Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis
Benedictus Henricus Merkelbach (1871–1942)
Summa Theologiae Moralis ad mentem D. Thomae et ad normam iuris novi
First published 1935
Volume I (De principiis) of Benedictus Henricus Merkelbach's Summa theologiae moralis sets out the foundations of Catholic moral theology within a Thomistic framework. It treats human acts, conscience, law, sin, and merit in relation to the canon law of its period. The present edition follows the Paris text published by Desclée de Brouwer in 1935 and includes the Latin text with an English translation. It comprises the first volume of the three-volume Summa.
Prologus
Introductio I: Theologia Moralis Generalis: Introductio
Tractatus I: Tractatus de ultimo actu humanorum fine seu de beatitudine
Introductio
Quaestio I: DE FINE ULTIMO IN COMMUNI
Quaestio II: DE BEATITUDINE OBIECTIVA
Quaestio III: DE BEATITUDINE FORMALI
Quaestio IV: DE QUALITATIBUS BEATITUDINIS
Quaestio V: DE MODO OBTINENDI BEATITUDINEM
Tractatus II: De actibus humanis in se
Introductio
Pars I: De actibus humanis secundum esse materiale et psychologicum
§ I: De conditione actuum humanorum
Caput I: De elemento subiectivo actus humani
Quaestio I: De voluntario
Articulus I: De voluntario in se
Articulus II: De voluntario tum positivo et directo, tum negativo et indirecto
Articulus III: De voluntario in se et in causa
Quaestio II: De impedimentis voluntarii seu de involuntario
Articulus I: De violentia
Articulus II: De metu
Articulus III: De concupiscentia
Articulus IV: De ignorantia
Quaestio III: De libero
Quaestio IV: De impedimentis liberi
Articulus I: De passionibus
Articulus II: De habitu et consuetudine
Articulus III: De impedimentis liberi remotioribus
Caput II: De elemento obiectivo actus humani
Quaestio I: De elemento essentiali seu obiecto
Quaestio II: De elemento accidentali seu de circumstantiis
§ II: De distinctione actuum humanorum
Quaestio I: De actibus elicitis
Quaestio II: De actibus imperatis
Pars II: De actibus humanis secundum esse morale
§ I: De moralitate actus humani in genere
Quaestio I: De essentia et speciebus moralitatis
Quaestio II: De fundamentis moralitatis
Articulus I: De intrinseca differentia boni inter et mali
Articulus II: De norma moralitatis
Articulus III: De fundamento obiectivo moralitatis
Articulus IV: De falsis systematibus circa fundamenta moralitatis
Articulus V: De facultate apprehensiva moralitatis
Quaestio III: De principiis seu fontibus moralitatis
Quaestio IV: De distinctione specifica inter actum bonum et malum
Quaestio V: De distinctione specifica inter varios actus bonos vel malos
Articulus I: De obiecto
Articulus II: De circumstantiis
Articulus III: De fine
§ II: De moralitate actuum humanorum in specie
Quaestio I: De bonitate et malitia actus interioris
Quaestio II: De bonitate et malitia actus exterioris
Quaestio III: De bonitate et malitia effectus externi
Quaestio IV: De bonitate et malitia passionum
Quaestio V: De bonitate et malitia circumstantiarum
Pars III: De actibus humanis secundum esse supernaturale et meritorium
Quaestio I: De merito praesertim supernaturali
Quaestio II: De conditionibus meriti supernaturalis
Tractatus III: De conscientia in generali
Introductio
Quaestio I: De conscientia morali secundum se in esse psychologico
Quaestio II: De conscientia prout est regula actuum moralium
Articulus I: De rectitudine conscientiae
Articulus II: De conscientiae certitudine
Quaestio III: De conscientia christiana prout est regula actuum supernaturalium
Tractatus IV: De legibus in genere
Introductio
§ I: De lege secundum esse psychologicum
Pars I: De lege in genere
Quaestio I: De ipsa lege in se
Articulus I: De essentia legis
Articulus II: De promulgatione legis
Quaestio II: De distinctione legum
Quaestio III: De effectibus legis
Articulus I: De vi directivâ seu obligatione legis
Articulus II: De vi coactivâ seu sanctione legis
Pars II: De lege aeterna quae est fundamentum omnis legis
Quaestio I: De essentia legis aeternae
Quaestio II: De potestate legis aeternae
Quaestio III: De mutabilitate legis aeternae
§ I: De legibus quae regunt actus morales
Pars III: De lege naturali
Quaestio I: De essentia legis naturalis
Quaestio II: De potestate legis naturalis
Articulus I: De vi directivâ seu obligatione legis naturalis
Articulus II: De vi coactivâ seu sanctione legis naturalis
Quaestio III: De mutabilitate legis naturalis
Quaestio IV: De Lege Humana in Se
Articulus I: De Auctore legis civilis
Articulus II: De Qualitate legis humanae
Articulus III: De Efformatione legis humanae
Articulus IV: De Divisione legis humanae
Quaestio V: De Potestate Legis Humanae
Articulus I: De Materia legis humanae
Articulus II: De Obligatione legis humanae
Articulus III: De Subditis legis civilis
Articulus IV: De Impletione et Interpretatione legis humanae
Quaestio VI: De Mutabilitate Legis Humanae
Caput I: De Lege Vetere
Quaestio I: De Lege Vetere Secundum Se
Quaestio II: De Potestate Legis Veteris
Quaestio III: De Mutabilitate Veteris Legis
Caput II: De Lege Nova
Quaestio I: De Essentia Legis Novae
Quaestio II: De Potestate Legis Novae
Quaestio III: De Lege Ecclesiastica Secundum Se
Articulus I: De Auctore legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus II: De Materia et Qualitate legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus III: De Efformatione legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus IV: De Divisione legis ecclesiasticae
Quaestio IV: De Potestate seu Obligatione Legis Ecclesiasticae
Articulus I: De Quantitate seu Gravitate Obligationis
Articulus II: De Qualitate et Extensione Obligationis legis praeceptivae
Articulus III: De Qualitate et Extensione Obligationis legis poenalis
Articulus IV: De Qualitate et Extensione Obligationis legis irritantis
Articulus V: De Subditis legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus VI: De Impletione legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus VII: De Interpretatione legis ecclesiasticae
Quaestio V: De Mutabilitate Legis Ecclesiasticae
Articulus I: De Ignorantia
Articulus II: De Impotentia
Articulus III: De Dispensatione
Articulus IV: De privilegio
Articulus V: De cessatione finis
Articulus VI: De abrogatione et derogatione
Articulus VII: De consuetudine
Tractatus V: De peccatis in genere
Introductio I: De Peccatis in Genere
Quaestio I: De essentia peccati
Articulus I: De notione et conditionibus peccati
Articulus II: De peccato omissionis negative voluntario
Articulus III: De peccato commissionis externo, indirecte aut in causa voluntario
Articulus IV: De elementis constitutivis peccati
Articulus V: De definitione peccati
Quaestio II: De distinctione peccatorum
Articulus I: De distinctione specifica
Articulus II: De distinctione numerica
Quaestio III: De comparatione et gravitate peccatorum
Quaestio IV: De subiecto peccati
Articulus I: De motibus seu peccatis sensualitatis
Articulus II: De consensu in delectationem seu de delectatione morosa
Articulus III: De consensu in actum seu de desiderio et gaudio
Pars I: De causis peccatorum
Quaestio I: De causis peccati interioribus
Articulus I: De ignorantia causa peccati ex parte rationis
Articulus II: De passione causa peccati ex parte appetitus sensitivi
Articulus III: De malitia causa peccati ex parte voluntatis
Quaestio II: De causis peccatorum exterioribus
Articulus I: De deo permittente
Articulus II: De diabolo tentante
Articulus III: De homine cooperante
Quaestio III: De peccato quod est causa alterius peccati
Articulus I: De modo quo unum peccatum alterum causat
Articulus II: De superbia et inani gloria
Articulus III: De avaritia
Articulus IV: De luxuria et gula
Articulus V: De invidia et ira
Articulus VI: De acedia
Pars II: De effectibus peccatorum
Quaestio I: De diminutione boni naturae
Quaestio II: De reatu culpae seu macula peccati
Quaestio III: De reatu poenae
Quaestio IV: De peccato mortali et veniali
Articulus I: De differentia inter peccatum mortale et veniale
Articulus II: De gravitate peccati mortalis
Articulus III: De conditionibus ad peccatum mortale requisitis
Articulus IV: De divisione peccati mortalis et venialis
Articulus V: De conversione peccati mortalis et venialis
Articulus VI: De peccato veniali secundum se
Tractatus VI: De habitibus et virtutibus in genere
Introductio I: De Habitibus et Virtutibus in Genere
Pars I: De habitibus in genere secundum esse psychologicum
Quaestio I: De essentia habitus
Quaestio II: De subiecto habitus
Quaestio III: De causa habituum
Quaestio IV: De distinctione habituum
Pars II: De habitibus secundum esse morale seu de virtutibus acquisitis
Quaestio I: De essentia virtutis
Quaestio II: De subiecto virtutis
Quaestio III: De distinctione virtutum
Articulus I: De virtutibus intellectualibus
Articulus II: De virtutibus moralibus
Articulus III: De virtutibus cardinalibus
Quaestio IV: De proprietatibus virtutum
Articulus I: De medio virtutis
Articulus II: De connexione virtutum
Articulus III: De aequalitate virtutum
Articulus IV: De duratione virtutum
Pars III: De habitibus secundum esse supernaturale seu de virtutibus infusis
Quaestio I: De existentia et essentia infusorum habituum ac virtutum
Quaestio II: De distinctione infusorum habituum et virtutum
Articulus I: De virtutibus theologicis
Articulus II: De virtutibus moralibus
Articulus III: De donis spiritus sancti
Quaestio III: De causa infusorum habituum et virtutum
Quaestio IV: De proprietatibus infusorum habituum et virtutum
Articulus I: De medio virtutum infusarum
Articulus II: De connexione habituum infusorum
Articulus III: De aequalitate habituum infusorum
Articulus IV: De duratione habituum infusorum
Tractatus VII: De fide divina
Introductio
Quaestio I: De Obiecto Formali Fidei
Quaestio II: De Obiecto Materiali Fidei
Articulus I: De obiecto materiali in se
Articulus II: De conditionibus ad obiectum materiale requisitis
Articulus III: De evolutione obiecti materialis
Articulus IV: De ecclesia proponente obiectum fidei
Pars I: De Actu Fidei
Caput I: De Actu Fidei Interiore
Quaestio I: De Essentia Actus Fidei
Quaestio II: De Analysi Actus Fidei
Articulus I: De ipso actu fidei
Articulus II: De ipso credulitatis affectu
Articulus III: De iudicio credibilitatis seu de praeambulis fidei
Quaestio III: De Necessitate Fidei
Caput II: De Actu Fidei Exteriore seu de Eius Confessione
Pars II: De Habitu Fidei
Quaestio I: De Ipsa Fide
Articulus I: De fide in ordine ad subiectum spectata
Articulus II: De fide spectata relative ad virtutes supernaturales
Articulus III: De fide spectata relative ad habitus intellectuales
Quaestio II: De habentibus fidem
Quaestio III: De causa et effectibus fidei
Quaestio IV: De donis fidei correspondentibus
Pars III: De vitiis et peccatis fidei oppositis
Quaestio I: De peccatis directe oppositis fidei
Articulus I: De infidelitate
Articulus II: De haeresi et apostasia
Quaestio II: De peccatis indirecte oppositis fidei
Articulus I: De communicatione cum infidelibus et haereticis
Articulus II: De cooperatione ad infidelitatem et haeresim
Articulus III: De lectione et evulgatione scriptorum prohibitorum
Articulus IV: De admissione vel professione doctrinae quae pro fide est periculosa
Quaestio III: De blasphemia quae opponitur confessioni fidei
Pars IV: De praecepto fidei
Quaestio I: Quaestio unica
Tractatus VIII: De spe divina
Introductio
Pars I: De obiecto et actu spei
Quaestio I: De obiecto formali spei
Quaestio II: De obiecto materiali spei
Quaestio III: De necessitate spei
Pars II: De habitu et subiecto spei
Quaestio I: De spe ut est virtus
Quaestio II: De subiecto spei
Quaestio III: De timore dei
Pars III: De peccatis spei oppositis
Quaestio I: De desperatione
Quaestio II: De praesumptione
Pars IV: De praecepto spei
Quaestio I: De Praecepto Spei
Tractatus IX: De divina charitate
Introductio I: De Divina Charitate
Pars I: De ipsa charitate
Quaestio I: De essentia charitatis
Quaestio II: De excellentia charitatis
Articulus I: De excellentia charitatis in se
Articulus II: De excellentia charitatis relative ad alias virtutes
Quaestio III: De charitate quoad subiectum spectata
Articulus I: De subiecto et generatione charitatis
Articulus II: De augmento charitatis
Articulus III: De diminutione et amissione charitatis
Pars II: De obiecto charitatis
Quaestio I: De obiecto formali
Quaestio II: De obiecto materiali charitatis
Articulus I: De diligendis ex charitate generatim
Articulus II: De diligendo deo
Articulus III: De diligendo seipso
Articulus IV: De peccatoribus diligendis
Articulus V: De inimicis diligendis
Quaestio III: De ordine charitatis
Articulus I: De ordine inter deum et nos
Articulus II: De ordine inter nos et proximum
Articulus III: De ordine inter varios proximos
Pars III: De actibus charitatis
Quaestio I: De actu proprio seu dilectione
Quaestio II: De effectibus internis charitatis
Quaestio III: De actu charitatis externo seu beneficentia
Articulus I: De eleemosyna corporali
Articulus II: De eleemosyna spirituali seu correptione fraterna
Pars IV: De peccatis charitati oppositis
Quaestio I: De odio quod opponitur dilectioni
Quaestio II: De peccatis oppositis gaudio
Articulus I: De acedia
Articulus II: De invidia
Quaestio III: De peccatis oppositis paci
Quaestio IV: De peccatis oppositis beneficentiae
Articulus I: De scandalo activo
S. Th. II-II, q. 43, a. 1-6.
958. Active scandal is defined: a word or deed less right giving occasion of spiritual ruin. It is called
1° word or deed, not however desired, because a merely internal sin cannot give another occasion of sinning. Since however affirmation and negation are reduced to the same genus, therefore under the name of word or deed omission also comes: not said, not done;
2° less right, i.e. which according to itself is evil or at least has the appearance of evil; as if one speaks of base things in the presence of a young person, or for a just cause eats meat on Friday in the presence of others who do not know, or works on the Lord's day: for nothing disposes to spiritual ruin except inasmuch as it has a defect of rectitude, because what is properly right rather guards man against a fall than induces him to ruin;
3° giving occasion of spiritual ruin, both a) because scandal is not the efficient cause of another's sin, but this is only the will itself, and b) because for scandal it is not enough that one sins in the presence of others (for scandal does not fall upon a perfect man nor upon one altogether wicked1), nor is it required that the ruin of the neighbor in fact follow, but that occasion be given him, i.e. that the action either always or in these circumstances of itself be apt to move him to commit sin. But if the action of itself does not move, but accidentally because of it someone is moved to sin from his own disposition, it will not be active scandal, but only passive (a. 1, ad 4).
959. Active scandal is a mortal sin. — It is proved:*:
a) From the words of Christ, Mt. XVIII, 6-7: "Woe to that man through whom scandal comes" (Rom. XIV, 13, 20; I Cor. VIII, 13).
b) From reason: Charity obliges under grave obligation (by affirmative precept) to correct the neighbor and to prevent him from falling into sin; therefore much more (by negative precept) not to impel him to sin by counsel or example.
It is mortal of its genus; because it can be venial not only from imperfection of the act, but also from smallness of matter, if another is induced only to venial sin, even if this is formally intended.
Moreover the sin of scandal is so much the graver as the ruin of the neighbor is greater, and as it is more intended, and as it follows more from our action (e.g. given in the presence of a young person or by a priest), and as the persons moved to sin are more numerous.
960. Active scandal is divided by reason of efficacy: into direct, when one is the true moral cause of the neighbor's sin, which is done by command, counsel, seduction, praise, petition to commit sin, etc.; — and indirect, when one places a less right action which is only a probable occasion of sinning for the neighbor, as is a bad example2.
direct, when one is the true moral cause of the neighbor's sin, which is done by command, counsel, seduction, praise, petition to commit sin, etc.;—and indirect, when one places a less right action which is only a probable occasion of sinning for the neighbor, as is a bad example.
Direct scandal is sin not only against charity but also against the virtue to the violation of which one induces the neighbor; indirect scandal is sin, but probably against charity alone. Hence if by command, counsel, etc. one has brought someone to mortal sin e.g. to adultery, the species of the sin to which he has led him, in this case adultery, is to be declared in confession; on the contrary if by bad example alone one has scandalized, it suffices to confess: I gave grave scandal. The reason is because every virtue obliges not only not to be violated by oneself but also not to be the cause and positively procure that it be violated by others; but it is not proved also to oblige not to give another the mere occasion of violating it, nor to prevent its violation. And surely the sin of another (directly and per se) cannot be imputed to us unless we are its cause; whence he who has only given another occasion of stealing (by example or intemperance) is not bound in solidum to restitution, and this is a sign that he has not sinned against justice. And similarly of other virtues3.
961. Active scandal is divided by reason of intention: into directly or explicitly intended, whether it be formally and per se intended (as end), if one explicitly intends the sin of neighbor inasmuch as it is sin (which is called diabolical scandal), or whether it be simply intended (as means), if one explicitly intends the sin of neighbor for one's own utility or pleasure; — and implicit or interpretative, if one does not intend the sin of another but only places a less right action, from which it can probably be feared that another may be drawn to sin4.
But just as someone by internal act alone can sin, not indeed by the sin of scandal, but by the desire or affect of scandal, so also by internal act one can more desire the sin of another than procure it by external scandal. Hence if one directly and explicitly intends to procure the sin of another by only indirect scandal, as if by bad example alone he explicitly intends to lead another to lust, he indeed sins by desire or affect against the virtue (e.g. chastity) which he intends to be violated, which is to be declared in confession; but the external sin of scandal as being indirect is against charity alone.
But if one formally with diabolical intention intends the sin of the neighbor, he commits a special (i.e. distinct in species) and gravest sin against charity toward the neighbor, directly opposed to fraternal correction, by which he explicitly intends as end the special and gravest harm of the neighbor which is spiritual ruin; the active end however of human acts gives the species. Otherwise the notion of scandal is as a circumstance changing the species of another sin.
962. There is an obligation of repairing active scandal, as far as possible: for if each one out of charity is bound to prevent the fall of another and to procure the amendment of the sinner (or of the erring), a fortiori he who has given scandal has been the occasion why another sinned. The obligation arises from charity alone because to one knowing and willing no injury is done; not however from justice or office, unless someone has used unjust means, e.g. fraud, force, fear, or unless a superior has given scandal to subjects whose spiritual good, by virtue of his office, he must safeguard.
As to the manner of reparation: 1° Scandal indirect, given by example alone, is to be repaired implicitly, namely by ceasing from scandal, by good example, by public reception of the sacraments, by prayer for the scandalized one, etc.
2° Scandal direct, given by evil counsel, false doctrine, bad books, machination against the Church, etc., must be repaired explicitly, so that first its further influence be removed, and then the harm caused be compensated so that the one who suffered the scandal be recalled to good. Thus evil counsel and false doctrine must be revoked, machination against the Church must be publicly detested, the diffusion of bad books must be prevented as far as possible, and good books must be written or spread.
3° Hence public scandal is also to be repaired publicly, both so that its further influence be removed, and so that the reparation, that they may be warned of the evil, be known to all and be profitable.
The manner of public reparation can be various: either a retraction written out is published through public papers, or it is done before witnesses and the matter is afterwards made known, or it is done before the parish priest and afterwards made known; the sinner is bound to have satisfied all, provided it suffices to remove the scandal. Since however the sacraments cannot be ministered to the unworthy, it is clear that one who has not removed public scandal is not to be publicly admitted to the sacraments; indeed the minister would commit scandal, because he would give occasion for judging that the sacraments are ministered to the unworthy and scandalous actions are tacitly approved. Thus a public concubinary is bound to first leave the shameful commerce and its occasion before he publicly receives the sacraments. — In practice it belongs to confessors, parish priests, bishops to determine the suitable manner of reparation.
963. Remarks. — 1. It can happen that a sin grave in itself is venial scandal, e.g. if your grave theft is an occasion for another to commit light theft. Conversely a sin light in itself can be grave scandal of disobedience or irreverence or injury or unchastity, e.g. if a religious utters a less honest word in the presence of women or of those who can therefrom take occasion of sinning mortally, or if a priest retains a suspect person at home.
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Scandal can contain several other added malice, either because of the quality of the scandalizing person, e.g. if a father scandalizes children, a superior subjects, a teacher disciples; for these are bound not only out of charity but also by office to prevent the ruin of their subjects; or because of the quality of the scandalized person, as if one directly induces to base things a married person, or one bound by vow of chastity; or because of the manner in which it is committed, if unjust means such as violence or threats are employed.
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"A deed is not scandal because another begins to suspect or think ill of such a man, because he does not sin if he suspects on sufficient indications. It is otherwise however, if he begins to think ill of the Catholic faith, clergy, religious order, or to be less inclined to piety" (S. Alph., l. II, n. 44, 6°). For it makes no difference whether one gives occasion by sin to sins of the same species, or to sins of a different species. Hence those who are of greater authority, or piety, or repute more easily give scandal.