Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. II-II, q. 26, a. 4 and 5.

905. Notions. — It must be premised: a) that there are three kinds of goods, distinguished by the order of charity: 1) most to be esteemed are spiritual and eternal goods, whether supernatural or natural, which of themselves and directly regard the soul and salvation, i.e. the moral perfection of man, "honesty"; — 2) then come natural temporal goods (whether of soul or of body) intrinsic to man, which of themselves and directly constitute the physical perfection of man, such as life, bodily integrity and health, learning, natural dispositions of soul, liberty, etc.; — 3) finally natural goods extrinsic to man, among which however reputation and honor, as being something moral, are superior to riches. Note however that the common good is greater than the private good, because the good of the whole, as universal, surpasses the good of the part.

It must be premised: b) that in goods both spiritual and eternal and temporal, a threefold necessity is distinguished by the order of charity: 1) extreme when the danger of damnation, or of death or of another morally equivalent evil certainly threatens, and cannot be morally avoided without the help of another; but an evil equivalent to death is the perpetual privation of a great good which is equivalent to life and which nature willed to be common to all, such as health, reason, liberty, integrity of members, e.g. incurable disease, perpetual loss of the use of reason, and perhaps the loss of a principal member, or perpetual servitude or imprisonment, especially if it be harsh; — 2) grave when the aforesaid evils probably only threaten and one cannot avoid them without great difficulty, or when the certainly threatening evil is only grave, such as: unjust captivity, notable infamy, grave illness, grave loss of goods by which one can with difficulty sustain himself, loss of state, etc.; — 3) common in which one can provide for oneself without great difficulty: in this are concerned in the spiritual order ordinary sinners, and in the temporal order the poor, begging at the door whether publicly or secretly.

906. General principle. In the order of charity, other things being equal, a man ought to love himself more than his neighbor. — The order between us and our neighbor is that in equal goods, equal necessity and condition, each one simply loves himself more than his neighbor. It is proved:

a) From Mt. XXII, 39: "You shall love your neighbor as yourself" (Lev. XIX, 18), in which words the love of self is given as the rule and exemplar of the love of neighbor; but the rule is better than the regulated; therefore we ought to love ourselves more than our neighbor. Whence the word: as, does not signify that a man love his neighbor equally to himself, but only similarly to himself (q. 44, a. 7).

b) By charity a man loves himself as a partaker of beatitude, but his neighbor only as a companion in this participation. But, says S. Thomas, participation is more potent than companionship as unity than union. Therefore a man ought to love himself more than his neighbor.

c) Man is naturally more inclined to the love of himself than to the love of neighbor. This natural inclination, as implanted by the author of nature, cannot be inordinate.

907. Comparing only spiritual and eternal goods, the principle is that: each one is bound to love himself more as to soul or salvation than his neighbor. Hence:

a) It is never lawful to sin even most lightly for the salvation of a neighbor.

b) Nor is it lawful to expose oneself to the danger of a neighbor sinning, because this is to sin (prop. 62 and 63, damn. by Inn. XI); but it is lawful to expose oneself to danger, if it is remote, — and also, for a grave cause, if with suitable aids, so that there is a well-founded hope of not falling, the proximate danger can be made remote, — indeed sometimes one ought so to act to help a neighbor in extreme spiritual necessity.

c) Charity always inclines to desiring for ourselves grace and glory, and indeed greater, than for a neighbor, nor is it ever lawful to desire for oneself less.

d) Charity of itself always inclines us to more perfect things; however if these are not strictly necessary, we can and sometimes ought to leave them for the spiritual or even temporal good of a neighbor, e.g. a priest prayer to hear confessions, a son entry into religion to support parents. In this case however the good, if it is left out of charity which thus pleases God more, is compensated by charity.

908. Comparing the spiritual and eternal goods of a neighbor with our temporal ones, the general principle is that: each one is bound to love his neighbor as to soul and salvation more than his own body. The reason is that we ought to love the soul of a neighbor as a companion in the full participation of beatitude, our body however as a partaker of beatitude by redundancy; but companionship in full beatitude is a greater reason for loving than participation by redundancy. Therefore.

Specifically: a) In extreme spiritual necessity of a neighbor, each one is bound, under grave obligation, to help him with certain danger of life (e.g. to an infant about to die without Baptism, or to a sinner about to suffer death not thinking of it or not able to elicit perfect contrition), provided the necessity is not from his own malice (as in duelists and unjust invaders of life), there is probable hope of helping him, there is no one else to bring help, nor is a graver evil feared as if from it the salvation of many others would be in danger (Jn. XV, 12; I Jn. III, 16).

b) In grave spiritual necessity, the neighbor must be helped, under grave obligation, with some detriment in temporal goods of reputation, honor, fortune, to be prudently morally judged. Not however with danger of life, although charity persuades it; unless 1) one is bound by justice by reason of office, as a physician, or a parish priest who is bound with danger of life or temporal goods to minister the sacrament of Penance to parishioners infected with the plague (Jn. X, 11); or 2) unless it is a public necessity: for this is always joined with the extreme necessity of many, and moreover the common good surpasses the private; whence if someone spreads perverse doctrine among the people and there is no one to prevent it, the obligation is present with danger of life for him who prevents it; and in time of plague (or persecution) a parish priest is bound to assist the dying, if no other is present.

c) In common spiritual necessity, the neighbor must be helped without bodily detriment, but not with even light detriment (cfr. 3 p., q. 3, a. 2).

909. Comparing only temporal goods, the general principle is that: each one per se is bound to love his own life and temporal goods more than the life and temporal goods of his neighbor, — but more his neighbor as to corporal goods than himself as to external goods.

Specifically: a) In extreme temporal necessity, the neighbor must be helped, under grave obligation, with notable detriment to one's own temporal goods; not however by extraordinary means (for this no one is bound as regards his neighbor's life), nor with loss of life or of an almost equivalent good, unless it is a question of the extreme necessity of the state. However, if one does not distrust being in a state of grace, nor is there necessity of family or others, charity itself often permits and persuades to expose life (a fortiori temporal goods) for the motive of virtue, e.g. for friendship, gratitude, the honor of God, the common good, not equivalently loving the neighbor's life as one's own, but more loving the good of virtue than one's own life, because the good of virtue which is spiritual surpasses corporal life. Thus with danger of life they laudably serve those infected with the plague, throw themselves into the waters to rescue others, die for persons very necessary to the state or family¹.

b) In grave temporal necessity help must be given, under grave obligation, to a private person with only moderate inconvenience, to a community even with grave inconvenience.

c) In common temporal necessity the neighbor must be helped, if it can be done without inconvenience (cfr. p. 3, q. 3, a. 1).

910. Corollaries. — 1° From the aforesaid follows the principle: Charity does not oblige with great inconvenience, it avails in common and grave necessity, and indeed only in general, but does not avail in extreme necessity in which charity obliges even with the greatest inconvenience.

2° In all the aforesaid rules it is to be understood: if there is hope of fruit, and if another more obligated has not provided it.