Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. II-II, q. 27.

**916. The virtue of charity, like every friendship, tends to love, not to that by which we are loved by others, but by which we love others. For it is the love of benevolence; and benevolence wills more to love than to be loved. Whence

1) the proper act of charity is to love, which "belongs to charity inasmuch as it is charity";

2) "it more belongs to it to love than to be loved": to love per se, inasmuch as the virtue is inclined to its proper act, to be loved by something else, inasmuch as it is itself also something lovable good, and has a common notion of good to be loved by others through an act of charity; whence mothers, because they love most, seek more to love than to be loved;

3) it is more praiseworthy and better to love than to be loved, whence friends are more praised for this that they love, than for this that they are loved; indeed if they do not love, they are blamed. And although the better, inasmuch as they are better, are more lovable, for the reason that in them there is more perfect charity they are more loving.

917. The proper and principal act of charity is dilection. — This is not a simple benevolence by which we only wish good, but it is the love of benevolence and friendship, and therefore also includes union according to the affection between the lover and the loved, inasmuch as we esteem those whom we love as in a way one with us and so are moved toward them and even wish good to them (n. 844 and 846).

Dilection therefore includes benevolence and adds union of affection and complacence. Whence benevolence is the principle of friendship.

It is not therefore enough to wish a greater good to those who are more to be loved, or even to benefit them more effectively, but it is also necessary according to the affection to love one more than another, so that from greater affection charity may proceed to a greater effect as far as necessary.

918. How God is to be loved. — A. God is to be loved for his own sake: 1) as final cause, because he is not ordered to another but himself is the last end of all; 2) as formal cause, because he himself is his goodness by essence; 3) as efficient cause, for his goodness proceeds from no other, but on the contrary the goodness of others proceeds from him. — But 4) not as dispositive cause or material, for we are disposed through other things to love God in himself e.g. through benefits received from him, or through rewards hoped for, or through penalties which we intend to avoid through him. And thus hope and fear lead to charity.

B. God is to be loved immediately, and through him whatever else is to be loved is loved. For although here on earth he cannot be known immediately and in himself, he can however be loved in this way, because love tends toward the thing loved not as it is in the knower but as it exists in itself¹; and therefore in heaven charity is not brought to nothing but remains.

C. God is to be loved totally: a) on the part of the thing loved, because all that pertains to God must be loved; b) also on the part of the one loving, because a man ought according to his whole power to love God i.e. his whole self and all his things to order to the love of God. — c) However it cannot be loved totally according to the comparison of the lover to the thing loved, so that it be loved as much as it is lovable, because no creature can infinitely love him who is infinitely lovable.

D. God is to be loved supremely and without measure and no measure is to be imposed on the love of him, because in the love of God there can be no excess. For God is the last end and the measure and supreme rule of all actions. But no one can adhere too much to the last end, nor to the supreme rule, otherwise the last end would have another end and the measure another measure, and so one would proceed to infinity; but the more the last end and rule is attained, the better. Therefore the more God is loved, the better the love².

919. Remarks. — As to merit of love S. Thomas teaches: 1) the love of a friend, on the part of the object, is more meritorious than the love of an enemy, because it is better to love the better; but the love of an enemy, as more difficult, is a sign of greater love of God, which is shown to be so much the stronger as from it more easily the more difficult things; charity however more fervently loves friends than enemies because they are nearer to us (a. 7).

2) If considered separately, the love of God is more meritorious than the love of neighbor, for the latter is not meritorious except through the former; but if the love of God alone and the love of neighbor for God's sake are compared, so that it includes the love of God, thus the love of neighbor excels (a. 8).

S. Th. II-II, q. 28, 29, 30, 45.

920. There are three internal effects of charity:

1st is joy which is caused by love, either a) on account of this that the good is in the loved and is preserved in him, and thus we rejoice in the immutable goodness of God (the joy of friendship completing the love of complacence), or b) on account of the presence of the loved, and thus we rejoice fully in God in heaven, or even on earth in his inhabitation in the soul (the joy of concupiscence fulfilling the desire of the lover).

The first joy cannot have any sadness mingled with it; — likewise the other joy in heaven, where it will be altogether full because nothing remains to be desired, indeed superfull because more is given than is desired; not however now on earth, where from itself there can also follow sadness for those things which are repugnant to the perfection of the participation of the divine good and which are contrary to the effects of charity in us or in our neighbor.

In a similar way we can rejoice in our own goods, and rejoice with our neighbor in his goods.

2nd is peace which includes two things: a) concord or union of our will with the will of others: this charity makes inasmuch as we love our neighbors as ourselves; from which it follows that a man wishes to fulfill the will of his neighbor as of himself, and so two wills tend to one; b) union of all our appetites: this charity makes inasmuch as we love God with our whole heart and refer all things to him; and so all our appetites tend to one.

3rd is mercy which is defined by S. Augustine, de Civ. Dei, l. 9: "a compassion in our heart for another's misery or sadness, by which we are compelled, if we can, to help". For since the lover regards his friend as himself, the evil of him he regards as his own, and therefore he is grieved by it as by his own, and wishes to relieve his misery, as his own.

Joy and peace are secondary acts of charity, naturally and necessarily following dilection; they have the same object and motive as dilection, whence they are not distinct habits. Mercy however is a special virtue because it has a special object, namely another's misery to be relieved by our help out of compassion, and a special appetite, namely sorrow for another's misery, to be moderated by reason; for misery consists in this that a man suffers what he does not wish, i.e. evil which is in some way involuntary for him, and so the sin of another also is an object of mercy, inasmuch as it has certain evils annexed which are against the will of the sinner, such as the obligation of punishment, infirmity, separation from God, etc.

921. Remark. — Mercy is the greatest of all virtues, if considered in itself, because to give to others and to relieve their defects is most of the superior, and therefore is proper to God, in whom it is not distinguished from gratuitous love or charity which it includes and extends to others. But if considered as regards the man having it, it is not the greatest because it is greater to be united to the superior God, which is done immediately by the theological virtues and mediately by certain others; but among all virtues which pertain to the neighbor it is the greatest, because to be suppliant to a defect inasmuch as such is of the better (q. 30, a. 4). Thus it is annexed not only to charity but also to justice, and pertains to liberality of which it is a species (III Sent., d. 33, q. 3, a. 4, qc. 4.).

922. The Gift of Wisdom corresponds to charity, as being among the gifts of the Holy Spirit the most perfect. Wisdom is taken: a) for the natural and acquired intellectual virtue by which a man promptly judges of all things through the highest causes known by reason; b) for the supernatural and infused gift by which a man through the highest supernatural cause, God, and the divine rules, can judge and order all things by connaturality. Which judgment a man obtains through the Holy Spirit (I Cor. II, 15 and 10), and therefore this wisdom is a gift of the Holy Spirit.

Wisdom resides in the intellect because its act is to judge; but it has its cause in the will, namely charity by which we are connatural to divine things, since it unites us to God: hence it is of wisdom to judge with savor, taste, suavity and delectation. Whence wisdom is not in sinners. Moreover it not only contemplates divine things but also by divine reasons judges of human things; hence it is speculative together with practical.

From the aforesaid its definition is clear: A habit divinely infused, by which the mind is rendered easily moved by the Holy Spirit to contemplate divine things, and to judge of them, and of human things according to divine reasons.

Just as charity according to the threefold state of men is divided into the charity of beginners, and of those progressing, and of the perfect, which is not a specific but a gradual distinction, conformably a threefold degree of wisdom exists.

"All having charity and sanctifying grace have the gift of wisdom at least according to this its first degree. But this degree of wisdom consists in two things. First in this that through it the intellect judges that one must rather adhere to divine things than to created and transitory things, saying that of the Psalmist: To me to adhere to God is good. Second, that through it one rightly disposes and rules one's human and external works according to divine laws, according to divine precepts or counsels...

The second degree of wisdom belongs to those progressing, consisting in this that for the sake of perceiving and experiencing spiritual and most pure suavity or delectation of wisdom, a man despises and forsakes all enticements of the flesh and delights of the world, and strives to fix his intellect with all his strength in the clear and savory speculation of divine things, endeavoring to ascend to the limpidity of angelic conversation...

The third degree of wisdom belongs to the perfect only, and consists in this, that no knowledge of any created thing is savory, delightful or pleasing to the intellect, except inasmuch as it contributes to the knowledge of divine things, and thus the mind itself is totally fixed in the contemplation of divine things; so that it can promptly, sincerely, subtly and sweetly contemplate them, with the passions so calmed, and the exterior man entirely reformed, ordered and subjected to the rule of reason at will, as much as the fragility of the present life admits or sustains..."¹.

To the gift of wisdom is attributed the 7th beatitude: Blessed are the peacemakers for they shall be called sons of God: 1) as to merit, for the peace are those who make peace either in themselves or in others, which is done by bringing them back to the due order; but to order pertains to wisdom; therefore to be peaceable is fittingly attributed to wisdom; 2) as to reward, for they shall be sons of God by participating in the likeness of the only-begotten Son of God who is the very uncreated Wisdom begotten.

923. Remark. — Note the words of S. Thomas, q. 45, a. 5: "Some attain only so much of right judgment both in the contemplation of divine things and also in the ordering of human things according to divine rules, as is necessary for salvation; and this is wanting to many who are in a state of sanctifying grace without mortal sin... Others however perceive the gift of wisdom in a higher degree both as to the contemplation of divine things, inasmuch namely as they know certain higher mysteries and can manifest them to others; and also as to the direction of human things according to divine rules inasmuch as they can according to them order not only themselves but also others; and this degree of wisdom is not common to all having sanctifying grace, but rather pertains to the gratuitous graces which the Holy Spirit distributes as he wills according to that of I Cor. XII, 8: To others..."

S. Th. II-II, q. 31.

924. Beneficence is nothing other than to do good to someone. Now this is the external act or effect of charity; for dilection includes benevolence, for he who loves his friend as himself wishes him good as for himself; but the will effects what it wills when it can; therefore beneficence follows from the act of dilection and benevolence as an effect.

To do good which is an act of charity is to do good considered under the common notion of good, inasmuch as it is good; but if the good which one does to another is considered under a special notion of good e.g. inasmuch as it is owed, or gratuitous, or relieving misery, thus beneficence pertains to a special virtue e.g. justice, or liberality, or mercy.

Beneficence is not a special virtue, for it has the same object (and motive) as dilection and benevolence (good under the notion of good), of which it is the external executive act. Beneficence and benevolence namely differ only as interior act and exterior act, because beneficence is the execution of benevolence. Interior and exterior act do not require different virtues.

925. Good is to be done to all. — Since the love of charity extends itself to all, good is also to be done to all, without exception, according to place and time: for it is not possible to do good to all in particular, yet a man must always be ready in the preparation of soul to do good to whomever if the time were present. Among them however an order is to be observed, so that more good is to be done to those who are nearer to us or who are in greater necessity.

When beneficence is concerned with the necessity or misery of another, it is called corporal or spiritual almsgiving. Hence

S. Th. II-II, q.32.

926. Almsgiving (from the Greek: compassion) is the work by which something is given to the needy, out of compassion, for God's sake, i.e. a work rendered to the needy out of commiseration to relieve their want. In which definition it is not taken, as often is customary, for the thing given, but for the action of giving.

It is an act of mercy commanded by charity. It is proved:*:

The exterior act pertains to that virtue to which pertains the proximate motive on account of which the act is performed; but the proximate motive for giving alms is that help be brought to the one suffering necessity, which pertains to mercy; but mercy is an effect of charity; therefore almsgiving is an act of charity through mercy as a mediator, or an act of mercy commanded by charity; which is said in the definition: for God's sake.

But if it is ordered to another end, and is done from another motive, as to make satisfaction for sins, or in worship of God, it will be an act commanded by penance or religion, etc.

927. There are seven spiritual almsgivings which are ordered to defects of the soul, and seven corporal to defects of the body. Spiritual almsgivings however simply excel corporal ones: a) by reason of the thing rendered, namely the spiritual gift which is nobler than the corporal; b) by reason of the one who is helped, namely the spirit which is nobler than the body; c) as to the acts themselves by which the neighbor is helped, because spiritual acts are nobler than corporal ones. Per accidens however in a particular case, corporal almsgiving is to be preferred, as e.g. it is more [important] to feed one dying of hunger than to teach.

Among the corporal ones, six are exercised toward the living (Mt. XXV, 35-36, 42-43): to feed the hungry, to give drink to the thirsty, to clothe the naked, to take in the stranger, to visit the sick, to ransom the captive; and one toward the dead (Tob. II, 3-10, XII, 12-13): to bury the dead.

928. By natural and divine law there is a precept, to give corporal alms, which is of its genus grave. — It is proved:*:

1) Christ, in Mt. XXV, 41, says: "Go, cursed ones, into the eternal fire...: for I was hungry and you did not give me to eat"; but no one is damned for the omission of something which is not a precept and indeed under grave obligation; therefore to give alms is in a precept, and indeed a grave one.

2) Since the love of neighbor is in a precept, all those precepts are without which this love would not be had. But the love of neighbor requires not only that we wish him good but also that we procure it for him, for which it is required that we help his necessity by almsgiving. Therefore almsgiving is in a precept. The minor is proved: The law of nature requires that we help our neighbor in necessity, just as we wish him to help us in our necessity; whence I Jn. III, 18: "Let us not love in word and tongue, but in deed and in truth". (Deut. XV, 11; Prov. XXV, 21; Is. LVIII, 7; Ezech. XVIII, 7; Lk. III, 9 sq.; I Tim. VI, 17 sq.; Jas. II, 15 sq.; I Jn. III, 17).

929. The precept of almsgiving arises from a twofold ground: a) if there is moral capacity or surplus on the part of the giver, b) if there is true necessity on the part of the needy. For a fuller understanding of these, by the order of charity there is to be distinguished not only a threefold temporal necessity with regard to the needy, of which was said above, n. 905; but also a threefold kind of temporal goods with regard to him who is to give alms:

1st kind of goods which are necessary for the sustenance of one's own life and of those for whom one has care (parents, wife, children, etc.): food, clothing, and dwelling; and these are called necessary (absolutely) for nature or life.

2nd kind of goods which are necessary (conditionally) for one's state, namely for preserving a becoming state for oneself and one's own, having regard not indeed to all things which can happen, but to those which can be prudently feared and expected. Whence theologians in this kind include those things which are required to feed servants, or for the necessities probably occurring of family increase, dowries of children, illnesses, old age, wars, etc., indeed entertainments and honest gifts and moderate liberalities, according to one's state, not however excess of pomp and display. "Of such necessary, says S. Thomas, q. 32, a. 6, the limit is not set in an indivisible point, but with many additions one cannot judge that it is beyond such a necessary; and with many subtractions, something still remains by which one can suitably pass life according to one's own state". Therefore this admits of a breadth from the strictly necessary for state without which the state is lost, up to the becoming without which one would not act so suitably. Necessary for one's state are the surplus of life.

3rd kind of goods which are surplus to one's state.

930. Principles. Of which goods almsgiving is to be made. — In this matter the following rules apply¹:

A. In extreme necessity: 1° Almsgiving is not to be given from what is necessary for life, because our life and that of ours is to be preferred to the life of another, unless it is a question of a person necessary to the state, because the common good is to be preferred to the private.

2° There is a grave obligation to give from the surplus of life and from what is necessary for one's state, even with great inconvenience, as much as is necessary to remove the necessity: the order of charity requires that we love the life of our neighbor more than the becoming of our state, which is a far inferior good².

3° However no one is bound to do this with the greatest inconvenience, or to use extraordinary and exquisite means which men are not commonly wont to use, e.g. very great expense to buy a very expensive medicine, to procure an extraordinary surgical operation, to send to a distant region, to ransom from proximate danger of death, because we are not bound to use these to preserve our own life; nor therefore is anyone bound to go out of his state or to undergo a great lessening of it, which moreover is reputed a very grave evil.

B. In grave necessity: There is a grave obligation to give from the surplus of one's state, as much as is necessary to remove the necessity (prop. 12 damn.³ by Inn. XI), indeed also from what is necessary for one's state, when this can be done without grave inconvenience; because the order of charity requires that with slight inconvenience we help a grave inconvenience of our neighbor; indeed with great inconvenience, if it is a question of a grave necessity of the state.

C. In common necessity: 1° There is an obligation of some surplus of one's state to give sometimes during life (Eccli. XIV, 13) to certain poor, because we ought to love the becoming of our neighbor's state more than our own surplus.

2° However there is no obligation to give to all, nor precisely to this or that, nor to take away entirely the necessity, because all the rich are bound, and if all distribute something of the surplus, the necessities are sufficiently relieved⁴.

3° Nor is there an obligation to seek out the poor, unless there is a quite grave doubt of extreme necessity, or unless someone is bound to this by office, as a parish priest: for that would be a grave burden, and moreover it pertains to the one suffering the necessity to set forth the necessity.

931. The obligation of almsgiving is grave of its genus; whence it certainly obliges under mortal sin in grave matter, namely in grave necessity of which at least Scripture speaks (Mt. XXV), and a fortiori in extreme necessity. Indeed also probably in common necessity, both because the words of Scripture and the Fathers without discrimination and without restriction inculcate the grave obligation of helping the poor, which they suppose is often violated, while however grave necessity is rather rare; — and because, if they were not helped, some would fall into grave necessity, and moreover the light necessities of the poor aggregated constitute a grave evil for society, to which a remedy must be provided.

How much however is to be given depends on various circumstances, for the necessities are not always the same. In ordinary circumstances it suffices to give, according to S. Alphonsus, the fiftieth part or 2% of the revenues, if this part is surplus, and a proportionally smaller part, if the revenues are large; although this estimation can be considered rather benign. Therefore he who should resolve to give no alms in common necessity, or who should be notably negligent in these, seems to sin mortally; but if he does not give the small quantity owed, he would not sin except venially from lightness of matter.

But, although one has strictly satisfied the precept of almsgiving toward the poor, there always remains for him the obligation of using well and usefully the remaining surplus goods; which pertains to the virtues of liberality and magnificence, or also to legal justice with a view to the common good.

932. Corollaries. — Since almsgiving is a transfer of ownership:

A. Only those are able to give alms who can dispose of things, namely all who have ownership and free administration of goods, — and also those who, without ownership, have administration: thus a husband from goods whose ownership or usufruct belongs to the community, indeed from the wife's own goods if he has their administration; a superior as to the goods of the monastery; likewise guardians and curators of the goods of a minor for small almsgivings which he himself ought to make; all others who are constituted under authority, e.g. religious or servants, only in extreme necessity of the neighbor, or if there is explicit or tacit or reasonably presumed consent of the superior or master, which consent they do not have if he opposes. Hence:

1) A wife is able to give alms from her own goods if she has any of which she herself can dispose; — likewise from the goods of the husband or of the community but with the consent of the husband; — indeed also, in our regions, without consent from the household goods moderate, not extraordinary, almsgivings she can make according to her condition, because this pertains to the honest sustenance to which a wife among us has a right; unless however in a particular case the husband should prohibit giving to such or such. But if he should altogether prohibit, sometimes perhaps it would be better to abstain, to avoid the indignation of the husband.

2) Children of the family can make moderate almsgivings from goods which are given to them by the parents absolutely and not for a determined use, unless however the father expressly prohibits.

3) Servants cannot without certain permission, and this, because masters are not wont to grant it, cannot easily be presumed, except perhaps when foods which remain and otherwise would profitably be thrown out, or bread for truly poor; but if nevertheless they do so, per se they are bound to restitution.

B. Almsgiving a) from goods unjustly acquired is illicit, unless they cannot be restored to the owner, or the poor person is in extreme necessity and cannot otherwise be helped;

b) likewise from goods acquired simoniacally, because every simoniacal contract is void from the beginning (can. 729); whence those goods are to be restored;

c) it can however be made from goods licitly acquired, but through sin or from what is illicit, e.g. because of a homicide committed or prostitution practiced; but it is not a precept.

C. Fictitious poor sin in a threefold way: 1) against truth; 2) against charity because they subtract alms from true poor; 3) against justice because they deceive by fraud and deceit; whence the donation is invalid, and therefore they are bound to restitution either to the owner or to the poor by presumed consent of the owner, unless it is a question of purest gifts whose primary motive is not need but the love of God and neighbor.

933. Remarks. — 1st The precept of assisting a neighbor in necessity is sufficiently satisfied by giving a loan, lending e.g. a horse until the owner returns, selling with delayed payment, etc. if by such means the necessity is removed, e.g. if the neighbor only needs the use of the thing, or if he is not so absolutely poor that he has nothing either in fact or in hope. However thus the precept of giving alms from the surplus is not satisfied, which precept however can be fulfilled also in other circumstances, by giving to others.

2nd Physicians, lawyers, and others holding public office are bound to give their services gratis to the poor, if it does not appear how otherwise they can be helped.

3rd To the publicly exposed poor who seem to show signs of extreme necessity (e.g. by nakedness, illness, etc.) or who assert it (e.g. by saying they have fasted for 3 days), rarely is anyone bound by precept to help even from the surplus, both because perhaps that necessity is exaggerated to move spectators, and because they are presumed to be helped by others.

4th No one is bound (indeed it is sometimes illicit) to give alms to the poor who are unwilling to work; let not however those be numbered among these who have fallen into misery for lack of work. For whom it would be more expedient to procure or supply work by which they might live.

5th In almsgivings those nearer are to be preferred; no one however can be systematically excluded (neither infidels, nor pilgrims, nor enemies), whether they are poor from infirmity, or from virtue for Christ's sake, or even from previous fault (if the almsgiving is the only means of helping), not however if from actual fault (Mt. V, 45; Prov. XXV, 21; Rom. XII, 20).

6th Of the surplus it is lawful to reserve some to acquire a somewhat higher state, provided not all are reserved: decency indeed can require that we ascend moderately and gradually to a higher state, not however that we reserve everything for this, indeed it requires that we distribute some out of magnificence in almsgivings (prop. 12 damn. by Inn. XI).

7th The prohibition of begging made by the civil magistrate does not free from the obligation of giving alms, because other means are not lacking to satisfy the precept, e.g. by giving money to those who have the care of the needy, or to good institutions or works of beneficence.

8th Likewise the payment of a tax from which the poor are helped diminishes the obligation of giving alms, but does not entirely extinguish it, if the tax does not suffice to extinguish the poor's necessity.

9th Also harm is to be averted from a neighbor, if it can be averted without grave inconvenience, e.g. by warning him who is threatened, or by removing the cause.

934. Practical admonitions. — 1. Almsgiving should be a) prudent, to the truly poor, not to the idle (II Thess. III, 10; Eccli. XII, 4); b) willing i.e. cheerful and kind (II Cor. IX, 7); c) abundant that the poor may be truly relieved even many (Tob. IV, 9); d) prompt that it be opportune, lest otherwise the poor fall into abject misery and into desperation (Prov. III, 28); e) secret and humble (Mt. VI, 1-4); f) just; g) in right order; h) helpful to all.

2. A confessor should not easily deny absolution because of the omission of almsgiving, because penitents easily think themselves excused, and because there are few who give absolutely nothing to the poor or to good works, and because the grave obligation in common necessity is not certainly present.

S. Th. II-II, q. 33; De Virt., q. 3.

935. There are seven spiritual almsgivings: 1) to pray for all, of which it is said in the tr. on Religion; 2) to forgive those who offend, of which was said above n. 898; 3) to console the sad, and 4) to bear with the burdensome and heavy, which pertain rather to those who are constituted in office; 5) to teach the ignorant; 6) to counsel the doubtful; 7) to correct the sinner, of which is to be said here, especially of the last which is the chief and presents a special difficulty.

936. Correction of a sinner is either judicial or fraternal:

1° That one is employed a) against sin inasmuch as it is an evil for others, especially for the common good; b) and is done to repair the order, c) by punishment of the offender; this one is a) a remedy for sin inasmuch as it is an evil of the sinner himself, b) and is done simply by his admonition, and c) directed to his amendment.

2° That one is an act of justice; this one is the chief spiritual almsgiving, whence it is an act of mercy commanded by charity.

3° That one is done by juridical action by a superior as judge; this one is done by a neighbor as by a brother for the good of the brother, and if it is done by a superior, it is not done by him as a superior, but as a private person. Hence it is defined: an admonition of a sinful neighbor made by a private person or quasi-private person that the neighbor be amended; or with S. Thomas, IV Sent., d. 19, q. 2, a. 1: an admonition of a brother concerning the amendment of faults proceeding from fraternal charity.

Between the two is paternal, which is done by a superior with authority, but without the form of a trial, for amendment and to remove scandal.

937. By natural and divine law there is a precept of fraternal correction grave of its genus. — It is proved:*:

a) From S. Matt. XVIII, 15: "If your brother sins against you, go and correct him between you and him alone; if he listens to you, you will have gained your brother" (cfr. Lev. XIX, 17; Eccli. XVII, 12; XIX, 13 sq.; Lk. XVII, 3; Gal. VI, 1; I Thes. V, 14; II Thes. III, 15).

b) From reason: By the law of nature and charity we are bound to help our neighbor who is in corporal need; therefore much more one in spiritual need. — Moreover we ought to love our neighbor; but the love of neighbor includes to wish and provide him good; therefore much more to avert a grave evil from him, such as certain mortal sin.

That precept, like charity, per se obliges all toward all, i.e. not only superiors who are bound to correct both by office or justice, and also by the order of charity because they are more suitable and more united to their subjects; but also it obliges equals, indeed subjects and sinners, although these are excused by many circumstances, as not always suitable for correction.

Superiors are parents, husband, guardians, masters and teachers, masters with respect to servants, bishops, prelates and parish priests, confessors with respect to penitents, preachers with respect to listeners.

938. Conditions required for fraternal correction. — Five conditions are required together that this precept oblige here and now:

1) Certain matter, i.e. a grave sin certainly committed, in which it is foreseen that the neighbor will relapse, or in which it is feared he will die, or will not do penance in due time.

It is said: grave sin, because since every correction is burdensome to the one correcting and includes at least some slight inconvenience, per se and ordinarily it does not oblige to remove a slight evil from the neighbor. Then a morally certain knowledge of the grave sin is required because of the danger of one's own rashness and of offending another; if there is doubt, a private person should not and cannot inquire into the life of the neighbor because it would be very burdensome and hateful to others (Prov. XXIV, 15); otherwise sometimes a superior who has the care and providence of others¹.

2) Necessity, i.e. probability that the neighbor will not amend himself of his own accord and that another equally suitable person will not correct him.

3) Utility, i.e. well-founded hope of amendment, or probability that the correction will not be harmful (e.g. by impelling to new or graver sins) but beneficial either immediately, or at least after some time. For when the end ceases the precept ceases.

Hence a) if the correction is doubtfully useful but certainly not harmful, it is to be done;

b) if the utility is not probable but doubtful, so that amendment is equally hoped for and harm is feared, per se and in general it is to be omitted because the negative precept of not harming obliges more than the affirmative precept of doing good;

c) however in such doubt, per accidens and exceptionally it is to be done, if it is foreseen that the neighbor will die in sin, or a greater evil is feared which must be prevented, e.g. dishonor of God, irreverence to religion, scandal or harm to many or to the state, indeed harm to one if it is greater or more feared than the harm of the sinner; likewise if by office the correction must be done by a superior, who even with slight hope is bound to admonish, lest discipline be weakened or scandal harm others.

4) Possibility, i.e. that it can be done without excessive inconvenience to the one correcting, such as is not the danger of some indignation which is almost always present.

The inconvenience is to be undergone all the greater, the greater is the necessity of the neighbor (in extreme necessity even with danger of life), or the gravity of the sin, or the probability of fruit, or the obligation of correcting. And indeed superiors are bound even with great inconvenience in grave necessity, indeed with danger of life if they are bound by justice, as bishops, parish priests, teachers; or with some great detriment, as parents, masters, husband, teachers; — on the contrary servants and subjects are rarely bound when the matter is easily doubtful in a particular case.

5) Opportunity, i.e. that the time, place and other circumstances suitable for amendment are present here and now: for the affirmative precept does not oblige for always, but only in sufficient circumstances.

Therefore it is not always to be employed immediately, but is often to be deferred to an opportune time, when more fruit is hoped for; indeed sometimes the reiteration of sin can be permitted that the sinner may more fervently repent, if immediate fruit is not hoped for. But if immediate fruit is hoped for, let it be done immediately, if scandal harmful to others is to be removed, or if the honor of God or of the neighbor is to be defended.

939. The manner and order to be observed in correction. — Fraternal correction can be done either by suitable speech, or by equivalent deeds or signs, by showing a sad countenance, diverting speech to other things, withdrawing temporal help, or by other ways by which the neighbor is openly or implicitly admonished.

It should always be done with great prudence and with the affection of charity, and indeed toward inferiors and equals with kindness and love (Gal. VI, 1), toward superiors with humility and reverence (I Tim. V, 1).

Lest one sin against justice by harming the reputation of a neighbor without necessity (Mt. XVIII, 15), the order to be observed in correction is prescribed: first it is to be done secretly, and this often, as long as fruit is hoped for; but if it does not help, one or two witnesses are to be employed; and if it still does not help, denunciation is made to the superior who first corrects paternally, then, if necessary, also judicially. But that order can be changed so that denunciation is made immediately: a) if the offense is public, known to the greater part of the community or soon to be made known; b) if private admonition is foreseen not to be profitable, especially if the necessity of correction is urgent, as if the sin is to the harm of the community or of religion, or to the grave harm of a third party (e.g. of reputation, of corruption of others); c) if amendment by the superior is foreseen to be much more sure and fruitful, provided the superior is prudent and discreet; d) if some law imposes denunciation, as for soliciting confessors.

940. To omit fraternal correction is a mortal sin of its genus. According to S. Thomas, if someone presumes of someone that he could draw him back from sin, and yet for fear or cupidity or shame absolutely refuses to make the correction, he sins mortally because he prefers fear, etc. to fraternal charity; but if someone is only made slower to correct from these, so that however if it were clear to him that he could draw his brother back from sin, he would not omit it, he sins only venially, because the reason of the end is not removed, e.g. if he were negligent in considering the circumstances and opportunity in which he is bound to correct, or culpably thinking himself not suitable for it.

941. The matter of correction are only grave sins committed, and therefore are not:

1) Sins to be committed: for these are matter of admonition (to counsel the doubtful), which obliges in the same circumstances as correction.

2) Material sins done from invincible or at least not gravely culpable ignorance: these are matter of instruction (to teach the ignorant), which is also of precept in the same circumstances as correction, not only out of reverence for the law but also out of charity, because the bad ignorance of those things which one is bound to know is an evil to be removed from the neighbor just like sin; however less strictly and often only under venial because it is a lesser evil. Hence according to many it is probable that private persons are not bound to instruct others about material sins against positive law (divine or human) only committed, because these are not intrinsically evil and therefore of lesser moment; it would be otherwise if by office one were bound to teach others, or if from the ignorance there arose harm to the ignorant one, or to a third party, or scandal, or irreverence toward God or religion, etc.

3) Venial sins. These however per accidens can be matter of correction, instruction or admonition sometimes to be done even under grave obligation, both by reason of the effect e.g. if from them follows a proximate danger of mortal sinning, or great scandal, or another grave evil for religion or the common good, such as disturbance of tranquility in the community, or relaxation of regular discipline in the monastery; and by reason of office, for superiors because they have the care of others.

942. Instruction of the ignorant is useful and therefore, the other conditions being supposed, is to be done in general:

1) If the ignorance is vincible and gravely culpable, e.g. if one is not in good faith but doubts, as if he should ask.

2) If the ignorance will soon become vincible, as if one ignores laws which cannot be long ignored, e.g. the first principles and first conclusions of natural law, or the obvious duties of state (of priest, of father, of judge).

3) If the ignorance is not gravely culpable, but harmful to the ignorant one, e.g. if it concerns things necessary for salvation, or induces occasion or proximate danger of sinning or of persevering in sin, or is the cause of thinking something to be sin which is not, or to be mortal which is venial.

4) Even if the ignorance is invincible and favorable, but the admonition is probably going to be profitable, at least after some time, and no greater inconveniences are feared such as infamy for others, scandal, hatreds, quarrels, e.g. about the dissolution of an invalid marriage.

On the contrary in general it is to be omitted because of a greater evil, namely if the ignorance is not gravely culpable and

a) the admonition is doubtfully profitable to the ignorant one and equally doubtfully harmful (with positive doubt), because formal sin is more to be prevented than material sin².

b) more so if it is probably not profitable, unless however a greater harm is feared either public (great scandal), or of a third party (omission of restitution), or of the ignorant one himself (a bad custom e.g. of pollution difficult to overcome);

c) most of all if it is certainly not profitable; unless however silence is equivalent to approval (e.g. if a priest or teacher being asked or seeing fornication, pollution, theft, keeps silent), or unless from not admonishing follows great harm to many or public, because the common good or of many is to be preferred to the private good of one (thus per se a priest would invalidly consecrate, or a teacher teach errors, or spouses who exercise the act of marriage so as to prevent generation), not however if harm to one follows because the spiritual good of the ignorant one can be preferred.

943. Practical remarks. — 1. Since the conditions required for the obligation of fraternal correction are rarely present for private persons (unless they are intimately united), these are rarely bound to correction, especially toward strangers whose inquiry is unknown, and therefore amendment is very doubtful. A fortiori the scrupulous are rarely bound to it, who for want of discretion would always think themselves bound to correct others, or would always doubt about it, and most often would commit improprieties.

2. The sinner is bound to amend himself at the correction: a) if he is a superior, because he is bound to procure those things which are necessary for the right fulfillment of his office, among which is his own amendment; b) if he is a scandal to others, because he is bound to abstain from scandal; c) if the neighbor is in mortal sin and about to die, unless he himself amended corrects, because then a grave necessity seems to be present to which with some inconvenience he must help.

3. In communities, colleges, etc. it is generally expedient that correction be done by way of denunciation to the superior: for he who would denounce could easily know, if he first privately admonished; indeed where it concerns grave harm to the community (not of one or another), the companions could not be absolved who refuse to denounce.

4. As to denunciation to a superior S. Alphonsus notes:

a) If it is certainly known that the brother has perfectly amended the hidden sin, and there is no danger of relapse or harm to himself or another from it, it is not lawful to denounce to the father or prelate, unless the brother expressly consents to this denunciation.

b) It is not lawful to refer the offense to mediate superiors, if the immediate superior can correct by himself, and there is no probable suspicion that he will fail in his duty; for the reputation of the neighbor, as far as possible, must be safeguarded.

c) A superior, by virtue of the knowledge obtained through private denunciation made to him as a father, cannot publicly proceed or proceed judicially, because the offense was not made manifest to him as judge.