Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis
Benedictus Henricus Merkelbach (1871–1942)
Summa Theologiae Moralis ad mentem D. Thomae et ad normam iuris novi
First published 1935
Volume I (De principiis) of Benedictus Henricus Merkelbach's Summa theologiae moralis sets out the foundations of Catholic moral theology within a Thomistic framework. It treats human acts, conscience, law, sin, and merit in relation to the canon law of its period. The present edition follows the Paris text published by Desclée de Brouwer in 1935 and includes the Latin text with an English translation. It comprises the first volume of the three-volume Summa.
Prologus
Introductio I: Theologia Moralis Generalis: Introductio
Tractatus I: Tractatus de ultimo actu humanorum fine seu de beatitudine
Introductio
Quaestio I: DE FINE ULTIMO IN COMMUNI
Quaestio II: DE BEATITUDINE OBIECTIVA
Quaestio III: DE BEATITUDINE FORMALI
Quaestio IV: DE QUALITATIBUS BEATITUDINIS
Quaestio V: DE MODO OBTINENDI BEATITUDINEM
Tractatus II: De actibus humanis in se
Introductio
Pars I: De actibus humanis secundum esse materiale et psychologicum
§ I: De conditione actuum humanorum
Caput I: De elemento subiectivo actus humani
Quaestio I: De voluntario
Articulus I: De voluntario in se
Articulus II: De voluntario tum positivo et directo, tum negativo et indirecto
Articulus III: De voluntario in se et in causa
Quaestio II: De impedimentis voluntarii seu de involuntario
Articulus I: De violentia
Articulus II: De metu
Articulus III: De concupiscentia
Articulus IV: De ignorantia
Quaestio III: De libero
Quaestio IV: De impedimentis liberi
Articulus I: De passionibus
Articulus II: De habitu et consuetudine
Articulus III: De impedimentis liberi remotioribus
Caput II: De elemento obiectivo actus humani
Quaestio I: De elemento essentiali seu obiecto
Quaestio II: De elemento accidentali seu de circumstantiis
§ II: De distinctione actuum humanorum
Quaestio I: De actibus elicitis
Quaestio II: De actibus imperatis
Pars II: De actibus humanis secundum esse morale
§ I: De moralitate actus humani in genere
Quaestio I: De essentia et speciebus moralitatis
Quaestio II: De fundamentis moralitatis
Articulus I: De intrinseca differentia boni inter et mali
Articulus II: De norma moralitatis
Articulus III: De fundamento obiectivo moralitatis
Articulus IV: De falsis systematibus circa fundamenta moralitatis
Articulus V: De facultate apprehensiva moralitatis
Quaestio III: De principiis seu fontibus moralitatis
Quaestio IV: De distinctione specifica inter actum bonum et malum
Quaestio V: De distinctione specifica inter varios actus bonos vel malos
Articulus I: De obiecto
Articulus II: De circumstantiis
Articulus III: De fine
§ II: De moralitate actuum humanorum in specie
Quaestio I: De bonitate et malitia actus interioris
Quaestio II: De bonitate et malitia actus exterioris
Quaestio III: De bonitate et malitia effectus externi
Quaestio IV: De bonitate et malitia passionum
Quaestio V: De bonitate et malitia circumstantiarum
Pars III: De actibus humanis secundum esse supernaturale et meritorium
Quaestio I: De merito praesertim supernaturali
Quaestio II: De conditionibus meriti supernaturalis
Tractatus III: De conscientia in generali
Introductio
Quaestio I: De conscientia morali secundum se in esse psychologico
Quaestio II: De conscientia prout est regula actuum moralium
Articulus I: De rectitudine conscientiae
Articulus II: De conscientiae certitudine
Quaestio III: De conscientia christiana prout est regula actuum supernaturalium
Tractatus IV: De legibus in genere
Introductio
§ I: De lege secundum esse psychologicum
Pars I: De lege in genere
Quaestio I: De ipsa lege in se
Articulus I: De essentia legis
Articulus II: De promulgatione legis
Quaestio II: De distinctione legum
Quaestio III: De effectibus legis
Articulus I: De vi directivâ seu obligatione legis
Articulus II: De vi coactivâ seu sanctione legis
Pars II: De lege aeterna quae est fundamentum omnis legis
Quaestio I: De essentia legis aeternae
Quaestio II: De potestate legis aeternae
Quaestio III: De mutabilitate legis aeternae
§ I: De legibus quae regunt actus morales
Pars III: De lege naturali
Quaestio I: De essentia legis naturalis
Quaestio II: De potestate legis naturalis
Articulus I: De vi directivâ seu obligatione legis naturalis
Articulus II: De vi coactivâ seu sanctione legis naturalis
Quaestio III: De mutabilitate legis naturalis
Quaestio IV: De Lege Humana in Se
Articulus I: De Auctore legis civilis
Articulus II: De Qualitate legis humanae
Articulus III: De Efformatione legis humanae
Articulus IV: De Divisione legis humanae
Quaestio V: De Potestate Legis Humanae
Articulus I: De Materia legis humanae
Articulus II: De Obligatione legis humanae
Articulus III: De Subditis legis civilis
Articulus IV: De Impletione et Interpretatione legis humanae
Quaestio VI: De Mutabilitate Legis Humanae
Caput I: De Lege Vetere
Quaestio I: De Lege Vetere Secundum Se
Quaestio II: De Potestate Legis Veteris
Quaestio III: De Mutabilitate Veteris Legis
Caput II: De Lege Nova
Quaestio I: De Essentia Legis Novae
Quaestio II: De Potestate Legis Novae
Quaestio III: De Lege Ecclesiastica Secundum Se
Articulus I: De Auctore legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus II: De Materia et Qualitate legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus III: De Efformatione legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus IV: De Divisione legis ecclesiasticae
Quaestio IV: De Potestate seu Obligatione Legis Ecclesiasticae
Articulus I: De Quantitate seu Gravitate Obligationis
Articulus II: De Qualitate et Extensione Obligationis legis praeceptivae
Articulus III: De Qualitate et Extensione Obligationis legis poenalis
Articulus IV: De Qualitate et Extensione Obligationis legis irritantis
Articulus V: De Subditis legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus VI: De Impletione legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus VII: De Interpretatione legis ecclesiasticae
Quaestio V: De Mutabilitate Legis Ecclesiasticae
Articulus I: De Ignorantia
Articulus II: De Impotentia
Articulus III: De Dispensatione
Articulus IV: De privilegio
Articulus V: De cessatione finis
Articulus VI: De abrogatione et derogatione
Articulus VII: De consuetudine
Tractatus V: De peccatis in genere
Introductio I: De Peccatis in Genere
Quaestio I: De essentia peccati
Articulus I: De notione et conditionibus peccati
Articulus II: De peccato omissionis negative voluntario
Articulus III: De peccato commissionis externo, indirecte aut in causa voluntario
Articulus IV: De elementis constitutivis peccati
Articulus V: De definitione peccati
Quaestio II: De distinctione peccatorum
Articulus I: De distinctione specifica
Articulus II: De distinctione numerica
Quaestio III: De comparatione et gravitate peccatorum
Quaestio IV: De subiecto peccati
Articulus I: De motibus seu peccatis sensualitatis
Articulus II: De consensu in delectationem seu de delectatione morosa
Articulus III: De consensu in actum seu de desiderio et gaudio
Pars I: De causis peccatorum
Quaestio I: De causis peccati interioribus
Articulus I: De ignorantia causa peccati ex parte rationis
Articulus II: De passione causa peccati ex parte appetitus sensitivi
Articulus III: De malitia causa peccati ex parte voluntatis
Quaestio II: De causis peccatorum exterioribus
Articulus I: De deo permittente
Articulus II: De diabolo tentante
Articulus III: De homine cooperante
Quaestio III: De peccato quod est causa alterius peccati
Articulus I: De modo quo unum peccatum alterum causat
Articulus II: De superbia et inani gloria
Articulus III: De avaritia
Articulus IV: De luxuria et gula
Articulus V: De invidia et ira
Articulus VI: De acedia
Pars II: De effectibus peccatorum
Quaestio I: De diminutione boni naturae
Quaestio II: De reatu culpae seu macula peccati
Quaestio III: De reatu poenae
Quaestio IV: De peccato mortali et veniali
Articulus I: De differentia inter peccatum mortale et veniale
Articulus II: De gravitate peccati mortalis
Articulus III: De conditionibus ad peccatum mortale requisitis
Articulus IV: De divisione peccati mortalis et venialis
Articulus V: De conversione peccati mortalis et venialis
Articulus VI: De peccato veniali secundum se
Tractatus VI: De habitibus et virtutibus in genere
Introductio I: De Habitibus et Virtutibus in Genere
Pars I: De habitibus in genere secundum esse psychologicum
Quaestio I: De essentia habitus
Quaestio II: De subiecto habitus
Quaestio III: De causa habituum
Quaestio IV: De distinctione habituum
Pars II: De habitibus secundum esse morale seu de virtutibus acquisitis
Quaestio I: De essentia virtutis
Quaestio II: De subiecto virtutis
Quaestio III: De distinctione virtutum
Articulus I: De virtutibus intellectualibus
Articulus II: De virtutibus moralibus
Articulus III: De virtutibus cardinalibus
Quaestio IV: De proprietatibus virtutum
Articulus I: De medio virtutis
Articulus II: De connexione virtutum
Articulus III: De aequalitate virtutum
Articulus IV: De duratione virtutum
Pars III: De habitibus secundum esse supernaturale seu de virtutibus infusis
Quaestio I: De existentia et essentia infusorum habituum ac virtutum
Quaestio II: De distinctione infusorum habituum et virtutum
Articulus I: De virtutibus theologicis
Articulus II: De virtutibus moralibus
Articulus III: De donis spiritus sancti
Quaestio III: De causa infusorum habituum et virtutum
Quaestio IV: De proprietatibus infusorum habituum et virtutum
Articulus I: De medio virtutum infusarum
Articulus II: De connexione habituum infusorum
Articulus III: De aequalitate habituum infusorum
Articulus IV: De duratione habituum infusorum
Tractatus VII: De fide divina
Introductio
Quaestio I: De Obiecto Formali Fidei
Quaestio II: De Obiecto Materiali Fidei
Articulus I: De obiecto materiali in se
Articulus II: De conditionibus ad obiectum materiale requisitis
Articulus III: De evolutione obiecti materialis
Articulus IV: De ecclesia proponente obiectum fidei
Pars I: De Actu Fidei
Caput I: De Actu Fidei Interiore
Quaestio I: De Essentia Actus Fidei
Quaestio II: De Analysi Actus Fidei
Articulus I: De ipso actu fidei
Articulus II: De ipso credulitatis affectu
Articulus III: De iudicio credibilitatis seu de praeambulis fidei
Quaestio III: De Necessitate Fidei
Caput II: De Actu Fidei Exteriore seu de Eius Confessione
Pars II: De Habitu Fidei
Quaestio I: De Ipsa Fide
Articulus I: De fide in ordine ad subiectum spectata
Articulus II: De fide spectata relative ad virtutes supernaturales
Articulus III: De fide spectata relative ad habitus intellectuales
Quaestio II: De habentibus fidem
Quaestio III: De causa et effectibus fidei
Quaestio IV: De donis fidei correspondentibus
Pars III: De vitiis et peccatis fidei oppositis
Quaestio I: De peccatis directe oppositis fidei
Articulus I: De infidelitate
Articulus II: De haeresi et apostasia
Quaestio II: De peccatis indirecte oppositis fidei
Articulus I: De communicatione cum infidelibus et haereticis
Articulus II: De cooperatione ad infidelitatem et haeresim
Articulus III: De lectione et evulgatione scriptorum prohibitorum
Articulus IV: De admissione vel professione doctrinae quae pro fide est periculosa
Quaestio III: De blasphemia quae opponitur confessioni fidei
Pars IV: De praecepto fidei
Quaestio I: Quaestio unica
Tractatus VIII: De spe divina
Introductio
Pars I: De obiecto et actu spei
Quaestio I: De obiecto formali spei
Quaestio II: De obiecto materiali spei
Quaestio III: De necessitate spei
Pars II: De habitu et subiecto spei
Quaestio I: De spe ut est virtus
Quaestio II: De subiecto spei
Quaestio III: De timore dei
Pars III: De peccatis spei oppositis
Quaestio I: De desperatione
Quaestio II: De praesumptione
Pars IV: De praecepto spei
Quaestio I: De Praecepto Spei
Tractatus IX: De divina charitate
Introductio I: De Divina Charitate
Pars I: De ipsa charitate
Quaestio I: De essentia charitatis
Quaestio II: De excellentia charitatis
Articulus I: De excellentia charitatis in se
Articulus II: De excellentia charitatis relative ad alias virtutes
Quaestio III: De charitate quoad subiectum spectata
Articulus I: De subiecto et generatione charitatis
S. Th. II-II, q. 24, a. 1, 2, 3, 4; I-II, q. 112, a. 4; de Virt., q. 2, a. 10 and 11.
863. Charity is in the will. — Since charity has as object not a sensible good but a divine good, hence it is not in the sensitive appetite but resides in the will.
864. Thesis. Charity is a virtue infused per se: for it does not inhere in us naturally, nor is it caused by our acts; therefore from divine infusion alone. — It is proved:
Charity exceeds the faculty of our nature: for it is founded on the communication of eternal beatitude and grace which are supernatural gifts, exceeding nature. But that which exceeds the faculty of nature does not inhere in us naturally; nor is it acquired by natural powers, because the effect cannot surpass the cause. Therefore charity cannot be had except by divine infusion. It is confirmed: charity
a) is a property consequent on sanctifying grace, therefore supernatural like it;
b) is the principle of a salutary and supernatural act, therefore it is itself supernatural; c) has a supernatural material and formal object; therefore it must be supernatural to be able to tend toward it.
865. Corollary. — From this S. Thomas deduces that charity is not given to us according to natural capacity (or disposition), as if natural perfection or works done by the powers of nature had a disposition toward charity or toward a certain quantity (or degree) of charity; or as if God had decreed to give a greater or less charity according as the natural perfection is greater or less. But God gives charity in such proportion as he wills (Eph. IV, 7); however when he infuses it, he through grace prepares the man (adult) and gives him an actual disposition by which he may voluntarily and freely strive to receive it, and indeed gives a disposition or striving proportioned to the quantity of charity which he wills to infuse; otherwise man would have the love of God without willing it, or more than he would will or strive. In this sense is to be understood C. Trid., sess. 6, c. 7: "each one receives his own, according to the measure which the Holy Spirit distributes to each as he wills, and according to each one's own disposition and cooperation". Cfr. c. 5 and 6 and can. 4.
866. Remark. — The supernatural act of charity proximately disposes toward grace and the habit of charity in the manner of material cause, and therefore with the sole desire of the sacrament justifies (Cfr. tr. on Justification and on Penance).
Articulus II: De augmento charitatis
S. Th. II-II, q. 24, a. 4-9; q. 184, a. 2; I-II, q. 114, a. 8; III, q. 89, a. 2 and 5; Q. D. de Virt. q. 1, a. 11.
867. Charity on the way can be increased intensively. — The charity of the fatherland cannot be increased because it is at its term. — The charity of the way cannot be increased extensively, i.e. by extending itself to new objects, because the smallest charity extends itself to all things which are to be loved out of charity. But it can be increased intensively, inasmuch as it becomes more intense, stronger and more prompt for acting.
Which is done not indeed by an addition of charity to charity, but by this alone that the same charity is more received and more firmly inheres, and man more participates charity, and is more reduced into act according to it, as was explained in tr. on Virtue in gen., n. 570.
It is proved: For he who is on the way can always approach nearer to the term; but the term of the way is God; therefore on earth we can always approach nearer to God. Now by charity we tend and approach to God, to whom we do not approach by steps of the body but by affections of the mind by which we are united to him; therefore the charity of the way can always be increased. Cfr. Eph. IV, 15-16; Phil. I, 9; Prov. IV, 18; and C. Trid., sess. 6, can. 24 and 32, c. 10: "This increase of justice holy Church asks when she prays: Give us the increase of faith, hope and charity".
868. Charity can be increased without end, as was defined in C. Vien., can. 1 against the Beguards. For there is no reason why its increase should be limited: 1) from its essence it is a participation of the infinite charity of God, which can always be more participated; 2) the infinite virtue of God which is the cause of charity can always produce a greater charity; 3) man can always receive a greater charity, for, charity increasing, the aptitude for the increase of charity increases. Therefore from no part is there a reason for limiting this increase. — From divine preordination however no one in fact will arrive at the charity of Christ or of the B. V. M.
869. God is the principal efficient cause of the increase of charity, as of its production; but charity is increased instrumentally by the sacraments, dispositively and meritorily by good works. From the treatise on grace and on human acts we know that any act, whether of charity, or placed under the influence of charity, even the smallest, merits de congruo eternal life, and an increase of grace and charity. Whence Christ says, Mk. IX, 40: "For whoever shall give you to drink a cup of water in my name... shall not lose his reward". Cfr. C. Trid., sess. 6, c. 10 and 16, can. 32.
870. When then is charity increased? — Although every good act done out of charity disposes to the increase of charity, indeed merits it, it seems however that with S. Thomas we must say that not every act of charity in fact increases it, but this is done only by an intense act by which the agent as much as he can strives for the increase of charity, namely with all the powers of the charity which he has. For just as God does not infuse a determined degree of charity except in proportion to the disposition and striving of the will, so he does not seem to increase unless someone through an intense act strives for this. And then the increase is given not only on account of the last act but also on account of all preceding acts. "The spiritual increase of charity is in some way similar to bodily growth; but bodily growth in animals and plants is not a continuous motion...; but through some time the operating nature prepares for increase, and does not actually increase; and afterwards produces in effect that for which it has disposed, actually increasing the animal or the plant. So also not by every act of charity is charity actually increased; but every act disposes to the increase of charity, inasmuch as from one act of charity a man is rendered more prompt to act again according to charity, and with the aptitude increasing, the man becomes more prompt to an act of more fervent love, by which he strives for the progress of charity; and then charity is actually increased" (q. 24, a. 6). Cfr. de Virt., n. 640.
871. In what sense can charity be perfect. — Charity:
1) On the part of the object: of God who is lovable, circumscript the strength of wayfarers, cannot be perfect, because God can never be loved as much as he is lovable: thus therefore the only perfect charity is that by which God loves himself.
2) On the part of the subject: of the man loving, the charity of the fatherland is perfect because it is in a connatural state (while here we are pilgrims away from the Lord): a) for in it the conditions of friendship are perfectly verified: there is an excellent communication, the highest union, the perfect presence of the friend, conversation with him and possession of him; whence b) it is always carried actually toward God and indeed with all its strength; and therefore c) it is inamissible. Therefore although the habit of charity according to its essence is the same as in heaven, and can be equal in degree, indeed even greater in one wayfarer than in another blessed, according to the aforesaid conditions however the charity of the fatherland is always more perfect and more intense.
3) The charity of the way, although it cannot have the perfection of the fatherland because the whole heart of man actually is always carried toward God: for it is impossible on account of the infirmity of human life always actually to think of God and to be moved by love toward him; it can however be perfect inasmuch as it excludes all things that are repugnant to the movement of charity. And indeed in a twofold way:
a) that habitually one sets his whole heart upon God, so that he thinks or wills nothing that is contrary to divine love (or any mortal sin whatever), and this perfection is essential to charity which cannot be without it, and is common to all having charity, and is of necessity for salvation; b) that one strives to be free for God and divine things so that he is actually carried toward God inasmuch as the necessities of present life permit, and leaves other things except inasmuch as the necessity of present life requires; and such perfection is possible also for some on the way, and is of counsel, and belongs only to the perfect.
Whence the charity of the way on the part of man is in a triple state: for when someone has acquired charity, his principal care is to avoid sin (mortal) and to preserve charity, and then charity is called incipient (way of purging); then the principal care is to progress in good, and to avoid venial sins especially deliberate, and then charity is progressing (way of enlightening); finally the third care is to adhere to God, and to avoid those things which impede even a more perfect union with God, and then charity is perfect (way of union), not as in heaven, but as it can be perfect on earth, namely not so that he is actually always carried toward God, but that man does this inasmuch as the necessity of present life permits.
The first is prescribed under mortal sin, the second under venial, the third is not of precept; it would however be a sin to despise it, or to fix one's mind against spiritual progress.
Articulus III: De diminutione et amissione charitatis
S. Th. II-II, q. 24, a. 10, 11, 12; de Virt., q. 2, a. 6, 11, 12, 13.
872. Charity cannot be diminished. — Charity is not diminished properly, directly and in itself:
1° For this is not done by the mere cessation from the act (as for acquired virtues), because charity is not caused by our acts.
2° Neither by a sinful act:
a) it is not done by mortal sin, because it takes away charity;
b) nor does venial sin effect a diminution of charity: for a habit is diminished by its contrary, but venial sin is not opposed to charity, because it is only an inordination about the means to the end, while charity is about the end itself.
3° Neither does God diminish charity in us, because he does not take away from us a good unless we merit it; but venial sin does not merit the diminution of charity: for when one sins in a smaller matter, he does not deserve to suffer loss in a greater; hence he who is inordinately disposed about the means to the end does not deserve to suffer loss in charity by which he is ordered to the last end itself. God namely does not turn away from man more than man turns away from him.
However the cooling of charity (Mt. XXIV, 12) which consists in the diminution or cessation of fervor i.e. of the frequency of acts or exercise of charity, disposes indirectly to its corruption; and venial sins also dispose directly to it: this disposition toward corruption can be called indirect and improperly so called diminution.
873. The charity of the way on our part can be lost. — Charity according to itself cannot fail, neither 1) on the part of God moving, who through it can infallibly move to an act of charity (Rom. VIII, 38), nor 2) according to its proper notion and power of charity which excludes all sin (I Jn. III, 9); but only 3) on the part of the subject, of our will, which is changeable according to the freedom of choice, and so can cast away charity.
The charity of the fatherland however cannot be lost because it is always actually carried toward God; but the charity of the way can be lost on account of the change of our will: for when charity is not actually carried toward God, something can occur by which it is lost, namely the motive of sinning to which consent is given.
So define the Council of Vienne against the Beguards, and the Council of Trent against the Calvinists, sess. 6, c. 12, 14, 15, can. 23 and 27 (Cfr. Ezech. XVIII, 26; XXXIII, 12-13; Rom. XI, 20-22; Gal. V, 4; I Cor. IX, 27; Apoc. II, 4, 5).
Charity is lost by any mortal sin whatever (C. Trid. sess. 6, c. 15). For:
1) "He who has my commandments and keeps them, he it is who loves me" (Jn. XIV, 21); but he who sins mortally does not keep the commandments of God; therefore he does not love God.
2) Mortal sin renders one worthy of eternal death (Rom. VI, 23); but he who has charity is worthy of eternal life (Rom. VIII, 15-17 together with II Tim. I, 7 and IV, 8). But it is impossible that one be at the same time worthy of eternal death and eternal life. Therefore mortal sin removes charity.
3) Charity requires that we love God above all things by esteem and that we wish to be subject to him in all things. But by mortal sin a man in some matter refuses and does not wish to be subject to God, but prefers sin to the friendship of God and a creature to God. Whence mortal sin is contrary to charity, and therefore removes it not only meritorily, but also physically and efficaciously expels it1.