Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. II-II, q. 23, a. 4 and 5; q. 25, a. 1; I, q. 60, a. 5; I-II, q. 65, a. 5; de Virt. q. 2, a. 2 and 4.

874. Thesis. The formal object or proximate motive of charity toward God is the absolute goodness of God in himself, lovable for his own sake, inasmuch as he is the object of supernatural beatitude.

It is the goodness of God in himself. For:

1) Right love toward God has as motive the goodness of God considered either in himself or in relation to us. But the love of charity does not have as motive the goodness of God in relation to us. Therefore. — The minor is proved: There is true friendship with God. But the love of friendship loves the friend on account of the goodness of the friend himself, not however that some good may come to us from him; whence Jn. XV, 13, it is said: love lays down its life for a friend. Therefore.

2) Just as in the state of pure nature we would tend habitually toward the natural last end as good in itself, to be loved above all things¹, so in the supernatural order it is necessary, that by supernatural virtue we tend habitually toward the supernatural last end as good in itself to be loved above all things. But we do not do this by faith which tends toward God under the notion of true; nor by hope by which we tend toward God inasmuch as he is our supreme good: for this does not tend toward him as the supreme good in himself, nor does it make us love God above ourselves. Therefore by charity we tend toward God the supernatural end as good in himself.

875. The formal object of charity is called the goodness of God in himself, as the object of beatitude i.e. as supernatural end. Which does not signify the goodness of God inasmuch as he makes us blessed, for this is no longer the goodness of God in himself but the goodness of God relative to us; but the sense is that the goodness of God which and inasmuch as it communicates itself in the beatific vision and is the supernatural last end of all, and can be known only by the supernatural light of faith, is in itself and above all things lovable, and so is the motive of charity.

For the goodness of God considered in itself can be considered in three ways: either by abstracting from this that it communicates itself, — or inasmuch as it communicates itself improperly by a certain adumbration of itself in the production of natural things, and according to the requirement of nature could be the end and object of natural beatitude, — or inasmuch as it communicates itself most properly through the beatific vision and sanctifying grace. In the first two ways it is only the motive of natural love and benevolence which would also exist in the state of pure nature; in the third way considered, it is the motive of supernatural love and friendship. For a) if the goodness of God did not communicate itself in a way exceeding all the requirements of nature, it would never be the motive of supernatural love; and b) if the very goodness and proper life of God were not made common to us, they would never be the foundation of friendship (cfr. prop. Baius damn. 34, 36, 38).

876. Opinions not to be approved. — 1° A few moderns understood the goodness of God to be the formal motive of charity in such a way that God is our supreme good and makes us blessed, also saying that the love of concupiscence is the love of charity. Which assertion is not only made without any foundation; but is also false, for it is against the nature and perfection of true friendship; nor does it seem to be able to be reconciled with the doctrine of the preeminence of charity over hope. And it not only directly contradicts S. Thomas, as is manifest from the exposition of the doctrine made², but also before the end of the 18th century it seems to have been unknown.

2° Others, more numerous, without merit contend that the motive of charity is mere nature, or whatever divine perfection abstracted from the rest, inasmuch as it is in itself lovable.

For although God can thus be loved by a certain love of benevolence, the motive of charity is goodness in itself inasmuch as it communicates itself; God however is in himself infinitely good with all perfections and communicates himself such as he is in himself, and therefore all his perfections to be seen and possessed are communicated to us.

Moreover the motive of charity is the last end, namely the supreme goodness in itself supremely lovable, than which nothing greater can be thought and which, when possessed, nothing remains to be desired, because it perfectly beatifies and fully satisfies the whole appetite of man; but this is not verified of one or another perfection which virtually contains others, but only of the good which is also formally conceived as the cumulus of all perfections at least in confusion. The adequate motive therefore of charity is the supreme infinite goodness of God inasmuch as it contains all perfections.

877. The formal object of charity toward the neighbor is the same goodness of God in himself, as the object of supernatural beatitude, inasmuch namely as it is communicated or communicable to us.

For we can love our neighbor on account of the goodness of God in himself, to which he has a relation:

a) inasmuch as he is a thing of God and destined for his glory: the means for the end;

b) inasmuch as the divine goodness is supernaturally participated by him, shines forth in him and makes him lovable, or at least is proximately destined for this: the participant to the participated; the image to the truth, exemplar, prototype;

c) inasmuch as he is loved by God, and by destination at least is a friend of God: the loved to the lover.

To love the neighbor with the love of charity is to wish him supernatural good, especially that he may adhere in God as in the last end, and so forever love and praise God; the motive however why we wish this is because God in himself infinitely good and perfect deserves to be loved forever.

to be praised and glorified by all who can do so (cfr. I Jn. III, 14 sq.; IV, 12, 21; V, 1, 2).

Thus the ultimate and formal reason for loving the neighbor is the very uncreated goodness of God lovable for his own sake.

878. How by divine charity we love ourselves. — In the same way it is explained how we love ourselves for God's sake. Which however may seem difficult or even impossible, namely that we love God because he is good in himself: for we do not love except that which is good for us; but to love someone because he is good for us, is not to love ourselves for his sake but on the contrary to love him for ourselves. Which is clear from the fact that our happiness in all natural acts we naturally and necessarily pursue.

Reply: It is true that the condition required for us to love something is that it be our good, whence also first we naturally love God with the love of concupiscence because he is good for us; but the principal and proximate motive of love is not always that something be our good, but it can be that it be good in itself; and therefore after we have loved God for ourselves, as our good, we also consider him as good in himself and love him principally for his own sake, and we refer ourselves to God and wish ourselves to God, as the good of God.

In other words: a prerequired condition without which not, is that the act of love of such an object and therefore the object itself be our good and be fitting for us (so it is within the sphere of the will); but this universal reason of love is not the special reason of perfect love: it is not its proximate motive, nor is it what the will desires. For thus one does not love a good because it is his, but because it is good.

Which of course does not signify that in that act we do not seek happiness: for in every act we naturally seek it; but it signifies that we will ourselves to God and refer our happiness to God's happiness, and voluntarily constitute ourselves in it. Charity therefore tends not so much toward God as the good of the lover, but rather as the good of the loved.

879. Corollaries. — From the aforesaid it follows:

1) Although benefits received or to be received from God are remote motives which induce and impel us to charity, inasmuch as a) they show God in himself to be perfect and: lovable for himself (Eph. V, 2), and inasmuch as b) they move us to love the benefactor in himself, which case gratuitously disposes to the love of charity; however to wish good to God solely and precisely on account of benefits is not an act of charity, but of gratitude, which pertains to the virtue of religion. Therefore if benefits are considered as goods conferred on us and we stop there, it is an act of gratitude; if they are considered as communications of divine goodness, it can be an act of charity, if in them we do not love our utility, because we have received, but the goodness of God which communicates itself, inasmuch as it is lovable for its own sake.

2) Charity, and the love of concupiscence by which we love God as our good, do not mutually exclude each other; indeed this love is necessarily presupposed by charity and as a remote impulsive cause disposes and moves to it (as was said in the preceding corollary) and strengthens it, inasmuch as goods received or to be received from God show him to be good in himself³. — Whence the love of concupiscence can be elicited by charity itself provided it is subordinated to it, and God is loved principally, our good secondarily desired, inasmuch as we desire to possess God and to be blessed so that through possession we may better love and praise God's goodness.

3) To love the neighbor solely because God commanded it, is not an act of charity but of obedience.

4) To love the neighbor on account of benefits received from him, or on account of outstanding natural qualities, or on account of the natural image of God impressed on him, is not charity but natural love. The same is to be said if he is loved on account of his supernatural perfections of grace and charity, not indeed precisely as they are a participation of divine goodness (for thus they are loved with charity, as was said n° 877), but inasmuch as they are proper to the neighbor, without considering the relation which they have to God.

5) No one out of charity can love the neighbor without virtually implicitly loving God, because to love the neighbor is to will that he love God forever; and conversely one cannot love God without virtually implicitly loving the neighbor, because to love God is also to will that he be loved and praised forever by the neighbor. Cfr. I Jn. IV, 12, 21; V, 1, 2.

6) The act of charity is in substance a supernatural act, and truly divine, because as material and formal object it has God himself in himself: for it loves God himself on account of his own proper goodness by which he surpasses all creatures and all nature, in the same way namely as we shall love God in heaven where we shall be perfectly partakers of his very life, and in a manner similar to that by which God loves himself.