Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. I-II, q. 29; II-II, q. 34.

944. Hatred is the movement of the appetite by which we are adversely affected toward something. For just as love is the consonance of the appetite to that which is fitting for it, so hatred is the dissonance to that which is repugnant or evil. Hatred is however twofold:

1° Hatred of abomination or of aversion by which we shun something (thing or person) as an evil or harmful to us; when it concerns a person it is called hatred of quality;

2° Hatred of enmity or of malevolence, or hatred of the person himself according to himself, by which from displeasure of some person we wish him evil, because it is evil to him, i.e. resting in his evil, that namely it may be ill with him.

1° Hatred of abomination is opposed to the love of concupiscence, hatred of enmity to the love of benevolence; but as the love of concupiscence is ordered to the love of benevolence, so the former hatred disposes to this latter: for from the fact that we shun someone as displeasing and troublesome to us, it often happens that we wish him evil, and reckon his evil as our good.

945. Hatred of God. — According to its essence God cannot be hated because by essence he is goodness itself; and therefore he who sees this essence does not hate God. But inasmuch as from him there comes to us an effect which we deem evil, he can be hated by us (cfr. Num. X, 35; Deut. XXXII, 41; Ps. LXXIII, 23; Jn. XV, 24), e.g. inasmuch as he forbids sins or punishes sinners.

This is sin, and always mortal, unless it is done without deliberation: for it is always a grave disorder to shun the supreme Good in whom nothing is to be shunned; or to wish evil to him who is supremely lovable. Indeed it is the greatest sin of all: 1) because it directly opposes the love of God which is the principal act of the more worthy virtue: charity, and therefore also directly opposes the infinite goodness of God; 2) because that precisely by which something is a mortal sin is the aversion of the will from God; but this is had per se, essentially and explicitly in the hatred of God, in other sins it is found only implicitly, participatively and according to another; therefore the hatred of God is the gravest sin of all. — But hatred of enmity toward God is graver than hatred of abomination: the former opposes the infinite intrinsic goodness of God, the latter his external manifestation and glory.

By hatred of enmity sins a) he who wishes God not to be, or not to be almighty, omniscient, just, etc.; — b) who is saddened by his perfections or rejoices in his offense, in the violation of God's precepts; — c) who persecutes the works of God and intends to diminish his external glory, because God is displeasing. Thus the devil desires and procures evil to God because his evil is so.

946. Hatred of neighbor. — Hatred of abomination of neighbor is good, if it is hated according to that which is evil in him (Sap. XIV, 9; Ps. CXVIII, 113; CXXXVIII, 21), e.g. inasmuch as he is a sinner, enemy, persecutor, harmful to us, etc., unless the hatred is greater than the cause merits. On the contrary it is sin, if it is hated according to something that is good in him, e.g. inasmuch as he is pious, just, prudent, etc. — Hatred of enmity toward neighbor, by which we wish him evil as an evil that it may be ill with him, is always sin. Thus he who 1) desires the disadvantage of neighbor as such and absolutely taken; 2) who rejoices in his evil as his evil; or 3) who is saddened by good as his good.

The sin of hatred toward neighbor is mortal of its genus because it is against charity (I Jn. II, 9; III, 14-15; IV, 20). It can however be venial, not only from lack of deliberation as if it is done from a sudden movement of anger, but also from lightness of matter e.g. if we wish slight evil to our neighbor, or if the aversion is slight, as ordinarily is a simple displeasure without imprecation of evil. This however is dangerous, especially if it lasts long, because easily it will come about that the evils which happen to the neighbor from this please.

Hatred of neighbor if considered on the part of the disorder of the sinner is the gravest of sins against neighbor, because thus our will is most disordered toward him¹. However it is not the greatest on the part of the effect, namely the harm done to the neighbor: thus theft, homicide, detraction, etc. are greater.

947. Hatred of neighbor is specifically multiple. — Hatreds of the quality of the neighbor differ specifically according to specifically different motives, e.g. to hate a neighbor because he is pious or because he caused just harm.

Hatreds of neighbor by which we wish (with inefficacious desire) that various evils befall him, are probably of the same species, because these evils are desired for him only under the general notion of evil, whence evils are not to be specified in confession. On the contrary of different species certainly are the hatreds by which we desire (with true efficacious desire) to inflict various evils on neighbor, because the desire of committing sin has the malice of the deed with all its circumstances; whence the evils desired are to be declared in confession. Thus differ the will of taking away reputation, and the will of killing.

948. Remarks. — 1. Formal hatred of oneself does not exist, as repugnant to nature.

2. To wish someone evil inasmuch as it is good for him or others is not hatred; indeed it is lawful, if the order of charity is observed (cfr. n. 889). It would however be sin to wish the evil of another against the order of charity, i.e. for a good which it does not equal: thus a son cannot wish the death of his father for the inheritance (cfr. prop. 13, 14, 15 damn. by Inn. XI).

3. Hatred of abomination of only the evil of neighbor is not simply hatred, but in a certain respect and mixed with love: "This very thing that we hate the fault and the defect of good in a brother, pertains to the love of the brother: for it is of the same reason that we wish someone's good and that we hate his evil. Whence, taking simply hatred of a brother (not willing the good), it is always with sin" (a. 3).

4. True hatred is difficultly healed; however penitents often confess as hatreds which are not such, or at least not grave. Thus when they affirm that they cannot forget an injury, or cannot look at someone, speak to him, greet him, or cannot do so without vehement emotion, it is to be investigated whether these are not a mere natural aversion from real or apparent offense, — or a pure affection of the sensitive appetite from diversity of disposition without sufficient deliberation, — or a desire of evil for an honest end. But if they do not wish grave evil to the neighbor, nor refuse the ordinary signs of love, nor is other grave inconvenience feared from this affection (e.g. contempt, scandal and desire of vengeance), they are to be absolved.

5. S. Alphonsus notes, Th. M., l. II, n. 30, ad 3°: "A private person who, being averse from another, flees from him, if he does this to deprive him of conversation and solace, and thus to make him sad, and ill with him, it is hatred of enmity and sin. — But if, wishing no evil, you only flee because your nature is adverse to him, or he is wont to be troublesome to you, it is hatred of aversion and sin, if it be without reason: which will not be the case if it be of a very harsh person, provided there is absent contempt, scandal, and desire of vengeance".

6. Hatred of neighbor formally according to the notion of the object and therefore more directly arises from envy, by which the very good of neighbor is made saddening and consequently hateful; dispositively however from anger: for first through anger a man apprehends the evil of neighbor according to a certain measure as having the notion of vengeance, but anger persisting, a man comes to consider and seek the evil of neighbor absolutely and according to itself, which pertains to the notion of hatred (a. 6, ad 3).

To the joy of charity itself over the divine good is opposed acedia; to joy over the neighbor's good, envy.

S. Th. II-II, q. 35; de Malo, q. 11.

949. Acedia is sadness about spiritual good, especially divine. For acids are cold, whence acedia imports weariness or tepidity in working, which so depresses the mind of man that nothing pleases him to do. Hence spiritual acedia denotes torpor, languor, tepidity, weariness about spiritual things, which are therefore troublesome because they require bodily labor. Whence it is sadness about spiritual things because they impede quiet and bodily pleasure: for acedia prefers to do nothing rather than to disturb the body's rest, and from this arises flight from spiritual things, horror and detestation. This sadness is always sin: a) by reason of the object: for to be sad about evil is good, but to be sad about that which appears to be evil but truly is good, is sin, because good does not deserve that we be sad about it; b) by reason of the effect: for it withdraws man from due works.

Acedia is twofold: 1st that by which we are sad about the good of any virtue; this is not a special sin, even if it is done for the sake of the bodily labor attached, but it is a circumstance of every sin, because every vice flees the spiritual good opposed to it even inasmuch as it impedes bodily rest; 2nd that by which we are sad about the spiritual good to which all other things are ordered, namely the divine good, not in itself, but inasmuch as it is internal to us or pertains to us and seems evil to us: if one is sad namely about beatitude or about the friendship of God, for the reason that by laborious exercises of virtue they must be preserved and so does not care for that friendship, or if for the labor one is sad about the means to it e.g. about the sacraments, the grace of God, good works, divine precepts, etc., inasmuch as they are necessary or useful for the friendship of God. This is a special sin because it has a special object, and is directly contrary to the special act of a special virtue: for it is opposed to the joy in the divine good in which charity delights.

950. Gravity of acedia. — 1. Acedia as it is a general sin, is mortal or venial according as the sin of which it is a circumstance is grave or light.

2. Special acedia is a mortal sin of its genus, because according to its proper notion it is opposed to charity. For the proper effect of charity is joy in God, whence acedia by which we are sad about the divine good is directly opposed to charity. It can however be venial if it is not perfectly deliberate, or also, as it seems, when it concerns goods not necessary for salvation.

This acedia is also a capital sin, as was declared above, in tr. on Sins, n. 513.

S. Th. II-II, q. 36; Q. D. de Malo, q. 10.

951. Envy is inordinate sadness about another's good, esteemed as one's own evil, inasmuch as that good seems to be a diminutive of one's own excellence. It is called

1° sadness: this is about evil considered as united to us, and thus envy differs from hatred which is about the good of neighbor, in the neighbor considered as absolutely evil;

2° about another's good esteemed as one's own evil: "The object of sadness is one's own evil; but it happens that what is another's good is apprehended as one's own evil, and thus about another's good there can be sadness";

3° inasmuch as it is a diminutive of one's own excellence: sadness about another's good which is considered as evil, can happen in four ways: a) when someone grieves over another's good, because from it he fears harm to come to himself or to other goods, and such sadness is an effect of fear; b) when someone is sad about another's good, not because he has it, but because that good which he has is wanting to us, and this is zeal or emulation which, if it is about honest goods, is praiseworthy; c) when someone is sad about another's good, because he to whom the good happens is unworthy of it, and this sadness is called nemesis or indignation, which is good if it is done for a right end and with due subjection to the ordination of divine Providence; d) when someone grieves over another's good, inasmuch as another exceeds him in goods and this is esteemed as one's own evil, because it is a diminutive of one's own glory or excellence, and this properly is envy;

4° inordinate: envy is always evil because it grieves about that of which one should rejoice, namely about the good of neighbor.

952. Gravity of envy. — Envy is a mortal sin of its genus. For the genus of sin is taken from the part of the object. But envy according to its object is opposed to charity, because as charity rejoices in the good of neighbor, so envy is sad about it. It can however be venial not only from imperfection of the act, but also from lightness of matter if one envies a slight good of neighbor, e.g. that he wins in a game, as by running with him, or doing something of this kind.

953. Remark. — The sin of envy is usually found especially among those who are in some way equal, e.g. of the same family, or at least approaching in something, e.g. in condition, knowledge, virtue, etc.: for such wish to be equal to one another or preferred. It is chiefly about those goods in which there is glory, and in which men love to be honored and to be in repute, especially of wisdom and happiness. Whence it arises from vainglory, although it is itself a capital sin, as was said in tr. on Sins, n. 508.

S. Th. II-II, q. 37-42.

954. Sins against private peace. — To peace which is an effect of charity several sins are opposed. To private peace is opposed:

1) In the heart discord, which is directly contrary to concord or the union of wills, and is a dissension of wills (not only of intellects) concerning the good of God or of neighbor which we ought to will out of charity, namely about the good necessary to which we are bound to consent.

Discord happens in two ways: a) per se when one knowingly and intentionally dissents from the good of God or of neighbor to which he ought to consent, and thus it is a mortal sin of its genus because it is contrary to charity; b) per accidens when the intention of some is toward the good that pertains to the honor of God or the utility of neighbor, but one judges this to be good, another however has the contrary opinion, and such discord which is rather of opinions and intellects than of wills, is not against charity nor sin, unless there is error concerning those things which are of necessity for salvation, or the limits of moderation are exceeded so that undue pertinacity is employed. — Discord arises from vainglory, because we want our own and our own opinion more than is right.

2) From discord is often born contention, which is an altercation of words by which one contradicts another inordinately, whether by impugning the truth, or by defending it in an undue way e.g. with too much acrimony. In the first case it is a mortal sin of its genus, namely in matter of great moment: of faith, of morals, of justice, etc.; in the second case it is only venial, unless it generates grave scandal. It also arises from vainglory by which each of the contending tries to gain victory over the other.

3) From discord and contention is sometimes born quarrel, which is a fight of hands between private persons by which, with angry minds, one tries to strike or harm another. It is a mortal sin of its genus in the aggressor; if however it does not exceed the measure, as a slight fight, it is venial. In the one defending himself it is not sin, if he does not exceed the limits of moderation; if he exceeds a little, it is venial; if much, mortal, e.g. if without necessity someone rises up to gravely harm another. — It arises from anger.

955. Sins against public peace. — 1) To the peace of the Church, schism which is the voluntary separation of oneself from the unity of the Church, while retaining the profession of faith, or the voluntary separation of a baptized person from the Catholic Church. It is committed in two ways, for "the unity of the Church is attended in two things, namely a) in the connection of the members of the Church to one another..., and b) again in the order of all the members to one head... And therefore schismatics are called 1) (perfectly) those who refuse to be subject to the supreme Pontiff (with rebellion, so that they pertinaciously refuse to obey the precepts), and 2) those who refuse to communicate with members of the Church subject to him" (in doctrine, worship, sacraments); from which it is clear that it is a most grave sin and mortal of its whole genus. It is however less grave than infidelity, which is against God himself inasmuch as he is in himself the first truth on which faith rests, whereas schism is against the unity of the Church, which is a participated good and less than God himself. And although charity is nobler than faith, the sin which is opposed against the secondary good of charity, namely the good of neighbor, is less than infidelity, because the good of neighbor is less than the object of faith which is God himself.

2) To the peace of the civil multitude, both a) unlawful war; and b) sedition, which is a tumultuousness or aggressive war by which one part of the state unjustly rises up against another or against the legitimate prince, which latter case is called rebellion. It is a sin all the graver as the common good (namely peace and unity of society) surpasses the private good; whence it is mortal of its whole genus.

These sins are also against justice, and are better considered in tr. on Justice.

956. Remark. — External heretics are also schismatics, but not conversely, although however schism leads to heresy. Schismatics also are punished with the same ecclesiastical penalties as heretics; moreover about communication with schismatics and about co-operation toward schism the same is to be said as for heresy (cfr. tr. on Faith).

957. Scandal is opposed to beneficence. — There are many sins which are opposed to beneficence, most of which inflict injury on him or co-operate in it, and therefore harm justice; against charity especially is scandal. Which word etymologically signifies an obstacle, and is taken actively for the placing of an obstacle in the way against which the foot striking is disposed to fall or ruin; and passively for the very striking against the obstacle or wounding of the foot. Hence in the theological sense, actively it is the placing of an action which disposes someone to spiritual ruin; passively it is the very fall or spiritual ruin on account of another's action.

In the theological sense therefore scandal is not that which in common speech is so called, namely rumor, or wonder, or horror and indignation at another's sin; but grave suspicions, and rash judgments, detraction, calumnies arisen about the people, — indeed also delectation or approval or consent in sin, although these latter in common speech are not scandal.

S. Th. II-II, q. 43, a. 1-6.

958. Active scandal is defined: a word or deed less right giving occasion of spiritual ruin. It is called

1° word or deed, not however desired, because a merely internal sin cannot give another occasion of sinning. Since however affirmation and negation are reduced to the same genus, therefore under the name of word or deed omission also comes: not said, not done;

2° less right, i.e. which according to itself is evil or at least has the appearance of evil; as if one speaks of base things in the presence of a young person, or for a just cause eats meat on Friday in the presence of others who do not know, or works on the Lord's day: for nothing disposes to spiritual ruin except inasmuch as it has a defect of rectitude, because what is properly right rather guards man against a fall than induces him to ruin;

3° giving occasion of spiritual ruin, both a) because scandal is not the efficient cause of another's sin, but this is only the will itself, and b) because for scandal it is not enough that one sins in the presence of others (for scandal does not fall upon a perfect man nor upon one altogether wicked¹), nor is it required that the ruin of the neighbor in fact follow, but that occasion be given him, i.e. that the action either always or in these circumstances of itself be apt to move him to commit sin. But if the action of itself does not move, but accidentally because of it someone is moved to sin from his own disposition, it will not be active scandal, but only passive (a. 1, ad 4).

959. Active scandal is a mortal sin. — It is proved:*:

a) From the words of Christ, Mt. XVIII, 6-7: "Woe to that man through whom scandal comes" (Rom. XIV, 13, 20; I Cor. VIII, 13).

b) From reason: Charity obliges under grave obligation (by affirmative precept) to correct the neighbor and to prevent him from falling into sin; therefore much more (by negative precept) not to impel him to sin by counsel or example.

It is mortal of its genus; because it can be venial not only from imperfection of the act, but also from smallness of matter, if another is induced only to venial sin, even if this is formally intended.

Moreover the sin of scandal is so much the graver as the ruin of the neighbor is greater, and as it is more intended, and as it follows more from our action (e.g. given in the presence of a young person or by a priest), and as the persons moved to sin are more numerous.

960. Active scandal is divided by reason of efficacy: into direct, when one is the true moral cause of the neighbor's sin, which is done by command, counsel, seduction, praise, petition to commit sin, etc.; — and indirect, when one places a less right action which is only a probable occasion of sinning for the neighbor, as is a bad example².

direct, when one is the true moral cause of the neighbor's sin, which is done by command, counsel, seduction, praise, petition to commit sin, etc.;—and indirect, when one places a less right action which is only a probable occasion of sinning for the neighbor, as is a bad example.

Direct scandal is sin not only against charity but also against the virtue to the violation of which one induces the neighbor; indirect scandal is sin, but probably against charity alone. Hence if by command, counsel, etc. one has brought someone to mortal sin e.g. to adultery, the species of the sin to which he has led him, in this case adultery, is to be declared in confession; on the contrary if by bad example alone one has scandalized, it suffices to confess: I gave grave scandal. The reason is because every virtue obliges not only not to be violated by oneself but also not to be the cause and positively procure that it be violated by others; but it is not proved also to oblige not to give another the mere occasion of violating it, nor to prevent its violation. And surely the sin of another (directly and per se) cannot be imputed to us unless we are its cause; whence he who has only given another occasion of stealing (by example or intemperance) is not bound in solidum to restitution, and this is a sign that he has not sinned against justice. And similarly of other virtues³.

961. Active scandal is divided by reason of intention: into directly or explicitly intended, whether it be formally and per se intended (as end), if one explicitly intends the sin of neighbor inasmuch as it is sin (which is called diabolical scandal), or whether it be simply intended (as means), if one explicitly intends the sin of neighbor for one's own utility or pleasure; — and implicit or interpretative, if one does not intend the sin of another but only places a less right action, from which it can probably be feared that another may be drawn to sin⁴.

But just as someone by internal act alone can sin, not indeed by the sin of scandal, but by the desire or affect of scandal, so also by internal act one can more desire the sin of another than procure it by external scandal. Hence if one directly and explicitly intends to procure the sin of another by only indirect scandal, as if by bad example alone he explicitly intends to lead another to lust, he indeed sins by desire or affect against the virtue (e.g. chastity) which he intends to be violated, which is to be declared in confession; but the external sin of scandal as being indirect is against charity alone.

But if one formally with diabolical intention intends the sin of the neighbor, he commits a special (i.e. distinct in species) and gravest sin against charity toward the neighbor, directly opposed to fraternal correction, by which he explicitly intends as end the special and gravest harm of the neighbor which is spiritual ruin; the active end however of human acts gives the species. Otherwise the notion of scandal is as a circumstance changing the species of another sin.

962. There is an obligation of repairing active scandal, as far as possible: for if each one out of charity is bound to prevent the fall of another and to procure the amendment of the sinner (or of the erring), a fortiori he who has given scandal has been the occasion why another sinned. The obligation arises from charity alone because to one knowing and willing no injury is done; not however from justice or office, unless someone has used unjust means, e.g. fraud, force, fear, or unless a superior has given scandal to subjects whose spiritual good, by virtue of his office, he must safeguard.

As to the manner of reparation: 1° Scandal indirect, given by example alone, is to be repaired implicitly, namely by ceasing from scandal, by good example, by public reception of the sacraments, by prayer for the scandalized one, etc.

2° Scandal direct, given by evil counsel, false doctrine, bad books, machination against the Church, etc., must be repaired explicitly, so that first its further influence be removed, and then the harm caused be compensated so that the one who suffered the scandal be recalled to good. Thus evil counsel and false doctrine must be revoked, machination against the Church must be publicly detested, the diffusion of bad books must be prevented as far as possible, and good books must be written or spread.

3° Hence public scandal is also to be repaired publicly, both so that its further influence be removed, and so that the reparation, that they may be warned of the evil, be known to all and be profitable.

The manner of public reparation can be various: either a retraction written out is published through public papers, or it is done before witnesses and the matter is afterwards made known, or it is done before the parish priest and afterwards made known; the sinner is bound to have satisfied all, provided it suffices to remove the scandal. Since however the sacraments cannot be ministered to the unworthy, it is clear that one who has not removed public scandal is not to be publicly admitted to the sacraments; indeed the minister would commit scandal, because he would give occasion for judging that the sacraments are ministered to the unworthy and scandalous actions are tacitly approved. Thus a public concubinary is bound to first leave the shameful commerce and its occasion before he publicly receives the sacraments. — In practice it belongs to confessors, parish priests, bishops to determine the suitable manner of reparation.

963. Remarks. — 1. It can happen that a sin grave in itself is venial scandal, e.g. if your grave theft is an occasion for another to commit light theft. Conversely a sin light in itself can be grave scandal of disobedience or irreverence or injury or unchastity, e.g. if a religious utters a less honest word in the presence of women or of those who can therefrom take occasion of sinning mortally, or if a priest retains a suspect person at home.

2. Scandal can contain several other added malice, either because of the quality of the scandalizing person, e.g. if a father scandalizes children, a superior subjects, a teacher disciples; for these are bound not only out of charity but also by office to prevent the ruin of their subjects; or because of the quality of the scandalized person, as if one directly induces to base things a married person, or one bound by vow of chastity; or because of the manner in which it is committed, if unjust means such as violence or threats are employed.

3. "A deed is not scandal because another begins to suspect or think ill of such a man, because he does not sin if he suspects on sufficient indications. It is otherwise however, if he begins to think ill of the Catholic faith, clergy, religious order, or to be less inclined to piety" (S. Alph., l. II, n. 44, 6°). For it makes no difference whether one gives occasion by sin to sins of the same species, or to sins of a different species. Hence those who are of greater authority, or piety, or repute more easily give scandal.

S. Th. II-II, q. 43, a. 1, 2, 3, 7, 8.

964. Passive scandal or occasioned is sin because it is the very spiritual ruin of a neighbor on the occasion of another's word or deed; but it is not a special sin because from another's word or deed occasion is taken according to any genus of sin and it has no special deformity.

Passive scandal is 1) accepted because given, if the sin of the neighbor truly arises from another's word or deed, or from active scandal; or 2) accepted only, when the sin of the neighbor does not truly arise from another's word or deed, but either a) from the sole malice of the sinner (e.g. from exercises of piety or virtue), and then it is Pharisaic, or b) from his sole ignorance or infirmity, and then it is the scandal of the little ones or of the infirm (e.g. from a woman honestly adorned). Hence S. Thomas notes that sometimes there is passive scandal without active, as Pharisaic; sometimes active without passive, as when one induces another to sin and he does not consent; sometimes active with passive, if from the inducement or bad example of one another sins.

965. Obligation of avoiding passive scandal. — From the law of charity by which we are bound to do good to our neighbor, there is also an obligation, grave of its genus, of avoiding passive scandal, i.e. of omitting those things from which the neighbor will take occasion of sin, whenever there is not sufficient reason for performing the act and permitting the spiritual ruin of the neighbor.

A so much greater cause is required as a graver sin is feared, and as it is more easily and certainly foreseen to follow, and as more are to be scandalized. Hence:

1. it is generally illicit to ask, counsel, command, etc. a work which, although it can be done by another without sin, this one however will not do it without sin either certainly or probably, e.g. an oath from one who will perjure; — unless there is a just cause of necessity or utility, e.g. in case by a judge;

2. a greater cause is required for a cleric to be the occasion of sin and to permit it, than for a layman to permit the same; a greater cause for permitting the scandal of the little ones than the Pharisaic;

3. it is lawful only for the gravest necessity to do a work however otherwise good, which is of itself very inductive to sin, e.g. to bathe or swim naked in public, to exercise the conjugal act publicly; — and if a great multitude of men is feared to be induced to grave sins, even sometimes it must be omitted with the loss of life: namely to avoid a grave necessity of many.

966. Principles and Practical Rules. — Therefore to avoid passive scandal, certain things are to be omitted. And indeed:

I. To avoid scandal accepted because given:

a) Always to be omitted is every work that actively scandalizes, if it is evil.

b) Also in general to be omitted is a work that has only the appearance of evil, unless there is an urgent and grave reason.

This reason ordinarily sufficiently removes the scandal; but if it does not suffice for this, then the occasion of ruin must be removed, as far as is in the power of the agent, e.g. by admonition made to the neighbor about the rectitude of the action because of dispensation, excusing cause, etc.: thus a priest dispensed eating meat on a forbidden day, — or frequenting a suspect person for counsel or administration of sacraments. And if active scandal, i.e. the appearance of evil, cannot be sufficiently removed, one must abstain from the work, whatever some moderns may seem to assert, for S. Thomas says, a. 2: "Active scandal is always a sin in him who scandalizes: because either the work itself which he does is sin; or even if it has the appearance of sin, it must be left always for the charity of the neighbor, from which each one is bound to provide for the salvation of his neighbor: and so he who does not leave off acts against charity".

II. To avoid the scandal of the little ones:

a) Never must nor can be omitted things necessary for salvation (the reception of Baptism or of true faith), nor precepts of the natural law, whether negative (not to lie), or affirmative if the law urges here and now (the precept of confession of faith or of penance), because it is not lawful to do intrinsically evil things that good may come.

b) Precepts of positive law certainly are not to be often omitted, because this would be a grave inconvenience to which charity does not oblige; but probably they are to be omitted once or twice, grave inconvenience being excluded, because the precept of avoiding scandal which is of natural law in itself urges more than positive precepts.

Examples are in S. Alphonsus, l. II, n. 52: "A sin by which you know the confessor is to be gravely scandalized in confession, although from infirmity, you must keep silent... A wife must once or twice omit the fast, from which the husband would be gravely offended, and discord would arise... If, going to Mass, a grave quarrel or fight would be stirred up, you are not bound to go... A superior can dissemble the sins of a subject to avoid disturbances and greater evils which otherwise he would be bound to punish". So also a woman knowing herself to be evilly desired by a certain man, if she would go to Mass on Sunday, could once or twice abstain from the sacred action¹.

c) Works of counsel or indifferent, provided they can be done without great inconvenience, are to be omitted once or twice, or concealed, or delayed for some time until the reason for the work has been rendered to the neighbor; but if after admonition the scandal remains, it is judged Pharisaic.

Hence entry into religion is to be deferred because of the scandal of relatives, if their consent is soon hoped for; one can however rightly enter, if, good motives having been proposed, they continue to resist; — likewise a woman knowing herself to be evilly desired by a certain man, should several times either abstain from hearing Mass not of precept, or lay aside an honest adornment, or not offer herself at the window, or abstain from walking or take another way to flee his sight; — a fortiori she could not be excused from mortal sin, if led by vanity, although she does not intend the scandal of that man, she of set purpose offers herself to his sight, or if she sought some place, which she would not go to, unless she knew her lover was to be there.

III. To avoid Pharisaic scandal:

a) Ordinarily good works are not to be omitted, because thus

the wicked would have occasion to maliciously impede the good, unless however from the delay fruit is hoped for, or there is no cause for doing the work immediately, or the evil feared is far greater than the good that would be obtained by the work, as if a very grave sin were feared in the article of death, or many would sin: thus the punishment of a sinner is sometimes to be left, if schism is feared.

b) Indifferent works are to be omitted, unless there is a just cause, which need not be very grave, e.g. a priest can for a light cause pass by a way where malicious enemies of religious who blaspheme are met.

c) Works of precept cannot be omitted, e.g. a parish priest cannot omit those things which are necessary for the preservation of the goods of the church, because of lawsuits; he is however bound to admonish.

967. Remark. — Temporal goods 1) are not to be given up because of Pharisaic scandal, because thus the wicked would have occasion to plunder, which would harm the common good, and also the plunderers themselves who would remain in sin by retaining another's goods. Hence no one is bound to pay more to a worker because he foresees that he will blaspheme, nor a parish priest to give up his stole fees to prevent the detractions of parishioners, because it is a grave inconvenience for himself and his successors.

2. But for the scandal of the little ones one's own temporal goods are either to be given up, by bestowing them or not demanding them back, provided the sin which is prevented is grave and the loss is light, because the spiritual good of the neighbor is to be preferred to one's own temporal; — or the scandal is to be removed by a charitable admonition or instruction, which admonition having been made, if it persists, it is judged Pharisaic. But the goods of another are not to be given up except by consent of the owner at least reasonably presumed.

S. Th. II-II, q. 78, a. 4; q. 98, a. 4; q. 169, a. 2.

That the aforesaid doctrine on scandal may be better understood and easily applied in practice, it is best to apply it to some special cases and determined examples more frequently occurring, so that it may be expressed in more concrete rules, whether general or special.

968. General rules on the guilt of scandal.

I. He is guilty of active scandal, and indeed always, who asks, counsels, commands, etc. a work which cannot be done by another without sin, even if this one is ready to sin, because it is intrinsically evil as directly inducing to sin or at least to the exercise and continuation of sin.

Thus he who asks from an excommunicated priest to be avoided the sacraments, or from a priest lacking jurisdiction absolution, from an infidel to swear by false gods, from a usurer to lend with unjust usury, from a notary or keeper what is against his office, from a prostitute fornication, from a man an onanistic copulation, etc. However

a) he who asks, counsels, commands, etc. a work which indeed can be done by another without sin but which certainly or probably will not be done by him without sin, e.g. a loan from a usurer, is not guilty of active scandal, although he may sin against charity by reason of passive scandal, as will be said below under II., and is clear from n° 965;

b) if someone is already prepared to commit a grave evil, and cannot be diverted from his purpose (otherwise the persuasion would not be good), it is lawful to provide him the occasion of a lesser evil and to permit this, indeed probably and to advise but chiefly that which is less, unless however an unjust harm to a third party would follow. For it is not to seek evil but good, namely the choice of a lesser evil; to draw back from a greater evil and to propose conditionally the lesser;

c) he who sins with an accomplice is probably not bound explicitly to confess the sin of scandal of which he has become guilty by seduction, because the other party by consenting is guilty of scandal of the same species; whence he sufficiently accuses the scandal by confessing the sin committed with the accomplice.

II. He is guilty of passive scandal generally who asks, counsels, commands, etc. a work which indeed can be done by another without sin but which the other certainly or probably will not do without sin. It is excepted if it is done for a sufficiently grave cause.

Hence out of necessity or sufficiently great utility it is lawful to ask the sacraments from a sacrilegious priest, especially if he is the parish priest; to borrow from a usurer, an oath from one about to swear by false gods; and a wife out of danger of incontinence can ask from an onanistic husband (who does not complete the copulation) the conjugal debt.

III. Likewise he is guilty of passive scandal generally who of set purpose places something which will be an occasion of sin for another. It is excepted if it is done for a just and proportioned cause, provided the action does not actively induce to sin and is indifferent.

Hence it is lawful for the father of a family of set purpose not to remove or even to provide for children or servants prone or ready for theft the mere occasion of sinning (e.g. by exposing money or keys or leaving open the chest in which money is kept), not intending but permitting one theft so that more are avoided; likewise for the keepers of fields, vineyards, forests to hide themselves so that the damaging ones are caught and the punished are turned away from further damage, not however for the sole purpose of catching someone from whom to receive a fine or inflict punishment; likewise for a husband to provide a suspect wife the mere occasion of adultery to correct her, or to catch her, or to prove her unfaithfulness.

969. Examples of active scandal. — Of active scandal are to be held guilty, and gravely so:

1. Those who keep the custom of blaspheming, especially in the presence of younger people, especially if in the presence of children.

2. Those who, having heard grave detraction, report the matter to others: for hence arise hatreds and quarrels.

3. Those who, without matrimonial end, are messengers of love to some woman, whether married or unmarried; thus servants and household members sin who lend assistance to children of the family in fostering base loves.

4. Those who write, publish, spread, sell indiscriminately to all or hand over to others to be read books and other writings of harmful reading.

5. Those who compose, spread, or publicly sing base songs or poems.

6. Those who introduce in schools a pernicious manner of teaching, or pernicious books. Without scandal anatomical or surgical books or even books of pagan authors not sufficiently expurgated cannot be put in the hands of the pious.

7. Those who institute and prolong, whether in clear words, or in equivocal ones (sufficiently understood by the hearers) truly lascivious speeches (e.g. about the matrimonial act, about base ways of preventing generation, about things seen and done in brothels) especially in the presence of persons of the other sex or in the presence of young people or innocent children; — otherwise if jocosely said among themselves by common people, reapers, ploughers and other workers, because they are not much moved thereby.

8. Clerics who retain a person suspect to the people, give occasion for sins of detraction, calumny, and contempt for the clerical state.

9. Likewise wives who, by admitting charming lovers to family conversations, are an offense to their husbands and others; likewise a husband who retains a maid-servant not without reason suspect to his wife.

10. Likewise per se parents and masters who permit their daughters or maid-servants conversations in hidden places with suitors and lovers; they are guilty because of their co-operation toward scandal.

970. Specifically in the matter of lust, guilty of active scandal are:

A. As to obscene images and statues, and indeed gravely sin:

1. Painters, sculptors, photographers, etc. who fashion images or statues truly obscene and commonly incentives to lust; unless it is for a just cause e.g. for the study of anatomical science. Obscene however are those which intend to exhibit parts entirely unbecoming of an adult person naked or covered only with a thin veil, or which represent gravely unchaste acts, or altogether lascivious forms.

2. Those who expose such images or statues in offices or in houses or gardens publicly to the eyes of all; likewise those who sell them except to those engaged in anatomical science.

3. Those who spread them, carry them around or give occasion to see them.

But images of excellent art, by which the observers are most moved by the artistic manner of representing or by the idea represented rather than by the nakedness, it is lawful to preserve in collections and museums; it would however be necessary that they not be entrusted indiscriminately to all to be examined, but to those skilled in art and persons of mature age. Therefore also it seems lawful to make and reproduce the aforesaid images, and to sell them to those skilled in art or serious persons.

B. As to spectacles and dances, which per se are not illicit, although they are often an occasion of sin; whence one must dissuade from these and take care not to introduce them:

1. The authors and actors of comedies gravely sin in which no respect is shown for virtue or good morals or religion, or of very base theatrical dances in which because of unbecoming dress, obscene ways of dancing, or lascivious gesticulations or contacts great indecency appears.

2. Likewise those who at their homes conduct very base and lascivious dances, as are usually the gatherings called masked balls.

3. Likewise those who promote or approve them with much money or applause.

4. Likewise musicians who cooperate with their music, or masters and inhabitants by renting the place, unless for a graver cause, e.g. by reason of grave harm.

5. Indeed those who assist at or take part in such things, unless they are not moved to sin thereby and are not a scandal by bad example to others.

C. As to the granting or procuring of a place for sinning:

1. Innkeepers most gravely sin who provide secret rooms for lust; likewise a private person who grants a place to those asking to sin, unless perhaps, says Lehmkuhl, there is a quite grave necessity, in which case he should still manifest his displeasure.

2. To rent a house to prostitutes (also to usurers) in villages and small towns is illicit; but in large cities, in which to avoid a greater evil prostitutes are to be permitted, it is not illicit (especially if other renters are lacking), unless this would gravely harm neighbors, or by reason of the location there would be a special facility for sin such that seductions and sins would multiply, or there would be grave scandal to others, as often easily happens.

3. Drivers who carry others to a brothel are not excused by reason of the pay, but only for grave harm to be avoided e.g. if they fear being dismissed, not easily finding another master, or if by civil precept they are bound to drive travelers wherever they wish. They can never lend assistance to lead anyone more safely or secretly, or to one who does not know indicate where the brothel is; unless perhaps for the greatest harm (cfr. n. 492, B).

D. As to concubinage and merely civil marriage, see our work De Variis Peccatis in sacramentali confessione medendis, c. II, § B, q. 2, n. V-VIII.

E. As to the adornment of women will be spoken in tr. on Temperance, where of modesty.