Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. II-II, q. 25, a. 8 and 9; de Virt. q. 2, a. 8.

891. Enemies are to be loved. — Enemies are those who hate us or ours, or have offended or injured us, or at least are apprehended as such¹.

Enemies are not to be loved as enemies, i.e. their enmity is not to be loved, because it is evil. But enemies according to their nature, inasmuch as they are men capable of eternal beatitude, are to be loved out of charity. — It is proved:

a) From the words of Christ, Mt. V, 44: "Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you... pray for those who persecute and calumniate you, that you may be sons of your Father who is in heaven"; and VI, 12: "Forgive us our debts as we also forgive our debtors", where the love of enemies is indicated as a condition required for the remission of sins, for V, 15: "But if you will not forgive men, neither will your Father forgive you your sins".

b) From the Old Testament: Lev. XIX, 17-18; Exod. XXIII, 4, 5; Prov. XXV, 21, compared with Rom. XII, 20-21.

c) Reason dictates the principle: What you do not wish to be done to yourself, do not do to another; but no one wishes to be hated but entirely desires to be loved. — Moreover it is against reason to hate someone, on account of a fault, not only according to the fault, but also according to his nature, inasmuch as there is good in him.

892. Enemies are to be loved by precept in general, i.e. as other men even unknown, inasmuch as we cannot exclude them from the love of neighbor; whence we are bound per se and in general to render them, out of internal affection, the common signs and benefits of love: to deny these in general would be taken as a sign of hatred, and easily causes scandal, both with respect to the enemy who is thereby confirmed in enmity, and also with respect to those who see it.

But in particular, by exercising a special act of love toward the person of the enemy, it is not of precept but of perfection and counsel; and therefore to show special signs of love in general is not of precept. It is however in precept according to the preparation of soul, namely that a man be ready to love his enemy in particular, and to do good to him, and to show him special signs of love, if necessity should demand (Prov. XXV, 21).

893. Common signs and benefits of love are those which, by reason of general charity, are either shown to all men or to all of some condition (e.g. when someone prays for all, or gives alms to all the poor of the same city), or are customarily shown by all men of such a state or condition to one another (e.g. by a neighbor to neighbors, by a relative to relatives, by a father to sons, by a disciple to fellow disciples, etc.). Which however these are, is to be judged from prudent estimation and received custom: for there is great diversity according to region, state and time. Whence, says S. Alphonsus, n° 28: "It is not lawful to exclude an enemy from common prayers, e.g. the Lord's prayer which is instituted for the community, nor from common alms, return of greeting, response (even by letters), the sale of goods offered; because these are common signs of love, and therefore to act against these, e.g. to invite all relatives, to greet from custom all those met from the neighborhood or college, with the sole enemy excluded", is per se and regularly evil.

894. Special signs and benefits of love are those which are owed to no one, nor are required by the condition of the person and custom of the region, but are specially shown out of mere liberality to certain persons, by reason of a special friendship which is not toward all of the same condition: these just as they are freely undertaken, are freely omitted. Whence per se and in general we are not bound to visit sick enemies, to console the sad, to receive them in hospitality or at table, to pray specially for them, to have frequent commerce e.g. by letters with them, indeed not even first otherwise or to greet them, unless it were a question of a superior or very close persons, or unless the greeting or address were a common sign of charity toward those met (e.g. in small places, in a banquet, communities, etc.), from which to abstain for a longer time would be taken as a sign of hatred.

895. To omit common signs and benefits of love is sometimes lawful, but accidentally and extraordinarily for a time, for just cause:

a) from justice, namely 1) if a superior offended by an inferior hopes to amend him in this way (provided the hope is well founded), or intends to correct him, or to give example to others: for the superior has the right to punish² ;

b) from charity: 2) if it is done without hatred, even by one not a superior, that the audacity and insolence of the offender may be restrained, or that he may be amended³; 3) if one prudently fears from the signs shown greater obstinacy of the enemy, recollection of the injuries, new commotion or quarrel;

c) from another reasonable cause: 4) if it is done in sign of just pain from actual or recent injury, especially if this was atrocious; 5) if it is done on account of a gravely defaming injury, lest it seem to be esteemed of little account; 6) if, without scandal, it is done because one knows certainly that the enemy will not respond to signs shown, e.g. because he has experienced this; but if he doubts, he is bound at least to try once.

**896. We ought to show special signs of love accidentally and extraordinarily; which however then are common signs owed to all:

a) in grave spiritual or temporal necessity (of life, of reputation, of fortune) of the neighbor, for then to deny them would rightly be taken as a sign of hatred;

b) when the enemy asks pardon, or shows special signs to obtain it, in which case to deny special signs is ordinarily a sign of hatred; sometimes however one will lawfully deny them (for a time), e.g. a superior for amendment, punishment or example, anyone to express just grief if pardon is asked immediately after the offense;

c) to resist the hatred to which you feel yourself inclined;

d) to avoid scandal, which however can otherwise be avoided e.g. by declaration or admonition of those who see it;

e) if there is a well-founded hope that the enemy will then lay down grave hatred, from which obligation however a grave inconvenience excuses (cfr. infra, p. 3, q. 3, a. 2).

897. To deny an enemy signs of charity owed is a mortal sin of its genus. — It is mortal because it is against charity⁴; which happens 1) from internal intention, when it proceeds from hatred or appetite of mortal revenge, 2) by reason of external signification, when it is considered by the enemy as a grave offense, or when it causes grave scandal, or when it would be taken by others as a sign of grave hatred or appetite of mortal revenge. To judge this latter, attention must be paid to the cause why the signs are omitted, e.g. if it is done on account of a preceding grave quarrel it will more easily be taken as a sign of grave hatred than if it is done about trifles. Whence it seems too general, that some without restriction say, that a religious who does not wish to address a confrere after ten days is not to be absolved: for it is not always taken as a sign of grave hatred.]

It is mortal of its genus; therefore it admits of lightness of matter: thus if a person of much greater rank does not return the greeting of an inferior, e.g. a nobleman a peasant, a father his son, it does not seem mortal; and moreover in our regions the omission of greeting or return of greeting once or twice is more often a venial sin: for per se it is opposed only to affability, nor per se with us is it a sign or effect of grave hatred, or cause of grave scandal.

898. We are bound internally to remit the offense to the enemy (Mt. VI, 15; XVIII, 35), but not to renew with him the former special friendship, if this was freely undertaken. Nor are we bound per se, even if he asks pardon, to remit restitution for damage done, or satisfaction for injury inflicted (for no one is bound per se to remit a good owed to him), indeed not even to accept them if he offers them; but we can seek them by juridical action, provided we do not principally intend the evil of the enemy, but the good which such action procures, namely the amendment of the enemy, or his restraint, the quiet of others, or the preservation of justice.

In practice however: 1) In general we ought to accept sufficient satisfaction spontaneously offered, nor can we seek it juridically, especially if it is a question of seeking a grave penalty against the enemy without advantage for ourselves, or of pressing a satisfaction greater than he can offer. The reason is that in seeking such things it is difficult for the spirit of vengeance to be absent: for it is difficult that one seek public vengeance out of pure love of justice from a judge, without an inordinate love of private vengeance which is illicit, and to which man is greatly inclined; whence also the common estimation takes this as a sign of vengeance.

2) Sometimes we ought to remit reparation for a merely personal injury, when the burden which the enemy would undergo in making reparation would be too great in respect to the good which would come to us from it.

3) Never is it lawful to remit, if a superior needed his reputation, not only for himself, but more for the good and salvation of others, or if it were an injury that would bring infamy upon the whole family or community, unless it were repaired by juridical satisfaction.

899. On the order and manner of reconciliation. — The offender ought to begin the reconciliation (Mt. V, 23-24) as soon as he morally can: for out of charity he is bound, just as not to place, so also to remove the offense; but if the offense is mutual, he who offended the more gravely; if it is nearly equal, he who offended first. It is excepted, if it is certainly foreseen that pardon will be denied by the other, or if the offender greatly surpasses in dignity or state, unless perhaps the injury is enormous.

Reconciliation is generally sought sufficiently in an indirect way by special signs of love: by sending a gift, rendering a service, an office or benefit, going ahead in honor, amicable conversation, etc. or by the intercession of others. However when the offense was grave, and no other means of reconciliation is at hand (or if a superior or judge imposes it), the offender must also directly ask pardon, because just as out of charity he was bound not to place the offense, so out of charity he is bound to remove it. But in practice, a formal petition of pardon admits of many excuses, e.g. if it is not in use among persons of such condition, if the offended demands an unusual humiliation, or does not care for the petition, or if it can otherwise be fully satisfied e.g. by money or by indirect means, by a sign of special love or honor, as was said above.

900. Practical admonition. — Since each one easily persuades himself that he has suffered a graver injury, and the confessor exhorts each one to seek reconciliation. He should not however easily impose the obligation of directly asking pardon, because this is not always to be borne; indeed even if it is certainly present, it is often prudent to leave the penitent in good faith, if admonition is not hoped to be profitable.