself or to operation. Therefore habits inhere in those things which 1) are in potency, 2) to many, diverse, contrary things, and therefore 3) in many or diverse ways can and ought to be disposed well or ill to their nature or operation. These three conditions are required for this, that something needs a habit. Hence:

1°) There is no habit in God, because in no way is he in potency, but he is his own being and his own operation, and accordingly can be disposed to nothing beyond himself.

2°) Neither is there habit in potencies altogether determined to one thing, because they are sufficient for the act determined and cannot be determined in more ways, nor be more or better or less well disposed; whence the forces of nature do not acquire a habit by their exercise, but always act as much as they can.

3°) But habits are in potencies which are not altogether determined to one thing, and therefore do not have all the propensity which they could have to operation, but to this they can be proportioned in diverse ways. By habit such a potency acquires greater inclination, and so constancy, facility, and pleasure in perfecting its acts. Which mode becomes as it were connatural to it, and therefore it is called habit second nature.

Whence operative habit can be defined: A quality difficult to move by which man is disposed to operating easily, promptly, and delightfully¹; — or a permanent quality superadded to an operative potency and facilitating and inclining it to operating either well or ill, i.e. suitably or not suitably to the end.

562. Observations. — 1°a. From the aforesaid definition it follows:

a) an operative habit is the first (proximate) act of the potency, and the operation is the second act (q. 49, a. 3, ad 1);

b) habit is the mean between pure operative potency (remote first act) and perfect act (operation, second act);

c) habit does not give the potency the ability to operate, but that it operates perfectly, i.e. constantly and uniformly, — promptly, easily, and expeditely, — and delightfully (Q. D. de Virt. 1, a. 1; C. G. IV, 77);

d) an operative habit is truly and properly found in an active potency which properly operates; in a merely passive potency however through which the active operates, it is not found except improperly and secondarily, inasmuch as there is rather a passive quality which this potency easily serves the active potency (q. 50, a. 1).

2°a. An operative habit, while it is in an indifferent potency, does not however completely remove its indifference, nor therefore necessitate it to act; whence S. Thomas says that one uses a habit when one wishes (q. 49, a. 3 sed contra; q. 50, a. 3, ad 2; a. 5).

S. Th. I-II, q. 50.

563. Natural entitative habit is not found in the soul, because this is the complete form of human nature, and therefore it cannot be disposed to something perfect according to nature; but there can be found in it a supernatural habit by which it participates a higher nature: thus by sanctifying grace it participates the divine nature. — In the body however there is found a natural entitative habit by which it is more or less perfect in its being: such are health, sickness, beauty, deformity, leanness, etc.

564. Principle. Operative habit is in an indifferent operative potency i.e. not altogether determined to one. — It is proved:

1°) It is in an operative potency. For an operative habit is that which immediately determines to operation; but that must be determined to operation which is the principle of operation.

2°) It is in an indifferent potency. For what can be disposed in itself in many ways can be ordered and determined to acting in diverse ways.

Hence it is in the potencies of the soul which can operate in diverse ways:

1°) in the will which, as being a rational potency, can be ordered to acting in diverse ways and to the determined good of reason, and of itself is indifferent to acting well or ill;

2°) in the intellect which is in potency to all intelligibles, and undetermined to things not evident;

3°) in the sensitive potencies, not indeed when they operate from the instinct of nature (thus they are determined to one), but when they operate by the command of reason, according as they can be ordered to diverse things and well or ill disposed. Since however

a) the sensitive appetite operates more by the command of reason (and thus is more indifferent) than the internal senses, it follows that habits are found more in the sensitive appetite;

b) nevertheless habits are found in the internal senses, by which man is well disposed for memory, or thought, or imagination; but

c) they are not found in the external senses, because by nature they are altogether determined to one.

565. Properly so called operative habits are not in the potencies of the body, which properly do not operate, but are mere instruments of the soul. For:

a) An operative habit of itself is not in the potencies of the body, namely the exterior members, or the vegetative forces, or the motive forces according to place, because by nature they are determined to one.

b) Inasmuch however as they are moved by the soul, even in them and in the external senses, properly operative habits cannot be, because they properly do not operate, but are mere instruments of the soul which principally operates in them and which they obey at its nod.

c) But they are said to be in them secondarily, because in them there can be passive qualities and dispositions by which they are more disposed for promptly serving the operations of the soul. As e.g. the motive forces insofar as the nerves are relaxed or contracted; the vegetative forces as by use they become adapted for abstinence or for the use of determined food.

S. Th. I-II, q. 51, 52, 53; q. 63, a. 1 and 2; De Virt. q. 1, a. 8 and 9.

566. Principle I. One operative habit of the soul is in man from nature, not indeed totally (then it would be innate) but partially and according to a beginning, namely the habit of first principles, inasmuch as, the terms being known through intelligible species (which are not in us from nature), at once the facility results of seeing that the terms agree with each other or not.

567. Principle II. Other habits are caused in the soul from the human acts proper to the agent, namely from the acts of the moving potency in the moved potency of the same agent¹; thus e.g. the act of the appetitive virtue proceeds from an apprehension representing the object, the intellective power as reasoning has the active principle of self-evident propositions, the possible intellect is moved by the agent intellect. For the agent in which there is at the same time the active and passive principle of its act, inasmuch as it is active can cause the habit, and inasmuch as it is passive can receive it and be perfected by it.

They are acquired habits².

Sometimes by one act the habit is caused, when the active potency by one act totally overcomes the passive potency, as happens in the habit of science because one act suffices for conviction³; — ordinarily however from acts of the same species repeated, as happens in the habit of opinion, in the habits of the internal senses, and especially in the moral virtues and vices, because reason by one act cannot make that the appetite is ordinarily, and generally, and in all circumstances good or evil, as is required for virtue or vice.

568. Principle III. Other habits are caused by God, namely supernatural ones by which we are disposed to a supernatural end exceeding the capacity of human nature; likewise God can also cause habits which by our acts we can acquire, as he gave some the knowledge of the Scriptures or of languages.

They are infused habits of themselves, or accidentally.

569. Principle IV. No habit is innate. — Supernatural habits are in no way in us from nature; — nor are acquired habits from nature according to essence, perfection, and consummation; but only according to a certain aptitude and beginning, and indeed in two ways.

a) On the part of the soul, not according to the beginning of the habit itself, but only according to aptitude or as to its principles, inasmuch as the intellect and will naturally say the order and inclination to the knowledge of truth and love of good, and thus the habits of first principles in the intellect and the natural inclination of the will to good are the principles or seeds from which intellectual and moral virtues are generated⁴. But « because the inclination to proper objects, which seems to be the beginning of habit, does not pertain to the habit but rather to the very notion of the potencies » (q. 51, a. 1), therefore it is not the beginning of the habit itself according to itself, but only according to its principles or according to its aptitude in causes.

b) On the part of the body and internal senses, also according to the beginning of the habit itself, inasmuch as because of their disposition man is helped or impeded for good, and thus is better or less well disposed for certain habits: thus from the disposition of the organs and complexion of the body, one is more disposed for understanding than another, or has a propensity for certain virtues (chastity, fortitude, meekness) or vices (anger, lust). Thus he has greater aptitude for receiving such or such a habit and will more easily acquire it⁵.

Moreover habits of the body can be caused by one act, if the producing cause is of great strength, as health from one strong medicine, organic deformation from one passion, e.g. a great terror.

570. Principle V. Habits are increased, but not by addition of a new degree: for if added, two or more would be added, whence there would be more habits and thus more accidents of the same species in the same subject, which is repugnant (e.g. two charities, two temperances, two arts); nor would the former habit truly become greater and be increased, but rather be multiplied. But they are increased

1°) according to themselves: extensively, inasmuch as the same habit in number extends itself to new objects to which it was not before ordered; as theological knowledge is extended by the study of a new treatise;

2°) on the part of the subject: intensively, inasmuch as the same habit is more received and adheres more firmly in the subject, and reduces it more to act; and accordingly the potency in which the habit resides more participates the character of habit, whence it tends more expeditely and promptly to act; as knowledge of the same treatise which becomes clearer. And indeed:

a) Habits are increased intensively by the same cause by which they are produced: for similar acts cause habits not only in species but also in degree and similar intensity; whence an act more intense or equally intense as the habit increases it or at least disposes to increase; but when the will does not use the habit totally and produces a less intense act, that act rather disposes to the diminution of the habit and does not increase it.

b) Habits are increased extensively by acts about another part of the object: he who already has knowledge of all the treatises of theology, one excepted, increases the habit by the study of that part.

571. Principle VI. Habits are corrupted of themselves or accidentally: accidentally, when the subject in which the habit is, is corrupted; of themselves i.e. by their contrary. It is to be noted that every habit which is acquired by one act, is corrupted by one act; but that which is acquired by many acts, is not corrupted except by many, but by one only is diminished.

Of themselves those habits which have no contrary are not corrupted, as the habit of principles. Those which have a contrary can be corrupted of themselves, as science and opinion by an opposite principle or by a sophistic deduction; and acquired moral virtue by contrary judgments of practical reason from ignorance, passion, or malice; likewise habits of the body.

Habits of the intellect and will are not corrupted accidentally, because these faculties are incorruptible; but habits of the sensitive potencies and of the body are corrupted, as temperance before the resurrection.

572. Principle VII. Habits are diminished intensively and extensively from the same cause by which they are corrupted of themselves, i.e. by their contrary, because diminution is the way to corruption.

Moreover some habits are also diminished and corrupted by the mere cessation from act, not indeed directly of themselves, but indirectly accidentally, namely by the removal of the hindrance, inasmuch as this cessation takes away the acts which prevented contraries from corrupting or diminishing the habit of themselves.

S. Th. I-II, q. 54 and 56, a. 2.

573. There are several rules according to which habits are distinguished in species (a. 2):

1°a) As forms are distinguished by reason of the cause: Habits are specifically distinguished whose proper and of themselves causes are diverse, for every agent produces something like itself according to species. Thus habits which are acquired by diverse acts are distinguished; likewise acquired habits which we acquire by our acts, and infused of themselves which God alone can give us.

2°a) As habits are distinguished by reason of nature: Habits are specifically distinguished which signify a diverse order to nature (and consequently to the end), as good and evil habits, or which signify order to a diverse nature, as ordinary human virtue and divine or heroic virtue which is fitting to a higher nature.

3°a) As operative habits are distinguished by reason of the object: Habits are specifically distinguished which have diverse formal objects: for habits are dispositions to acts; if therefore acts are specifically distinguished according to objects, so also habits. — This is the chief rule, because it indicates the ultimate species.

The three aforesaid rules are fundamental; from the last however follows a derived rule, namely:

4°a) That habits are consequently distinguished by reason of the subject: Habits are specifically distinguished which are in diverse potencies principally operating. For the potencies themselves are distinguished by generically distinct objects. Whence where the potencies are diverse, also the objects are diverse¹.

574. Corollaries. — 1°o. From the third rule it follows that habits of diverse species can be in one and the same potency, because a potency can be ordered to diverse objects.

2°o. The fourth rule of specific distinction by reason of the subject or potency is to be understood of potencies which principally operate. For those which operate secondarily, serving the principal act or disposing to it, adhere to the object of the principal operation, and therefore the secondary habits which are in them take their species from this object: thus the operation of art in the hand takes its species from the object of the art which is in the intellect.

3°o. Hence one habit or one virtue cannot be equally and according to essence in several potencies; it can however pertain to several potencies in a certain order, so that it is principally in one, and extends itself secondarily to others: whether by way of diffusion according as one potency moves another which serves it, e.g. justice commands the passions or temperance; or by way of disposition according as one receives from another, e.g. prudence rectifying the choice of means supposes the rectitude of the appetite, about the end (q. 66, a. 2).

According to moral being, i.e. in relation to the last end and the rule of morals, operative habits are good and virtues, or evil and vices, according as they agree or do not agree with rational nature and its last end¹.

in the treatise on sins: for as many as there are sins specifically complete and diverse, so many habits caused by them and inclining to them, or vices, can also be had. It remains therefore that we speak specially of good habits and virtues.

S. Th. I-II, q. 55; 56, a. 3; 57, a. 1; 65, a. 2; De Virt. q. 1, a. 1 and 2.

576. Virtue according to the name (ἰσχύς, δύναμις, deugd) is derived from force, and therefore designates the perfection of an operative potency or a complete potency¹. Hence

1. natural potencies, since they are altogether determined to one, of themselves are perfectly disposed to operation, and therefore are called virtues of nature (a. 1). But

2. potencies indifferent to many and diverse things, as rational potencies, of themselves can be better disposed through habit, and therefore in them the potency is distinguished from its perfection; and virtue in them is habit (a. 1). Since however

3. true perfection consists only in good, it follows that virtue is a good operative habit (a. 3). Whence Aristotle: Virtue is that which makes the one having it good and his work good (II Eth., c. 6; VII Phys., c. 3);

4. we treat of human virtue, which is proper to man, and which therefore is a good rational operative habit (a. 2).

577. Virtue is defined by words gathered from S. Augustine²: A good quality of mind by which one lives rightly, which no one uses badly, which God works in us without us. There is indicated

1°) genus: quality, because it is of the genus of habits; better however it would be called habit, which is the proximate genus;

2°) specific difference: good, by which it is specifically distinguished from evil habits;

3°) subject: of mind, because human virtue resides in reason or in the potency moved by reason; 4°) the end of virtue, namely operation: a) by which one lives rightly, i.e. by which man operates conformably to reason, that it may be indicated to be a properly operative habit, and it is distinguished from habits which always are disposed to evil; b) which no one uses badly, by which it is distinguished from habits which are sometimes for good, sometimes for evil, as opinion or human faith. Whence virtue cannot be a productive principle of an evil act, and the act of virtue cannot be evil, for virtue does not influence an evil act. No one namely can make virtue produce an evil act, no one can, using virtue as a principle, produce an evil work; — one can however use virtue badly as an object, when e.g. one is proud of it or hates it, but that act does not proceed from virtue as from an operative principle;

5°) the efficient cause is added: which God works in us without us, i.e. without our effecting, but not without our consenting as adults, or by the help of grace disposing us; which is true of the supernatural infused virtue of which Augustine speaks. If these last words are removed, the definition common to all acquired and infused virtues is had (a. 4).

That this definition is real, i.e. that such virtues exist in fact, will be shown throughout the treatise.

578. Virtue renders the potency perfect. — Hence:

1. Not every good habit is a virtue, but that only which includes no imperfection; whence opinion, human faith or hope, continence and constancy³ are not virtues (q. 58, a. 3, ad 2).

2. Neither are those good habits virtues which serve the action of the principal potency: for as long as the principal potency, which consummates the work, is not well disposed to operation, man will not yet be perfectly disposed to it, nor therefore will the operation be perfect. The habit therefore which is in the principal potency, consummative of a good work, is alone called virtue. Whence it is said by Aristotle: a disposition of the perfect to the best⁴, i.e. a stable disposition of a potency perfectly instructed for best exercising its operation.

579. The notion of virtue is analogous, which therefore does not equally perfectly belong to all, nor is said in the same sense of all. For some virtues render man perfect under some respect only and therefore are called virtues in a qualified sense; — some render man simply good inasmuch as he is man, and therefore are called simply and properly so called; to them in the full sense belongs Aristotle's definition: virtue is that which makes the one having it good and his work good. Hence:

A. In the natural order and for philosophers: merely intellectual virtues (arts and sciences) which render man good under some respect only, namely with respect to the good of one potency, e.g. which make a good architect, a good philosopher, etc., are called virtues in a qualified sense; but moral virtues render man simply perfect under the notion of good (namely the honest), namely with respect to the good of the whole man, and make a good man, and therefore are called virtues simply so called or virtues simply human. Of which there is a twofold difference:

a) the former, although they give aptitude for operating well, do not however incline to using their aptitude, whence he who does not use his art, is not for that reason considered an imperfect artist; the latter incline man to use his aptitude rightly, whence he who does not perform just or temperate acts does not have justice or temperance;

b) the former do not render man morally good, nor incline to living honestly; on the contrary the latter, whence they reside in the will or in the potency as moved by the will (q. 57, a. 1; 56, a. 3).

B. In the supernatural order and for theologians: virtues in a qualified sense are those which render man good with respect to a particular end (or the last in some genus) e.g. temperate, just, believing, etc.; virtues simply and properly so called are those by which man is perfect as to the supernatural last end. Whence natural and philosophical virtues, even strictly so called, are not in a perfect state of virtue nor are called by theologians virtues simply so called, unless in fact they are habitually ordered to the last end, which is done by charity: then they are called perfect or formed; but if they are present in a man turned away from the last end, they are called imperfect or unformed, since the ultimate or supreme perfection or form of morality is lacking to them. Formed virtues are virtues in the fullest sense (q. 65, a. 2).

580. Observation. — Just as in a good or evil human act (and in a passion), so also in a moral habit, virtue and vice, a twofold element can be distinguished:

1°) the material and physical, which is the mere inclination or physical propensity to acting well or ill;

2°) the formal or moral, which is rational ordination, namely a permanent deliberate adhesion to the object as good or evil, which perfects the habit in the moral being of virtue or vice.

Whence when a sinner is converted, that which has the character of the formal of vice is taken away from the evil habit, but not the material propensity although it is diminished and impeded; whence vice remains only as to the material, in a certain state of destruction. And likewise when a virtuous man sins gravely against the object of virtue, he loses the formal of virtue, but the good acquired habit remains as to its material⁵.

581. Corollary. — The doctrine proposed is contradicted by the followers of Americanism, whose ideas among some also in Germany, France, and England are found latent. They are said to distinguish two kinds of virtues, namely active virtues and passive, or: forces, such as independent of self, properly personal cult, vital, duties toward neighbor; and feminine, as humility, patience, meekness, self-denial, full confidence in God; — moreover natural virtues seem rather to have the active ones which respond more fitly to the customs and necessities of the present age, but the Christian and supernatural ones rather passive, which do not so much fit the present time as they did the middle ages.

Which doctrine was condemned by Leo XIII, in the letter of 22 Jan. 1899 to Card. Gibbons. And rightly; for it contradicts:

1° Scripture, where Prov. XVI, 32: « Better is the patient than the brave »; and Christ, our exemplar, is presented as meek and humble (Mt. XI, 29), and obedient (Phil. II, 5, 8), and crucified for the mortification of the flesh, wherefore those who are Christ's have crucified their flesh with the vices and concupiscences (Gal. V, 24).

2° Reason. For a) virtue cannot be passive, for, as Leo XIII says, « virtue is the perfection of potency..., the end of potency is act, and nothing else is the act of virtue than the good use of free choice »;

b) moreover that natural virtues are to be preferred to supernatural ones and are of greater efficacy or fecundity, cannot be understood, because nature, with grace added, does not become weaker, but is perfected. Whence also the saints from humility, obedience, abstinence became powerful in deed and word.

3° Experience. It is evident that to exercise passive virtues is of greater labor than to acquire active virtues; moreover it is established that the exercise of those virtues has brought great fruits both to individuals and to society, as Leo XIII shows.

4° Finally the very doctrine of the connection of virtues among themselves, with which it squares badly and can scarcely agree⁶.

S. Th. I-II, q. 56; De Virt. q. 1, a. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7.

582. Principle I. Virtues are in the potencies of the soul. — Since virtue is 1) an operative habit, and 2) the perfection of an operative potency, and 3) a disposition to the best end, but the end is operation or the worked thing, it follows that it is in the operative potency of the soul as in a subject.

583. Principle II. In the intellect considered in itself there are only virtues in a qualified sense, by which man is perfect under some respect: thus science and art; but inasmuch as it is moved by the will, in it also are virtues simply and properly so called by which man is perfected for the last end: prudence and the virtues annexed to it, and in the supernatural order divine faith (q. 56, a. 3).

584. Principle III. In the will are virtues simply so called, but not all. — For in the will:

a) There are not the habits by which we are inclined to choose the good of our reason, proportioned to the will: for the will is appetite, whence by its nature, without habit, it sufficiently tends to its own good; it is rational appetite, therefore it tends to the good of reason, i.e. the honest. Whence in the will there is no virtue for choosing the good of reason in the passions (q. 56, a. 6).

b) There are however in the will habits for resisting passions, namely continence for resisting passions impelling to the delightful good against right reason, and constancy for resisting passions withdrawing from the good of reason because of sadness and arduousness; which however are not called virtues, because they do not render man perfect: for they do not make it so that the passions obey reason (q. 58, a. 3, ad 2).

c) There are in the will virtues simply so called, by which we are well ordered to an extrinsic good, which exceeds the proportion of the will either with respect to the individual, as the good of another to which justice orders, or with respect to the species or human nature, as the divine or supernatural good which is communicated to us, to which theological hope and charity order: for to these goods the will is not sufficiently inclined by its nature, and therefore the virtues which order the affection of man to God or neighbor are in the will (q. 56, a. 6).

585. Principle IV. In the sensitive appetite are true virtues. — For in the sensitive appetite

a) considered in itself there are not habits, nor therefore virtues;

b) inasmuch however as it is moved by reason and is the immediate principle of human acts, in it are habits by which the passions obey and are conformed to reason, as fortitude, temperance, meekness, etc.;

c) moreover those habits are virtues simply so called, because they include no imperfection, and because the good work is consummated in the sensitive appetite, namely the passion itself regulated (q. 56, a. 4).

586. Principle V. In other potencies there are not virtues. — In the internal senses indeed there are good habits, but those are not virtues, because the good work is not consummated in the internal senses, and therefore those habits are subordinate to others: thus the habit of good memory subserves the virtue of science, and good thought [subserves] prudence. In the other potencies of man (external senses, vegetative or locomotive forces) there are not properly operative habits, nor therefore virtues (a. 5).

S. Th. I-II, q. 57-63; De Virt. q. 1, a. 12.

587. Principles. Virtues are distinguished:

1. By reason of the subject or potency in which they principally are, into intellectual which are in the intellect, and moral (or appetitive) which are in the appetite.

2. By reason of the nature to which they have order, into natural which are fitting to human nature as such, and to the natural end; and supernatural which are fitting to the divine nature participated in us, and to the supernatural end: the beatific vision; of which will be spoken in the 3rd part.

3. By reason of the cause, into acquired which are acquired by our natural acts, in the way explained in part 1, q. 3, n. 567; and infused of themselves, which God alone can give us.

4. By reason of the object and matter about which they are concerned, intellectual are divided into speculative and practical, and moral according to various objects; likewise supernatural are distinguished into theological which are concerned with God himself, and moral which order our life: these last, just as the natural virtues strictly so called which render man morally good, are distinguished into cardinal which are concerned with the principal matter, and annexed which are concerned with the secondary matter.

It is to be noted that virtues can be distinguished from several heads; in fact, however many there are, they are distinguished by reason of the object which gives the lowest species.

Specially we shall say in the present about the intellectual, moral, and cardinal virtues.

S. Th. I-II, q. 57; De Virt. q. 1, a. 6 and 7.

588. Principle. Five distinct species of intellectual virtues are enumerated:

A. Three are in the speculative intellect which stops at the contemplation of truth, by which namely it is perfected for knowing the true:

1°) Habit of principles, by which it is disposed for knowing first principles, whether speculative: then it is called simply intellect (νοῦς), or practical: then it is called synderesis.

2°) Science (ἐπιστήμη), which is perfected for knowing conclusions evident in some genus of knowable things through their proper causes.

3°) Wisdom (σοφία), which is perfected for knowing conclusions of any genus whatsoever through the highest causes, by which it also judges of the principles.

B. In the practical intellect, which orders truth to work, there are two, by which it is perfected for directing and regulating human operations:

4°) Art (τέχνη), which directs transient operations, by which one makes something in exterior matter, as to build, to cut, etc.

5°) Prudence (φρόνησις), which directs operations remaining in the agent itself, as to will, to love, to be angry, etc.

Art is defined as right reason of the makeable, which directs the works themselves or effects to be made according to certain rules; prudence as right reason of the doable, which directs human acts.

589. In what sense they are virtues. — The four former are virtues in a qualified sense, because they do not incline to acting honestly: for they give only aptitude for operating well, not good use, because this pertains to the appetite, whence the work of art can be morally most evil; — on the contrary, prudence by which human reason is well disposed for ordering human acts in the appetite, as means to the honest end, is a virtue simply so called.

This virtue is most necessary for man. For for living honestly, it does not suffice that man wills some good end (what he does), but also that he order suitable means to the end is most required (how he does it). For the due end man is disposed in the appetite through moral virtue; but for the means being conveniently ordered to the end, reason also must be well disposed, moved by the will, which is done by prudence: for precisely about the means to be chosen to deliberate, and to judge, and to command are acts of reason; for doing these rightly prudence disposes us well.

590. Corollary. — Hence, although prudence according to essence and by reason of subject is an intellectual virtue, by reason of matter which is the honest human act it agrees with the moral virtues. Whence it is numbered among them, when they are opposed to the theological virtues.