Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. II-II, q. 25, a. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 11, 12; de Virt., q. 2, a. 7.

880. The twofold object of love. — Since to love is to will good for someone, in every love there is a twofold object: the person for whom we will good, who is the immediate object, loved per se and simply; — and the good which we will for him, which is loved only mediately and under a certain respect, inasmuch as we love the person to whom this good belongs. Whence the persons loved alone are properly called the material object of love.

881. Thesis. The principal material object of charity is God himself the supernatural end who is loved per se on account of his own goodness, and for whose sake other persons are loved, so that we may thus love him more and more perfectly. The secondary material object is all rational creatures who can share in the beatitude of God: ourselves, all wayfaring men, the saints in heaven, the good angels, the souls dwelling in purgatory; not however irrational creatures, the damned, and the evil angels. They are loved not per se on account of their own goodness, but for God's sake and his goodness: just as if someone has friendship for some man, on his account he loves all who belong to that man, whether children, or friends, or servants, etc. inasmuch as they pertain to him, so the friendship of charity extends itself to all the familiars of God, whom he calls to his society and beatitude.

882. What good do we will with the love of charity? — The principal good which we will for God are his own infinite perfections, which indeed we do not desire for him, but in which we are pleased; the secondary is the manifestation and external glorification of these perfections, which we wish and procure for God and about which we procure to rejoice.

The principal good which we will for ourselves and our neighbor is charity itself together with its foundation sanctifying grace and beatitude; the secondary is both all supernatural goods which lead per se to beatitude, and also per accidens natural goods inasmuch as they can sometimes lead to beatitude.

Charity can also be concerned with irrational creatures or demons, inasmuch as one wills them to be preserved for the glory of God or the utility of men.

883. Four different things are to be loved out of charity, according to Augustine, de doctr. chr., l. 1, c. 23 and 26: 1) something as the cause and root of beatitude: God;

2) something which participates directly in beatitude: the one loving himself, or ourselves;

3) those whom we can have as associates in this participation: our neighbors;

4) finally something to which beatitude is derived only through a certain redundancy: our body.

S. Th. II-II, q. 23, a. 4; q. 25, a. 1; q. 27, a. 2, 5, 6; q. 28, a. 1; q. 44, a. 4, 5, 6.

884. How charity is to be exercised toward God. — Charity or divine friendship is an efficacious love of benevolence, whence it comprises both complacence in the divine goods, — and desire or benevolence properly so called i.e. the will of increasing the divine goods, — and zeal for promoting the glory of God.

1) Complacence is in the goods which God possesses: for when we truly love someone, we regard his goods as our own, and therefore are pleased in his goods, as if they were our own; which Christ indicated by these words: "If you loved me, you would indeed rejoice that I go to the Father" Jn. XIV, 28. Hence:

a) The just rejoice in the infinite perfections of God in themselves considered, such as his wisdom, power, goodness, beauty, etc., indeed they are more pleased in the perfection and glory of God than in their own beatitude. So Augustine is reported to have said: "Lord God, I love you so, that if I were God and you Augustine, I would wish to be Augustine, that you might be God". And S. Francis de Sales who reports this, himself prayed: "O dearest of my heart, I do not indeed desire that I may be able to wish something good for your majesty, but with my whole heart I am pleased in that supreme degree of goodness which you have, to which neither by desire nor even by thought anything can be added; but if such a desire were possible, O infinite Deity and divine Infinity, my soul would wish to be this very desire and nothing else¹."

b) They rejoice likewise in the external manifestation of God's attributes, in divine providence, in the extension of the kingdom of God, in the external glory which they receive from the Angels, the elect in heaven, and the just on earth.

c) Which complacence spontaneously bursts forth into praise of God (which is an act of religion) by which they congratulate him for all that pertains to his perfection and glory: "Glory to God in the highest... We praise you, we bless you, we glorify you... We laud you, we confess you the Lord".

2) Desire is for the divine goods to be increased inasmuch as it is possible; which is benevolence strictly so called by which we wish and desire good for God: for when we truly love someone, we wish him good as for ourselves.

a) That desire is not absolute which concerns the intrinsic perfections of God whose increase we do not desire, since nothing good can accrue to the Infinite; yet we can in some way desire them conditionally. For S. Thomas says (III Sent., d. 29, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4): "If it were possible that from our works something could accrue to him, he who has charity would do many more things to preserve beatitude for him than to obtain it for himself". Whence S. Francis de Sales (l. c.): "I said to the Lord: My God, you are mine, immense and full of goodness, who need neither my goods nor those of any other; if however it were possible that you needed some good, I would never cease to wish it to you, and, to procure it for you, I would gladly spend my life and all that is dearest to me".

b) But absolute is the desire for the extrinsic glory of God, to procure which we are induced by love, both in ourselves inasmuch as we are ready to do and suffer all things to progress in divine love, and in others inasmuch as we sincerely desire that sinners and infidels be enlightened and know, love and glorify God, or even that the just may glorify him more: "Let the peoples confess to you, God; let all the peoples confess to you... Praise the Lord from the heavens... praise the Lord from the earth... praise him all nations... Bless all the works of the Lord... Hallowed be your name, your kingdom come".

c) From which desire arises sadness for sins and offenses committed against God, the supreme Good, and filial fear lest by offending God we be separated from him who is loved above all.

3) Zeal for promoting the glory of God arises, when love does not stop in the affection alone, but also works outwardly. For the affection is not enough, but charity must be effective: "Let us not love in word or in tongue but in deed and in truth" (I Jn. III, 18; cfr. Mt. XXV, 41 sq.). "He who has my commandments and keeps them, he it is who loves me" (Jn. XIV, 21). Whence S. Gregory: "The proof of love is the showing of the work" (hom. in Ev., l. 8, hom. 30).

Which is done in two ways: a) vehemently repelling as much as possible those things which are against the honor and will of God, and b) positively performing those things which procure the honor of God: in oneself perfectly observing the commandments, indeed even the counsels, and doing all works to please God so that he truly reigns over us; in others promoting the exercise of religion and of the virtues.

885. Suitable means are to be employed to progress in the love of God. One must:

1) Diminish the obstacle and gradually eradicate the inordinate love of self, which is directly contrary to divine love and is the cause of all sin (I-II, q. 77, a. 4). Whence Christ (Mt. XVI, 24): "If anyone wishes to come after me, let him deny himself". Wherefore the nourishment of charity is the lessening of cupidity, and we progress in charity only as much as we depress the love of ourselves.

2) Consider the reasons for loving God, namely a) God is the lover of us, who first loved us and from eternity chose us gratuitously for existence and innumerable natural and supernatural benefits, not for his own advantage or happiness, but for our good.

b) God wills and ardently desires to be loved by us, as is clear from the precept which he imposed on us as the first and greatest of the whole law (Mt. XXII, 37-38), — from the promises, communications, benefits and punishments by which he allures to his love, and presents himself as a most generous benefactor, best father, most loving spouse, for he longs to be loved, — especially from this that he sent his Son who came to communicate divine life to us, to send the fire of divine love to be kindled, and to promise the Holy Spirit and God dwelling in us.

c) God in himself is infinitely lovable, as is clear from this that all the perfections, goodnesses and beauties of all creatures and all supernatural benefits he eminently and infinitely contains in himself; whence he is worthy of all love, and if love must be proportioned to the dignity of the object, the supreme and infinite goodness must be loved without measure.

3) Employ means by which charity is frequently exercised and increased, whether:

a) Directly, by eliciting the act of love toward God the excellent benefactor lovable in himself, complacence in the divine attributes worthy of all praise, benevolence by which we desire that the name of God be hallowed, his kingdom come and his will be done on earth as in heaven, zeal by which with all our strength we promote the glory of God, perfect contrition by which we detest sins because they offend God who is infinitely good; — or:

b) Indirectly, by eliciting acts of the moral virtues which are informed by charity, especially the observance of the commandments which is the sign of love (Jn. XIV, 15, 21; I Jn. II, 4; V, 3), by perfect subjection to the will of God especially in fulfilling the duties of state; indeed by any act of piety, of labor, of mortification, etc. done out of love of God (I Cor. X, 31). And thus even the more difficult works become easy, for, as Augustine says, nothing is difficult for those who love.

S. Th. II-II, q. 25, a. 4, 5, 7.

886. A man must love himself, both with natural love, which he also naturally fulfills, since everyone naturally loves his own preservation and happiness (and so to love is common to the good and the wicked); — and with the supernatural love of charity, as is clearly presupposed in the Lord's precept, of loving namely the neighbor as oneself. For although properly so called friendship cannot be had directly toward oneself, but something greater than friendship, nevertheless friendship can be had toward God, and consequently toward others (and ourselves) who are God's. Whence S. Thomas, q. 25, a. 4:

"Since charity is a certain friendship... we can speak of charity in two ways. In one way under the common notion of friendship, and according to this it must be said that friendship is not had properly toward oneself, but something greater than friendship, because friendship imports a certain union... But to each one there is unity with himself, which is more potent than union with another. Whence, just as unity is the principle of union, so the love by which one loves himself is the form and root of friendship. For in this we have friendship toward others, because we are disposed toward them as toward ourselves... In another way we can speak of charity according to its proper notion itself, inasmuch namely as it is the friendship of man toward God principally, and consequently toward those things which are God's: among which is also the man himself, who has charity; and thus among other things which he loves out of charity as pertaining to God, he also loves himself out of charity".

887. How a man must love himself. — By virtue of the divine precept a man is bound, out of love for himself, to love himself supernaturally, for God's sake, not according to his sensitive and corporeal nature considered in itself, and according to the corruption of the exterior man in those things which are repugnant to reason, but according to his rational nature or the interior man, inasmuch as he can be a partaker of divine beatitude according to soul and according to body. This is the most perfect reason and at the same time the unique norm and rule in our love of ourselves: in so far we ought to love ourselves, i.e. soul and body, as we pertain to God. And indeed: 1) Principally the soul, which created by God, has been made by grace a partaker of divine nature, redeemed by the blood of Christ, the temple of divinity and capable of eternal beatitude.

Whence we are bound a) to prefer the salvation of the soul and sanctification before all things (Mt. VI, 33), and to employ the necessary means for salvation, b) to cultivate Christian virtues, c) to do good and meritorious works according to the example of Christ (Mt. VI, 19-20), d) to esteem grace and the means of preserving and increasing it more than all temporal aids, e) and to hate and to fear one sin which turns us away from God. All the goods of the soul however, whether natural such as learning, knowledge, honor, fame, glory, etc., or even supernatural, are not to be loved for themselves but for God.

2) Secondarily and subordinately we must also love the body, not for its own sake but for God's sake, inasmuch as it is the instrument of the soul to render honor to God and to work good (Rom. VI, 13, 19), and the temple of God sanctified by grace and capable in some way of beatitude, which redounds from the glory of the soul into the body (II Cor. VI, 19-20; XV, 42-43).

Whence a) we are bound to employ ordinary means of preserving our own life, the integrity of members and health, procuring for ourselves food, clothing, dwelling, so that the body may be a suitable instrument to serve the soul and to serve God; however b) in seeking the good of the body, e.g. health, pleasure, life, etc., all these we must seek for God's sake, for the glory of God; c) we must restrain the concupiscence of the flesh and inordinate desires out of hatred of sin, and inflict reasonable mortification on the body which weighs down the soul and is prone to rebellion, that namely it may be subjected to the mind and to the service of God (Col. III, 5; I Cor. IX, 27); d) however not afflict the body out of hatred of the body considered according to its nature (as such it is good), nor seek mortification for its own sake (just as neither pleasure for its own sake), nor flee all delights and pleasures, but we may rejoice and enjoy even earthly delights, yet according to right reason.

888. They sin against the love of themselves: a) More by excess, who indulge in inordinate egotism and pursue private advantages principally, more than the good of God, or exclusively, with the glory of God or the salvation and utility of others set aside (Phil. II, 21; II Cor. X, 24; II Tim. III, 1-2). Whence it is understood 1) that this is done in every mortal sin (Ps. X, 6; Tob. XII, 10); 2) that for the sake of no good is it lawful to sin even venially.

b) More by defect: 1) who love exterior or corporal goods so that spiritual goods are despised, namely preferring the good of the body to the good of the soul (Mt. X, 28), or even preferring the goods of fortune to salvation and bodily life;

2) who neglect the necessary means of salvation or the ordinary means of preserving one's own life, bodily integrity or health; or expose themselves without sufficient reason to danger of soul (e.g. by long deferring penance) or of body (e.g. of death or grave illness);

3) who wish evil upon themselves and a fortiori inflict it upon themselves, e.g. directly harming bodily salvation, injuring themselves in the integrity of members, or taking away their own bodily life.

To this malice however by which these sins are opposed to charity toward oneself, special attention is not to be paid in confession, because it is included in every sin; moreover these sins always injure another precept or virtue, and therefore they are to be declared under another species.

S. Th. II-II, q. 25, a. 6 and 7.

889. Sinners are to be loved. — "Every sinner, says Augustine, l. 1 de Doctr. chr., c. 27, inasmuch as he is a sinner, is not to be loved, and every man, inasmuch as he is a man, is to be loved for God's sake". Therefore sinners according as there is guilt in them are not to be loved, but rather to be hated, i.e. the guilt in sinners is to be hated; but according to their nature inasmuch as they are men capable of eternal beatitude, they are to be loved out of charity.

To desire evil for a sinner inasmuch as it is evil is always illicit. But sometimes it is lawful to desire temporal evil for him under the notion of a greater good, either for the amendment of guilt (e.g. illness or adversity that he may be converted), or for the preservation of justice (e.g. that he be punished for a crime committed), or for the common good (e.g.

the death of a heresiarch lest he lead others away from the faith). But it is illicit for any wayfarer to desire that he be damned or that he sin, because that is simply evil.

890. Sinners do not love themselves out of charity. — "Sinners, say the Mechlinienses, n. 60, q. 2, do not truly love themselves; because they do not love themselves according to what is principal in them, namely according to the soul and spiritual goods; but according to what they ought to hate and deny, namely according to the corruption of the exterior man. Whence, says S. Thomas (Q. D. de Virt. 2, a. 12, ad 6), a sinner "rather hates himself than loves himself according to Ps. X, 6: He who loves iniquity hates his own soul". Nevertheless there remains the natural love of self".

S. Thomas illustrates the matter, q. 25, a. 7: "To love oneself in one way is common to all, in another way it is proper to the good, in a third way it is proper to the wicked... Man is said to be something: in one way according to his substance and nature; and according to this... all men good and wicked love themselves, inasmuch as they love their own preservation. In another way man is said to be something according to what is principal...: for the principal in man is the rational mind, the secondary however is the sensitive and corporeal nature, of which the Apostle names the first the interior man, the second the exterior (II Cor. IV, 16). Now the good esteem the principal in themselves to be the rational nature, or the interior man, whence according to this they esteem themselves to be what they are. The wicked however esteem the principal in themselves to be the sensitive and corporeal nature, namely the exterior man. Whence, not rightly knowing themselves, they do not truly love themselves, but they love that which they think themselves to be. The good however truly knowing themselves, truly love themselves. And this the Philosopher proves by the five things which are proper to friendship. For each friend 1° indeed wills his friend to be and to live; 2° wills good things for him; 3° works good things for him; 4° lives with him delightfully; 5° agrees with him, as delighting and being saddened in the same things. And according to this the good love themselves, as to the interior man, because 1) they wish it to be preserved in its integrity; and 2) they wish good things for it, which are spiritual goods, and 3) they also bestow effort to obtain them; and 4) it is delightful for them to return to their own heart, because there they find good thoughts in the present, and the memory of past goods, and the hope of future goods from which they delight. Likewise also 5) they do not suffer in themselves a dissension of will because their whole soul tends to one thing. — On the contrary however the wicked 1) do not wish to be preserved in the integrity of the interior man; 2) nor do they desire spiritual goods for it; 3) nor do they work for this; 4) nor is it delightful for them to live with themselves, returning to the heart, because they find there evils, both present, past, and future, which they abhor; 5) nor are they in accord with themselves on account of the remorse of conscience.

And by the same things it can be proved that the wicked love themselves according to the corruption of the exterior man; thus however the good do not love themselves.

S. Th. II-II, q. 25, a. 8 and 9; de Virt. q. 2, a. 8.

891. Enemies are to be loved. — Enemies are those who hate us or ours, or have offended or injured us, or at least are apprehended as such¹.

Enemies are not to be loved as enemies, i.e. their enmity is not to be loved, because it is evil. But enemies according to their nature, inasmuch as they are men capable of eternal beatitude, are to be loved out of charity. — It is proved:

a) From the words of Christ, Mt. V, 44: "Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you... pray for those who persecute and calumniate you, that you may be sons of your Father who is in heaven"; and VI, 12: "Forgive us our debts as we also forgive our debtors", where the love of enemies is indicated as a condition required for the remission of sins, for V, 15: "But if you will not forgive men, neither will your Father forgive you your sins".

b) From the Old Testament: Lev. XIX, 17-18; Exod. XXIII, 4, 5; Prov. XXV, 21, compared with Rom. XII, 20-21.

c) Reason dictates the principle: What you do not wish to be done to yourself, do not do to another; but no one wishes to be hated but entirely desires to be loved. — Moreover it is against reason to hate someone, on account of a fault, not only according to the fault, but also according to his nature, inasmuch as there is good in him.

892. Enemies are to be loved by precept in general, i.e. as other men even unknown, inasmuch as we cannot exclude them from the love of neighbor; whence we are bound per se and in general to render them, out of internal affection, the common signs and benefits of love: to deny these in general would be taken as a sign of hatred, and easily causes scandal, both with respect to the enemy who is thereby confirmed in enmity, and also with respect to those who see it.

But in particular, by exercising a special act of love toward the person of the enemy, it is not of precept but of perfection and counsel; and therefore to show special signs of love in general is not of precept. It is however in precept according to the preparation of soul, namely that a man be ready to love his enemy in particular, and to do good to him, and to show him special signs of love, if necessity should demand (Prov. XXV, 21).

893. Common signs and benefits of love are those which, by reason of general charity, are either shown to all men or to all of some condition (e.g. when someone prays for all, or gives alms to all the poor of the same city), or are customarily shown by all men of such a state or condition to one another (e.g. by a neighbor to neighbors, by a relative to relatives, by a father to sons, by a disciple to fellow disciples, etc.). Which however these are, is to be judged from prudent estimation and received custom: for there is great diversity according to region, state and time. Whence, says S. Alphonsus, n° 28: "It is not lawful to exclude an enemy from common prayers, e.g. the Lord's prayer which is instituted for the community, nor from common alms, return of greeting, response (even by letters), the sale of goods offered; because these are common signs of love, and therefore to act against these, e.g. to invite all relatives, to greet from custom all those met from the neighborhood or college, with the sole enemy excluded", is per se and regularly evil.

894. Special signs and benefits of love are those which are owed to no one, nor are required by the condition of the person and custom of the region, but are specially shown out of mere liberality to certain persons, by reason of a special friendship which is not toward all of the same condition: these just as they are freely undertaken, are freely omitted. Whence per se and in general we are not bound to visit sick enemies, to console the sad, to receive them in hospitality or at table, to pray specially for them, to have frequent commerce e.g. by letters with them, indeed not even first otherwise or to greet them, unless it were a question of a superior or very close persons, or unless the greeting or address were a common sign of charity toward those met (e.g. in small places, in a banquet, communities, etc.), from which to abstain for a longer time would be taken as a sign of hatred.

895. To omit common signs and benefits of love is sometimes lawful, but accidentally and extraordinarily for a time, for just cause:

a) from justice, namely 1) if a superior offended by an inferior hopes to amend him in this way (provided the hope is well founded), or intends to correct him, or to give example to others: for the superior has the right to punish² ;

b) from charity: 2) if it is done without hatred, even by one not a superior, that the audacity and insolence of the offender may be restrained, or that he may be amended³; 3) if one prudently fears from the signs shown greater obstinacy of the enemy, recollection of the injuries, new commotion or quarrel;

c) from another reasonable cause: 4) if it is done in sign of just pain from actual or recent injury, especially if this was atrocious; 5) if it is done on account of a gravely defaming injury, lest it seem to be esteemed of little account; 6) if, without scandal, it is done because one knows certainly that the enemy will not respond to signs shown, e.g. because he has experienced this; but if he doubts, he is bound at least to try once.

**896. We ought to show special signs of love accidentally and extraordinarily; which however then are common signs owed to all:

a) in grave spiritual or temporal necessity (of life, of reputation, of fortune) of the neighbor, for then to deny them would rightly be taken as a sign of hatred;

b) when the enemy asks pardon, or shows special signs to obtain it, in which case to deny special signs is ordinarily a sign of hatred; sometimes however one will lawfully deny them (for a time), e.g. a superior for amendment, punishment or example, anyone to express just grief if pardon is asked immediately after the offense;

c) to resist the hatred to which you feel yourself inclined;

d) to avoid scandal, which however can otherwise be avoided e.g. by declaration or admonition of those who see it;

e) if there is a well-founded hope that the enemy will then lay down grave hatred, from which obligation however a grave inconvenience excuses (cfr. infra, p. 3, q. 3, a. 2).

897. To deny an enemy signs of charity owed is a mortal sin of its genus. — It is mortal because it is against charity⁴; which happens 1) from internal intention, when it proceeds from hatred or appetite of mortal revenge, 2) by reason of external signification, when it is considered by the enemy as a grave offense, or when it causes grave scandal, or when it would be taken by others as a sign of grave hatred or appetite of mortal revenge. To judge this latter, attention must be paid to the cause why the signs are omitted, e.g. if it is done on account of a preceding grave quarrel it will more easily be taken as a sign of grave hatred than if it is done about trifles. Whence it seems too general, that some without restriction say, that a religious who does not wish to address a confrere after ten days is not to be absolved: for it is not always taken as a sign of grave hatred.]

It is mortal of its genus; therefore it admits of lightness of matter: thus if a person of much greater rank does not return the greeting of an inferior, e.g. a nobleman a peasant, a father his son, it does not seem mortal; and moreover in our regions the omission of greeting or return of greeting once or twice is more often a venial sin: for per se it is opposed only to affability, nor per se with us is it a sign or effect of grave hatred, or cause of grave scandal.

898. We are bound internally to remit the offense to the enemy (Mt. VI, 15; XVIII, 35), but not to renew with him the former special friendship, if this was freely undertaken. Nor are we bound per se, even if he asks pardon, to remit restitution for damage done, or satisfaction for injury inflicted (for no one is bound per se to remit a good owed to him), indeed not even to accept them if he offers them; but we can seek them by juridical action, provided we do not principally intend the evil of the enemy, but the good which such action procures, namely the amendment of the enemy, or his restraint, the quiet of others, or the preservation of justice.

In practice however: 1) In general we ought to accept sufficient satisfaction spontaneously offered, nor can we seek it juridically, especially if it is a question of seeking a grave penalty against the enemy without advantage for ourselves, or of pressing a satisfaction greater than he can offer. The reason is that in seeking such things it is difficult for the spirit of vengeance to be absent: for it is difficult that one seek public vengeance out of pure love of justice from a judge, without an inordinate love of private vengeance which is illicit, and to which man is greatly inclined; whence also the common estimation takes this as a sign of vengeance.

2) Sometimes we ought to remit reparation for a merely personal injury, when the burden which the enemy would undergo in making reparation would be too great in respect to the good which would come to us from it.

3) Never is it lawful to remit, if a superior needed his reputation, not only for himself, but more for the good and salvation of others, or if it were an injury that would bring infamy upon the whole family or community, unless it were repaired by juridical satisfaction.

899. On the order and manner of reconciliation. — The offender ought to begin the reconciliation (Mt. V, 23-24) as soon as he morally can: for out of charity he is bound, just as not to place, so also to remove the offense; but if the offense is mutual, he who offended the more gravely; if it is nearly equal, he who offended first. It is excepted, if it is certainly foreseen that pardon will be denied by the other, or if the offender greatly surpasses in dignity or state, unless perhaps the injury is enormous.

Reconciliation is generally sought sufficiently in an indirect way by special signs of love: by sending a gift, rendering a service, an office or benefit, going ahead in honor, amicable conversation, etc. or by the intercession of others. However when the offense was grave, and no other means of reconciliation is at hand (or if a superior or judge imposes it), the offender must also directly ask pardon, because just as out of charity he was bound not to place the offense, so out of charity he is bound to remove it. But in practice, a formal petition of pardon admits of many excuses, e.g. if it is not in use among persons of such condition, if the offended demands an unusual humiliation, or does not care for the petition, or if it can otherwise be fully satisfied e.g. by money or by indirect means, by a sign of special love or honor, as was said above.

900. Practical admonition. — Since each one easily persuades himself that he has suffered a graver injury, and the confessor exhorts each one to seek reconciliation. He should not however easily impose the obligation of directly asking pardon, because this is not always to be borne; indeed even if it is certainly present, it is often prudent to leave the penitent in good faith, if admonition is not hoped to be profitable.