Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. I-II, q. 29; II-II, q. 34.

944. Hatred is the movement of the appetite by which we are adversely affected toward something. For just as love is the consonance of the appetite to that which is fitting for it, so hatred is the dissonance to that which is repugnant or evil. Hatred is however twofold:

1° Hatred of abomination or of aversion by which we shun something (thing or person) as an evil or harmful to us; when it concerns a person it is called hatred of quality;

2° Hatred of enmity or of malevolence, or hatred of the person himself according to himself, by which from displeasure of some person we wish him evil, because it is evil to him, i.e. resting in his evil, that namely it may be ill with him.

1° Hatred of abomination is opposed to the love of concupiscence, hatred of enmity to the love of benevolence; but as the love of concupiscence is ordered to the love of benevolence, so the former hatred disposes to this latter: for from the fact that we shun someone as displeasing and troublesome to us, it often happens that we wish him evil, and reckon his evil as our good.

945. Hatred of God. — According to its essence God cannot be hated because by essence he is goodness itself; and therefore he who sees this essence does not hate God. But inasmuch as from him there comes to us an effect which we deem evil, he can be hated by us (cfr. Num. X, 35; Deut. XXXII, 41; Ps. LXXIII, 23; Jn. XV, 24), e.g. inasmuch as he forbids sins or punishes sinners.

This is sin, and always mortal, unless it is done without deliberation: for it is always a grave disorder to shun the supreme Good in whom nothing is to be shunned; or to wish evil to him who is supremely lovable. Indeed it is the greatest sin of all: 1) because it directly opposes the love of God which is the principal act of the more worthy virtue: charity, and therefore also directly opposes the infinite goodness of God; 2) because that precisely by which something is a mortal sin is the aversion of the will from God; but this is had per se, essentially and explicitly in the hatred of God, in other sins it is found only implicitly, participatively and according to another; therefore the hatred of God is the gravest sin of all. — But hatred of enmity toward God is graver than hatred of abomination: the former opposes the infinite intrinsic goodness of God, the latter his external manifestation and glory.

By hatred of enmity sins a) he who wishes God not to be, or not to be almighty, omniscient, just, etc.; — b) who is saddened by his perfections or rejoices in his offense, in the violation of God's precepts; — c) who persecutes the works of God and intends to diminish his external glory, because God is displeasing. Thus the devil desires and procures evil to God because his evil is so.

946. Hatred of neighbor. — Hatred of abomination of neighbor is good, if it is hated according to that which is evil in him (Sap. XIV, 9; Ps. CXVIII, 113; CXXXVIII, 21), e.g. inasmuch as he is a sinner, enemy, persecutor, harmful to us, etc., unless the hatred is greater than the cause merits. On the contrary it is sin, if it is hated according to something that is good in him, e.g. inasmuch as he is pious, just, prudent, etc. — Hatred of enmity toward neighbor, by which we wish him evil as an evil that it may be ill with him, is always sin. Thus he who 1) desires the disadvantage of neighbor as such and absolutely taken; 2) who rejoices in his evil as his evil; or 3) who is saddened by good as his good.

The sin of hatred toward neighbor is mortal of its genus because it is against charity (I Jn. II, 9; III, 14-15; IV, 20). It can however be venial, not only from lack of deliberation as if it is done from a sudden movement of anger, but also from lightness of matter e.g. if we wish slight evil to our neighbor, or if the aversion is slight, as ordinarily is a simple displeasure without imprecation of evil. This however is dangerous, especially if it lasts long, because easily it will come about that the evils which happen to the neighbor from this please.

Hatred of neighbor if considered on the part of the disorder of the sinner is the gravest of sins against neighbor, because thus our will is most disordered toward him¹. However it is not the greatest on the part of the effect, namely the harm done to the neighbor: thus theft, homicide, detraction, etc. are greater.

947. Hatred of neighbor is specifically multiple. — Hatreds of the quality of the neighbor differ specifically according to specifically different motives, e.g. to hate a neighbor because he is pious or because he caused just harm.

Hatreds of neighbor by which we wish (with inefficacious desire) that various evils befall him, are probably of the same species, because these evils are desired for him only under the general notion of evil, whence evils are not to be specified in confession. On the contrary of different species certainly are the hatreds by which we desire (with true efficacious desire) to inflict various evils on neighbor, because the desire of committing sin has the malice of the deed with all its circumstances; whence the evils desired are to be declared in confession. Thus differ the will of taking away reputation, and the will of killing.

948. Remarks. — 1. Formal hatred of oneself does not exist, as repugnant to nature.

2. To wish someone evil inasmuch as it is good for him or others is not hatred; indeed it is lawful, if the order of charity is observed (cfr. n. 889). It would however be sin to wish the evil of another against the order of charity, i.e. for a good which it does not equal: thus a son cannot wish the death of his father for the inheritance (cfr. prop. 13, 14, 15 damn. by Inn. XI).

3. Hatred of abomination of only the evil of neighbor is not simply hatred, but in a certain respect and mixed with love: "This very thing that we hate the fault and the defect of good in a brother, pertains to the love of the brother: for it is of the same reason that we wish someone's good and that we hate his evil. Whence, taking simply hatred of a brother (not willing the good), it is always with sin" (a. 3).

4. True hatred is difficultly healed; however penitents often confess as hatreds which are not such, or at least not grave. Thus when they affirm that they cannot forget an injury, or cannot look at someone, speak to him, greet him, or cannot do so without vehement emotion, it is to be investigated whether these are not a mere natural aversion from real or apparent offense, — or a pure affection of the sensitive appetite from diversity of disposition without sufficient deliberation, — or a desire of evil for an honest end. But if they do not wish grave evil to the neighbor, nor refuse the ordinary signs of love, nor is other grave inconvenience feared from this affection (e.g. contempt, scandal and desire of vengeance), they are to be absolved.

5. S. Alphonsus notes, Th. M., l. II, n. 30, ad 3°: "A private person who, being averse from another, flees from him, if he does this to deprive him of conversation and solace, and thus to make him sad, and ill with him, it is hatred of enmity and sin. — But if, wishing no evil, you only flee because your nature is adverse to him, or he is wont to be troublesome to you, it is hatred of aversion and sin, if it be without reason: which will not be the case if it be of a very harsh person, provided there is absent contempt, scandal, and desire of vengeance".

6. Hatred of neighbor formally according to the notion of the object and therefore more directly arises from envy, by which the very good of neighbor is made saddening and consequently hateful; dispositively however from anger: for first through anger a man apprehends the evil of neighbor according to a certain measure as having the notion of vengeance, but anger persisting, a man comes to consider and seek the evil of neighbor absolutely and according to itself, which pertains to the notion of hatred (a. 6, ad 3).