Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. II-II, q. 23, a. 4 and 5; q. 25, a. 1; I, q. 60, a. 5; I-II, q. 65, a. 5; de Virt. q. 2, a. 2 and 4.

874. Thesis. The formal object or proximate motive of charity toward God is the absolute goodness of God in himself, lovable for his own sake, inasmuch as he is the object of supernatural beatitude.

It is the goodness of God in himself. For:

1) Right love toward God has as motive the goodness of God considered either in himself or in relation to us. But the love of charity does not have as motive the goodness of God in relation to us. Therefore. — The minor is proved: There is true friendship with God. But the love of friendship loves the friend on account of the goodness of the friend himself, not however that some good may come to us from him; whence Jn. XV, 13, it is said: love lays down its life for a friend. Therefore.

2) Just as in the state of pure nature we would tend habitually toward the natural last end as good in itself, to be loved above all things¹, so in the supernatural order it is necessary, that by supernatural virtue we tend habitually toward the supernatural last end as good in itself to be loved above all things. But we do not do this by faith which tends toward God under the notion of true; nor by hope by which we tend toward God inasmuch as he is our supreme good: for this does not tend toward him as the supreme good in himself, nor does it make us love God above ourselves. Therefore by charity we tend toward God the supernatural end as good in himself.

875. The formal object of charity is called the goodness of God in himself, as the object of beatitude i.e. as supernatural end. Which does not signify the goodness of God inasmuch as he makes us blessed, for this is no longer the goodness of God in himself but the goodness of God relative to us; but the sense is that the goodness of God which and inasmuch as it communicates itself in the beatific vision and is the supernatural last end of all, and can be known only by the supernatural light of faith, is in itself and above all things lovable, and so is the motive of charity.

For the goodness of God considered in itself can be considered in three ways: either by abstracting from this that it communicates itself, — or inasmuch as it communicates itself improperly by a certain adumbration of itself in the production of natural things, and according to the requirement of nature could be the end and object of natural beatitude, — or inasmuch as it communicates itself most properly through the beatific vision and sanctifying grace. In the first two ways it is only the motive of natural love and benevolence which would also exist in the state of pure nature; in the third way considered, it is the motive of supernatural love and friendship. For a) if the goodness of God did not communicate itself in a way exceeding all the requirements of nature, it would never be the motive of supernatural love; and b) if the very goodness and proper life of God were not made common to us, they would never be the foundation of friendship (cfr. prop. Baius damn. 34, 36, 38).

876. Opinions not to be approved. — 1° A few moderns understood the goodness of God to be the formal motive of charity in such a way that God is our supreme good and makes us blessed, also saying that the love of concupiscence is the love of charity. Which assertion is not only made without any foundation; but is also false, for it is against the nature and perfection of true friendship; nor does it seem to be able to be reconciled with the doctrine of the preeminence of charity over hope. And it not only directly contradicts S. Thomas, as is manifest from the exposition of the doctrine made², but also before the end of the 18th century it seems to have been unknown.

2° Others, more numerous, without merit contend that the motive of charity is mere nature, or whatever divine perfection abstracted from the rest, inasmuch as it is in itself lovable.

For although God can thus be loved by a certain love of benevolence, the motive of charity is goodness in itself inasmuch as it communicates itself; God however is in himself infinitely good with all perfections and communicates himself such as he is in himself, and therefore all his perfections to be seen and possessed are communicated to us.

Moreover the motive of charity is the last end, namely the supreme goodness in itself supremely lovable, than which nothing greater can be thought and which, when possessed, nothing remains to be desired, because it perfectly beatifies and fully satisfies the whole appetite of man; but this is not verified of one or another perfection which virtually contains others, but only of the good which is also formally conceived as the cumulus of all perfections at least in confusion. The adequate motive therefore of charity is the supreme infinite goodness of God inasmuch as it contains all perfections.

877. The formal object of charity toward the neighbor is the same goodness of God in himself, as the object of supernatural beatitude, inasmuch namely as it is communicated or communicable to us.

For we can love our neighbor on account of the goodness of God in himself, to which he has a relation:

a) inasmuch as he is a thing of God and destined for his glory: the means for the end;

b) inasmuch as the divine goodness is supernaturally participated by him, shines forth in him and makes him lovable, or at least is proximately destined for this: the participant to the participated; the image to the truth, exemplar, prototype;

c) inasmuch as he is loved by God, and by destination at least is a friend of God: the loved to the lover.

To love the neighbor with the love of charity is to wish him supernatural good, especially that he may adhere in God as in the last end, and so forever love and praise God; the motive however why we wish this is because God in himself infinitely good and perfect deserves to be loved forever.

to be praised and glorified by all who can do so (cfr. I Jn. III, 14 sq.; IV, 12, 21; V, 1, 2).

Thus the ultimate and formal reason for loving the neighbor is the very uncreated goodness of God lovable for his own sake.

878. How by divine charity we love ourselves. — In the same way it is explained how we love ourselves for God's sake. Which however may seem difficult or even impossible, namely that we love God because he is good in himself: for we do not love except that which is good for us; but to love someone because he is good for us, is not to love ourselves for his sake but on the contrary to love him for ourselves. Which is clear from the fact that our happiness in all natural acts we naturally and necessarily pursue.

Reply: It is true that the condition required for us to love something is that it be our good, whence also first we naturally love God with the love of concupiscence because he is good for us; but the principal and proximate motive of love is not always that something be our good, but it can be that it be good in itself; and therefore after we have loved God for ourselves, as our good, we also consider him as good in himself and love him principally for his own sake, and we refer ourselves to God and wish ourselves to God, as the good of God.

In other words: a prerequired condition without which not, is that the act of love of such an object and therefore the object itself be our good and be fitting for us (so it is within the sphere of the will); but this universal reason of love is not the special reason of perfect love: it is not its proximate motive, nor is it what the will desires. For thus one does not love a good because it is his, but because it is good.

Which of course does not signify that in that act we do not seek happiness: for in every act we naturally seek it; but it signifies that we will ourselves to God and refer our happiness to God's happiness, and voluntarily constitute ourselves in it. Charity therefore tends not so much toward God as the good of the lover, but rather as the good of the loved.

879. Corollaries. — From the aforesaid it follows:

1) Although benefits received or to be received from God are remote motives which induce and impel us to charity, inasmuch as a) they show God in himself to be perfect and: lovable for himself (Eph. V, 2), and inasmuch as b) they move us to love the benefactor in himself, which case gratuitously disposes to the love of charity; however to wish good to God solely and precisely on account of benefits is not an act of charity, but of gratitude, which pertains to the virtue of religion. Therefore if benefits are considered as goods conferred on us and we stop there, it is an act of gratitude; if they are considered as communications of divine goodness, it can be an act of charity, if in them we do not love our utility, because we have received, but the goodness of God which communicates itself, inasmuch as it is lovable for its own sake.

2) Charity, and the love of concupiscence by which we love God as our good, do not mutually exclude each other; indeed this love is necessarily presupposed by charity and as a remote impulsive cause disposes and moves to it (as was said in the preceding corollary) and strengthens it, inasmuch as goods received or to be received from God show him to be good in himself³. — Whence the love of concupiscence can be elicited by charity itself provided it is subordinated to it, and God is loved principally, our good secondarily desired, inasmuch as we desire to possess God and to be blessed so that through possession we may better love and praise God's goodness.

3) To love the neighbor solely because God commanded it, is not an act of charity but of obedience.

4) To love the neighbor on account of benefits received from him, or on account of outstanding natural qualities, or on account of the natural image of God impressed on him, is not charity but natural love. The same is to be said if he is loved on account of his supernatural perfections of grace and charity, not indeed precisely as they are a participation of divine goodness (for thus they are loved with charity, as was said n° 877), but inasmuch as they are proper to the neighbor, without considering the relation which they have to God.

5) No one out of charity can love the neighbor without virtually implicitly loving God, because to love the neighbor is to will that he love God forever; and conversely one cannot love God without virtually implicitly loving the neighbor, because to love God is also to will that he be loved and praised forever by the neighbor. Cfr. I Jn. IV, 12, 21; V, 1, 2.

6) The act of charity is in substance a supernatural act, and truly divine, because as material and formal object it has God himself in himself: for it loves God himself on account of his own proper goodness by which he surpasses all creatures and all nature, in the same way namely as we shall love God in heaven where we shall be perfectly partakers of his very life, and in a manner similar to that by which God loves himself.

S. Th. II-II, q. 25, a. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 11, 12; de Virt., q. 2, a. 7.

880. The twofold object of love. — Since to love is to will good for someone, in every love there is a twofold object: the person for whom we will good, who is the immediate object, loved per se and simply; — and the good which we will for him, which is loved only mediately and under a certain respect, inasmuch as we love the person to whom this good belongs. Whence the persons loved alone are properly called the material object of love.

881. Thesis. The principal material object of charity is God himself the supernatural end who is loved per se on account of his own goodness, and for whose sake other persons are loved, so that we may thus love him more and more perfectly. The secondary material object is all rational creatures who can share in the beatitude of God: ourselves, all wayfaring men, the saints in heaven, the good angels, the souls dwelling in purgatory; not however irrational creatures, the damned, and the evil angels. They are loved not per se on account of their own goodness, but for God's sake and his goodness: just as if someone has friendship for some man, on his account he loves all who belong to that man, whether children, or friends, or servants, etc. inasmuch as they pertain to him, so the friendship of charity extends itself to all the familiars of God, whom he calls to his society and beatitude.

882. What good do we will with the love of charity? — The principal good which we will for God are his own infinite perfections, which indeed we do not desire for him, but in which we are pleased; the secondary is the manifestation and external glorification of these perfections, which we wish and procure for God and about which we procure to rejoice.

The principal good which we will for ourselves and our neighbor is charity itself together with its foundation sanctifying grace and beatitude; the secondary is both all supernatural goods which lead per se to beatitude, and also per accidens natural goods inasmuch as they can sometimes lead to beatitude.

Charity can also be concerned with irrational creatures or demons, inasmuch as one wills them to be preserved for the glory of God or the utility of men.

883. Four different things are to be loved out of charity, according to Augustine, de doctr. chr., l. 1, c. 23 and 26: 1) something as the cause and root of beatitude: God;

2) something which participates directly in beatitude: the one loving himself, or ourselves;

3) those whom we can have as associates in this participation: our neighbors;

4) finally something to which beatitude is derived only through a certain redundancy: our body.

S. Th. II-II, q. 23, a. 4; q. 25, a. 1; q. 27, a. 2, 5, 6; q. 28, a. 1; q. 44, a. 4, 5, 6.

884. How charity is to be exercised toward God. — Charity or divine friendship is an efficacious love of benevolence, whence it comprises both complacence in the divine goods, — and desire or benevolence properly so called i.e. the will of increasing the divine goods, — and zeal for promoting the glory of God.

1) Complacence is in the goods which God possesses: for when we truly love someone, we regard his goods as our own, and therefore are pleased in his goods, as if they were our own; which Christ indicated by these words: "If you loved me, you would indeed rejoice that I go to the Father" Jn. XIV, 28. Hence:

a) The just rejoice in the infinite perfections of God in themselves considered, such as his wisdom, power, goodness, beauty, etc., indeed they are more pleased in the perfection and glory of God than in their own beatitude. So Augustine is reported to have said: "Lord God, I love you so, that if I were God and you Augustine, I would wish to be Augustine, that you might be God". And S. Francis de Sales who reports this, himself prayed: "O dearest of my heart, I do not indeed desire that I may be able to wish something good for your majesty, but with my whole heart I am pleased in that supreme degree of goodness which you have, to which neither by desire nor even by thought anything can be added; but if such a desire were possible, O infinite Deity and divine Infinity, my soul would wish to be this very desire and nothing else¹."

b) They rejoice likewise in the external manifestation of God's attributes, in divine providence, in the extension of the kingdom of God, in the external glory which they receive from the Angels, the elect in heaven, and the just on earth.

c) Which complacence spontaneously bursts forth into praise of God (which is an act of religion) by which they congratulate him for all that pertains to his perfection and glory: "Glory to God in the highest... We praise you, we bless you, we glorify you... We laud you, we confess you the Lord".

2) Desire is for the divine goods to be increased inasmuch as it is possible; which is benevolence strictly so called by which we wish and desire good for God: for when we truly love someone, we wish him good as for ourselves.

a) That desire is not absolute which concerns the intrinsic perfections of God whose increase we do not desire, since nothing good can accrue to the Infinite; yet we can in some way desire them conditionally. For S. Thomas says (III Sent., d. 29, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4): "If it were possible that from our works something could accrue to him, he who has charity would do many more things to preserve beatitude for him than to obtain it for himself". Whence S. Francis de Sales (l. c.): "I said to the Lord: My God, you are mine, immense and full of goodness, who need neither my goods nor those of any other; if however it were possible that you needed some good, I would never cease to wish it to you, and, to procure it for you, I would gladly spend my life and all that is dearest to me".

b) But absolute is the desire for the extrinsic glory of God, to procure which we are induced by love, both in ourselves inasmuch as we are ready to do and suffer all things to progress in divine love, and in others inasmuch as we sincerely desire that sinners and infidels be enlightened and know, love and glorify God, or even that the just may glorify him more: "Let the peoples confess to you, God; let all the peoples confess to you... Praise the Lord from the heavens... praise the Lord from the earth... praise him all nations... Bless all the works of the Lord... Hallowed be your name, your kingdom come".

c) From which desire arises sadness for sins and offenses committed against God, the supreme Good, and filial fear lest by offending God we be separated from him who is loved above all.

3) Zeal for promoting the glory of God arises, when love does not stop in the affection alone, but also works outwardly. For the affection is not enough, but charity must be effective: "Let us not love in word or in tongue but in deed and in truth" (I Jn. III, 18; cfr. Mt. XXV, 41 sq.). "He who has my commandments and keeps them, he it is who loves me" (Jn. XIV, 21). Whence S. Gregory: "The proof of love is the showing of the work" (hom. in Ev., l. 8, hom. 30).

Which is done in two ways: a) vehemently repelling as much as possible those things which are against the honor and will of God, and b) positively performing those things which procure the honor of God: in oneself perfectly observing the commandments, indeed even the counsels, and doing all works to please God so that he truly reigns over us; in others promoting the exercise of religion and of the virtues.

885. Suitable means are to be employed to progress in the love of God. One must:

1) Diminish the obstacle and gradually eradicate the inordinate love of self, which is directly contrary to divine love and is the cause of all sin (I-II, q. 77, a. 4). Whence Christ (Mt. XVI, 24): "If anyone wishes to come after me, let him deny himself". Wherefore the nourishment of charity is the lessening of cupidity, and we progress in charity only as much as we depress the love of ourselves.

2) Consider the reasons for loving God, namely a) God is the lover of us, who first loved us and from eternity chose us gratuitously for existence and innumerable natural and supernatural benefits, not for his own advantage or happiness, but for our good.

b) God wills and ardently desires to be loved by us, as is clear from the precept which he imposed on us as the first and greatest of the whole law (Mt. XXII, 37-38), — from the promises, communications, benefits and punishments by which he allures to his love, and presents himself as a most generous benefactor, best father, most loving spouse, for he longs to be loved, — especially from this that he sent his Son who came to communicate divine life to us, to send the fire of divine love to be kindled, and to promise the Holy Spirit and God dwelling in us.

c) God in himself is infinitely lovable, as is clear from this that all the perfections, goodnesses and beauties of all creatures and all supernatural benefits he eminently and infinitely contains in himself; whence he is worthy of all love, and if love must be proportioned to the dignity of the object, the supreme and infinite goodness must be loved without measure.

3) Employ means by which charity is frequently exercised and increased, whether:

a) Directly, by eliciting the act of love toward God the excellent benefactor lovable in himself, complacence in the divine attributes worthy of all praise, benevolence by which we desire that the name of God be hallowed, his kingdom come and his will be done on earth as in heaven, zeal by which with all our strength we promote the glory of God, perfect contrition by which we detest sins because they offend God who is infinitely good; — or:

b) Indirectly, by eliciting acts of the moral virtues which are informed by charity, especially the observance of the commandments which is the sign of love (Jn. XIV, 15, 21; I Jn. II, 4; V, 3), by perfect subjection to the will of God especially in fulfilling the duties of state; indeed by any act of piety, of labor, of mortification, etc. done out of love of God (I Cor. X, 31). And thus even the more difficult works become easy, for, as Augustine says, nothing is difficult for those who love.

S. Th. II-II, q. 25, a. 4, 5, 7.

886. A man must love himself, both with natural love, which he also naturally fulfills, since everyone naturally loves his own preservation and happiness (and so to love is common to the good and the wicked); — and with the supernatural love of charity, as is clearly presupposed in the Lord's precept, of loving namely the neighbor as oneself. For although properly so called friendship cannot be had directly toward oneself, but something greater than friendship, nevertheless friendship can be had toward God, and consequently toward others (and ourselves) who are God's. Whence S. Thomas, q. 25, a. 4:

"Since charity is a certain friendship... we can speak of charity in two ways. In one way under the common notion of friendship, and according to this it must be said that friendship is not had properly toward oneself, but something greater than friendship, because friendship imports a certain union... But to each one there is unity with himself, which is more potent than union with another. Whence, just as unity is the principle of union, so the love by which one loves himself is the form and root of friendship. For in this we have friendship toward others, because we are disposed toward them as toward ourselves... In another way we can speak of charity according to its proper notion itself, inasmuch namely as it is the friendship of man toward God principally, and consequently toward those things which are God's: among which is also the man himself, who has charity; and thus among other things which he loves out of charity as pertaining to God, he also loves himself out of charity".

887. How a man must love himself. — By virtue of the divine precept a man is bound, out of love for himself, to love himself supernaturally, for God's sake, not according to his sensitive and corporeal nature considered in itself, and according to the corruption of the exterior man in those things which are repugnant to reason, but according to his rational nature or the interior man, inasmuch as he can be a partaker of divine beatitude according to soul and according to body. This is the most perfect reason and at the same time the unique norm and rule in our love of ourselves: in so far we ought to love ourselves, i.e. soul and body, as we pertain to God. And indeed: 1) Principally the soul, which created by God, has been made by grace a partaker of divine nature, redeemed by the blood of Christ, the temple of divinity and capable of eternal beatitude.

Whence we are bound a) to prefer the salvation of the soul and sanctification before all things (Mt. VI, 33), and to employ the necessary means for salvation, b) to cultivate Christian virtues, c) to do good and meritorious works according to the example of Christ (Mt. VI, 19-20), d) to esteem grace and the means of preserving and increasing it more than all temporal aids, e) and to hate and to fear one sin which turns us away from God. All the goods of the soul however, whether natural such as learning, knowledge, honor, fame, glory, etc., or even supernatural, are not to be loved for themselves but for God.

2) Secondarily and subordinately we must also love the body, not for its own sake but for God's sake, inasmuch as it is the instrument of the soul to render honor to God and to work good (Rom. VI, 13, 19), and the temple of God sanctified by grace and capable in some way of beatitude, which redounds from the glory of the soul into the body (II Cor. VI, 19-20; XV, 42-43).

Whence a) we are bound to employ ordinary means of preserving our own life, the integrity of members and health, procuring for ourselves food, clothing, dwelling, so that the body may be a suitable instrument to serve the soul and to serve God; however b) in seeking the good of the body, e.g. health, pleasure, life, etc., all these we must seek for God's sake, for the glory of God; c) we must restrain the concupiscence of the flesh and inordinate desires out of hatred of sin, and inflict reasonable mortification on the body which weighs down the soul and is prone to rebellion, that namely it may be subjected to the mind and to the service of God (Col. III, 5; I Cor. IX, 27); d) however not afflict the body out of hatred of the body considered according to its nature (as such it is good), nor seek mortification for its own sake (just as neither pleasure for its own sake), nor flee all delights and pleasures, but we may rejoice and enjoy even earthly delights, yet according to right reason.

888. They sin against the love of themselves: a) More by excess, who indulge in inordinate egotism and pursue private advantages principally, more than the good of God, or exclusively, with the glory of God or the salvation and utility of others set aside (Phil. II, 21; II Cor. X, 24; II Tim. III, 1-2). Whence it is understood 1) that this is done in every mortal sin (Ps. X, 6; Tob. XII, 10); 2) that for the sake of no good is it lawful to sin even venially.

b) More by defect: 1) who love exterior or corporal goods so that spiritual goods are despised, namely preferring the good of the body to the good of the soul (Mt. X, 28), or even preferring the goods of fortune to salvation and bodily life;

2) who neglect the necessary means of salvation or the ordinary means of preserving one's own life, bodily integrity or health; or expose themselves without sufficient reason to danger of soul (e.g. by long deferring penance) or of body (e.g. of death or grave illness);

3) who wish evil upon themselves and a fortiori inflict it upon themselves, e.g. directly harming bodily salvation, injuring themselves in the integrity of members, or taking away their own bodily life.

To this malice however by which these sins are opposed to charity toward oneself, special attention is not to be paid in confession, because it is included in every sin; moreover these sins always injure another precept or virtue, and therefore they are to be declared under another species.

S. Th. II-II, q. 25, a. 6 and 7.

889. Sinners are to be loved. — "Every sinner, says Augustine, l. 1 de Doctr. chr., c. 27, inasmuch as he is a sinner, is not to be loved, and every man, inasmuch as he is a man, is to be loved for God's sake". Therefore sinners according as there is guilt in them are not to be loved, but rather to be hated, i.e. the guilt in sinners is to be hated; but according to their nature inasmuch as they are men capable of eternal beatitude, they are to be loved out of charity.

To desire evil for a sinner inasmuch as it is evil is always illicit. But sometimes it is lawful to desire temporal evil for him under the notion of a greater good, either for the amendment of guilt (e.g. illness or adversity that he may be converted), or for the preservation of justice (e.g. that he be punished for a crime committed), or for the common good (e.g.

the death of a heresiarch lest he lead others away from the faith). But it is illicit for any wayfarer to desire that he be damned or that he sin, because that is simply evil.

890. Sinners do not love themselves out of charity. — "Sinners, say the Mechlinienses, n. 60, q. 2, do not truly love themselves; because they do not love themselves according to what is principal in them, namely according to the soul and spiritual goods; but according to what they ought to hate and deny, namely according to the corruption of the exterior man. Whence, says S. Thomas (Q. D. de Virt. 2, a. 12, ad 6), a sinner "rather hates himself than loves himself according to Ps. X, 6: He who loves iniquity hates his own soul". Nevertheless there remains the natural love of self".

S. Thomas illustrates the matter, q. 25, a. 7: "To love oneself in one way is common to all, in another way it is proper to the good, in a third way it is proper to the wicked... Man is said to be something: in one way according to his substance and nature; and according to this... all men good and wicked love themselves, inasmuch as they love their own preservation. In another way man is said to be something according to what is principal...: for the principal in man is the rational mind, the secondary however is the sensitive and corporeal nature, of which the Apostle names the first the interior man, the second the exterior (II Cor. IV, 16). Now the good esteem the principal in themselves to be the rational nature, or the interior man, whence according to this they esteem themselves to be what they are. The wicked however esteem the principal in themselves to be the sensitive and corporeal nature, namely the exterior man. Whence, not rightly knowing themselves, they do not truly love themselves, but they love that which they think themselves to be. The good however truly knowing themselves, truly love themselves. And this the Philosopher proves by the five things which are proper to friendship. For each friend 1° indeed wills his friend to be and to live; 2° wills good things for him; 3° works good things for him; 4° lives with him delightfully; 5° agrees with him, as delighting and being saddened in the same things. And according to this the good love themselves, as to the interior man, because 1) they wish it to be preserved in its integrity; and 2) they wish good things for it, which are spiritual goods, and 3) they also bestow effort to obtain them; and 4) it is delightful for them to return to their own heart, because there they find good thoughts in the present, and the memory of past goods, and the hope of future goods from which they delight. Likewise also 5) they do not suffer in themselves a dissension of will because their whole soul tends to one thing. — On the contrary however the wicked 1) do not wish to be preserved in the integrity of the interior man; 2) nor do they desire spiritual goods for it; 3) nor do they work for this; 4) nor is it delightful for them to live with themselves, returning to the heart, because they find there evils, both present, past, and future, which they abhor; 5) nor are they in accord with themselves on account of the remorse of conscience.

And by the same things it can be proved that the wicked love themselves according to the corruption of the exterior man; thus however the good do not love themselves.

S. Th. II-II, q. 25, a. 8 and 9; de Virt. q. 2, a. 8.

891. Enemies are to be loved. — Enemies are those who hate us or ours, or have offended or injured us, or at least are apprehended as such¹.

Enemies are not to be loved as enemies, i.e. their enmity is not to be loved, because it is evil. But enemies according to their nature, inasmuch as they are men capable of eternal beatitude, are to be loved out of charity. — It is proved:

a) From the words of Christ, Mt. V, 44: "Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you... pray for those who persecute and calumniate you, that you may be sons of your Father who is in heaven"; and VI, 12: "Forgive us our debts as we also forgive our debtors", where the love of enemies is indicated as a condition required for the remission of sins, for V, 15: "But if you will not forgive men, neither will your Father forgive you your sins".

b) From the Old Testament: Lev. XIX, 17-18; Exod. XXIII, 4, 5; Prov. XXV, 21, compared with Rom. XII, 20-21.

c) Reason dictates the principle: What you do not wish to be done to yourself, do not do to another; but no one wishes to be hated but entirely desires to be loved. — Moreover it is against reason to hate someone, on account of a fault, not only according to the fault, but also according to his nature, inasmuch as there is good in him.

892. Enemies are to be loved by precept in general, i.e. as other men even unknown, inasmuch as we cannot exclude them from the love of neighbor; whence we are bound per se and in general to render them, out of internal affection, the common signs and benefits of love: to deny these in general would be taken as a sign of hatred, and easily causes scandal, both with respect to the enemy who is thereby confirmed in enmity, and also with respect to those who see it.

But in particular, by exercising a special act of love toward the person of the enemy, it is not of precept but of perfection and counsel; and therefore to show special signs of love in general is not of precept. It is however in precept according to the preparation of soul, namely that a man be ready to love his enemy in particular, and to do good to him, and to show him special signs of love, if necessity should demand (Prov. XXV, 21).

893. Common signs and benefits of love are those which, by reason of general charity, are either shown to all men or to all of some condition (e.g. when someone prays for all, or gives alms to all the poor of the same city), or are customarily shown by all men of such a state or condition to one another (e.g. by a neighbor to neighbors, by a relative to relatives, by a father to sons, by a disciple to fellow disciples, etc.). Which however these are, is to be judged from prudent estimation and received custom: for there is great diversity according to region, state and time. Whence, says S. Alphonsus, n° 28: "It is not lawful to exclude an enemy from common prayers, e.g. the Lord's prayer which is instituted for the community, nor from common alms, return of greeting, response (even by letters), the sale of goods offered; because these are common signs of love, and therefore to act against these, e.g. to invite all relatives, to greet from custom all those met from the neighborhood or college, with the sole enemy excluded", is per se and regularly evil.

894. Special signs and benefits of love are those which are owed to no one, nor are required by the condition of the person and custom of the region, but are specially shown out of mere liberality to certain persons, by reason of a special friendship which is not toward all of the same condition: these just as they are freely undertaken, are freely omitted. Whence per se and in general we are not bound to visit sick enemies, to console the sad, to receive them in hospitality or at table, to pray specially for them, to have frequent commerce e.g. by letters with them, indeed not even first otherwise or to greet them, unless it were a question of a superior or very close persons, or unless the greeting or address were a common sign of charity toward those met (e.g. in small places, in a banquet, communities, etc.), from which to abstain for a longer time would be taken as a sign of hatred.

895. To omit common signs and benefits of love is sometimes lawful, but accidentally and extraordinarily for a time, for just cause:

a) from justice, namely 1) if a superior offended by an inferior hopes to amend him in this way (provided the hope is well founded), or intends to correct him, or to give example to others: for the superior has the right to punish² ;

b) from charity: 2) if it is done without hatred, even by one not a superior, that the audacity and insolence of the offender may be restrained, or that he may be amended³; 3) if one prudently fears from the signs shown greater obstinacy of the enemy, recollection of the injuries, new commotion or quarrel;

c) from another reasonable cause: 4) if it is done in sign of just pain from actual or recent injury, especially if this was atrocious; 5) if it is done on account of a gravely defaming injury, lest it seem to be esteemed of little account; 6) if, without scandal, it is done because one knows certainly that the enemy will not respond to signs shown, e.g. because he has experienced this; but if he doubts, he is bound at least to try once.

**896. We ought to show special signs of love accidentally and extraordinarily; which however then are common signs owed to all:

a) in grave spiritual or temporal necessity (of life, of reputation, of fortune) of the neighbor, for then to deny them would rightly be taken as a sign of hatred;

b) when the enemy asks pardon, or shows special signs to obtain it, in which case to deny special signs is ordinarily a sign of hatred; sometimes however one will lawfully deny them (for a time), e.g. a superior for amendment, punishment or example, anyone to express just grief if pardon is asked immediately after the offense;

c) to resist the hatred to which you feel yourself inclined;

d) to avoid scandal, which however can otherwise be avoided e.g. by declaration or admonition of those who see it;

e) if there is a well-founded hope that the enemy will then lay down grave hatred, from which obligation however a grave inconvenience excuses (cfr. infra, p. 3, q. 3, a. 2).

897. To deny an enemy signs of charity owed is a mortal sin of its genus. — It is mortal because it is against charity⁴; which happens 1) from internal intention, when it proceeds from hatred or appetite of mortal revenge, 2) by reason of external signification, when it is considered by the enemy as a grave offense, or when it causes grave scandal, or when it would be taken by others as a sign of grave hatred or appetite of mortal revenge. To judge this latter, attention must be paid to the cause why the signs are omitted, e.g. if it is done on account of a preceding grave quarrel it will more easily be taken as a sign of grave hatred than if it is done about trifles. Whence it seems too general, that some without restriction say, that a religious who does not wish to address a confrere after ten days is not to be absolved: for it is not always taken as a sign of grave hatred.]

It is mortal of its genus; therefore it admits of lightness of matter: thus if a person of much greater rank does not return the greeting of an inferior, e.g. a nobleman a peasant, a father his son, it does not seem mortal; and moreover in our regions the omission of greeting or return of greeting once or twice is more often a venial sin: for per se it is opposed only to affability, nor per se with us is it a sign or effect of grave hatred, or cause of grave scandal.

898. We are bound internally to remit the offense to the enemy (Mt. VI, 15; XVIII, 35), but not to renew with him the former special friendship, if this was freely undertaken. Nor are we bound per se, even if he asks pardon, to remit restitution for damage done, or satisfaction for injury inflicted (for no one is bound per se to remit a good owed to him), indeed not even to accept them if he offers them; but we can seek them by juridical action, provided we do not principally intend the evil of the enemy, but the good which such action procures, namely the amendment of the enemy, or his restraint, the quiet of others, or the preservation of justice.

In practice however: 1) In general we ought to accept sufficient satisfaction spontaneously offered, nor can we seek it juridically, especially if it is a question of seeking a grave penalty against the enemy without advantage for ourselves, or of pressing a satisfaction greater than he can offer. The reason is that in seeking such things it is difficult for the spirit of vengeance to be absent: for it is difficult that one seek public vengeance out of pure love of justice from a judge, without an inordinate love of private vengeance which is illicit, and to which man is greatly inclined; whence also the common estimation takes this as a sign of vengeance.

2) Sometimes we ought to remit reparation for a merely personal injury, when the burden which the enemy would undergo in making reparation would be too great in respect to the good which would come to us from it.

3) Never is it lawful to remit, if a superior needed his reputation, not only for himself, but more for the good and salvation of others, or if it were an injury that would bring infamy upon the whole family or community, unless it were repaired by juridical satisfaction.

899. On the order and manner of reconciliation. — The offender ought to begin the reconciliation (Mt. V, 23-24) as soon as he morally can: for out of charity he is bound, just as not to place, so also to remove the offense; but if the offense is mutual, he who offended the more gravely; if it is nearly equal, he who offended first. It is excepted, if it is certainly foreseen that pardon will be denied by the other, or if the offender greatly surpasses in dignity or state, unless perhaps the injury is enormous.

Reconciliation is generally sought sufficiently in an indirect way by special signs of love: by sending a gift, rendering a service, an office or benefit, going ahead in honor, amicable conversation, etc. or by the intercession of others. However when the offense was grave, and no other means of reconciliation is at hand (or if a superior or judge imposes it), the offender must also directly ask pardon, because just as out of charity he was bound not to place the offense, so out of charity he is bound to remove it. But in practice, a formal petition of pardon admits of many excuses, e.g. if it is not in use among persons of such condition, if the offended demands an unusual humiliation, or does not care for the petition, or if it can otherwise be fully satisfied e.g. by money or by indirect means, by a sign of special love or honor, as was said above.

900. Practical admonition. — Since each one easily persuades himself that he has suffered a graver injury, and the confessor exhorts each one to seek reconciliation. He should not however easily impose the obligation of directly asking pardon, because this is not always to be borne; indeed even if it is certainly present, it is often prudent to leave the penitent in good faith, if admonition is not hoped to be profitable.

901. In charity an order is to be observed inasmuch as one thing must be loved more than another, according to comparison to the principle of the love of charity; which is twofold: the objective and final principle of love and of beatitude which is God, and the efficient principle of love, i.e. the one loving himself. For the object of charity is the thing loved, and this according to different grades inasmuch as one thing is better, or more proximate.

Which order exists not only a) principally between different persons; but also secondarily, b) between different goods some of which are more excellent or necessary than others; indeed c) between different loves or friendships which according to different goods on which they are founded are more excellent than others: for human goods on which other unions and friendships are founded are ordered as to the ultimate end to the good upon which charity is founded, namely to eternal beatitude; and therefore the union and love of charity subordinates all other honest loves to itself, and commands the acts of every other honest friendship (q. 26, a. 7).

902. The order to be observed is described by S. Augustine, de doctr. chr., l. I, c. 27-28:

"He however lives justly and holily who is an upright estimator of things: he is the one who has an ordered love, lest he either love what is not to be loved, or not love what is to be loved, or love more what is less to be loved, or equally love what is to be loved either less or more, or less or more what is equally to be loved. Every sinner, inasmuch as he is a sinner, is not to be loved; and every man, inasmuch as he is a man, is to be loved for God's sake; God indeed for his own sake. And if God is to be loved more than any man, each one ought to love God more than himself. Likewise another man is to be loved more than our body: because all these things are to be loved for God's sake, and another man can enjoy God for us, which the body cannot; because the body lives by the soul, by which we enjoy God. But all are to be loved equally; but since you cannot benefit all, you must take care especially of those, who according to the opportunities of places and times or of any matters, are more closely joined to you by a certain lot".

Between persons therefore there is a triple order: 1) between God and us, 2) between us and the neighbor, 3) between various neighbors.

S. Th. II-II, q. 26, a. 1, 2, 3; De Virt., q. 2, a. 7.

903. Notions. — It must be premised that one is loved more than another in three ways: a) objectively we love more the one to whom we will a greater good; b) appetitively or by esteem we love more the one whom we simply prefer and esteem more than another, so that we fear more to lose his friendship than another's; c) intensively we love more the one whom we love with a more fervent affection, i.e. with greater intensity and vehemence of act, e.g. with greater effort of will¹.

904. Principle. In the order of charity God is to be loved simply above all things. — It is of the essence of charity that we love God above all things, as is said Deut. VI, 5 and Mt. XXII, 37:

1) Objectively, because we ought to wish for God the divine goods which are infinite, namely the infinity of his perfections which can belong to no creature; and because we ought to refer all other things to God and desire for him a greater glory than for ourselves or our neighbor.

2) Also by esteem, so that we would choose to lose and suffer all things rather than desert him²; for a) the infinite demands to be loved more than the finite creature, and the common good of all more than the particular proper good; b) God is the principle and cause of beatitude, whence we ought to love God more than ourselves or our neighbor who are only partakers of this beatitude; c) the reason for loving ourselves and our neighbor is God, as was said n. 877-878; whence God is more to be loved. Hence d) it is said in Lk. XIV, 26: "If anyone comes to me and does not hate his father and mother..., and even his own life, he cannot be my disciple" (cfr. Mt. X, 37).

3) However we ought not to love God more intensively: for sensible and present or near goods are wont to move us more vehemently than remote, absent and divine ones³.

But a creature cannot be loved more intensely than God, if it is loved with the same act out of charity, because then the reason for loving the creature is God who is loved, who therefore is loved more.

S. Th. II-II, q. 26, a. 4 and 5.

905. Notions. — It must be premised: a) that there are three kinds of goods, distinguished by the order of charity: 1) most to be esteemed are spiritual and eternal goods, whether supernatural or natural, which of themselves and directly regard the soul and salvation, i.e. the moral perfection of man, "honesty"; — 2) then come natural temporal goods (whether of soul or of body) intrinsic to man, which of themselves and directly constitute the physical perfection of man, such as life, bodily integrity and health, learning, natural dispositions of soul, liberty, etc.; — 3) finally natural goods extrinsic to man, among which however reputation and honor, as being something moral, are superior to riches. Note however that the common good is greater than the private good, because the good of the whole, as universal, surpasses the good of the part.

It must be premised: b) that in goods both spiritual and eternal and temporal, a threefold necessity is distinguished by the order of charity: 1) extreme when the danger of damnation, or of death or of another morally equivalent evil certainly threatens, and cannot be morally avoided without the help of another; but an evil equivalent to death is the perpetual privation of a great good which is equivalent to life and which nature willed to be common to all, such as health, reason, liberty, integrity of members, e.g. incurable disease, perpetual loss of the use of reason, and perhaps the loss of a principal member, or perpetual servitude or imprisonment, especially if it be harsh; — 2) grave when the aforesaid evils probably only threaten and one cannot avoid them without great difficulty, or when the certainly threatening evil is only grave, such as: unjust captivity, notable infamy, grave illness, grave loss of goods by which one can with difficulty sustain himself, loss of state, etc.; — 3) common in which one can provide for oneself without great difficulty: in this are concerned in the spiritual order ordinary sinners, and in the temporal order the poor, begging at the door whether publicly or secretly.

906. General principle. In the order of charity, other things being equal, a man ought to love himself more than his neighbor. — The order between us and our neighbor is that in equal goods, equal necessity and condition, each one simply loves himself more than his neighbor. It is proved:

a) From Mt. XXII, 39: "You shall love your neighbor as yourself" (Lev. XIX, 18), in which words the love of self is given as the rule and exemplar of the love of neighbor; but the rule is better than the regulated; therefore we ought to love ourselves more than our neighbor. Whence the word: as, does not signify that a man love his neighbor equally to himself, but only similarly to himself (q. 44, a. 7).

b) By charity a man loves himself as a partaker of beatitude, but his neighbor only as a companion in this participation. But, says S. Thomas, participation is more potent than companionship as unity than union. Therefore a man ought to love himself more than his neighbor.

c) Man is naturally more inclined to the love of himself than to the love of neighbor. This natural inclination, as implanted by the author of nature, cannot be inordinate.

907. Comparing only spiritual and eternal goods, the principle is that: each one is bound to love himself more as to soul or salvation than his neighbor. Hence:

a) It is never lawful to sin even most lightly for the salvation of a neighbor.

b) Nor is it lawful to expose oneself to the danger of a neighbor sinning, because this is to sin (prop. 62 and 63, damn. by Inn. XI); but it is lawful to expose oneself to danger, if it is remote, — and also, for a grave cause, if with suitable aids, so that there is a well-founded hope of not falling, the proximate danger can be made remote, — indeed sometimes one ought so to act to help a neighbor in extreme spiritual necessity.

c) Charity always inclines to desiring for ourselves grace and glory, and indeed greater, than for a neighbor, nor is it ever lawful to desire for oneself less.

d) Charity of itself always inclines us to more perfect things; however if these are not strictly necessary, we can and sometimes ought to leave them for the spiritual or even temporal good of a neighbor, e.g. a priest prayer to hear confessions, a son entry into religion to support parents. In this case however the good, if it is left out of charity which thus pleases God more, is compensated by charity.

908. Comparing the spiritual and eternal goods of a neighbor with our temporal ones, the general principle is that: each one is bound to love his neighbor as to soul and salvation more than his own body. The reason is that we ought to love the soul of a neighbor as a companion in the full participation of beatitude, our body however as a partaker of beatitude by redundancy; but companionship in full beatitude is a greater reason for loving than participation by redundancy. Therefore.

Specifically: a) In extreme spiritual necessity of a neighbor, each one is bound, under grave obligation, to help him with certain danger of life (e.g. to an infant about to die without Baptism, or to a sinner about to suffer death not thinking of it or not able to elicit perfect contrition), provided the necessity is not from his own malice (as in duelists and unjust invaders of life), there is probable hope of helping him, there is no one else to bring help, nor is a graver evil feared as if from it the salvation of many others would be in danger (Jn. XV, 12; I Jn. III, 16).

b) In grave spiritual necessity, the neighbor must be helped, under grave obligation, with some detriment in temporal goods of reputation, honor, fortune, to be prudently morally judged. Not however with danger of life, although charity persuades it; unless 1) one is bound by justice by reason of office, as a physician, or a parish priest who is bound with danger of life or temporal goods to minister the sacrament of Penance to parishioners infected with the plague (Jn. X, 11); or 2) unless it is a public necessity: for this is always joined with the extreme necessity of many, and moreover the common good surpasses the private; whence if someone spreads perverse doctrine among the people and there is no one to prevent it, the obligation is present with danger of life for him who prevents it; and in time of plague (or persecution) a parish priest is bound to assist the dying, if no other is present.

c) In common spiritual necessity, the neighbor must be helped without bodily detriment, but not with even light detriment (cfr. 3 p., q. 3, a. 2).

909. Comparing only temporal goods, the general principle is that: each one per se is bound to love his own life and temporal goods more than the life and temporal goods of his neighbor, — but more his neighbor as to corporal goods than himself as to external goods.

Specifically: a) In extreme temporal necessity, the neighbor must be helped, under grave obligation, with notable detriment to one's own temporal goods; not however by extraordinary means (for this no one is bound as regards his neighbor's life), nor with loss of life or of an almost equivalent good, unless it is a question of the extreme necessity of the state. However, if one does not distrust being in a state of grace, nor is there necessity of family or others, charity itself often permits and persuades to expose life (a fortiori temporal goods) for the motive of virtue, e.g. for friendship, gratitude, the honor of God, the common good, not equivalently loving the neighbor's life as one's own, but more loving the good of virtue than one's own life, because the good of virtue which is spiritual surpasses corporal life. Thus with danger of life they laudably serve those infected with the plague, throw themselves into the waters to rescue others, die for persons very necessary to the state or family¹.

b) In grave temporal necessity help must be given, under grave obligation, to a private person with only moderate inconvenience, to a community even with grave inconvenience.

c) In common temporal necessity the neighbor must be helped, if it can be done without inconvenience (cfr. p. 3, q. 3, a. 1).

910. Corollaries. — 1° From the aforesaid follows the principle: Charity does not oblige with great inconvenience, it avails in common and grave necessity, and indeed only in general, but does not avail in extreme necessity in which charity obliges even with the greatest inconvenience.

2° In all the aforesaid rules it is to be understood: if there is hope of fruit, and if another more obligated has not provided it.

S. Th. II-II, q. 26, a. 6-13; q. 31, a. 3; de Virt. q. 2, a. 9.

911. Notions. — The order is attended according to greater proximity to the principle. Now the principle of love is twofold, one objective: God; the other efficient: the one loving. Therefore a twofold order in charity is to be attended: a) according to proximity to God; b) according to proximity or union to the one loving.

Now threefold chiefly is the union distinguished:

1st of blood, arising from the bond of blood, and founded on the goods of life and family: this is specifically different inasmuch as it is between parents and children, — or between spouses, — or between blood relations, — or between in-laws;

2nd spiritual, arising from the bond of religion and founded on spiritual and eternal goods; which also contains several species: between members of the Church, — between members of a community, — between pastor and sheep, — between preacher or confessor and convert or penitent, etc.;

3rd civil, arising from the political bond and founded on social goods, of which again there are many species: between citizens, co-inhabitants, communities, benefactor and recipient of benefits, etc.

912. General principle. In the order of charity, those who are objectively better, and those who are intensively and appetitively closer, are more to be loved. — The order is attended according to greater proximity to the principle. But the principle of love is twofold, one objective: God; the other efficient: the one loving. Therefore those who are nearer and more united to God or to us are more to be loved. And indeed:

1) Those who are better or more holy are more to be loved in one way, namely objectively or directly, i.e. with the love which follows goods already possessed: for by the love of complacence we must rejoice in the greater good possessed by them, and by the love of benevolence we must wish them the greater beatitude to which they have right. For they are nearer to God and therefore more worthy, and according to this we must also show them greater reverence, worship and honor.

2) Those who are more united to us, other things being equal, are more to be loved in all other ways:

a) Intensively: for love is the movement of the lover toward the loved; but the principle of movement influences more powerfully those things which are nearer to it than those which are more remote; therefore the closer some are to the one loving, the more vehemently they are to be loved "and therefore man loves them with a more intense affection for that good to which he loves them, than the better for a greater good".

b) Also by esteem: for thus those are more to be loved who are loved under more titles, and by modes or friendships, all of which are commanded by charity (to which they are ordered as to an end, as was said n° 901). But those united to us are united to us by more titles and loves; others however only by the common union of charity, because they can arrive at beatitude. Therefore out of charity we ought to esteem more and prefer those who are more united to us.

c) Hence they are also more to be loved objectively but indirectly: for the good of virtue in man can be increased and diminished, and therefore we can out of charity wish that those nearer to us be better than others, and so arrive at greater beatitude. — They are therefore more to be loved with the love of benevolence and desire by which we wish others the good not yet possessed, and with the love of mercy and beneficence by which we procure good for them (I Tim. V, 8; Gal. VI, 10; Is. LVIII).

Whence simply and absolutely those more united are more to be loved.

913. Special principles. I. In goods proper to some union, that one is to be preferred who according to this union is nearer to us, and therefore in those things which pertain to nature we ought to love more blood relations, in those which pertain to civil intercourse fellow citizens are to be preferred, and in military matters fellow soldiers.

II. In goods common to any union, whether eternal or temporal, those who are absolutely nearer, i.e. who are united to us by a more potent union, are to be preferred.

Now per se spiritual union prevails over civil; but over both prevails that of blood, as united to nature, and therefore prior and more immovable, and founded on greater benefits; for charity does not change the order of nature but perfects it. Hence a son is bound to leave military service or religious life, if it is necessary, to convert or support his parents.

914. Order among blood relations. — In general, ordinarily and per se among various blood relations help must be given 1) to the wife who is so intimately united with the husband that they are one flesh; 2) to the children to whom according to nature parents must provide; 3) to the father who is the nobler principle of generation; 4) to the mother; 5) to brothers and sisters; 6) to other blood relations and in-laws. After these come friends, benefactors, superiors and persons more useful to the state.

It is said: in general, ordinarily and per se, for a) in extreme necessity the parents seem to be preferred to all others, because since they gave life, their life, if necessary, is most to be preserved; b) from particular circumstances it is lawful to invert this order: thus a good and diligent mother is more to be loved than a bad and wasteful father, likewise a singular friend or distinguished benefactor than more distant blood relations; c) it is lawful to change the order by reason of office or special obligation: thus a parish priest is generally bound more to the instruction of parishioners than of blood relations, however not in extreme necessity.

915. Remarks. — 1st Parents, because more like to God, are objectively and with reverence more to be loved than wife and children; but these more by esteem and intensively and with beneficence, because more united. By the same reason benefactors more objectively than those whom we benefit; on the contrary those whom we benefit more intensively than benefactors.

2nd A father as father is per se more to be loved than a mother as such, because he is the nobler principle of generation; but under another respect (and another love) the mother can be more to be loved, e.g. if she loves more, as naturally easily happens, because she has often done more for the son (at least at the beginning) and knows better that he is her son than the father, and keeps and nourishes the offspring born with her. Whence S. Thomas, III Sent., d. 29, q. 1, a. 7, ad 4: "the mother puts more of her own in the son than the father, but more of what is the son is put by the father than by the mother".

3rd In these and all the aforesaid rules, equal necessity in the same order of goods is always supposed in all; in unequal necessity help must first be given to the one who suffers greater, e.g. an infant is to be baptized rather than confessions heard.

4th The inversion of the order of charity is not mortally evil unless it is a question of extreme necessity; — or unless it is very notable and is done without any reason. Inversion is not notable between son, wife and parents; but well between entirely strangers and very close relations.

5th In heaven a) the order of charity remains between God and us, where God will be loved above all things simply; — b) as to the order between us and our neighbor objectively we shall love more the better, less however the less good, in perfect conformity to the divine will; c) as to various neighbors simply we shall love more those nearer to God (as nearer to us), because every other union to the neighbor ceases in heaven and the whole blessed life consists in the immovable ordination of the mind to God; whence those are more loved there and are held nearer by us who are nearer to God. And although some are also loved under more titles and ways (because grace does not destroy natural love), incomparably however to all these reasons is preferred the reason of love which is taken from proximity to God. On the contrary on earth where we need the help of others (Q. D. de Virt. 2, a. 9, ad 12; II-II, q. 26, a. 13).