Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. I-II, q. 26-28; I, q. 60; III Sent., d. 27, q. 1; C. G. IV, 19; Quodl. I, a. 8.

842. Charity according to the name. — The Latin word charity is derived either from the Greek word: χάρις, i.e. grace, benevolence; or from the Latin word: carum, i.e. what is of great price. Both senses come to nearly the same thing, for what is benevolently loved is generally esteemed of great price, and what is held of great price is easily loved with benevolence: whence:

1° Charity originally and primarily signifies a gratuitous, liberal, honest, benevolent, excellent love toward someone who is esteemed of great price.

For love, dilection, charity and friendship, although in some sense they pertain to the same thing, because they are an appetite for good, yet in the proper and strict sense are different: love and dilection properly signify an act, friendship is as it were a habit¹ or state, charity is said of both. Moreover love is the most general term: for it signifies either a passion of the sensitive concupiscible appetite, or an act of the will; dilection adds over love a preceding choice by which it comes about that one thing is loved before another, whence it is an act of the will alone; charity adds over dilection some perfection of love, inasmuch as that which is loved with charity is esteemed of great price and loved out of benevolence. Finally friendship adds over benevolence mutual love or return of love: for it is mutual benevolence, founded on a certain communication (Eth. VIII, 2; I-II, q. 26, a. 3). Hence S. Thomas: "friendship is the most perfect among those things which pertain to love" (III Sent., d. 27, q. 2, a. 1).

2° From usage of speech however charity is taken in the stricter sense, and is an eminent love of special friendship whether natural or supernatural.

3° But in theological speech and in the strictest sense only supernatural and divine friendship is called charity, as being more precious than all others, esteeming God above all else. Whence S. Thomas: "friendship toward God more precious and dearer than all" (ib., ad 7).

The aforesaid senses are set forth in Holy Scripture: 1) charity is called the very uncreated love of God a) by which he loves us (I Jn. IV, 8), indeed also b) the love of benevolence toward sinners who do not love him (Jer. XXXI, 3; Eph. II, 4); 2) natural friendship between men (II Macc. XIV, 26); 3) the love of supernatural friendship, namely both a) the act by which we love God for himself and therefore immediately for God's sake (Col. III, 14; Rom. XII, 10); and b) the habit of supernatural friendship toward God (I Cor. XIII, 13).

843. Charity is love. — Love is a coaptation of the affection to the good loved; in which respect knowledge and love differ: for the thing through knowledge is in a way drawn to the knower, because the agent intellect (by active virtue) acts on the thing and takes and transforms the thing into itself; on the contrary through love the lover is drawn to the thing loved, because the thing acts on the appetite and transforms the appetite (the passive power) into itself (I-II, q. 22, a. 2). The affection or appetite namely is in a way informed and changed by the apprehended good, — is adapted to it, conformed and assimilated, — is transformed into it, — and is united to it as one with it; and therefore it adheres to it as fixed in it, and rests in it and is pleased with it because it is fitting for it; and like a weight it inclines and tends toward it. It is namely the principle and beginning of a tendency toward the good, and so love differs from desire and joy: from desire, which is a movement or perfect tendency toward obtaining the good, proceeding from the inclination of love; and also from joy, which is rest in a good already possessed, because the complacence of love is completed by the possession of the loved². — Love is as it were a weight tending toward the loved; desire is a weight already falling; joy is the rest of the weight in its proper place, in the real possession and presence of the term.

A threefold love is found in man. For, as S. Thomas says, I-II, q. 26, a. 1: Love pertains to the appetite, since the object of both is good; whence according to the difference of appetite there is a difference of love. For there is:

1) A certain appetite not following the apprehension of the one desiring himself, but of another; and this kind is called the natural appetite: for natural things desire what befits them according to their nature, not by their own apprehension but by the apprehension of the one instituting the nature.

2) Another appetite follows the apprehension of the one desiring himself, but of necessity, not from free judgment; and such is the sensitive appetite in brutes, which however in men shares something of freedom, inasmuch as it obeys reason.

3) Another appetite follows the apprehension of the one desiring according to free judgment; and such is the rational appetite, or intellective, which is called the will.

In each of these appetites love is called that which is the principle of the movement tending toward the loved end:

produces a twofold effect in the patient, for 1° indeed it gives form, 2° it gives motion consequently to the form... So likewise the appetible itself gives the appetite first a certain coaptation to itself, which is a certain complacence of the appetible, from which follows a movement toward the appetible... For the appetible moves the appetite, making in it as it were its intention, and the appetite tends to the appetible to be really obtained, so that there may be the end where the beginning was. The first immutation therefore of the appetite by the appetible is called love, which is nothing other than the complacence of the appetible; and from this complacence follows the movement toward the appetible, which is desire; and lastly the rest which is joy. Thus therefore since love consists in a certain immutation of the appetite by the appetible, it is clear that love is a passion, properly indeed according as it is in the concupiscible, but commonly and in an extended sense according as it is in the will". And in III Sent., d. 27, q. 1, a. 1: "Love pertains to the appetite; the appetite however is a passive power... But every passive is brought into being according as it is informed by the form of its active, and in this its movement terminates and rests... When the affection or appetite is altogether imbued with the form of the good which is its object, it is pleased in it, and adheres to it as fixed in it; and then it is said to love it. Whence love is nothing other than a certain transformation of the affection into the thing loved. And because everything that becomes the form of something becomes one with it, therefore through love, the lover becomes one with the loved, which has become the form of the lover, and therefore the Philosopher says that a friend is another self; and I Cor. VI, 17: He who adheres to God is one spirit. Each thing however acts according to the requirement of its form, which is the principle of acting and the rule of work. But good is the end; the end however is the principle in things to be done... Whence... the lover whose effect is information by the very good which has the notion of end... is inclined through love to working according to the requirement of the loved". In sum, in a. 3, ad 2: "Love causes the loved to be fittingly and connaturally to the lover, inasmuch as it unites the affection of the lover to the loved...", and a. 1, ad 2: "it is the very union or nexus or transformation by which the lover is transformed into the loved and is in a way converted into it". Cfr. I-II, q. 28, a. 1 and 2; q. 26, a. 2, ad 2.

a) In the natural appetite the principle of such movement is the connaturality of the one desiring to that into which it tends, which can be called natural love: just as the very connaturality of a heavy body to its middle place is by gravity and can be called natural love. Such natural love is in all the powers of the soul, and also in all the parts of the body, and universally in all things, since each thing has a connaturality to that which is fitting for it according to its nature.

b) Likewise the coaptation of the sensitive appetite to some sensible good and the complacence of the sensitive appetite in a good apprehended sensibly is called sensible or sensitive love, which is concerned with qualities which please the senses and which are frivolous and changeable, whence the love which arises from it is vain and inconstant.

c) Finally the coaptation of the will to some intelligible good and the complacence of the will in a good apprehended by the intellect is called rational love, which arises from intellectual and moral endowments such as perspicacity or promptness of mind, rectitude of judgment, wisdom, knowledge, prudence, benignity, fortitude and other virtues, nobility of soul, etc. This love is worthy of man as founded on truly human qualities; and is more constant as joined to endowments which are less changeable and more stable.

844. Charity is benevolent love. — For there are two kinds of rational or elective love, namely of concupiscence or desire, and of benevolence or friendship³.

In the first way we love something (a thing or person) for our advantage and utility, namely for ourselves as a good to us or so that good may come to us from it; in the other we love someone for his own sake, and therefore we wish him good as good for him or so that good may come to him. To love a horse for usefulness or food for delight is of concupiscence: for no one has proper benevolence toward a horse or food; and similarly to love a man for usefulness or delight, e.g. a master for wages; on the contrary of benevolence is the love of a friend for a friend or of a mother for her son.

Which differ in many ways:

1) By reason of the end for whom: by the love of concupiscence we love something for ourselves so that it may be well for us, by the love of benevolence we love something for itself, so that it may be well for it.

2) By reason of the end which (material object): the love of concupiscence intends one's own advantage namely the proper good of the lover, the love of benevolence the good of another namely the good of the loved one himself.

3) By reason of the proximate motive (formal object): by the love of concupiscence we love something because it is good for us inasmuch as good comes to us from it, so that the love does not stop in the loved but returns to the lover; by the love of benevolence we love someone because he is good in himself, so that the love stops in the person loved because he has in himself a perfection by which he returns into himself as lovable.

This twofold love a) stands as perfect and imperfect: the love of benevolence by which we love someone according to himself (as a good in himself) so that it may be well for him is love in the full and proper sense; the love of concupiscence however by which we love something only for ourselves so that it may be good for us, is love in an imperfect and analogous sense⁴. Hence

b) they are always in some sense joined and subordinated to one another: for it is impossible that we desire anything unless we wish it benevolently and for the sake of something loved for itself, and thus in the love of concupiscence by which we wish something for ourselves we also love ourselves benevolently — and vice versa it is impossible that we love anyone benevolently unless we also desire some good for them;

c) morally however the love of concupiscence and of benevolence differ: in the love of concupiscence by which we wish some good for ourselves, we also love ourselves benevolently, but because this benevolence is necessary and natural, it is not attended to in moral science which judges human moral and free acts, and therefore this love is simply called of concupiscence; — on the contrary in the love of benevolence by which we love someone for his own sake, we also covet and desire goods for him as for ourselves, but because this arises from the same benevolent motive, this love is simply called benevolence.

And thus considered the love of concupiscence and of benevolence are distinguished in moral species, according as they principally tend to this or that proper good of the lover, or to the good of another in himself loved. For our acts have their species from different objects or motives distinguished by us.

845. Charity is the love of friendship. — Now friendship is a) mutual benevolence or return of love, whence it is said: a friend is friend to a friend (Eth. VIII); b) mutually known or manifested, otherwise indeed the love would be mutual per accidens, nor would it be a true return of love or love of another inasmuch as he also loves; whence it is said: friendship is a return of love not hidden (Eth. IV); c) stable and therefore founded in communication i.e. community of the same goods, in the partnership of the same life and of one intimate society, so that among friends there is a certain equality, from which parity they can have familiar intercourse, live together as friends in the same life, enjoy the same happiness. Whence it is said: friendship either finds equals or makes them.

Of friendship Scripture speaks beautifully, Eccli. VI, 14-16: "A faithful friend is a strong protection; he who finds him, finds a treasure; a faithful friend has no equal, and there is no weighing of gold and silver against the goodness of his fidelity; a faithful friend is the medicine of life and immortality".

846. The remote foundation of all love and the condition on the part of the subject is the necessary and natural love of self: for since we love ourselves benevolently and wish ourselves the supreme perfection or happiness, therefore by the love of concupiscence we wish for ourselves this or that good as something pertaining to our happiness; and by the love of benevolence we love others as ourselves and wish them good as for ourselves (q. 27, a. 3).

The proximate foundation of benevolence is some community of goods: for the likeness of the lover with the loved causes the lover to love the loved as another self, and to love the good for him as for himself⁵. — The proximate foundation of friendship is likeness even to equality at least of proportion, arising from communion in the same goods, namely the communication of proper goodness, association in the same life, or at least destination or aptitude for the same life⁶.

For experience shows: a) that friendship is naturally born among those who lead the same life, does not arise among those who are very distant; b) that according to the different communion of life, friendship is different: thus natural friendship is founded on the communication of natural life through generation, domestic, civil or military friendship is founded on the communion in the same domestic, civil or military life, etc., and the more excellent the goods of some life are, the more excellent the friendship is; c) that where there is the greatest union in the same life, there is the greatest friendship, as is clear from the union of husband and wife⁷.

847. The remote foundation of all love and the condition on the part of the object is the goodness itself, as known, i.e. inasmuch as it is proposed as proportioned to us; for it is impossible that anyone loves what does not seem good or fitting to him; whence also naturally we love someone first by the love of concupiscence inasmuch as he is our good, than by the love of benevolence or friendship (q. 27, a. 1 and 2).

The foundation or proximate motive, i.e. the formal object according to which concupiscence, benevolence and friendship differ, is that goodness considered in different ways: for the motive of the love of concupiscence is the relative goodness of the thing, precisely inasmuch as it is good for someone, because apt to perfect and beatify him; the motive of the love of benevolence is the absolute goodness of the person in himself or his very perfection, by which he is not only good for the one loving but good and lovable in himself; finally the motive of friendship is the same goodness of the person in itself but which we have in common with him, and on account of which we are also loved by him.

848. The chief effects of love, according to S. Thomas, are union or mutual inherence, ecstasy, zeal, universal influx into the activity of the agent and subordination of actions to the object loved, and wounding (q. 28).

1) Union, for any love tends to unite lovers, and of two or more to make one morally, according to that: And the multitude of believers had one heart and one soul (Acts IV, 32). It effects a twofold union: a) one affective by virtue of which friends strive for the same things to will and the same to refuse, and the lover is in the loved as reckoning his goods as his own and his friend's will, and conversely the loved is in the lover because he loves him as himself. So it is read in Scripture (I Reg. XVIII, 1): "The soul of Jonathan was knit to the soul of David, and Jonathan loved him as his own soul". This union is caused by love formally; — b) another real which consists in the presence and possession of the loved; which union love causes effectively. This however, although desired by lovers, is sometimes prevented or delayed by obstacles.

2) Ecstasy (ἐκ-στασις, a going out), by which the lover is placed as it were outside himself; which is done by a twofold act of the intellect and the will: a) according to the intellect, the lover, forgetful of himself, often thinks of the loved, and this ecstasy love causes dispositively inasmuch as it causes one to meditate on the loved; intense meditation on one thing abstracts from others; — b) according to the affection he is carried outside himself: by the love of concupiscence, not content with the good he has, he seeks to enjoy something outside himself; by the love of friendship, he does not act only for himself, but wishes and works good for his friend, as taking care of him and providing for him for the friend's own sake, not for his own good but for the good of the loved, and this ecstasy love causes directly. Therefore it is of the greatest importance to love only what is honest and holy, since the lover as it were goes out from himself and becomes like to the loved⁸.

3) Zeal which proceeds from the intensity of love: for the more vehemently we tend toward something, the more strongly we repel whatever opposes this inclination. Thus, in the love of concupiscence, he who intensely covets something, by that very fact is carried against all that which stands in the way of its attainment or quiet fruition; and in this way men are said to be jealous of their wives. In the love of friendship, he who sincerely wills the good of his friend, by that very fact is vehemently moved against all that which is contrary to his friend's good; and according to this one is said to be zealous for a friend, or even for God, when one strives to the utmost to repel those things which are against the good of the friend, or against the honor or will of God. Whence Ps. LXVIII, 10: "Zeal for your house has consumed me" (Cfr. III Reg. XIX, 14).

4) Universal influx into the activity of the agent. Since the love of good (or of the end) is the cause of all that the lover does, hence if one love is predominant, all things are done on account of it. And therefore he who vehemently loves someone, orders all his actions toward him, namely to please him and to obtain his friendship. From which it follows that nothing is more important than to order one's affections rightly, so that one's life itself be rightly instituted; for, as Augustine says, de Civ. Dei, l. XIV, c. 28: "two loves therefore have made two cities; namely the earthly the love of self even to the contempt of God, the heavenly indeed the love of God even to the contempt of self".

5) Wounding. To the aforesaid effects are also reduced liquefaction, fruition, languor, and fervor, which by one name can be called wounding (Cant. IV, 9). Liquefaction is the softening of the heart which causes the lover not to contain himself within himself, and by which the heart is made apt that the loved may enter, and is easily penetrated by the loved. If therefore the loved is present and possessed, there is caused fruition of the presence; but if he is absent, there will be languor or sadness of the absence, and fervor or intense desire of the presence by which the lover is carried outside himself into the loved. — Wounding is so called because the lover is divided from himself that he may enter the loved, and is carried outside himself that he may seek the loved. Concerning which S. Thomas notes, III Sent., d. 27, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4: "In love there is the union of the lover with the loved, but there is also a triple division. From the fact namely that love transforms the lover into the loved, it causes the lover to enter into the interior of the loved and conversely, so that nothing of the loved remains not one with the lover (just as the form reaches the inmost of the formed, and conversely); and therefore a) the lover is in a way penetrated into the loved and according to this love is called acute: for it is of the acute to reach the inmost by dividing; and similarly the loved penetrates the lover, reaching to his inmost, and on account of this love is said to wound, and that to be pierced is sweet. But because nothing can be transformed into another except inasmuch as it in a way recedes from its own form (because of one thing there is one form), therefore b) this division of penetration is preceded by another division, by which the lover is separated from himself tending into the loved, and according to this love is said to cause ecstasy (and languish), and to fervor, because what ferments bubbles over and exhales. Because however nothing recedes from itself unless that which was contained within itself is loosened (just as a natural thing does not lose its form unless the dispositions by which the form was retained in matter are loosened), therefore c) it is necessary that from the lover that determination, by which he was contained only within his own limits, be removed; and on account of this love is said to liquefy the heart, because a liquid is not contained within its limits, and the contrary disposition is hardness of heart".

But if the love is vehement, it can also cause a lesion of the body or organic lesion.

849. In friendship there is a threefold union. — One is the cause of friendship, and this is the community of goods, or union of likeness. Another is essentially the very love of friendship, and this is affective or moral union, in the affection, by which a man regards his friend as one with himself and another self, whence it is said: a friend is another self (Eth. IX). The third is an effect of friendship, and this is effective and physical real union of presence which the lover seeks to have with the person loved: this is not of the essence but of the fittingness of love (q. 28, a. 1, ad 2).

Union according to the affection is a mutual inherence (mutual penetration), not only a) because friends love one another mutually; but b) because the loved is in the lover, for it remains impressed in his memory through continued knowledge, and in the affection through complacence, whence the lover reckons the loved as the same to himself, and wills and acts for his friend as for himself; and conversely the lover is in the loved, because he tends to know him intimately, and because by affection he is transformed into him, whence he reckons the goods or evils of his friend as his own and the will of his friend as his own, and therefore wills and acts the same as his friend, and with him is sad and joyful, as made the same as the loved. Whence friendship is called the bond of lovers, union between lover and loved: for it is the union and concurrence of two wills (q. 28, a. 2).

850. Divine or theological charity is defined: a virtue divinely infused by which we love God the supernatural end with our whole heart for his own sake, and ourselves and our neighbor as ourselves, for God's sake. In which definition

1) there is indicated the genus to which charity pertains: a virtue divinely infused or supernatural;

2) the proper act of charity by which it is distinguished from other virtues: by which we love;

3) the material object of charity both principal: God the supernatural end, and secondary: ourselves and our neighbor;

4) the motive of charity: for God's sake;

5) the properties essential to charity: with the whole heart (above all things) toward God, and toward the neighbor as toward ourselves.

That this definition is real and adequate will be shown throughout the whole treatise⁹.

851. Division of the treatise. — The treatise on charity comprises five parts: on charity itself i.e. on the habit of charity, — on the object of charity, — on its acts and effects — on the vices and sins opposed to it, — on the precepts of charity.

Ordinarily for other virtues the act is known from the known object, and then from the act the habit; on the contrary for charity the habit is better known than the object and act: since indeed many and diverse loves can be referred to the same object under a different aspect, it must first be determined what kind of love charity is before it is determined under what formal aspect the object is considered and by what acts it is attained. Whence this treatise begins with the habit.

1st Part treats of charity itself: 1) of the essence of charity; 2) of the excellence of charity a) in itself, b) in relation to other virtues; 3) of the relation of charity to the subject: a) of the subject and generation of charity, b) of its increase, c) of its diminution and loss.

2nd Part treats of the object of charity: 1) of the formal object; 2) of the material object i.e. of those to be loved: a) of those to be loved in general; then specifically b) of the love of God, c) of the love of self, d) of the love of sinners, e) of the love of enemies; 3) of the order of charity: a) between us and God, b) between us and the neighbor, c) between various neighbors.

3rd Part is on the acts and effects of charity: 1) of the proper act, love; 2) of the internal effects of charity: joy, peace, mercy, and the gift of wisdom; 3) of the external act, or beneficence: a) material or almsgiving, b) spiritual or fraternal correction.

4th Part is on the sins opposed to charity: 1) of hatred which is opposed to love; 2) of the sins opposed to joy, namely of acedia and envy; 3) of the sins opposed to peace; 4) of scandal which is opposed to beneficence, namely a) of active scandal, b) of passive scandal, c) of certain scandals in particular.

5th Part is on the precepts of charity.