Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. II-II, q. 27.

**916. The virtue of charity, like every friendship, tends to love, not to that by which we are loved by others, but by which we love others. For it is the love of benevolence; and benevolence wills more to love than to be loved. Whence

1) the proper act of charity is to love, which "belongs to charity inasmuch as it is charity";

2) "it more belongs to it to love than to be loved": to love per se, inasmuch as the virtue is inclined to its proper act, to be loved by something else, inasmuch as it is itself also something lovable good, and has a common notion of good to be loved by others through an act of charity; whence mothers, because they love most, seek more to love than to be loved;

3) it is more praiseworthy and better to love than to be loved, whence friends are more praised for this that they love, than for this that they are loved; indeed if they do not love, they are blamed. And although the better, inasmuch as they are better, are more lovable, for the reason that in them there is more perfect charity they are more loving.

917. The proper and principal act of charity is dilection. — This is not a simple benevolence by which we only wish good, but it is the love of benevolence and friendship, and therefore also includes union according to the affection between the lover and the loved, inasmuch as we esteem those whom we love as in a way one with us and so are moved toward them and even wish good to them (n. 844 and 846).

Dilection therefore includes benevolence and adds union of affection and complacence. Whence benevolence is the principle of friendship.

It is not therefore enough to wish a greater good to those who are more to be loved, or even to benefit them more effectively, but it is also necessary according to the affection to love one more than another, so that from greater affection charity may proceed to a greater effect as far as necessary.

918. How God is to be loved. — A. God is to be loved for his own sake: 1) as final cause, because he is not ordered to another but himself is the last end of all; 2) as formal cause, because he himself is his goodness by essence; 3) as efficient cause, for his goodness proceeds from no other, but on the contrary the goodness of others proceeds from him. — But 4) not as dispositive cause or material, for we are disposed through other things to love God in himself e.g. through benefits received from him, or through rewards hoped for, or through penalties which we intend to avoid through him. And thus hope and fear lead to charity.

B. God is to be loved immediately, and through him whatever else is to be loved is loved. For although here on earth he cannot be known immediately and in himself, he can however be loved in this way, because love tends toward the thing loved not as it is in the knower but as it exists in itself¹; and therefore in heaven charity is not brought to nothing but remains.

C. God is to be loved totally: a) on the part of the thing loved, because all that pertains to God must be loved; b) also on the part of the one loving, because a man ought according to his whole power to love God i.e. his whole self and all his things to order to the love of God. — c) However it cannot be loved totally according to the comparison of the lover to the thing loved, so that it be loved as much as it is lovable, because no creature can infinitely love him who is infinitely lovable.

D. God is to be loved supremely and without measure and no measure is to be imposed on the love of him, because in the love of God there can be no excess. For God is the last end and the measure and supreme rule of all actions. But no one can adhere too much to the last end, nor to the supreme rule, otherwise the last end would have another end and the measure another measure, and so one would proceed to infinity; but the more the last end and rule is attained, the better. Therefore the more God is loved, the better the love².

919. Remarks. — As to merit of love S. Thomas teaches: 1) the love of a friend, on the part of the object, is more meritorious than the love of an enemy, because it is better to love the better; but the love of an enemy, as more difficult, is a sign of greater love of God, which is shown to be so much the stronger as from it more easily the more difficult things; charity however more fervently loves friends than enemies because they are nearer to us (a. 7).

2) If considered separately, the love of God is more meritorious than the love of neighbor, for the latter is not meritorious except through the former; but if the love of God alone and the love of neighbor for God's sake are compared, so that it includes the love of God, thus the love of neighbor excels (a. 8).