Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

410. Object of the Treatise. — Moral theology treats of human acts, by which we attain the end, happiness. Those are acts which are conformed to the dictate of right conscience and of the eternal law. But there are also human acts which do not conform to the law of God or to the dictate of right conscience, by which we do not attain the end, and which are called sins. Whence after the treatises on the end, on human acts, and on their rules, namely conscience and law, the consideration of evil acts or sins rightly comes.

411. The Treatise is divided into 3 parts:

Part 1 treats of sin considered in itself:

1. of the essence of sin; — 2) of the distinction of sins a) specific, b) numeric; — 3) of the comparison and gravity of sins; — 4) of the subject of sin, where internal sins are treated.

Part 2 treats of the causes of sins:

1. of interior causes: a) of ignorance on the part of reason, b) of passion on the part of the sensitive appetite, c) of malice on the part of the will;

2. of exterior causes: a) of God permitting, b) of the devil tempting, c) of man cooperating;

3. of the sin which is the cause of another sin, namely of the manner in which one sin causes another, and of the capital sins.

Part 3 treats of the effects of sin:

1. of the diminution of the good of nature; — 2) of the stain or guilt of sin; — 3) of the liability to punishment; — 4) of mortal and venial sin, which are distinguished according to their diverse effects: a) of the distinction of mortal from venial sin, b) of its gravity, c) of the conditions required for it, d) of the division of mortal and venial sins, e) of their conversion, f) of venial sin in itself.

412. Importance of the Treatise. — The treatise is of the greatest importance, because it applies the general abstract principles about human acts more determinately and concretely to sins, which are to be avoided by everyone above all, and are to be esteemed and judged by the priest and confessor in others¹.

S. Th. I-II, q. 21, a. 1 and 2; q. 71, a. 1-4; de Malo, q. 2, a. 2.

413. Sin properly so called is taken philosophically and theologically:

a) Among philosophers an evil act is called sin, which is midway between evil and fault: for not every evil is a sin, nor is every sin a fault. Evil indeed is the privation of a perfection which ought to be present in something. But sin is the privation of a perfection due in order to the end, i.e. in operation when this is not so directed as its end requires; since however law is the rule according to which an act is to be directed so as to reach its end, it is the same whether sin be called: a disordering from the end, or: a transgression of law. Now there are three laws: the law of physical nature, the rules of an art, and moral law; hence a monster is said to be a sin of nature, and a faulty structure a sin of art. But the transgression of moral law has this special feature, that it arises from a free will, as being mistress of its own acts; and accordingly it is imputable and blameworthy: hence it has obtained the special name of fault.

b) But among theologians, who consider sin only in the moral realm and in relation to the last end, God, the custom of taking sin and fault in the same sense has prevailed. In the stricter sense, therefore, sin is a morally evil act, or an evil human act. And in this sense, in the present treatise, sin will be spoken of.

414. Sin is distinguished from vice and from malice in strict speech; although in common speech these are often confused: vice is a habitual inclination to sin or an evil habit, — sin, an evil act, — malice is the incongruity with right reason and law, on account of which an act or habit is evil and therefore a sin or a vice. Vice is directly opposed to virtue, sin to a good act, malice to goodness.

Sin has greater malice than vice, for 1) habit is midway between potency and act, and therefore just as it exceeds potency in good or evil because it inclines it to this, so it exceeds the act which determines the potency to this; whence it is worse to act evilly than merely to be able or to be inclined to it; 2) vice is not evil except because of the malice of the act, because it inclines to an evil act. — In a certain respect, however, vice is worse than sin, because it lasts longer and can be the efficient cause of many sins; but sin with respect to vice is the final cause according to which goodness or malice is considered, and therefore it is simply worse.

415. Sin differs from imperfection, which is either negative or physical, namely a defect of a greater perfection which an act could have, and this is proper to every created act; or positive or moral. This in turn is distinguished as twofold: one improperly so called is the transgression of a law of lesser moment entirely indeliberate, e.g. an entirely involuntary distraction in prayer: this is materially a true venial sin but without any fault; the other properly so called is a voluntary action or omission against a counsel to which one is stirred either by divine inspiration, or by the judgment of reason, or by the will of a superior directly, e.g. to omit morning prayers, to violate the statutes of a community, etc., and in this sense they are already accustomed to speak of imperfection. This in itself is not a sin because it is not against the law; nevertheless if it be done deliberately and especially habitually, it will not always be without fault, either by reason of an effect such as scandal or harm, or more often by reason of its cause, namely an inordinate affection or a perverse motive on account of which it is placed: whether from negligence or levity, or from inordinate passion such as sensuality, curiosity, concupiscence or anger, impatience, sloth, worldly fear, etc., or from contempt: for reason forbids that a man act from an evil or irrational motive in his acts.

Herein one must in fact altogether observe the essential difference between a precept, which of itself is obligatory, because it concerns a necessary good to be done or an evil to be avoided, and a counsel, which is not obligatory of itself, as being about a better good; so that any theory which would remove this difference in practice would thereby be shown to fall short of the truth. Wherefore the doctrine of those more recent authors cannot be admitted, who hold the omission of a better good to be of itself and necessarily and always culpable, unless it be proved from determined circumstances that in the case that good is less fitting or less good: these practitioners remove the difference of precept and counsel in practice. For the rest, they do not validly prove their assertion, although the burden of proof lies on the one who affirms. Precisely because we are dealing with a better good, which of itself pleases God more, there is also present a lesser good, which also of itself pleases God, as being good, although it pleases less because it is less good.

The omission, therefore, of the better and the choice of the lesser good is not of itself, necessarily and always irrational, nor accordingly evil: for it can be done from a reasonable motive, provided one does not positively intend to abandon the greater good, but chooses the lesser good because here and now it is fitting for him, from which the omission of the greater good indirectly follows. Therefore imperfection is not always a fault, but is not always without fault. And therefore it would be better called a less perfect act than an imperfection.

416. Conditions of sin. — Sin strictly so called is a voluntary act deprived of due order to the last end or of due rectitude; therefore two concur for it: a) inordination, from which it has the character of evil, namely the privation of due order to the last end and therefore a withdrawal from right reason and the law of God: this comes to it from the part of the object; b) the character of voluntary, from which it has the character of fault: this comes to it from the part of the act or subject. Hence three conditions are required for sin:

1. moral malice of the object, otherwise it would not be evil; but subjective malice in the object suffices, i.e. in the thing or action as known, and objective malice in the thing or action as it is in itself is not necessarily required: for he who thinks something is evil and does it, in fact wills evil, whence he who falsely believes it to be Friday and eats meat, nevertheless sins;

2. there is required in the subject some advertence to the malice¹

at least confused: for nothing is willed unless foreknown; whence if the evil is adverted to in no way, neither by suspecting it nor by doubting about it, man cannot will it; hence he does not sin who, on Friday, thinking nothing of the precept, eats meat;

3. there is required the consent of the will² direct or indirect, because sin is a human act; hence an act which is neither in the will nor from the will nor accepted by it is not a sin, as a temptation not accepted by the will is; — and indeed consent must be free³, whence the most vehement movements of anger or of another passion by which the use of reason and freedom are taken away excuse from sin.

If advertence to malice is lacking, the evil act which is placed is called material sin, which is an involuntary transgression of law; it is not sin because in the acting subject the voluntary is lacking, yet it is called sin because on the part of the object or matter about which all things required for sin are present. Formal sin, on the other hand, is the deliberate, voluntary, and culpable transgression of law, whether the law exists or is reputed to exist.

417. The notion of sin is not univocal but analogous⁴. — It is not univocal, which is predicated of all in the same manner under some genus, but it is called analogous whose property it is that according to the full and perfect notion it is predicated of one genus, namely of actual mortal sin, imperfectly, deficiently, and in a qualified sense of others: for the essential elements which are found in every sin, namely the ratio of a voluntary act and inordination, are diverse. For:

1. Sin primarily and originally is an act, but secondarily and consequently it is also so called properly and is the inordination which follows the act, or the state of sin, which is not an evil act except in a qualified sense, insofar as the act morally or by guilt persists.

2. Mortal and venial sin differ in the notion of inordination: the former is perfectly against the law from whose end it turns the soul through charity; the latter only imperfectly, and therefore it only retards from the end.

3. Personal and original sin differ in the notion of voluntary: the former is voluntary by one's own will, the latter is most imperfectly voluntary, namely not by one's own will but only by the will of our head Adam.

418. Sin is called in Scripture: 1) in relation to the end: ἁμαρτία and ἀμάρτημα i.e. a wandering from the end (Rom. V, 12; VII, 7), so however that the first word is said also of the state of sin, the second of the act alone; — 2) in relation to the law of God: ἀνομία and παράνομια (in Vulg. iniquity) i.e. violation or contempt of law (I John III, 4; II Pet. II, 15); παράβασις i.e. transgression or prevarication of law (Rom. V, 14; Gal. III, 19; I Tim. II, 14); παράκοή i.e. the will not to hear the voice of God or disobedience (Rom. V, 19; Heb. II, 2); — 3) in relation to the sinner: παράπτωμα i.e. a fall (Mk. XI, 25-26); ἥττημα i.e. a disaster, a diminution (Rom. XI, 12); ἀγνόημα i.e. ignorance, because every sin involves a culpable error (Heb. XI, 7; Acts XVII, 30).

More often also sin is taken in a metaphorical and improper sense, either for a sacrifice offered for sins (Hos. IV, 8; II Cor. V, 21), or for a cause, occasion, or object of sin (Deut. IX, 21), or even for its punishment or effect (Lev. XX, 20), or for cause and effect together, as concupiscence is called sin by the Apostle (Rom. VII, 17) because it is from sin and inclines to sin (C. Trid. sess. 5, can. 5).

S. Th., I-II, q. 71, a. 5; De Malo, q. 2, a. 1.

419. What is a sin of omission? — A sin of commission is the placement of a forbidden act, and is opposed to a negative precept; a sin of omission is the non-placement of a prescribed act, and is opposed to an affirmative precept.

This sin of omission in itself, i.e. considered in its essence, is not an act but a mere privation; yet it supposes some positive act, at least interior, conjoined or preceding, which is its cause or occasion, by which namely one directly wills to omit the prescribed thing, or directly wills, whether now or previously, something else by which he is hindered from doing what he ought. For omission, to be a sin, must be directly voluntary, either in itself, as if one wills not to hear Mass, or at least in cause, as if one directly wills to place an act incompatible with the prescribed thing, whether conjoined, as e.g. if one wills to play when he ought to hear Mass, or preceding, as if one wills to stay up late at night, from which he foresees that he will not hear it¹.

420. When is it a sin of omission? — A sin of omission is begun interiorly and contracted as to affection and guilt when the cause of the omission is voluntarily placed: for then the one omitting either voluntarily intends not to fulfill, or voluntarily exposes himself to the danger of not fulfilling; it is consummated exteriorly and placed effectively when the time of fulfilling the precept is present and it is not fulfilled.

This exterior omission adds no malice of itself to the interior act; nevertheless it is sin (and therefore to be declared in confession) as being a voluntary inordination, in the same way as an external evil work is rightly called sin. But if one has sincerely and efficaciously withdrawn the will to omit before the exterior omission follows, this will not be sin but only the effect of sin materially evil, as e.g. one who threw the breviary into the sea, and afterward repents on the journey.

421. Is a work placed at the time of omission a sin? — A work placed at the time of omission, if it is the cause or occasion of it, is a sin, yet not distinct from the omission (and accordingly not to be declared in confession), but evil by the very malice of the omission: thus a game which is the cause of the omission of Mass. If it is not the cause of the omission but is merely accidentally and concomitantly related to the omission, unless it is evil from elsewhere, it will not be evil nor from the omission: thus if one has efficaciously resolved not to hear Mass, but, lest he meanwhile remain idle, applies himself to study.

S. Th. I-II, q. 71, a. 6; q. 74, a. 2; de Malo, q. 2, a. 2 and 3.

422. What is an external sin of commission. — A sin of commission properly so called is not only the interior will of evil, but also the external evil work commanded by the will or not prevented by it, e.g. homicide, theft, an external movement of anger: for although an external act does not have the character of fault except from the will, yet of itself it has the character of evil because it has a deformity or incongruity with right reason and the law of God, on account of undue matter or undue circumstances. Whence it is also prohibited by God: but whatever is prohibited by God is sin (and therefore to be declared in confession).

External sin is begun interiorly in the affection when its cause is voluntarily placed, and is consummated exteriorly in the effect when the external act is really present, in the same way as was said about omission.

423. External sin can be voluntary in cause or only indirectly. — For sin is an evil human act; therefore, just as for a human act, so for an external evil work to be sin, it is required and also suffices that it be voluntary in some way. Therefore it is not required that it be voluntary in itself, but it suffices that it be voluntary in a positive cause (as e.g. anger from drunkenness), or indirectly in a preceding omission inasmuch as the will ought to prevent it and does not (as e.g. damage from the fact that a father does not prevent his son from stealing).

424. Question: Is actual advertence to malice required for sin? — It is answered, from what has been said the question is easily solved: For sin some voluntariness suffices, whether in cause or indirectly from omission; but for such voluntariness, permittance at the moment when such cause or omission is placed suffices. Hence:

a) Actual advertence to malice is not always required here and now, i.e. at the moment when the sin is exteriorly consummated or the external act is effectively placed: for this is not required in order for it to be voluntary, for evil effects or acts placed with culpable inadvertence and proceeding from a voluntary cause from which they are foreseen to follow, are rightly imputed to man, as from culpable ignorance through negligence (e.g. harm to a patient from a physician negligent to learn what he is bound to know), from a passion which one deliberately wills to follow (e.g. homicide from drunkenness or anger), from an evil habit (e.g. blasphemy from custom), from voluntary inconsideration as by working precipitately (e.g. a hunter negligent to consider whether a man or a beast is present and killing a man).

b) Nevertheless that inadvertence and the act placed with it will not be voluntary and culpable unless at the moment when the cause was placed actual advertence was present by which the effect or evil act was foreseen at least confusedly, obscurely, and indistinctly, inasmuch as one at least doubted or suspected that evil would follow, or knew the obligation to attend to it or to use greater caution; otherwise in no way would they be voluntary. At this moment the sin is interiorly begun and committed as to affection and guilt.

From the given explanation the opposing opinions of theologians are easily reconciled, some of whom always require actual advertence, others on the contrary affirm that a virtual and interpretative [advertence] always suffices (n. 60, II, and 63).

S. Th. I-II, q. 71, a. 6; q. 72, a. 1 and 5; q. 73, a. 2; C. Gent. III, 9; de Malo, q. 1, a. 1; q. 2.

425. Sin consists of two constitutive elements, as it were metaphysical parts, which are related as matter (indeterminate) and form (determining) in natural beings, and which are accordingly called material and formal. In sin itself there is found:

1° a positive and material element: the substance of the act considered, not in physical being insofar as it tends to any good whatsoever (for thus it is not a human or moral act, nor therefore morally evil, and accordingly is not a constitutive element of sin but is presupposed to it), but in moral being insofar as it unduly tends to some created good which cannot be referred to the last end: it is an undue conversion to a creature; — and

2° a privative element which necessarily follows from the first, namely the very privation of rectitude or due ordination to the last end: it is an aversion or turning away from God. This is the formal element* because it determines the material to this, that it be sin: for conversion to a creature would not be theological sin unless through it man also stood inordinately with regard to the last end. — In other words: the material of sin is the voluntary act itself by which man tends to something contrary to the eternal law; the formal is the very deformity of the act or withdrawal from the eternal law.

426. Observation. — The material of sin is not to be confused with material sin: in the latter indeed there is no formal malice, indeed it can be a formally good act; the material of sin is its constitutive element which inseparably has malice attached to it. Thus Jacob's approach to Leah is the material of sin with respect to Jacob, but the material of sin with respect to Leah; taking money from one who is violently brought to it is material sin, the material of sin for the one who inflicts the violence.

Likewise the formal of sin and formal sin are not to be confused: the latter is the whole sin, the former is an element of formal sin.

427. The essence of sin. — About the essence of sin there has been a celebrated controversy: S. Thomas says that both the material and formal elements pertain to the essence of sin, and accordingly that this consists in something positive; Scotus, on the other hand, Suarez, and others, considering the material element as the mere subject of sin, say that the formal is the whole of sin, and that this consists in a privative, or even, as a few have said, in a negative.

Concerning which it must be noted:

1. It is certain that sin does not consist in a negative: for sin is an evil act, but evil is not the simple absence of a perfection but the absence of a due perfection. Hence sin is essentially not something negative, but at least something privative.

2. It is certain that the formal element of sin is something privative. For the formal of sin is that by which an evil act is evil. Now evil is the privation of good. Therefore the formal of sin is a privation, and sin insofar as it is evil is something privative, namely the privation of conformity with the eternal law or of the rectitude due to the act.

3. It is certain that the sin of omission, considered in its essence separated from the act which is its cause, insofar as it is

mere omission, is something privative, as was said above, n. 419. In it the material is the privation of the due act, the formal the privation of order to the last end.

4. It seems to be said that the essence of the sin of commission is not a pure privation, but something positive, namely that the voluntary act which is the material of sin pertains to the very essence of sin¹. It is proved:

a) Privation is twofold: one is pure, total, and complete, which destroys the whole opposite good, as death, blindness, and therefore can be conceived without any positive, but essentially is only privation; the other is not pure but partial and incomplete, as sickness which is a way to death, and ophthalmia or dim-sightedness to blindness: this does not destroy the whole opposite good but retains something of it so that without this it cannot be conceived, and therefore in its essence includes something positive. But in moral things there is no pure privation (or pure evil), because no will can tend to evil as evil, but always under the aspect of good; the will in acting does not totally take away the good of reason, but always retains something of rectitude or of the order of reason to good. Therefore the privation of due order which is found in sin essentially includes the preservation of some rectitude or tendency to good, which is something positive. Whence, as sickness is not the pure and total privation of life, but includes the partial preservation of life which nevertheless is not acted in the normal way; so sin is not the pure and total privation of the order of reason, but positively includes a tendency or order of reason to an apparent good, which in truth is evil and to be prohibited because it cannot be referred to the last end.

b) Moral good and evil are not opposed contradictorily as quality and privation, thing and nothing, but contrarily as two opposed qualities: for virtue and vice are contraries because they tend to contrary goods or evils; but if vice is contrary to virtue, so also is the sin from which vice is generated or which is elicited by it. But if moral evil or sin were mere privation, it would be opposed to good contradictorily, and would be the simple absence of good. Therefore moral evil or sin is not mere privation but something positive, namely an act tending to an evil object.

S. Th. I-II, q. 71, a. 6.

428. Sin taken theologically is defined by Augustine, bk. 22, c. Faustum, c. 27: Something said, done, or desired against the eternal law.

a) There is indicated that which is material in sin, namely an act which is distinguished as threefold to denote the threefold sin which can be committed in thought, word, and deed. Since however affirmation and negation are reduced to the same genus, under the name of something said, done, or desired (i.e. willed or loved) there also falls the sin of omission: not said, not done, not desired when one ought to say, do, or will. For the rest, the sin of omission radically consists in a positive act, because it is not voluntary unless it is derived from a deliberation by which man has resolved either to omit the precept or to do something incompatible with it.

b) It is said: against the law, so that it may be implicitly signified that for sin it is required that it be voluntary and free: for no one properly and formally acts against the law except through a voluntary and free act, or unless he wills freely to transgress it.

c) It is said: against the eternal law, because the eternal law is the first and essential rule of human acts, ordering them to the end, from which they have that they are good or evil; and although sins are also against reason, or even sometimes against human laws, these sins are not sins except because they are at the same time against the eternal law of God, from which all laws are derived and which commands obedience to them. This is the formal of sin, that it be against the law of God.

429. Sin strictly so called is also rightly defined philosophically: An act against right reason, or a human act incongruous with rational nature.

Thus, as S. Thomas notes, ad 5, « by theology sin is considered principally according as it is an offense against God, by the moral philosopher according as it is contradictory to reason ». Nevertheless there is no philosophical sin, i.e. repugnant to right reason, which is not at the same time theological, or contrary to the eternal law, because on the one hand whatever is against right reason is against the eternal law which is the reason of God, since right reason is nothing other than the participation of the eternal law in the created mind; on the other hand it is impossible that any man who has sufficient use of reason invincibly ignore God and the eternal law. The concept of philosophical sin is therefore not metaphysically repugnant: for an act sufficiently appears evil and a sin because it is repugnant to the rule of reason alone, abstracting (not excluding) from the eternal law; in fact, however, in the real order, it does not exist, as is evident from prop. 2 condemned as scandalous, rash, and erroneous by Alex. VIII¹.

430. Less well, sin is defined by some: A free transgression of the law of God, or a voluntary withdrawal from the divine rule.

Which definition, although true, is nevertheless incomplete because it is made according to the formal element² and does not indicate that the material element is of the essence of sin; it is also less proper than Augustine's definition: for sin is rather a voluntary act than a privation or withdrawal, because the will does not directly tend to a privation, but to a positive good, which has a privation attached to it; for good is its proper object. Whence in the first place and directly the positive element is to be posited.

431. Observation. — Just as the notion of sin, so also the definition does not fit perfectly except to actual mortal sin, imperfectly and in a qualified sense to others.

S. Th. I-II, q. 72; de Malo, q. 2, a. 6.

432. Principle I. Sins are specifically distinguished immediately and proximately according to diverse formal objects, or a morally distinct species. For sin is not a simple privation but a voluntary act deprived of due rectitude, whence just as other human acts, sins will have their species immediately from the object: thus idolatry, homicide, and gluttony are distinguished (a. 1). — Since however the end or good is the proper object of the will, it follows that sins are specifically distinguished according to diverse ends (ad 1), whether of the agent (as e.g. to steal out of vengeance or out of fornication), or especially intrinsic to the work itself (as e.g. gluttony for pleasure, theft for money; — gluttony from love of delicious food or from love of much food).

433. Principle II. Sins are not specifically distinguished immediately and proximately, as opposed to the diverse virtues from which they withdraw (as Scotus taught) or to the diverse precepts (as Vasquez said): for the privation which is had in sin, namely a withdrawal from virtue or law, is not intended by the sinner but is beside his intention, whence it is not of itself and directly the object of the will and human act, nor therefore gives the evil act its species (a. 1).

S. Thomas noted that it comes to the same thing, that sins are distinguished in species either according to objects or according to the virtues to which they are opposed, because the virtues themselves are distinguished in species by their objects (ad 2); — or also according to precepts, because these differ according to a diverse object, motive, and end, and also according to diverse virtues, since they are given for this, that we may work according to virtue. Sins, therefore, although they do not immediately take their species from the law which they transgress, or from the virtue from which they withdraw, yet remotely and mediately they can be said to receive their species from them¹.

434. Practical rules are usually laid down as follows, by which the specific distinction of objects and accordingly of sins is easily discerned:

1st, altogether universal, to which all others can be reduced: Sins are diverse which are concerned with formally diverse objects; but objects are formally diverse not according to physical being but according to moral being, i.e. according to a special agreement or repugnance with right reason and the eternal law: hence to steal a sheep or a horse or money is the same sin in species, although the objects are materially diverse, because they agree in one moral notion, in taking another's good; — on the contrary homicide, adultery, and theft, because they contain a diverse repugnance to reason, since they injure a different right to life, to wife, to external goods (a. 1 and ad 3).

2nd: Those sins are diverse which are opposed to diverse virtues: for each virtue has its own proper goodness. Hence theft, fornication, and perjury are distinguished because they are opposed to justice, chastity, and religion (ad 2).

3rd: Those sins are diverse which are opposed to the same virtue but in a contrary way, that is by excess and defect, as presumption and despair of hope, prodigality and avarice to the virtue of liberality: for they are placed from an opposite motive and withdraw from the virtue in a diverse notion (a. 8).

4th: Those sins are diverse which are opposed to the same virtue, not in a contrary way but in a diverse way, on account of a special repugnance with right reason and law; in other words, which are against diverse goods, rectitudes, honesties, offices of the same virtue, as e.g. homicide and theft, theft and robbery, contumely and detraction, real, personal, and local sacrilege, violation of vow and of oath, idolatry and magic, perjury and blasphemy: for then a diverse goodness is injured and in the objects there is a deformity of a distinct notion is had.

5th: Those sins are diverse which are repugnant to formally diverse precepts, i.e. given for a diverse motive or intrinsic end, but not those which are repugnant to many precepts given for the same intrinsic motive, even if they are given by diverse legislators. Hence one who is bound by vow and by the precept of the confessor to fast on Ember Friday, if he does not fast, commits a threefold sin specifically distinct against temperance, religion, and the virtue of penance; — on the contrary, he who omits the holy day falling on a Sunday, or does not fast on Ember Saturday falling on a vigil, because each precept is of the same notion on the part of the end or intrinsic motive; likewise there is only one sin which is forbidden by natural, divine, ecclesiastical, and civil law, such as homicide.

435. Circumstances only per se aggravate sin. — For many pertain to the same object and the same matter, as e.g. from the same motive a prodigal gives when, where, to whom he ought not, and an illiberal man takes when, where it is not fitting, and more than is fitting. — They change species however if they include a special and distinct deformity with reason or proceed from a special motive; but then they do not remain circumstances but become as it were a secondary object of the act and have the character of a specific difference. Thus theft of a sacred thing is specifically distinguished from simple theft, likewise the various sins of gluttony such as eating too much or food that is too delicious (a. 9).

436. Corollaries. — A. Therefore sins are specifically distinguished: a) carnal and spiritual sins, because they tend to formally diverse objects: for carnal sins, namely gluttony and lust and what is reduced to them, have as their end carnal pleasure which is perfected in bodily touch, spiritual [sins have] spiritual pleasure which is consummated in the knowledge of something, as the other five capital [sins] (a. 2).

b) Likewise sins against God, against oneself, and against neighbor, for the objects and virtues by which man is ordered to God, to neighbor, and to oneself are specifically diverse. It is to be noted that every sin which is against neighbor and against oneself is also against God: but here under the name of sin against God comes that which is proximately, immediately, and specially against him, without being against neighbor and oneself (a. 4).

B. Sins are not specifically distinguished: a) because they differ according to liability to punishment, namely mortal and venial. For the will of the sinner does not intend the punishment of sin, but this is accidental and beside his intention. Since therefore the liability to punishment is not the object of the sinful act but follows accidentally, it does not cause a difference of species.

Mortal and venial sin differ infinitely on the part of inordination or privation, not however on the part of conversion to a created good, on the part of the act and object, from which nevertheless they have their species. Nothing therefore prevents mortal and venial sin being found in the same moral species, just as the first movement in the genus of adultery, or theft of 10 cents, is venial (a. 5).

Likewise b) because they are sins of heart, mouth, and work: although indeed per accidens they differ in completed species if they are consummated and perfect either in thought, or in word, or in work, such as heresy, blasphemy, and idolatry, because then they have diverse ends or objects; per se however they indicate only degrees of one species of sin, whose 1st beginning is in the affection of the heart, 2nd degree in the manifestation of the mouth, 3rd in the consummation of the work, as e.g. the desire, proposal, and perpetration of adultery; to conceive in the heart anger toward another, to express it in harsh words, and to strike him (a. 7).

Hence 1) they are not distinguished when they are joined together; 2) but if one or another degree is found separately and the will does not proceed further and does not carry out the sin, then they are distinguished in incomplete species, because then they are related as incomplete and complete species in the same way as a part of a movement and the whole movement, an imperfect work and a complete one, as e.g. the laying of a foundation and the building of a house. Thus internal lust, imperfect lust of the mouth, sight, or touch, and consummate or perfect lust of deed (ad 3).

Likewise c) because they are sins of commission and omission: although indeed according to physical being they are distinguished in species and even in genus, according to moral being they are not necessarily distinguished in species, because they can be concerned with the same object, tend to the same end, and proceed from the same motive, such as to rob another's goods and not to restore them, to watch and to sleep against the precept of a superior, to omit Mass or to steal for adultery, etc. (a. 6).

S. Th. II Sent., d. 42, q. 1, a. 1; de Malo, q. 2, a. 6, ad 12.

437. Principles. — Sins are multiplied in number, not indeed from many or diverse deformities or malices, and therefore that which is multiple in species is not necessarily multiple in number, because one and the same act can have several moral species, as e.g. theft of a sacred thing; — but

1. from the moral multiplication of acts: for sin is not a simple privation but rather an act deprived of due order; — also

2. from the moral multiplication of objects: for acts are distinguished according to objects, for an act is nothing other than a tendency to an object.

Hence a twofold practical rule is usually established.

438. The first rule is: There are as many sins as there are total moral objects, i.e. morally not united but distinct and not coalescing into one object. Hence:

a) External acts physically many which are considered by reason and commanded by the will as coordinated as incomplete or integrating parts of one complete object, according as they are concerned with things of the same notion, are one sin, such as repeated acts to take several and even diverse goods of the same person, several evil oaths or blasphemies or various contumelies or heresies uttered in one impulse, several impure touches exercised on the same person in the same impulse, several canonical hours of one day omitted, and probably diverse sacraments (such as of the sick) to one person, or several sacraments (such as of the Eucharist or Penance) to several persons sacrilegiously administered without moral interruption, because they are one administration; — on the contrary, external acts complete in themselves are many sins, such as to steal Peter's horse and then Paul's money, to detract from one and immediately afterward from another, three acts of fornication even had one immediately after another, an office omitted for 3 days, 3 Masses sacrilegiously celebrated on the Nativity of the Lord, several sacrilegious administrations of sacraments.

b) External acts physically many which are intended as subordinated to one principal action as means to one end are one sin, as e.g. one who sacrilegiously consecrates and communicates in the same sacrifice, who for fornication gives gifts, utters obscene words, exercises impure touches, works the sin itself and immediately after has complacency in it, who, wishing to kill an enemy, buys arms, lays snares, and strikes¹; — on the contrary, if they are not subordinated to the principal complete act: thus one who without the intention of fornication exercises impure touches and finally comes to fornication commits two sins, as one who, after fornication, after some interval again touches impurely.

c) An external act physically one by which diverse persons or matters are touched is probably one sin, such as to kill or scandalize several in one action, to steal or detract from several in one act or before several, to blaspheme against several saints, to consecrate several hosts sacrilegiously in the same sacrifice, etc.: for an external act has unity in itself and therefore tends to several in the manner of one; whence these are conceived and intended as one adequate object²; — on the contrary, if one explicitly intended distinctly and singly to touch those things, in the manner of several, because then they are intended as many and distinct objects: for the act physically one will then be morally multiple.

d) The will inefficacious intending several objects of the same notion, such as several external acts even complete, is probably one sin, as morose delight about 3 women, hatred of 3 persons, inefficacious desire to fornicate even with three, to omit several hours, a fast, Mass for a week, a month, a year, inefficacious choice of diverse evils even to several: for then these are considered in the manner of one as one pleasing or displeasing object; — on the contrary, if several complete acts are intended by an efficacious will or resolve, because then they are considered in the manner of several, as several effects to be obtained or caused.

It is to be noted that several acts, or several evil effects of one act, which constitute only one sin, are not for that reason less evil than if they were several sins: for this one sin is so much the graver as it contains more malices, and is as evil as several sins because in malice it equals several.

439. The second rule is: There are as many sins as there are morally interrupted and repeated acts even about the same object. Acts are morally interrupted, however, when virtually or in effect they are not considered to remain. Which happens in three ways:

1° by retraction or contrary will, whether explicit or equivalent, by placing an act incompatible with the former;

2° by cessation from the act voluntarily and freely, without the resolve to proceed further³, as e.g. by ceasing from an attempt which is not ordered to another attempt, by turning aside to other things because of weariness or fatigue;

3° by involuntary or natural cessation, which is had from involuntary distraction, forgetfulness, occupation, etc., as e.g. by reading a letter, sleep, drunkenness, and the like, when the former will does not remain virtually and cannot be considered the cause of the later about the same object. The sign, however, by reason of which the former will is rightly considered to remain virtually, is that the will returns to the same object as if spontaneously and without new deliberation; on the contrary, if new deliberation is necessary. Whence a brief involuntary cessation ordinarily is not a moral interruption; how great precisely the delay required for moral interruption, however, cannot be defined by a general rule but is to be left to the prudent determination of an arbitrator, with attention to the intensity of the act and the nature of the distraction. Hence:

a) Merely internal acts (morose delights, inefficacious desires or hatreds, envies, rash judgments, doubts concerning faith, despairings) do not long persevere, so that if the physical interruption is notable it is considered moral: for the same affection cannot last amid diverse occupations and distractions except for a short time, regularly certainly not beyond 2 or 3 hours; indeed this seems much.

b) Internal acts to be completed exteriorly, as being ordered to external work, last longer, especially if they have begun to be executed; otherwise they are considered to persevere only for some days: for the same internal impulse, even of a vehement one, does not last longer, at least generally, for some, such as efficacious hatreds, desires of a base thing and of vengeance, often because of vehemence last long, even the will of not restoring, because it is ordered to an effect in itself perpetual.

c) External acts are interrupted if they are absolute and complete, i.e. if they are not subordinated to the principal action nor done in the same impulse, as was said in rule 1st under a) and b).

440. Practical corollaries. — 1° He who commits a single sin which is concerned with several objects is not bound of himself to declare the number of objects in confession; — but he is bound to declare the plurality, saying e.g. I scandalized several or many, I inefficaciously desired several women, I absolved several sacrilegiously, I detracted from the household, etc.; otherwise he would lead the confessor into error, who would rightly think that the act is concerned with one object only, and thus in fact would accuse that sin of him, like one who would say: I stole a gold coin in place of 20.

2° In acts subordinated to one principal action, this alone, and not the means, is to be declared, unless they contain mortal malice specifically distinct, as e.g. theft for fornication. But if the principal action has not followed, the intention of committing it is to be declared; — the means employed are not to be declared if in themselves they are indifferent (as e.g. to buy arms, to walk about) because they are not evil except by the malice of the intention; they are to be declared if in themselves they are evil, as e.g. if they manifest the internal intention, but in a general and confused way, as e.g. I employed impure means for fornication or I tried to procure it; they are to be declared in a distinct way if they contain mortal malice specifically distinct, as e.g. a maleficium or the cooperation of another to inflict harm.

3° Penitents who cannot determine how many interrupted times they consented to the internal temptation, should declare the time during which they persevered in evil will, as e.g. for a day I hated, for a month I desired the girl, adding as far as possible whether the angers or interruptions were frequent. From the time the confessor indeed, with attention to the disposition of the person, the nature of the thing, and the circumstances, can in some way conjecture the interruption.

4° He who in one impulse places several acts of the same notion, should declare one, saying e.g. I touched a woman, I blasphemed, I swore, I detracted, etc.: for it is one act morally.

5° That the sacrament of penance not be made burdensome, nor may the faithful and confessors be tormented by scruples, questions are not to be made about the species and number of sins unless grave motives are present. Penitents, however, are bound to confess the species and number according to the knowledge which they had of these, at least in a confused way, at that moment when they committed the sin, but not according to theological knowledge if they did not have it: for nothing is willed unless foreknown.

S. Th. I-II, q. 73; de Malo, q. 2, a. 7, 8, 9, 10.

441. Principle I. Not all sins are equal. — For sin is not a pure and simple privation but retains something of the order of reason to good; whence just as sickness is greater or lesser according as it deprives more or less of health, so sin is more or less grave according as it withdraws more or less from the rectitude of reason.

It is de fide against the Stoics and Jovinian (cf. prop. 20th of Baius).

It is proved 1) from Scripture: John XIX, 11; I John V, 16; Mt. V, 22; Ezech. XVI; Jer. VII; Lam. IV;

2. from the unequal punishments of sins: When the punishments of sins are unequal, the sins themselves are also unequal, because the inequality of punishment supposes an inequali-

Summa Theologiae Moralis I — 24 ty of guilt. But punishments are unequal; therefore also sins (cf. Deut. XXV; Lk. X, 12-14);

3. from the unequal species of sins: Species are related as numbers. But sins are specifically distinct. Therefore unequal in the notion of sin, and therefore the gravity of them is not the same (a. 2).

442. Principle II. The fundamental or principal gravity of sins:

1° is taken immediately from the objects from which sins have their fundamental or first moral species. For just as sickness is so much the graver as it injures a nobler principle or organ of life, so sin is so much the graver as it is done against a nobler end or object (a. 3).

Hence sins directly against God are in themselves or according to species (i.e. other things being equal, without regard to circumstances) graver than sins against Christ the man, and these than those which are done against worship and sacred things, and these than those which are done against oneself and neighbor; moreover suicide is greater than homicide, and this than adultery and fornication which are against the mere propagation of life, and these than theft which is against external goods.

2° is taken mediately from opposition to the virtues. Hence a) those sins are in themselves graver which directly repel against their principal object the more worthy virtues, so that the greatest sin against the most worthy virtue is greater than the greatest sin against an inferior virtue: therefore the greatest sin is hatred of God which is against charity; follow sins directly against faith, against hope, against religion, against penance, and against the cardinal virtues in order (a. 4).

We said: which directly repel against the principal object; for indirect opposition to a more worthy virtue or direct opposition about a secondary object can be less than direct opposition to the primary object of an inferior virtue, as e.g. the omission of an act of charity, or scandal or envy is less than heresy, the reading of a heretical book than despair.

b) Among sins which repel against the same virtue, those are in themselves graver which withdraw more from the principal inclination of the virtue, whence avarice is a greater sin than prodigality, timidity than audacity, intemperance than insensibility, and generally the sin of commission than of omission, as e.g. perjury than violation of an oath.

c) Likewise those are in themselves graver which are opposed to a greater rectitude, good, or office of the same virtue, as e.g. homicide than adultery, and this than detraction, and this than theft; likewise blasphemy is graver than perjury, and this than sacrilege.

3° is also taken mediately from opposition to precepts: in themselves they are graver if they are opposed to more worthy precepts, i.e. given for a more noble motive or by a more worthy legislator, or more necessary, as e.g. other things being equal, a sin against divine law is greater than against human.

443. Principle III. The accidental and secondary gravity of sins, which can happen that a sin in itself graver from its object is in fact less grave and vice versa, is taken from the circumstances (C. Trid. sess. 14, c. 5, can. 7):

1° from the part of the agent or cause: sin is so much the graver as the free will which is the proper cause of sin is greater; the signs of which are most often the intensity and duration of the act (a. 6). Hence sins from malice, because they are more from the will, are graver than sins from infirmity or passion, and these than sins done from ignorance;

2° from the part of the act, whether the circumstances change the species (as e.g. theft of a sacred thing; various sins of lust according to their nature), or multiply the notion of sin in the same species (such as a prodigal who gives when and to whom he ought not, or one who utters diverse contumelies), or increase or diminish the deformity of sin (such as one who steals much, scandalizes many or absolves sacrilegiously, omits several hours of one day): for sin is from the defect of some due circumstance (a. 7).

Hence a) sin is aggravated according to the condition and dignity of the person against whom it is committed, because this is as it were the object of sin; whence sins against persons joined to God or to sin or to many are graver (III Kings XIX, 14; Mic. VII, 6). Examples are: the killing of a priest (Zech. II, 8), of a father (Ecclus. XIV, 5), or of a king or public person (Exod. XXII, 28), whose injury redounds to many (a. 9).

b) Deliberate sins are graver in a person of greater knowledge or virtue, both because he more easily resists sin, and because of ingratitude and scandal, and because of the special repugnance of sin to such a person, as e.g. injustice in a king, fornication in a priest, idolatry in a faithful person. But sins which are committed by stealth because of the infirmity of human nature are lesser, inasmuch as such a person is less negligent in restraining them (a. 10).

c) Sins against neighbor are so much the graver as the greater harm follows from them, especially if it was intended for its own sake; even if it was not intended in itself but nevertheless foreseen, at least confusedly, nor was there a just cause for permitting it¹ (a. 8).

444. Corollary. — Any spiritual sin is not of greater guilt than any carnal sin; but, other things being equal, considering only the difference of spirituality and carnality, spiritual sins are graver: 1° from the part of the subject, because carnal sins are consummated in carnal appetite, to which it principally pertains to be converted to a bodily good, and therefore they have more of conversion to a created good; spiritual sins, on the other hand, are more in reason and will, to which it pertains to be converted to God and to be turned away from him, whence they have more of the aversion from which guilt proceeds; — 2° from the part of him against whom it is committed: he who sins with a spiritual sin sins against God or neighbor, he who sins with a carnal sin sins of himself against his own body, of which he unduly makes use; — 3° from the part of the motive: carnal sins are lesser because we are more impelled to them, which diminishes freedom. Nevertheless carnal sins are of greater infamy because they consist in a delight common to us and the brutes, and are of greater adhesion and danger because of the delight attached (a. 5).

445. Observations. — 1. All sins are not connected. Indeed all mortal sins contemn the same author of the law, God, and agree in aversion, and therefore are contrary to charity (which is the end of the law) and deprive of grace and incur the guilt of the same punishment, according to what James says, II, 10: « Whosoever shall keep the whole law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of all », i.e. guilty of that guilt and punishment which is found in all; whence one mortal sin cannot be forgiven without the other. Nevertheless the sinner does not intend to turn away from God and withdraw from that which is according to reason, but rather to tend to certain desirable goods; but such goods are diverse, nor are they connected, indeed sometimes they are contrary, and accordingly one can be desired without the other, as James himself witnesses, II, 11 (a. 1).

2. From the sixteenth century many speak of 4 sins which in Scripture are called crying to heaven, because, as many think, they are committed directly against the supreme goods necessary to every society as its foundation. This, however, is sufficiently founded neither in Scripture nor in reason, as the distinguished prof. Leroux shows in the journal Revue Eccl. de Liége, May 1914.