Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. II-II, q. 23, a. 1 and 2; de Virt., q. 2, a. 1-2; III Sent., d. 27, q. 2, a. 2 and 4.

852. Thesis. Charity is true and properly so called friendship between God and man. — It is certain.

It is proved:

1) From Scripture: a) it indicates in open words that such friendship exists (Sap. VII, 14; Ps. CXXXVIII, 17), for which reason the just are called friends of God e.g. Abraham (Is. XLI, 8; Judith VIII, 22; Jas. II, 23); — b) the soul is united to God as bride to bridegroom (Cant. Cant.), and man as son to father (Rom. VIII, 14-17; I Jn. III, 1), and becomes citizen and member of the household in the society and house of God (Eph. II, 19); but from the communication of domestic and civil life, especially between son and father, between bridegroom and bride, friendship is naturally born, whence Cant. II, 13, the bridegroom says: "arise, my friend...", and V, 16, the bride says: "he is my friend"; — c) in the New Testament the Son of God himself explicitly calls friends those who keep the commandments (Jn. XIV, 15, 21; XV, 10, 14), and describes that friendship, Jn. XV, 21... "He who loves me shall be loved by my Father, and I will love him... and we will come to him and make our abode with him", and XV, 14-15: "You are my friends, I will no longer call you servants because the servant does not know what his master does. But I have called you friends, because all things whatsoever I have heard from my Father I have made known to you". Which friendship we call charity.

2) From Tradition: the thesis is explicitly enunciated by the Fathers: Hilar. in Ps. 138, n. 38; Chrys. (P. G. LV, 417); Athan. (P.G. XXVII, 534); Ambros. ep. 37, n. 13; August. in Jn., tr. 85 (p. 1848 sq.); Cyr. Al. in Jn. XV, 4; Bern. serm. in Cant. 1, n. 8; 68, n. 1, 3; and it is the common doctrine of theologians after S. Thomas, and of the commentators on the Canticle of Canticles.

3) From reason: Charity is friendship between God and man, if all the conditions required for this are present. Now a) there is a communication of goods and indeed of those which are proper to the nature and life of God: for God communicates himself and his own intellectual life and beatitude in the beatific vision (I Cor. I, 9; I Jn. III, 2), and by grace we are partakers and participants of his very divinity, and sons like to God in nature and operations (II Pet. I, 4; I Jn. III, 1-2); in one word: God communicates to us his own goodness inchoately by grace, perfectly and consummately by glory, so that we are truly sons of God and he is our Father (Rom. VIII, 15). From which communication naturally arises b) mutual benevolence, namely a benevolent love by which we love God our Father as the altogether ultimate supernatural end above all things, and therefore for his own sake, because he is infinitely lovable; — and the benevolent love by which God gratuitously loves us as sons not for his own but for our utility and happiness: on the one hand indeed God cannot but be pleased in himself in the likeness of his own nature communicated with us, and on the other hand he expects no utility or happiness to come to himself from this love, since he is in himself the supreme Good and the supreme Happiness. c) It is also mutually known, for God has declared that he loves those who love him (Prov. VIII, 17; Jn. XIV, 21, 23), and by probable conjectures and sufficiently certain signs we are able to discern whether we truly love God. Therefore.

853. In charity there is a threefold union. — One is the communication of goods or the union of likeness which is the foundation of friendship and charity, and this in the case is sanctifying grace by which we are like to God in nature and worthy of eternal beatitude. Another is charity itself, and this is the mutual union according to the affection, by which God wills his own beatitude to us as to himself, and we will the beatitude which we wish for ourselves, more to God. The third is the real union which is an effect of charity, by which God and we seek mutual real presence, and God substantially inhabits in us on earth through grace and charity, and will be present to our minds in glory.

Of the second union, or mutual inherence according to the affection, John says (I ep., IV, 16): He who abides in charity, abides in God and God in him. God namely abides in us, because in our affection he remains so impressed that we will beatitude and all our goods for God as for ourselves, indeed more than for ourselves: thus he has become one with us. On the contrary we abide in God, because we follow the will of God as our own, and have his desires and goods as our own, whence we will, act and live as God: thus we are transformed into God. Whence I Cor. VI, 17: He who adheres to the Lord is one spirit.

854. Corollary. — Since in the state of pure nature no communication of the goodness and life proper to God had been made to us, there would have been between God and us no equality nor friendship, although there would have been from both sides the love of benevolence. For in that state we would have been only servants in relation to God; now however we are his friends, not indeed inasmuch as we are servants, but inasmuch as we are his adopted sons.

855. Charity is not the Holy Spirit himself. — Peter Lombard taught that charity is not a habit created in the soul, but the Holy Spirit himself granted to us who, with no created habit mediating, immediately through himself produces in us the act of divine love. Which opinion is erroneous:

a) Because it cannot be reconciled with the Council of Trent which teaches (sess. 6, c. 7 and 16, can. 11) that charity which is given by the Holy Spirit to us inheres in us, and that in justification we receive infused faith, hope and charity, through the Holy Spirit who pours forth charity; where manifestly charity is described as a habit, and is distinguished from the Holy Spirit as effect from cause;

b) It is also contrary to reason, which 1) proves that charity is the principle of a created operation: for the act of charity is voluntary and meritorious, whence it is not produced by the Holy Spirit alone, nor by the will acting as moved by him as a mere instrument of him, but by a principle of activity intrinsic to the will, by which it itself by its own powers freely moves itself to love God; but the act of charity, because supernatural, exceeds the natural intrinsic powers of the will; therefore it is necessary that the Holy Spirit add to the will a principle of operating, or supernatural powers intrinsic to it by which it becomes capable of producing the act of charity. — 2) Reason proves that this principle is not momentary and transient, but habitual and permanent: for no one perfectly tends and operates toward an end except through a permanent principle of operation, whence to natural things God has given such principles for operating toward their end; therefore also toward our supernatural end (concerning which certainly God has no less provided) he has given us a supernatural principle habitual and permanent, that we may perfectly operate and tend toward it. Otherwise the act of charity would not be easy, nor delectable, but we would be moved toward it almost violently and with sadness, which however is contrary to experience.

Whence that charity is a habit created in the soul is theologically certain.

856. Remarks. — 1st Grace is not itself friendship with God, but its principle, root and foundation, namely a divine good participated, on account of which friendship between God and us can be, which is done through charity: by grace we are made lovable to God, i.e. worthy of the love of divine friendship, by friendship loved and loving; grace is in the essence of the soul to which it gives a supernatural being, charity in the willing will to which it gives the power of operating supernaturally.

2nd God, in order to love us benevolently, does not await the presence of grace in us: for this is the effect, not the cause, of the gratuitous divine love toward us, since the love of God is the cause of all the goodness of things and all good things come from the love of God¹. — But after we have been adorned with grace from the gratuitous love of God, we are now worthy to be loved by him and capable of loving him in return as father. And thus grace, which is the effect of the love of God's special benevolence, is also the foundation of divine friendship or stable and mutual love. God namely first out of love of benevolence confers on man the perfection on account of which he becomes lovable, and then loves him as a friend.

3rd Between us and God there is a friendship of excellence, because there is no equality of quantity but only of proportion to the most excellent, which we participate, of the goodness of God.

S. Th. II-II, q. 23, a. 3, 4, 5, 6; I-II, q. 66, a. 6; De Virt., q. 2, a. 4 and 5; III Sent., d. 27, q. 2, a. 2.

857. Charity is a virtue because it is a habit making man perfect, for it unites him to God, who is the supreme rule of human acts. It is a special virtue because it has a special object, namely the goodness of God in himself, inasmuch as he is the object of supernatural beatitude. It is one virtue because charity has one end and one principal reason for loving God, ourselves and our neighbor, namely the divine goodness which he wishes to communicate to us all; — and because there is one communication of eternal beatitude upon which the friendship of charity is founded.

Let it not be said that friendship is not a virtue. For S. Thomas replies, Q. D. de Virt., q. 2, a. 2, ad 8: "(Human) friendship is not posited as a virtue, but as consequent to virtue, because from this very fact that someone has virtue and loves the good of reason, it follows from the very inclination of virtue that he loves those like himself, namely the virtuous in whom the good of reason flourishes. But the friendship which is toward God, inasmuch as he is blessed and the author of (supernatural) beatitude, must be set above the virtues which are ordered to that beatitude. And therefore since it is not consequent to the other virtues but a preamble..., it must be that it itself is a virtue per se". Likewise II-II, q. 23, a. 3, ad 1: "Friendship... is not a virtue per se distinct from others. For it does not have the notion of the praiseworthy and honest except from the object, namely inasmuch as it is founded on the honesty of the virtues; which is clear from this, that not every friendship has the notion of the praiseworthy and honest, as is clear in the friendship of the delightful and useful. Whence virtuous friendship is more something consequent to virtue than a virtue¹. Nor is it similar with charity, which is founded principally not on human virtue but on divine goodness".

858. Charity is the most excellent virtue. — For

1) it is more excellent than the moral virtues, because it attains God himself;

2) it is also more excellent than the theological [virtues]

a) on the part of the formal object, because it more and more perfectly attains God: for faith and hope attain him inasmuch as from him there comes to us either the knowledge of truth or the possession of good, but charity attains him in himself, so that it rests in him, not however as some good coming to us from him; whence faith and hope rest on God revealing and helping, charity rests on God in himself;

b) on the part of the condition of the material object, because charity is more proximate to God: for faith and hope include a distance from God, and imperfection, since faith is about God unseen, and hope about God not possessed; but charity is about God who is already in some way united and possessed to us through the love of friendship, and will be fully possessed: "for the loved is in the lover and the lover through affection is drawn to the union of the loved" (cfr. Col. III, 14; I Cor. XIII, 13).

In one word: faith and hope of themselves include imperfection, namely either obscurity, or the absence of an arduous good; charity however of itself induces no imperfection. Whence those will be brought to nothing in the fatherland, not so charity, which there, by reason of the object present and seen intuitively, is perfected.

859. They object to the aforesaid doctrine, that faith resides in a nobler power: the intellect, but charity only in the will. — The reply is given: cognition is naturally perfected according as the object understood is in the intellect, and therefore the perfection of cognition is measured by the dignity of the object understood; volition however is perfected according as the will is inclined to the thing as to a term, and specifically love according as the one loving is drawn to the thing loved, and therefore the perfection of volition and love is measured by the perfection of the thing toward which it tends. Now the things which are below us are in a nobler way in the intellect than in themselves (because each thing is in another according to the mode of that in which it is); but the things which are above us are in a nobler way in themselves than in our intellect. And therefore cognition is more perfect than love of those things which are below us; but of those which are above us, as God, love is more perfect than cognition. Whence charity is more excellent than faith, according to Eph. III, 19: the charity of Christ which surpasses knowledge. Hence God can be loved in himself without being known in himself. — So it is in the state of the way; otherwise in the fatherland: for in the beatific vision (by which we see God in himself), God is not represented in our intellect by a species received in us, but is seen immediately in himself without a created and received species, whence the intellect is united to the thing according as it is in itself, to God as he is in himself. And therefore vision is more perfect than love.

S. Th. II-II, q. 23, a. 7 and 8; I-II, q. 65, a. 2 and 4; De Virt., q. 2, a. 3.

860. Without charity there is no perfect virtue. — Since virtue makes man perfect and the supreme perfection of man consists in ordination to the last end, which is not had without charity, it follows that without charity no virtue is had in the full sense and in a perfect state. Nevertheless without it true virtues can be had which make man honest and perfect under a certain respect, as to some particular end; because however they lack ordination to the last end, which is the supreme perfection or form of morality, they are called imperfect or formless virtues, such as faith, hope, or natural virtue in a sinner (I Cor. XIII, 1-3). They are formed, however, when they receive order to the last end from charity, which is therefore called the form of all virtues.

861. Charity is the form, queen and end of all virtues. — Charity in relation to all virtues is:

1° End because it orders the acts of all virtues toward the last end, which is precisely its own object and its proper end; and since the precepts are about the acts of virtues, it is also called the end of the law (I Tim. I, 5; Rom. XIII, 10).

2° Form, not indeed intrinsic and essential, but extrinsic and accidental, because it gives and imprints on the acts of the other virtues form and ultimate perfection, namely order or tendency toward the last end, and so confers on them merit of eternal life (I Cor. XIII, 1-3)¹.

3° Root, because it nourishes and sustains them, conferring on them strength that they may be exercised more easily and frequently.

But by charity the acts of the other virtues are ordered to the last end. Therefore charity gives form to the acts of the other virtues. It is proved: That which gives an act order to the object gives it form. But human acts have as object their proper end. Therefore that which gives a human act order to the end gives form.

2° The principle of the demonstration is therefore: In moral matters the form of an act is from the part of the end. Which presupposes the doctrine set forth in Iª-IIªe: When an act is from two principles, the higher moving gives the form, the lower as matter. Hence q. 13, a. 5 on choice says it is essentially an act of the will, but formally of the intellect; and q. 16, a. 1, on use says it is an act of the will but with reason preordering. And on the contrary q. 17, a. 1 and 4 on command, says it is essentially an act of reason, but formally of the will as moving; and q. 18, a. 6 and 20, a. 3, on the case of a twofold act, says that the will of the end is the formal element, but the exterior act commanded, toward the end, is the material element. Therefore if the act of charity moves the other virtues to its end which is the last end, it gives them form.

Of the habit however one must say the same as of the act: the virtue itself is said to be formed in order to acts. Therefore the virtue of charity is the form of the other virtues.

3° What kind of form is it? Not intrinsic or constitutive of the essence, nor essential; but extrinsic, effective or motive, and accidental, as conferring the ultimate perfection of completion. And yet it gives something intrinsic to the other virtues, thus constituting them in an accidental notion: it imprints namely and imprints order on the acts of the other virtues, moving the habit to the act.

What does it imprint? Cajetan answers: The participation of the passion of command and order is as it were the form constituting those acts in the being of virtuous simply. From this participation the acts of the other virtues are called and are formed.

Whence it adds something intrinsic, which constitutes them under a certain respect, namely in the notion of perfect virtue, whence their merit and dignity. And yet they are not the same virtue: they have it by participation at the moment they are moved by charity; just as an instrument participates the virtue of the principal agent without becoming a principal agent.

4° Is it an exemplary form? S. Thomas seems here to deny it, ad 1; in Q. D. de Charitate however he affirms it. But it is a question of words. Under one notion it is not exemplary; under another it is exemplary. And he does not deny it altogether in the Summa, for he says: it is called form not as exemplary, but rather as effective. Whence it is not merely exemplary.

An exemplary cause properly is one to whose likeness others are; more broadly, one to whose likeness others work, inasmuch as the inclination to the good is like the inclination of charity to the supreme good.

Whence charity properly is not an exemplary form, because the virtues are not generated to the likeness of charity, but more broadly, inasmuch as they work to the likeness of charity (Q. D. de Char., a. 3, ad 6 and 8). It is therefore exemplary only as to the order to the last end.

5° Hence charity is placed in the definition of every virtue as meritorious (ibid., ad 1 and 3). It does not give them their proper species, otherwise it would be the essential and constitutive form (ad 1); but it gives them the common species of perfect virtue, and is a common form (ad 5 and 9). Whence there is one common species in all virtues (ad 1 and 5); not one proper species, which is called most special.

Nor does it hinder that thus there are several forms in one thing. For several accidental forms are not incompatible, provided it is according to a certain order (ad 2).

4° Mover and queen, because it can move and command all so that they produce their acts when and how the end of it demands, the love and glory of God.

5° Mother, because from the appetite of the last end it conceives and generates the acts of the other virtues, commanding them (I Cor. XIII, 4-7).

862. Remark. — Prudence is the form of the moral virtues because it gives order to the particular end according to right reason; charity is the form of the theological virtues, of prudence and of the moral virtues because it gives perfect order to the last end; grace is the form of charity and of the virtues, as to the divine being, because it gives dignity and right to the last end.

S. Th. II-II, q. 24, a. 1, 2, 3, 4; I-II, q. 112, a. 4; de Virt., q. 2, a. 10 and 11.

863. Charity is in the will. — Since charity has as object not a sensible good but a divine good, hence it is not in the sensitive appetite but resides in the will.

864. Thesis. Charity is a virtue infused per se: for it does not inhere in us naturally, nor is it caused by our acts; therefore from divine infusion alone. — It is proved:

Charity exceeds the faculty of our nature: for it is founded on the communication of eternal beatitude and grace which are supernatural gifts, exceeding nature. But that which exceeds the faculty of nature does not inhere in us naturally; nor is it acquired by natural powers, because the effect cannot surpass the cause. Therefore charity cannot be had except by divine infusion. It is confirmed: charity

a) is a property consequent on sanctifying grace, therefore supernatural like it;

b) is the principle of a salutary and supernatural act, therefore it is itself supernatural; c) has a supernatural material and formal object; therefore it must be supernatural to be able to tend toward it.

865. Corollary. — From this S. Thomas deduces that charity is not given to us according to natural capacity (or disposition), as if natural perfection or works done by the powers of nature had a disposition toward charity or toward a certain quantity (or degree) of charity; or as if God had decreed to give a greater or less charity according as the natural perfection is greater or less. But God gives charity in such proportion as he wills (Eph. IV, 7); however when he infuses it, he through grace prepares the man (adult) and gives him an actual disposition by which he may voluntarily and freely strive to receive it, and indeed gives a disposition or striving proportioned to the quantity of charity which he wills to infuse; otherwise man would have the love of God without willing it, or more than he would will or strive. In this sense is to be understood C. Trid., sess. 6, c. 7: "each one receives his own, according to the measure which the Holy Spirit distributes to each as he wills, and according to each one's own disposition and cooperation". Cfr. c. 5 and 6 and can. 4.

866. Remark. — The supernatural act of charity proximately disposes toward grace and the habit of charity in the manner of material cause, and therefore with the sole desire of the sacrament justifies (Cfr. tr. on Justification and on Penance).

S. Th. II-II, q. 24, a. 4-9; q. 184, a. 2; I-II, q. 114, a. 8; III, q. 89, a. 2 and 5; Q. D. de Virt. q. 1, a. 11.

867. Charity on the way can be increased intensively. — The charity of the fatherland cannot be increased because it is at its term. — The charity of the way cannot be increased extensively, i.e. by extending itself to new objects, because the smallest charity extends itself to all things which are to be loved out of charity. But it can be increased intensively, inasmuch as it becomes more intense, stronger and more prompt for acting.

Which is done not indeed by an addition of charity to charity, but by this alone that the same charity is more received and more firmly inheres, and man more participates charity, and is more reduced into act according to it, as was explained in tr. on Virtue in gen., n. 570.

It is proved: For he who is on the way can always approach nearer to the term; but the term of the way is God; therefore on earth we can always approach nearer to God. Now by charity we tend and approach to God, to whom we do not approach by steps of the body but by affections of the mind by which we are united to him; therefore the charity of the way can always be increased. Cfr. Eph. IV, 15-16; Phil. I, 9; Prov. IV, 18; and C. Trid., sess. 6, can. 24 and 32, c. 10: "This increase of justice holy Church asks when she prays: Give us the increase of faith, hope and charity".

868. Charity can be increased without end, as was defined in C. Vien., can. 1 against the Beguards. For there is no reason why its increase should be limited: 1) from its essence it is a participation of the infinite charity of God, which can always be more participated; 2) the infinite virtue of God which is the cause of charity can always produce a greater charity; 3) man can always receive a greater charity, for, charity increasing, the aptitude for the increase of charity increases. Therefore from no part is there a reason for limiting this increase. — From divine preordination however no one in fact will arrive at the charity of Christ or of the B. V. M.

869. God is the principal efficient cause of the increase of charity, as of its production; but charity is increased instrumentally by the sacraments, dispositively and meritorily by good works. From the treatise on grace and on human acts we know that any act, whether of charity, or placed under the influence of charity, even the smallest, merits de congruo eternal life, and an increase of grace and charity. Whence Christ says, Mk. IX, 40: "For whoever shall give you to drink a cup of water in my name... shall not lose his reward". Cfr. C. Trid., sess. 6, c. 10 and 16, can. 32.

870. When then is charity increased? — Although every good act done out of charity disposes to the increase of charity, indeed merits it, it seems however that with S. Thomas we must say that not every act of charity in fact increases it, but this is done only by an intense act by which the agent as much as he can strives for the increase of charity, namely with all the powers of the charity which he has. For just as God does not infuse a determined degree of charity except in proportion to the disposition and striving of the will, so he does not seem to increase unless someone through an intense act strives for this. And then the increase is given not only on account of the last act but also on account of all preceding acts. "The spiritual increase of charity is in some way similar to bodily growth; but bodily growth in animals and plants is not a continuous motion...; but through some time the operating nature prepares for increase, and does not actually increase; and afterwards produces in effect that for which it has disposed, actually increasing the animal or the plant. So also not by every act of charity is charity actually increased; but every act disposes to the increase of charity, inasmuch as from one act of charity a man is rendered more prompt to act again according to charity, and with the aptitude increasing, the man becomes more prompt to an act of more fervent love, by which he strives for the progress of charity; and then charity is actually increased" (q. 24, a. 6). Cfr. de Virt., n. 640.

871. In what sense can charity be perfect. — Charity:

1) On the part of the object: of God who is lovable, circumscript the strength of wayfarers, cannot be perfect, because God can never be loved as much as he is lovable: thus therefore the only perfect charity is that by which God loves himself.

2) On the part of the subject: of the man loving, the charity of the fatherland is perfect because it is in a connatural state (while here we are pilgrims away from the Lord): a) for in it the conditions of friendship are perfectly verified: there is an excellent communication, the highest union, the perfect presence of the friend, conversation with him and possession of him; whence b) it is always carried actually toward God and indeed with all its strength; and therefore c) it is inamissible. Therefore although the habit of charity according to its essence is the same as in heaven, and can be equal in degree, indeed even greater in one wayfarer than in another blessed, according to the aforesaid conditions however the charity of the fatherland is always more perfect and more intense.

3) The charity of the way, although it cannot have the perfection of the fatherland because the whole heart of man actually is always carried toward God: for it is impossible on account of the infirmity of human life always actually to think of God and to be moved by love toward him; it can however be perfect inasmuch as it excludes all things that are repugnant to the movement of charity. And indeed in a twofold way:

a) that habitually one sets his whole heart upon God, so that he thinks or wills nothing that is contrary to divine love (or any mortal sin whatever), and this perfection is essential to charity which cannot be without it, and is common to all having charity, and is of necessity for salvation; b) that one strives to be free for God and divine things so that he is actually carried toward God inasmuch as the necessities of present life permit, and leaves other things except inasmuch as the necessity of present life requires; and such perfection is possible also for some on the way, and is of counsel, and belongs only to the perfect.

Whence the charity of the way on the part of man is in a triple state: for when someone has acquired charity, his principal care is to avoid sin (mortal) and to preserve charity, and then charity is called incipient (way of purging); then the principal care is to progress in good, and to avoid venial sins especially deliberate, and then charity is progressing (way of enlightening); finally the third care is to adhere to God, and to avoid those things which impede even a more perfect union with God, and then charity is perfect (way of union), not as in heaven, but as it can be perfect on earth, namely not so that he is actually always carried toward God, but that man does this inasmuch as the necessity of present life permits.

The first is prescribed under mortal sin, the second under venial, the third is not of precept; it would however be a sin to despise it, or to fix one's mind against spiritual progress.

S. Th. II-II, q. 24, a. 10, 11, 12; de Virt., q. 2, a. 6, 11, 12, 13.

872. Charity cannot be diminished. — Charity is not diminished properly, directly and in itself:

1° For this is not done by the mere cessation from the act (as for acquired virtues), because charity is not caused by our acts.

2° Neither by a sinful act:

a) it is not done by mortal sin, because it takes away charity;

b) nor does venial sin effect a diminution of charity: for a habit is diminished by its contrary, but venial sin is not opposed to charity, because it is only an inordination about the means to the end, while charity is about the end itself.

3° Neither does God diminish charity in us, because he does not take away from us a good unless we merit it; but venial sin does not merit the diminution of charity: for when one sins in a smaller matter, he does not deserve to suffer loss in a greater; hence he who is inordinately disposed about the means to the end does not deserve to suffer loss in charity by which he is ordered to the last end itself. God namely does not turn away from man more than man turns away from him.

However the cooling of charity (Mt. XXIV, 12) which consists in the diminution or cessation of fervor i.e. of the frequency of acts or exercise of charity, disposes indirectly to its corruption; and venial sins also dispose directly to it: this disposition toward corruption can be called indirect and improperly so called diminution.

873. The charity of the way on our part can be lost. — Charity according to itself cannot fail, neither 1) on the part of God moving, who through it can infallibly move to an act of charity (Rom. VIII, 38), nor 2) according to its proper notion and power of charity which excludes all sin (I Jn. III, 9); but only 3) on the part of the subject, of our will, which is changeable according to the freedom of choice, and so can cast away charity.

The charity of the fatherland however cannot be lost because it is always actually carried toward God; but the charity of the way can be lost on account of the change of our will: for when charity is not actually carried toward God, something can occur by which it is lost, namely the motive of sinning to which consent is given.

So define the Council of Vienne against the Beguards, and the Council of Trent against the Calvinists, sess. 6, c. 12, 14, 15, can. 23 and 27 (Cfr. Ezech. XVIII, 26; XXXIII, 12-13; Rom. XI, 20-22; Gal. V, 4; I Cor. IX, 27; Apoc. II, 4, 5).

Charity is lost by any mortal sin whatever (C. Trid. sess. 6, c. 15). For:

1) "He who has my commandments and keeps them, he it is who loves me" (Jn. XIV, 21); but he who sins mortally does not keep the commandments of God; therefore he does not love God.

2) Mortal sin renders one worthy of eternal death (Rom. VI, 23); but he who has charity is worthy of eternal life (Rom. VIII, 15-17 together with II Tim. I, 7 and IV, 8). But it is impossible that one be at the same time worthy of eternal death and eternal life. Therefore mortal sin removes charity.

3) Charity requires that we love God above all things by esteem and that we wish to be subject to him in all things. But by mortal sin a man in some matter refuses and does not wish to be subject to God, but prefers sin to the friendship of God and a creature to God. Whence mortal sin is contrary to charity, and therefore removes it not only meritorily, but also physically and efficaciously expels it¹.