Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. II-II, q.32.

926. Almsgiving (from the Greek: compassion) is the work by which something is given to the needy, out of compassion, for God's sake, i.e. a work rendered to the needy out of commiseration to relieve their want. In which definition it is not taken, as often is customary, for the thing given, but for the action of giving.

It is an act of mercy commanded by charity. It is proved:*:

The exterior act pertains to that virtue to which pertains the proximate motive on account of which the act is performed; but the proximate motive for giving alms is that help be brought to the one suffering necessity, which pertains to mercy; but mercy is an effect of charity; therefore almsgiving is an act of charity through mercy as a mediator, or an act of mercy commanded by charity; which is said in the definition: for God's sake.

But if it is ordered to another end, and is done from another motive, as to make satisfaction for sins, or in worship of God, it will be an act commanded by penance or religion, etc.

927. There are seven spiritual almsgivings which are ordered to defects of the soul, and seven corporal to defects of the body. Spiritual almsgivings however simply excel corporal ones: a) by reason of the thing rendered, namely the spiritual gift which is nobler than the corporal; b) by reason of the one who is helped, namely the spirit which is nobler than the body; c) as to the acts themselves by which the neighbor is helped, because spiritual acts are nobler than corporal ones. Per accidens however in a particular case, corporal almsgiving is to be preferred, as e.g. it is more [important] to feed one dying of hunger than to teach.

Among the corporal ones, six are exercised toward the living (Mt. XXV, 35-36, 42-43): to feed the hungry, to give drink to the thirsty, to clothe the naked, to take in the stranger, to visit the sick, to ransom the captive; and one toward the dead (Tob. II, 3-10, XII, 12-13): to bury the dead.

928. By natural and divine law there is a precept, to give corporal alms, which is of its genus grave. — It is proved:*:

1) Christ, in Mt. XXV, 41, says: "Go, cursed ones, into the eternal fire...: for I was hungry and you did not give me to eat"; but no one is damned for the omission of something which is not a precept and indeed under grave obligation; therefore to give alms is in a precept, and indeed a grave one.

2) Since the love of neighbor is in a precept, all those precepts are without which this love would not be had. But the love of neighbor requires not only that we wish him good but also that we procure it for him, for which it is required that we help his necessity by almsgiving. Therefore almsgiving is in a precept. The minor is proved: The law of nature requires that we help our neighbor in necessity, just as we wish him to help us in our necessity; whence I Jn. III, 18: "Let us not love in word and tongue, but in deed and in truth". (Deut. XV, 11; Prov. XXV, 21; Is. LVIII, 7; Ezech. XVIII, 7; Lk. III, 9 sq.; I Tim. VI, 17 sq.; Jas. II, 15 sq.; I Jn. III, 17).

929. The precept of almsgiving arises from a twofold ground: a) if there is moral capacity or surplus on the part of the giver, b) if there is true necessity on the part of the needy. For a fuller understanding of these, by the order of charity there is to be distinguished not only a threefold temporal necessity with regard to the needy, of which was said above, n. 905; but also a threefold kind of temporal goods with regard to him who is to give alms:

1st kind of goods which are necessary for the sustenance of one's own life and of those for whom one has care (parents, wife, children, etc.): food, clothing, and dwelling; and these are called necessary (absolutely) for nature or life.

2nd kind of goods which are necessary (conditionally) for one's state, namely for preserving a becoming state for oneself and one's own, having regard not indeed to all things which can happen, but to those which can be prudently feared and expected. Whence theologians in this kind include those things which are required to feed servants, or for the necessities probably occurring of family increase, dowries of children, illnesses, old age, wars, etc., indeed entertainments and honest gifts and moderate liberalities, according to one's state, not however excess of pomp and display. "Of such necessary, says S. Thomas, q. 32, a. 6, the limit is not set in an indivisible point, but with many additions one cannot judge that it is beyond such a necessary; and with many subtractions, something still remains by which one can suitably pass life according to one's own state". Therefore this admits of a breadth from the strictly necessary for state without which the state is lost, up to the becoming without which one would not act so suitably. Necessary for one's state are the surplus of life.

3rd kind of goods which are surplus to one's state.

930. Principles. Of which goods almsgiving is to be made. — In this matter the following rules apply¹:

A. In extreme necessity: 1° Almsgiving is not to be given from what is necessary for life, because our life and that of ours is to be preferred to the life of another, unless it is a question of a person necessary to the state, because the common good is to be preferred to the private.

2° There is a grave obligation to give from the surplus of life and from what is necessary for one's state, even with great inconvenience, as much as is necessary to remove the necessity: the order of charity requires that we love the life of our neighbor more than the becoming of our state, which is a far inferior good².

3° However no one is bound to do this with the greatest inconvenience, or to use extraordinary and exquisite means which men are not commonly wont to use, e.g. very great expense to buy a very expensive medicine, to procure an extraordinary surgical operation, to send to a distant region, to ransom from proximate danger of death, because we are not bound to use these to preserve our own life; nor therefore is anyone bound to go out of his state or to undergo a great lessening of it, which moreover is reputed a very grave evil.

B. In grave necessity: There is a grave obligation to give from the surplus of one's state, as much as is necessary to remove the necessity (prop. 12 damn.³ by Inn. XI), indeed also from what is necessary for one's state, when this can be done without grave inconvenience; because the order of charity requires that with slight inconvenience we help a grave inconvenience of our neighbor; indeed with great inconvenience, if it is a question of a grave necessity of the state.

C. In common necessity: 1° There is an obligation of some surplus of one's state to give sometimes during life (Eccli. XIV, 13) to certain poor, because we ought to love the becoming of our neighbor's state more than our own surplus.

2° However there is no obligation to give to all, nor precisely to this or that, nor to take away entirely the necessity, because all the rich are bound, and if all distribute something of the surplus, the necessities are sufficiently relieved⁴.

3° Nor is there an obligation to seek out the poor, unless there is a quite grave doubt of extreme necessity, or unless someone is bound to this by office, as a parish priest: for that would be a grave burden, and moreover it pertains to the one suffering the necessity to set forth the necessity.

931. The obligation of almsgiving is grave of its genus; whence it certainly obliges under mortal sin in grave matter, namely in grave necessity of which at least Scripture speaks (Mt. XXV), and a fortiori in extreme necessity. Indeed also probably in common necessity, both because the words of Scripture and the Fathers without discrimination and without restriction inculcate the grave obligation of helping the poor, which they suppose is often violated, while however grave necessity is rather rare; — and because, if they were not helped, some would fall into grave necessity, and moreover the light necessities of the poor aggregated constitute a grave evil for society, to which a remedy must be provided.

How much however is to be given depends on various circumstances, for the necessities are not always the same. In ordinary circumstances it suffices to give, according to S. Alphonsus, the fiftieth part or 2% of the revenues, if this part is surplus, and a proportionally smaller part, if the revenues are large; although this estimation can be considered rather benign. Therefore he who should resolve to give no alms in common necessity, or who should be notably negligent in these, seems to sin mortally; but if he does not give the small quantity owed, he would not sin except venially from lightness of matter.

But, although one has strictly satisfied the precept of almsgiving toward the poor, there always remains for him the obligation of using well and usefully the remaining surplus goods; which pertains to the virtues of liberality and magnificence, or also to legal justice with a view to the common good.

932. Corollaries. — Since almsgiving is a transfer of ownership:

A. Only those are able to give alms who can dispose of things, namely all who have ownership and free administration of goods, — and also those who, without ownership, have administration: thus a husband from goods whose ownership or usufruct belongs to the community, indeed from the wife's own goods if he has their administration; a superior as to the goods of the monastery; likewise guardians and curators of the goods of a minor for small almsgivings which he himself ought to make; all others who are constituted under authority, e.g. religious or servants, only in extreme necessity of the neighbor, or if there is explicit or tacit or reasonably presumed consent of the superior or master, which consent they do not have if he opposes. Hence:

1) A wife is able to give alms from her own goods if she has any of which she herself can dispose; — likewise from the goods of the husband or of the community but with the consent of the husband; — indeed also, in our regions, without consent from the household goods moderate, not extraordinary, almsgivings she can make according to her condition, because this pertains to the honest sustenance to which a wife among us has a right; unless however in a particular case the husband should prohibit giving to such or such. But if he should altogether prohibit, sometimes perhaps it would be better to abstain, to avoid the indignation of the husband.

2) Children of the family can make moderate almsgivings from goods which are given to them by the parents absolutely and not for a determined use, unless however the father expressly prohibits.

3) Servants cannot without certain permission, and this, because masters are not wont to grant it, cannot easily be presumed, except perhaps when foods which remain and otherwise would profitably be thrown out, or bread for truly poor; but if nevertheless they do so, per se they are bound to restitution.

B. Almsgiving a) from goods unjustly acquired is illicit, unless they cannot be restored to the owner, or the poor person is in extreme necessity and cannot otherwise be helped;

b) likewise from goods acquired simoniacally, because every simoniacal contract is void from the beginning (can. 729); whence those goods are to be restored;

c) it can however be made from goods licitly acquired, but through sin or from what is illicit, e.g. because of a homicide committed or prostitution practiced; but it is not a precept.

C. Fictitious poor sin in a threefold way: 1) against truth; 2) against charity because they subtract alms from true poor; 3) against justice because they deceive by fraud and deceit; whence the donation is invalid, and therefore they are bound to restitution either to the owner or to the poor by presumed consent of the owner, unless it is a question of purest gifts whose primary motive is not need but the love of God and neighbor.

933. Remarks. — 1st The precept of assisting a neighbor in necessity is sufficiently satisfied by giving a loan, lending e.g. a horse until the owner returns, selling with delayed payment, etc. if by such means the necessity is removed, e.g. if the neighbor only needs the use of the thing, or if he is not so absolutely poor that he has nothing either in fact or in hope. However thus the precept of giving alms from the surplus is not satisfied, which precept however can be fulfilled also in other circumstances, by giving to others.

2nd Physicians, lawyers, and others holding public office are bound to give their services gratis to the poor, if it does not appear how otherwise they can be helped.

3rd To the publicly exposed poor who seem to show signs of extreme necessity (e.g. by nakedness, illness, etc.) or who assert it (e.g. by saying they have fasted for 3 days), rarely is anyone bound by precept to help even from the surplus, both because perhaps that necessity is exaggerated to move spectators, and because they are presumed to be helped by others.

4th No one is bound (indeed it is sometimes illicit) to give alms to the poor who are unwilling to work; let not however those be numbered among these who have fallen into misery for lack of work. For whom it would be more expedient to procure or supply work by which they might live.

5th In almsgivings those nearer are to be preferred; no one however can be systematically excluded (neither infidels, nor pilgrims, nor enemies), whether they are poor from infirmity, or from virtue for Christ's sake, or even from previous fault (if the almsgiving is the only means of helping), not however if from actual fault (Mt. V, 45; Prov. XXV, 21; Rom. XII, 20).

6th Of the surplus it is lawful to reserve some to acquire a somewhat higher state, provided not all are reserved: decency indeed can require that we ascend moderately and gradually to a higher state, not however that we reserve everything for this, indeed it requires that we distribute some out of magnificence in almsgivings (prop. 12 damn. by Inn. XI).

7th The prohibition of begging made by the civil magistrate does not free from the obligation of giving alms, because other means are not lacking to satisfy the precept, e.g. by giving money to those who have the care of the needy, or to good institutions or works of beneficence.

8th Likewise the payment of a tax from which the poor are helped diminishes the obligation of giving alms, but does not entirely extinguish it, if the tax does not suffice to extinguish the poor's necessity.

9th Also harm is to be averted from a neighbor, if it can be averted without grave inconvenience, e.g. by warning him who is threatened, or by removing the cause.

934. Practical admonitions. — 1. Almsgiving should be a) prudent, to the truly poor, not to the idle (II Thess. III, 10; Eccli. XII, 4); b) willing i.e. cheerful and kind (II Cor. IX, 7); c) abundant that the poor may be truly relieved even many (Tob. IV, 9); d) prompt that it be opportune, lest otherwise the poor fall into abject misery and into desperation (Prov. III, 28); e) secret and humble (Mt. VI, 1-4); f) just; g) in right order; h) helpful to all.

2. A confessor should not easily deny absolution because of the omission of almsgiving, because penitents easily think themselves excused, and because there are few who give absolutely nothing to the poor or to good works, and because the grave obligation in common necessity is not certainly present.