Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. I-II, q. 26-28; I, q. 60; III Sent., d. 27, q. 1; C. G. IV, 19; Quodl. I, a. 8.

842. Charity according to the name. — The Latin word charity is derived either from the Greek word: χάρις, i.e. grace, benevolence; or from the Latin word: carum, i.e. what is of great price. Both senses come to nearly the same thing, for what is benevolently loved is generally esteemed of great price, and what is held of great price is easily loved with benevolence: whence:

1° Charity originally and primarily signifies a gratuitous, liberal, honest, benevolent, excellent love toward someone who is esteemed of great price.

For love, dilection, charity and friendship, although in some sense they pertain to the same thing, because they are an appetite for good, yet in the proper and strict sense are different: love and dilection properly signify an act, friendship is as it were a habit¹ or state, charity is said of both. Moreover love is the most general term: for it signifies either a passion of the sensitive concupiscible appetite, or an act of the will; dilection adds over love a preceding choice by which it comes about that one thing is loved before another, whence it is an act of the will alone; charity adds over dilection some perfection of love, inasmuch as that which is loved with charity is esteemed of great price and loved out of benevolence. Finally friendship adds over benevolence mutual love or return of love: for it is mutual benevolence, founded on a certain communication (Eth. VIII, 2; I-II, q. 26, a. 3). Hence S. Thomas: "friendship is the most perfect among those things which pertain to love" (III Sent., d. 27, q. 2, a. 1).

2° From usage of speech however charity is taken in the stricter sense, and is an eminent love of special friendship whether natural or supernatural.

3° But in theological speech and in the strictest sense only supernatural and divine friendship is called charity, as being more precious than all others, esteeming God above all else. Whence S. Thomas: "friendship toward God more precious and dearer than all" (ib., ad 7).

The aforesaid senses are set forth in Holy Scripture: 1) charity is called the very uncreated love of God a) by which he loves us (I Jn. IV, 8), indeed also b) the love of benevolence toward sinners who do not love him (Jer. XXXI, 3; Eph. II, 4); 2) natural friendship between men (II Macc. XIV, 26); 3) the love of supernatural friendship, namely both a) the act by which we love God for himself and therefore immediately for God's sake (Col. III, 14; Rom. XII, 10); and b) the habit of supernatural friendship toward God (I Cor. XIII, 13).

843. Charity is love. — Love is a coaptation of the affection to the good loved; in which respect knowledge and love differ: for the thing through knowledge is in a way drawn to the knower, because the agent intellect (by active virtue) acts on the thing and takes and transforms the thing into itself; on the contrary through love the lover is drawn to the thing loved, because the thing acts on the appetite and transforms the appetite (the passive power) into itself (I-II, q. 22, a. 2). The affection or appetite namely is in a way informed and changed by the apprehended good, — is adapted to it, conformed and assimilated, — is transformed into it, — and is united to it as one with it; and therefore it adheres to it as fixed in it, and rests in it and is pleased with it because it is fitting for it; and like a weight it inclines and tends toward it. It is namely the principle and beginning of a tendency toward the good, and so love differs from desire and joy: from desire, which is a movement or perfect tendency toward obtaining the good, proceeding from the inclination of love; and also from joy, which is rest in a good already possessed, because the complacence of love is completed by the possession of the loved². — Love is as it were a weight tending toward the loved; desire is a weight already falling; joy is the rest of the weight in its proper place, in the real possession and presence of the term.

A threefold love is found in man. For, as S. Thomas says, I-II, q. 26, a. 1: Love pertains to the appetite, since the object of both is good; whence according to the difference of appetite there is a difference of love. For there is:

1) A certain appetite not following the apprehension of the one desiring himself, but of another; and this kind is called the natural appetite: for natural things desire what befits them according to their nature, not by their own apprehension but by the apprehension of the one instituting the nature.

2) Another appetite follows the apprehension of the one desiring himself, but of necessity, not from free judgment; and such is the sensitive appetite in brutes, which however in men shares something of freedom, inasmuch as it obeys reason.

3) Another appetite follows the apprehension of the one desiring according to free judgment; and such is the rational appetite, or intellective, which is called the will.

In each of these appetites love is called that which is the principle of the movement tending toward the loved end:

produces a twofold effect in the patient, for 1° indeed it gives form, 2° it gives motion consequently to the form... So likewise the appetible itself gives the appetite first a certain coaptation to itself, which is a certain complacence of the appetible, from which follows a movement toward the appetible... For the appetible moves the appetite, making in it as it were its intention, and the appetite tends to the appetible to be really obtained, so that there may be the end where the beginning was. The first immutation therefore of the appetite by the appetible is called love, which is nothing other than the complacence of the appetible; and from this complacence follows the movement toward the appetible, which is desire; and lastly the rest which is joy. Thus therefore since love consists in a certain immutation of the appetite by the appetible, it is clear that love is a passion, properly indeed according as it is in the concupiscible, but commonly and in an extended sense according as it is in the will". And in III Sent., d. 27, q. 1, a. 1: "Love pertains to the appetite; the appetite however is a passive power... But every passive is brought into being according as it is informed by the form of its active, and in this its movement terminates and rests... When the affection or appetite is altogether imbued with the form of the good which is its object, it is pleased in it, and adheres to it as fixed in it; and then it is said to love it. Whence love is nothing other than a certain transformation of the affection into the thing loved. And because everything that becomes the form of something becomes one with it, therefore through love, the lover becomes one with the loved, which has become the form of the lover, and therefore the Philosopher says that a friend is another self; and I Cor. VI, 17: He who adheres to God is one spirit. Each thing however acts according to the requirement of its form, which is the principle of acting and the rule of work. But good is the end; the end however is the principle in things to be done... Whence... the lover whose effect is information by the very good which has the notion of end... is inclined through love to working according to the requirement of the loved". In sum, in a. 3, ad 2: "Love causes the loved to be fittingly and connaturally to the lover, inasmuch as it unites the affection of the lover to the loved...", and a. 1, ad 2: "it is the very union or nexus or transformation by which the lover is transformed into the loved and is in a way converted into it". Cfr. I-II, q. 28, a. 1 and 2; q. 26, a. 2, ad 2.

a) In the natural appetite the principle of such movement is the connaturality of the one desiring to that into which it tends, which can be called natural love: just as the very connaturality of a heavy body to its middle place is by gravity and can be called natural love. Such natural love is in all the powers of the soul, and also in all the parts of the body, and universally in all things, since each thing has a connaturality to that which is fitting for it according to its nature.

b) Likewise the coaptation of the sensitive appetite to some sensible good and the complacence of the sensitive appetite in a good apprehended sensibly is called sensible or sensitive love, which is concerned with qualities which please the senses and which are frivolous and changeable, whence the love which arises from it is vain and inconstant.

c) Finally the coaptation of the will to some intelligible good and the complacence of the will in a good apprehended by the intellect is called rational love, which arises from intellectual and moral endowments such as perspicacity or promptness of mind, rectitude of judgment, wisdom, knowledge, prudence, benignity, fortitude and other virtues, nobility of soul, etc. This love is worthy of man as founded on truly human qualities; and is more constant as joined to endowments which are less changeable and more stable.

844. Charity is benevolent love. — For there are two kinds of rational or elective love, namely of concupiscence or desire, and of benevolence or friendship³.

In the first way we love something (a thing or person) for our advantage and utility, namely for ourselves as a good to us or so that good may come to us from it; in the other we love someone for his own sake, and therefore we wish him good as good for him or so that good may come to him. To love a horse for usefulness or food for delight is of concupiscence: for no one has proper benevolence toward a horse or food; and similarly to love a man for usefulness or delight, e.g. a master for wages; on the contrary of benevolence is the love of a friend for a friend or of a mother for her son.

Which differ in many ways:

1) By reason of the end for whom: by the love of concupiscence we love something for ourselves so that it may be well for us, by the love of benevolence we love something for itself, so that it may be well for it.

2) By reason of the end which (material object): the love of concupiscence intends one's own advantage namely the proper good of the lover, the love of benevolence the good of another namely the good of the loved one himself.

3) By reason of the proximate motive (formal object): by the love of concupiscence we love something because it is good for us inasmuch as good comes to us from it, so that the love does not stop in the loved but returns to the lover; by the love of benevolence we love someone because he is good in himself, so that the love stops in the person loved because he has in himself a perfection by which he returns into himself as lovable.

This twofold love a) stands as perfect and imperfect: the love of benevolence by which we love someone according to himself (as a good in himself) so that it may be well for him is love in the full and proper sense; the love of concupiscence however by which we love something only for ourselves so that it may be good for us, is love in an imperfect and analogous sense⁴. Hence

b) they are always in some sense joined and subordinated to one another: for it is impossible that we desire anything unless we wish it benevolently and for the sake of something loved for itself, and thus in the love of concupiscence by which we wish something for ourselves we also love ourselves benevolently — and vice versa it is impossible that we love anyone benevolently unless we also desire some good for them;

c) morally however the love of concupiscence and of benevolence differ: in the love of concupiscence by which we wish some good for ourselves, we also love ourselves benevolently, but because this benevolence is necessary and natural, it is not attended to in moral science which judges human moral and free acts, and therefore this love is simply called of concupiscence; — on the contrary in the love of benevolence by which we love someone for his own sake, we also covet and desire goods for him as for ourselves, but because this arises from the same benevolent motive, this love is simply called benevolence.

And thus considered the love of concupiscence and of benevolence are distinguished in moral species, according as they principally tend to this or that proper good of the lover, or to the good of another in himself loved. For our acts have their species from different objects or motives distinguished by us.

845. Charity is the love of friendship. — Now friendship is a) mutual benevolence or return of love, whence it is said: a friend is friend to a friend (Eth. VIII); b) mutually known or manifested, otherwise indeed the love would be mutual per accidens, nor would it be a true return of love or love of another inasmuch as he also loves; whence it is said: friendship is a return of love not hidden (Eth. IV); c) stable and therefore founded in communication i.e. community of the same goods, in the partnership of the same life and of one intimate society, so that among friends there is a certain equality, from which parity they can have familiar intercourse, live together as friends in the same life, enjoy the same happiness. Whence it is said: friendship either finds equals or makes them.

Of friendship Scripture speaks beautifully, Eccli. VI, 14-16: "A faithful friend is a strong protection; he who finds him, finds a treasure; a faithful friend has no equal, and there is no weighing of gold and silver against the goodness of his fidelity; a faithful friend is the medicine of life and immortality".

846. The remote foundation of all love and the condition on the part of the subject is the necessary and natural love of self: for since we love ourselves benevolently and wish ourselves the supreme perfection or happiness, therefore by the love of concupiscence we wish for ourselves this or that good as something pertaining to our happiness; and by the love of benevolence we love others as ourselves and wish them good as for ourselves (q. 27, a. 3).

The proximate foundation of benevolence is some community of goods: for the likeness of the lover with the loved causes the lover to love the loved as another self, and to love the good for him as for himself⁵. — The proximate foundation of friendship is likeness even to equality at least of proportion, arising from communion in the same goods, namely the communication of proper goodness, association in the same life, or at least destination or aptitude for the same life⁶.

For experience shows: a) that friendship is naturally born among those who lead the same life, does not arise among those who are very distant; b) that according to the different communion of life, friendship is different: thus natural friendship is founded on the communication of natural life through generation, domestic, civil or military friendship is founded on the communion in the same domestic, civil or military life, etc., and the more excellent the goods of some life are, the more excellent the friendship is; c) that where there is the greatest union in the same life, there is the greatest friendship, as is clear from the union of husband and wife⁷.

847. The remote foundation of all love and the condition on the part of the object is the goodness itself, as known, i.e. inasmuch as it is proposed as proportioned to us; for it is impossible that anyone loves what does not seem good or fitting to him; whence also naturally we love someone first by the love of concupiscence inasmuch as he is our good, than by the love of benevolence or friendship (q. 27, a. 1 and 2).

The foundation or proximate motive, i.e. the formal object according to which concupiscence, benevolence and friendship differ, is that goodness considered in different ways: for the motive of the love of concupiscence is the relative goodness of the thing, precisely inasmuch as it is good for someone, because apt to perfect and beatify him; the motive of the love of benevolence is the absolute goodness of the person in himself or his very perfection, by which he is not only good for the one loving but good and lovable in himself; finally the motive of friendship is the same goodness of the person in itself but which we have in common with him, and on account of which we are also loved by him.

848. The chief effects of love, according to S. Thomas, are union or mutual inherence, ecstasy, zeal, universal influx into the activity of the agent and subordination of actions to the object loved, and wounding (q. 28).

1) Union, for any love tends to unite lovers, and of two or more to make one morally, according to that: And the multitude of believers had one heart and one soul (Acts IV, 32). It effects a twofold union: a) one affective by virtue of which friends strive for the same things to will and the same to refuse, and the lover is in the loved as reckoning his goods as his own and his friend's will, and conversely the loved is in the lover because he loves him as himself. So it is read in Scripture (I Reg. XVIII, 1): "The soul of Jonathan was knit to the soul of David, and Jonathan loved him as his own soul". This union is caused by love formally; — b) another real which consists in the presence and possession of the loved; which union love causes effectively. This however, although desired by lovers, is sometimes prevented or delayed by obstacles.

2) Ecstasy (ἐκ-στασις, a going out), by which the lover is placed as it were outside himself; which is done by a twofold act of the intellect and the will: a) according to the intellect, the lover, forgetful of himself, often thinks of the loved, and this ecstasy love causes dispositively inasmuch as it causes one to meditate on the loved; intense meditation on one thing abstracts from others; — b) according to the affection he is carried outside himself: by the love of concupiscence, not content with the good he has, he seeks to enjoy something outside himself; by the love of friendship, he does not act only for himself, but wishes and works good for his friend, as taking care of him and providing for him for the friend's own sake, not for his own good but for the good of the loved, and this ecstasy love causes directly. Therefore it is of the greatest importance to love only what is honest and holy, since the lover as it were goes out from himself and becomes like to the loved⁸.

3) Zeal which proceeds from the intensity of love: for the more vehemently we tend toward something, the more strongly we repel whatever opposes this inclination. Thus, in the love of concupiscence, he who intensely covets something, by that very fact is carried against all that which stands in the way of its attainment or quiet fruition; and in this way men are said to be jealous of their wives. In the love of friendship, he who sincerely wills the good of his friend, by that very fact is vehemently moved against all that which is contrary to his friend's good; and according to this one is said to be zealous for a friend, or even for God, when one strives to the utmost to repel those things which are against the good of the friend, or against the honor or will of God. Whence Ps. LXVIII, 10: "Zeal for your house has consumed me" (Cfr. III Reg. XIX, 14).

4) Universal influx into the activity of the agent. Since the love of good (or of the end) is the cause of all that the lover does, hence if one love is predominant, all things are done on account of it. And therefore he who vehemently loves someone, orders all his actions toward him, namely to please him and to obtain his friendship. From which it follows that nothing is more important than to order one's affections rightly, so that one's life itself be rightly instituted; for, as Augustine says, de Civ. Dei, l. XIV, c. 28: "two loves therefore have made two cities; namely the earthly the love of self even to the contempt of God, the heavenly indeed the love of God even to the contempt of self".

5) Wounding. To the aforesaid effects are also reduced liquefaction, fruition, languor, and fervor, which by one name can be called wounding (Cant. IV, 9). Liquefaction is the softening of the heart which causes the lover not to contain himself within himself, and by which the heart is made apt that the loved may enter, and is easily penetrated by the loved. If therefore the loved is present and possessed, there is caused fruition of the presence; but if he is absent, there will be languor or sadness of the absence, and fervor or intense desire of the presence by which the lover is carried outside himself into the loved. — Wounding is so called because the lover is divided from himself that he may enter the loved, and is carried outside himself that he may seek the loved. Concerning which S. Thomas notes, III Sent., d. 27, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4: "In love there is the union of the lover with the loved, but there is also a triple division. From the fact namely that love transforms the lover into the loved, it causes the lover to enter into the interior of the loved and conversely, so that nothing of the loved remains not one with the lover (just as the form reaches the inmost of the formed, and conversely); and therefore a) the lover is in a way penetrated into the loved and according to this love is called acute: for it is of the acute to reach the inmost by dividing; and similarly the loved penetrates the lover, reaching to his inmost, and on account of this love is said to wound, and that to be pierced is sweet. But because nothing can be transformed into another except inasmuch as it in a way recedes from its own form (because of one thing there is one form), therefore b) this division of penetration is preceded by another division, by which the lover is separated from himself tending into the loved, and according to this love is said to cause ecstasy (and languish), and to fervor, because what ferments bubbles over and exhales. Because however nothing recedes from itself unless that which was contained within itself is loosened (just as a natural thing does not lose its form unless the dispositions by which the form was retained in matter are loosened), therefore c) it is necessary that from the lover that determination, by which he was contained only within his own limits, be removed; and on account of this love is said to liquefy the heart, because a liquid is not contained within its limits, and the contrary disposition is hardness of heart".

But if the love is vehement, it can also cause a lesion of the body or organic lesion.

849. In friendship there is a threefold union. — One is the cause of friendship, and this is the community of goods, or union of likeness. Another is essentially the very love of friendship, and this is affective or moral union, in the affection, by which a man regards his friend as one with himself and another self, whence it is said: a friend is another self (Eth. IX). The third is an effect of friendship, and this is effective and physical real union of presence which the lover seeks to have with the person loved: this is not of the essence but of the fittingness of love (q. 28, a. 1, ad 2).

Union according to the affection is a mutual inherence (mutual penetration), not only a) because friends love one another mutually; but b) because the loved is in the lover, for it remains impressed in his memory through continued knowledge, and in the affection through complacence, whence the lover reckons the loved as the same to himself, and wills and acts for his friend as for himself; and conversely the lover is in the loved, because he tends to know him intimately, and because by affection he is transformed into him, whence he reckons the goods or evils of his friend as his own and the will of his friend as his own, and therefore wills and acts the same as his friend, and with him is sad and joyful, as made the same as the loved. Whence friendship is called the bond of lovers, union between lover and loved: for it is the union and concurrence of two wills (q. 28, a. 2).

850. Divine or theological charity is defined: a virtue divinely infused by which we love God the supernatural end with our whole heart for his own sake, and ourselves and our neighbor as ourselves, for God's sake. In which definition

1) there is indicated the genus to which charity pertains: a virtue divinely infused or supernatural;

2) the proper act of charity by which it is distinguished from other virtues: by which we love;

3) the material object of charity both principal: God the supernatural end, and secondary: ourselves and our neighbor;

4) the motive of charity: for God's sake;

5) the properties essential to charity: with the whole heart (above all things) toward God, and toward the neighbor as toward ourselves.

That this definition is real and adequate will be shown throughout the whole treatise⁹.

851. Division of the treatise. — The treatise on charity comprises five parts: on charity itself i.e. on the habit of charity, — on the object of charity, — on its acts and effects — on the vices and sins opposed to it, — on the precepts of charity.

Ordinarily for other virtues the act is known from the known object, and then from the act the habit; on the contrary for charity the habit is better known than the object and act: since indeed many and diverse loves can be referred to the same object under a different aspect, it must first be determined what kind of love charity is before it is determined under what formal aspect the object is considered and by what acts it is attained. Whence this treatise begins with the habit.

1st Part treats of charity itself: 1) of the essence of charity; 2) of the excellence of charity a) in itself, b) in relation to other virtues; 3) of the relation of charity to the subject: a) of the subject and generation of charity, b) of its increase, c) of its diminution and loss.

2nd Part treats of the object of charity: 1) of the formal object; 2) of the material object i.e. of those to be loved: a) of those to be loved in general; then specifically b) of the love of God, c) of the love of self, d) of the love of sinners, e) of the love of enemies; 3) of the order of charity: a) between us and God, b) between us and the neighbor, c) between various neighbors.

3rd Part is on the acts and effects of charity: 1) of the proper act, love; 2) of the internal effects of charity: joy, peace, mercy, and the gift of wisdom; 3) of the external act, or beneficence: a) material or almsgiving, b) spiritual or fraternal correction.

4th Part is on the sins opposed to charity: 1) of hatred which is opposed to love; 2) of the sins opposed to joy, namely of acedia and envy; 3) of the sins opposed to peace; 4) of scandal which is opposed to beneficence, namely a) of active scandal, b) of passive scandal, c) of certain scandals in particular.

5th Part is on the precepts of charity.

S. Th. II-II, q. 23, a. 1 and 2; de Virt., q. 2, a. 1-2; III Sent., d. 27, q. 2, a. 2 and 4.

852. Thesis. Charity is true and properly so called friendship between God and man. — It is certain.

It is proved:

1) From Scripture: a) it indicates in open words that such friendship exists (Sap. VII, 14; Ps. CXXXVIII, 17), for which reason the just are called friends of God e.g. Abraham (Is. XLI, 8; Judith VIII, 22; Jas. II, 23); — b) the soul is united to God as bride to bridegroom (Cant. Cant.), and man as son to father (Rom. VIII, 14-17; I Jn. III, 1), and becomes citizen and member of the household in the society and house of God (Eph. II, 19); but from the communication of domestic and civil life, especially between son and father, between bridegroom and bride, friendship is naturally born, whence Cant. II, 13, the bridegroom says: "arise, my friend...", and V, 16, the bride says: "he is my friend"; — c) in the New Testament the Son of God himself explicitly calls friends those who keep the commandments (Jn. XIV, 15, 21; XV, 10, 14), and describes that friendship, Jn. XV, 21... "He who loves me shall be loved by my Father, and I will love him... and we will come to him and make our abode with him", and XV, 14-15: "You are my friends, I will no longer call you servants because the servant does not know what his master does. But I have called you friends, because all things whatsoever I have heard from my Father I have made known to you". Which friendship we call charity.

2) From Tradition: the thesis is explicitly enunciated by the Fathers: Hilar. in Ps. 138, n. 38; Chrys. (P. G. LV, 417); Athan. (P.G. XXVII, 534); Ambros. ep. 37, n. 13; August. in Jn., tr. 85 (p. 1848 sq.); Cyr. Al. in Jn. XV, 4; Bern. serm. in Cant. 1, n. 8; 68, n. 1, 3; and it is the common doctrine of theologians after S. Thomas, and of the commentators on the Canticle of Canticles.

3) From reason: Charity is friendship between God and man, if all the conditions required for this are present. Now a) there is a communication of goods and indeed of those which are proper to the nature and life of God: for God communicates himself and his own intellectual life and beatitude in the beatific vision (I Cor. I, 9; I Jn. III, 2), and by grace we are partakers and participants of his very divinity, and sons like to God in nature and operations (II Pet. I, 4; I Jn. III, 1-2); in one word: God communicates to us his own goodness inchoately by grace, perfectly and consummately by glory, so that we are truly sons of God and he is our Father (Rom. VIII, 15). From which communication naturally arises b) mutual benevolence, namely a benevolent love by which we love God our Father as the altogether ultimate supernatural end above all things, and therefore for his own sake, because he is infinitely lovable; — and the benevolent love by which God gratuitously loves us as sons not for his own but for our utility and happiness: on the one hand indeed God cannot but be pleased in himself in the likeness of his own nature communicated with us, and on the other hand he expects no utility or happiness to come to himself from this love, since he is in himself the supreme Good and the supreme Happiness. c) It is also mutually known, for God has declared that he loves those who love him (Prov. VIII, 17; Jn. XIV, 21, 23), and by probable conjectures and sufficiently certain signs we are able to discern whether we truly love God. Therefore.

853. In charity there is a threefold union. — One is the communication of goods or the union of likeness which is the foundation of friendship and charity, and this in the case is sanctifying grace by which we are like to God in nature and worthy of eternal beatitude. Another is charity itself, and this is the mutual union according to the affection, by which God wills his own beatitude to us as to himself, and we will the beatitude which we wish for ourselves, more to God. The third is the real union which is an effect of charity, by which God and we seek mutual real presence, and God substantially inhabits in us on earth through grace and charity, and will be present to our minds in glory.

Of the second union, or mutual inherence according to the affection, John says (I ep., IV, 16): He who abides in charity, abides in God and God in him. God namely abides in us, because in our affection he remains so impressed that we will beatitude and all our goods for God as for ourselves, indeed more than for ourselves: thus he has become one with us. On the contrary we abide in God, because we follow the will of God as our own, and have his desires and goods as our own, whence we will, act and live as God: thus we are transformed into God. Whence I Cor. VI, 17: He who adheres to the Lord is one spirit.

854. Corollary. — Since in the state of pure nature no communication of the goodness and life proper to God had been made to us, there would have been between God and us no equality nor friendship, although there would have been from both sides the love of benevolence. For in that state we would have been only servants in relation to God; now however we are his friends, not indeed inasmuch as we are servants, but inasmuch as we are his adopted sons.

855. Charity is not the Holy Spirit himself. — Peter Lombard taught that charity is not a habit created in the soul, but the Holy Spirit himself granted to us who, with no created habit mediating, immediately through himself produces in us the act of divine love. Which opinion is erroneous:

a) Because it cannot be reconciled with the Council of Trent which teaches (sess. 6, c. 7 and 16, can. 11) that charity which is given by the Holy Spirit to us inheres in us, and that in justification we receive infused faith, hope and charity, through the Holy Spirit who pours forth charity; where manifestly charity is described as a habit, and is distinguished from the Holy Spirit as effect from cause;

b) It is also contrary to reason, which 1) proves that charity is the principle of a created operation: for the act of charity is voluntary and meritorious, whence it is not produced by the Holy Spirit alone, nor by the will acting as moved by him as a mere instrument of him, but by a principle of activity intrinsic to the will, by which it itself by its own powers freely moves itself to love God; but the act of charity, because supernatural, exceeds the natural intrinsic powers of the will; therefore it is necessary that the Holy Spirit add to the will a principle of operating, or supernatural powers intrinsic to it by which it becomes capable of producing the act of charity. — 2) Reason proves that this principle is not momentary and transient, but habitual and permanent: for no one perfectly tends and operates toward an end except through a permanent principle of operation, whence to natural things God has given such principles for operating toward their end; therefore also toward our supernatural end (concerning which certainly God has no less provided) he has given us a supernatural principle habitual and permanent, that we may perfectly operate and tend toward it. Otherwise the act of charity would not be easy, nor delectable, but we would be moved toward it almost violently and with sadness, which however is contrary to experience.

Whence that charity is a habit created in the soul is theologically certain.

856. Remarks. — 1st Grace is not itself friendship with God, but its principle, root and foundation, namely a divine good participated, on account of which friendship between God and us can be, which is done through charity: by grace we are made lovable to God, i.e. worthy of the love of divine friendship, by friendship loved and loving; grace is in the essence of the soul to which it gives a supernatural being, charity in the willing will to which it gives the power of operating supernaturally.

2nd God, in order to love us benevolently, does not await the presence of grace in us: for this is the effect, not the cause, of the gratuitous divine love toward us, since the love of God is the cause of all the goodness of things and all good things come from the love of God¹. — But after we have been adorned with grace from the gratuitous love of God, we are now worthy to be loved by him and capable of loving him in return as father. And thus grace, which is the effect of the love of God's special benevolence, is also the foundation of divine friendship or stable and mutual love. God namely first out of love of benevolence confers on man the perfection on account of which he becomes lovable, and then loves him as a friend.

3rd Between us and God there is a friendship of excellence, because there is no equality of quantity but only of proportion to the most excellent, which we participate, of the goodness of God.

S. Th. II-II, q. 23, a. 3, 4, 5, 6; I-II, q. 66, a. 6; De Virt., q. 2, a. 4 and 5; III Sent., d. 27, q. 2, a. 2.

857. Charity is a virtue because it is a habit making man perfect, for it unites him to God, who is the supreme rule of human acts. It is a special virtue because it has a special object, namely the goodness of God in himself, inasmuch as he is the object of supernatural beatitude. It is one virtue because charity has one end and one principal reason for loving God, ourselves and our neighbor, namely the divine goodness which he wishes to communicate to us all; — and because there is one communication of eternal beatitude upon which the friendship of charity is founded.

Let it not be said that friendship is not a virtue. For S. Thomas replies, Q. D. de Virt., q. 2, a. 2, ad 8: "(Human) friendship is not posited as a virtue, but as consequent to virtue, because from this very fact that someone has virtue and loves the good of reason, it follows from the very inclination of virtue that he loves those like himself, namely the virtuous in whom the good of reason flourishes. But the friendship which is toward God, inasmuch as he is blessed and the author of (supernatural) beatitude, must be set above the virtues which are ordered to that beatitude. And therefore since it is not consequent to the other virtues but a preamble..., it must be that it itself is a virtue per se". Likewise II-II, q. 23, a. 3, ad 1: "Friendship... is not a virtue per se distinct from others. For it does not have the notion of the praiseworthy and honest except from the object, namely inasmuch as it is founded on the honesty of the virtues; which is clear from this, that not every friendship has the notion of the praiseworthy and honest, as is clear in the friendship of the delightful and useful. Whence virtuous friendship is more something consequent to virtue than a virtue¹. Nor is it similar with charity, which is founded principally not on human virtue but on divine goodness".

858. Charity is the most excellent virtue. — For

1) it is more excellent than the moral virtues, because it attains God himself;

2) it is also more excellent than the theological [virtues]

a) on the part of the formal object, because it more and more perfectly attains God: for faith and hope attain him inasmuch as from him there comes to us either the knowledge of truth or the possession of good, but charity attains him in himself, so that it rests in him, not however as some good coming to us from him; whence faith and hope rest on God revealing and helping, charity rests on God in himself;

b) on the part of the condition of the material object, because charity is more proximate to God: for faith and hope include a distance from God, and imperfection, since faith is about God unseen, and hope about God not possessed; but charity is about God who is already in some way united and possessed to us through the love of friendship, and will be fully possessed: "for the loved is in the lover and the lover through affection is drawn to the union of the loved" (cfr. Col. III, 14; I Cor. XIII, 13).

In one word: faith and hope of themselves include imperfection, namely either obscurity, or the absence of an arduous good; charity however of itself induces no imperfection. Whence those will be brought to nothing in the fatherland, not so charity, which there, by reason of the object present and seen intuitively, is perfected.

859. They object to the aforesaid doctrine, that faith resides in a nobler power: the intellect, but charity only in the will. — The reply is given: cognition is naturally perfected according as the object understood is in the intellect, and therefore the perfection of cognition is measured by the dignity of the object understood; volition however is perfected according as the will is inclined to the thing as to a term, and specifically love according as the one loving is drawn to the thing loved, and therefore the perfection of volition and love is measured by the perfection of the thing toward which it tends. Now the things which are below us are in a nobler way in the intellect than in themselves (because each thing is in another according to the mode of that in which it is); but the things which are above us are in a nobler way in themselves than in our intellect. And therefore cognition is more perfect than love of those things which are below us; but of those which are above us, as God, love is more perfect than cognition. Whence charity is more excellent than faith, according to Eph. III, 19: the charity of Christ which surpasses knowledge. Hence God can be loved in himself without being known in himself. — So it is in the state of the way; otherwise in the fatherland: for in the beatific vision (by which we see God in himself), God is not represented in our intellect by a species received in us, but is seen immediately in himself without a created and received species, whence the intellect is united to the thing according as it is in itself, to God as he is in himself. And therefore vision is more perfect than love.

S. Th. II-II, q. 23, a. 7 and 8; I-II, q. 65, a. 2 and 4; De Virt., q. 2, a. 3.

860. Without charity there is no perfect virtue. — Since virtue makes man perfect and the supreme perfection of man consists in ordination to the last end, which is not had without charity, it follows that without charity no virtue is had in the full sense and in a perfect state. Nevertheless without it true virtues can be had which make man honest and perfect under a certain respect, as to some particular end; because however they lack ordination to the last end, which is the supreme perfection or form of morality, they are called imperfect or formless virtues, such as faith, hope, or natural virtue in a sinner (I Cor. XIII, 1-3). They are formed, however, when they receive order to the last end from charity, which is therefore called the form of all virtues.

861. Charity is the form, queen and end of all virtues. — Charity in relation to all virtues is:

1° End because it orders the acts of all virtues toward the last end, which is precisely its own object and its proper end; and since the precepts are about the acts of virtues, it is also called the end of the law (I Tim. I, 5; Rom. XIII, 10).

2° Form, not indeed intrinsic and essential, but extrinsic and accidental, because it gives and imprints on the acts of the other virtues form and ultimate perfection, namely order or tendency toward the last end, and so confers on them merit of eternal life (I Cor. XIII, 1-3)¹.

3° Root, because it nourishes and sustains them, conferring on them strength that they may be exercised more easily and frequently.

But by charity the acts of the other virtues are ordered to the last end. Therefore charity gives form to the acts of the other virtues. It is proved: That which gives an act order to the object gives it form. But human acts have as object their proper end. Therefore that which gives a human act order to the end gives form.

2° The principle of the demonstration is therefore: In moral matters the form of an act is from the part of the end. Which presupposes the doctrine set forth in Iª-IIªe: When an act is from two principles, the higher moving gives the form, the lower as matter. Hence q. 13, a. 5 on choice says it is essentially an act of the will, but formally of the intellect; and q. 16, a. 1, on use says it is an act of the will but with reason preordering. And on the contrary q. 17, a. 1 and 4 on command, says it is essentially an act of reason, but formally of the will as moving; and q. 18, a. 6 and 20, a. 3, on the case of a twofold act, says that the will of the end is the formal element, but the exterior act commanded, toward the end, is the material element. Therefore if the act of charity moves the other virtues to its end which is the last end, it gives them form.

Of the habit however one must say the same as of the act: the virtue itself is said to be formed in order to acts. Therefore the virtue of charity is the form of the other virtues.

3° What kind of form is it? Not intrinsic or constitutive of the essence, nor essential; but extrinsic, effective or motive, and accidental, as conferring the ultimate perfection of completion. And yet it gives something intrinsic to the other virtues, thus constituting them in an accidental notion: it imprints namely and imprints order on the acts of the other virtues, moving the habit to the act.

What does it imprint? Cajetan answers: The participation of the passion of command and order is as it were the form constituting those acts in the being of virtuous simply. From this participation the acts of the other virtues are called and are formed.

Whence it adds something intrinsic, which constitutes them under a certain respect, namely in the notion of perfect virtue, whence their merit and dignity. And yet they are not the same virtue: they have it by participation at the moment they are moved by charity; just as an instrument participates the virtue of the principal agent without becoming a principal agent.

4° Is it an exemplary form? S. Thomas seems here to deny it, ad 1; in Q. D. de Charitate however he affirms it. But it is a question of words. Under one notion it is not exemplary; under another it is exemplary. And he does not deny it altogether in the Summa, for he says: it is called form not as exemplary, but rather as effective. Whence it is not merely exemplary.

An exemplary cause properly is one to whose likeness others are; more broadly, one to whose likeness others work, inasmuch as the inclination to the good is like the inclination of charity to the supreme good.

Whence charity properly is not an exemplary form, because the virtues are not generated to the likeness of charity, but more broadly, inasmuch as they work to the likeness of charity (Q. D. de Char., a. 3, ad 6 and 8). It is therefore exemplary only as to the order to the last end.

5° Hence charity is placed in the definition of every virtue as meritorious (ibid., ad 1 and 3). It does not give them their proper species, otherwise it would be the essential and constitutive form (ad 1); but it gives them the common species of perfect virtue, and is a common form (ad 5 and 9). Whence there is one common species in all virtues (ad 1 and 5); not one proper species, which is called most special.

Nor does it hinder that thus there are several forms in one thing. For several accidental forms are not incompatible, provided it is according to a certain order (ad 2).

4° Mover and queen, because it can move and command all so that they produce their acts when and how the end of it demands, the love and glory of God.

5° Mother, because from the appetite of the last end it conceives and generates the acts of the other virtues, commanding them (I Cor. XIII, 4-7).

862. Remark. — Prudence is the form of the moral virtues because it gives order to the particular end according to right reason; charity is the form of the theological virtues, of prudence and of the moral virtues because it gives perfect order to the last end; grace is the form of charity and of the virtues, as to the divine being, because it gives dignity and right to the last end.

S. Th. II-II, q. 24, a. 1, 2, 3, 4; I-II, q. 112, a. 4; de Virt., q. 2, a. 10 and 11.

863. Charity is in the will. — Since charity has as object not a sensible good but a divine good, hence it is not in the sensitive appetite but resides in the will.

864. Thesis. Charity is a virtue infused per se: for it does not inhere in us naturally, nor is it caused by our acts; therefore from divine infusion alone. — It is proved:

Charity exceeds the faculty of our nature: for it is founded on the communication of eternal beatitude and grace which are supernatural gifts, exceeding nature. But that which exceeds the faculty of nature does not inhere in us naturally; nor is it acquired by natural powers, because the effect cannot surpass the cause. Therefore charity cannot be had except by divine infusion. It is confirmed: charity

a) is a property consequent on sanctifying grace, therefore supernatural like it;

b) is the principle of a salutary and supernatural act, therefore it is itself supernatural; c) has a supernatural material and formal object; therefore it must be supernatural to be able to tend toward it.

865. Corollary. — From this S. Thomas deduces that charity is not given to us according to natural capacity (or disposition), as if natural perfection or works done by the powers of nature had a disposition toward charity or toward a certain quantity (or degree) of charity; or as if God had decreed to give a greater or less charity according as the natural perfection is greater or less. But God gives charity in such proportion as he wills (Eph. IV, 7); however when he infuses it, he through grace prepares the man (adult) and gives him an actual disposition by which he may voluntarily and freely strive to receive it, and indeed gives a disposition or striving proportioned to the quantity of charity which he wills to infuse; otherwise man would have the love of God without willing it, or more than he would will or strive. In this sense is to be understood C. Trid., sess. 6, c. 7: "each one receives his own, according to the measure which the Holy Spirit distributes to each as he wills, and according to each one's own disposition and cooperation". Cfr. c. 5 and 6 and can. 4.

866. Remark. — The supernatural act of charity proximately disposes toward grace and the habit of charity in the manner of material cause, and therefore with the sole desire of the sacrament justifies (Cfr. tr. on Justification and on Penance).

S. Th. II-II, q. 24, a. 4-9; q. 184, a. 2; I-II, q. 114, a. 8; III, q. 89, a. 2 and 5; Q. D. de Virt. q. 1, a. 11.

867. Charity on the way can be increased intensively. — The charity of the fatherland cannot be increased because it is at its term. — The charity of the way cannot be increased extensively, i.e. by extending itself to new objects, because the smallest charity extends itself to all things which are to be loved out of charity. But it can be increased intensively, inasmuch as it becomes more intense, stronger and more prompt for acting.

Which is done not indeed by an addition of charity to charity, but by this alone that the same charity is more received and more firmly inheres, and man more participates charity, and is more reduced into act according to it, as was explained in tr. on Virtue in gen., n. 570.

It is proved: For he who is on the way can always approach nearer to the term; but the term of the way is God; therefore on earth we can always approach nearer to God. Now by charity we tend and approach to God, to whom we do not approach by steps of the body but by affections of the mind by which we are united to him; therefore the charity of the way can always be increased. Cfr. Eph. IV, 15-16; Phil. I, 9; Prov. IV, 18; and C. Trid., sess. 6, can. 24 and 32, c. 10: "This increase of justice holy Church asks when she prays: Give us the increase of faith, hope and charity".

868. Charity can be increased without end, as was defined in C. Vien., can. 1 against the Beguards. For there is no reason why its increase should be limited: 1) from its essence it is a participation of the infinite charity of God, which can always be more participated; 2) the infinite virtue of God which is the cause of charity can always produce a greater charity; 3) man can always receive a greater charity, for, charity increasing, the aptitude for the increase of charity increases. Therefore from no part is there a reason for limiting this increase. — From divine preordination however no one in fact will arrive at the charity of Christ or of the B. V. M.

869. God is the principal efficient cause of the increase of charity, as of its production; but charity is increased instrumentally by the sacraments, dispositively and meritorily by good works. From the treatise on grace and on human acts we know that any act, whether of charity, or placed under the influence of charity, even the smallest, merits de congruo eternal life, and an increase of grace and charity. Whence Christ says, Mk. IX, 40: "For whoever shall give you to drink a cup of water in my name... shall not lose his reward". Cfr. C. Trid., sess. 6, c. 10 and 16, can. 32.

870. When then is charity increased? — Although every good act done out of charity disposes to the increase of charity, indeed merits it, it seems however that with S. Thomas we must say that not every act of charity in fact increases it, but this is done only by an intense act by which the agent as much as he can strives for the increase of charity, namely with all the powers of the charity which he has. For just as God does not infuse a determined degree of charity except in proportion to the disposition and striving of the will, so he does not seem to increase unless someone through an intense act strives for this. And then the increase is given not only on account of the last act but also on account of all preceding acts. "The spiritual increase of charity is in some way similar to bodily growth; but bodily growth in animals and plants is not a continuous motion...; but through some time the operating nature prepares for increase, and does not actually increase; and afterwards produces in effect that for which it has disposed, actually increasing the animal or the plant. So also not by every act of charity is charity actually increased; but every act disposes to the increase of charity, inasmuch as from one act of charity a man is rendered more prompt to act again according to charity, and with the aptitude increasing, the man becomes more prompt to an act of more fervent love, by which he strives for the progress of charity; and then charity is actually increased" (q. 24, a. 6). Cfr. de Virt., n. 640.

871. In what sense can charity be perfect. — Charity:

1) On the part of the object: of God who is lovable, circumscript the strength of wayfarers, cannot be perfect, because God can never be loved as much as he is lovable: thus therefore the only perfect charity is that by which God loves himself.

2) On the part of the subject: of the man loving, the charity of the fatherland is perfect because it is in a connatural state (while here we are pilgrims away from the Lord): a) for in it the conditions of friendship are perfectly verified: there is an excellent communication, the highest union, the perfect presence of the friend, conversation with him and possession of him; whence b) it is always carried actually toward God and indeed with all its strength; and therefore c) it is inamissible. Therefore although the habit of charity according to its essence is the same as in heaven, and can be equal in degree, indeed even greater in one wayfarer than in another blessed, according to the aforesaid conditions however the charity of the fatherland is always more perfect and more intense.

3) The charity of the way, although it cannot have the perfection of the fatherland because the whole heart of man actually is always carried toward God: for it is impossible on account of the infirmity of human life always actually to think of God and to be moved by love toward him; it can however be perfect inasmuch as it excludes all things that are repugnant to the movement of charity. And indeed in a twofold way:

a) that habitually one sets his whole heart upon God, so that he thinks or wills nothing that is contrary to divine love (or any mortal sin whatever), and this perfection is essential to charity which cannot be without it, and is common to all having charity, and is of necessity for salvation; b) that one strives to be free for God and divine things so that he is actually carried toward God inasmuch as the necessities of present life permit, and leaves other things except inasmuch as the necessity of present life requires; and such perfection is possible also for some on the way, and is of counsel, and belongs only to the perfect.

Whence the charity of the way on the part of man is in a triple state: for when someone has acquired charity, his principal care is to avoid sin (mortal) and to preserve charity, and then charity is called incipient (way of purging); then the principal care is to progress in good, and to avoid venial sins especially deliberate, and then charity is progressing (way of enlightening); finally the third care is to adhere to God, and to avoid those things which impede even a more perfect union with God, and then charity is perfect (way of union), not as in heaven, but as it can be perfect on earth, namely not so that he is actually always carried toward God, but that man does this inasmuch as the necessity of present life permits.

The first is prescribed under mortal sin, the second under venial, the third is not of precept; it would however be a sin to despise it, or to fix one's mind against spiritual progress.

S. Th. II-II, q. 24, a. 10, 11, 12; de Virt., q. 2, a. 6, 11, 12, 13.

872. Charity cannot be diminished. — Charity is not diminished properly, directly and in itself:

1° For this is not done by the mere cessation from the act (as for acquired virtues), because charity is not caused by our acts.

2° Neither by a sinful act:

a) it is not done by mortal sin, because it takes away charity;

b) nor does venial sin effect a diminution of charity: for a habit is diminished by its contrary, but venial sin is not opposed to charity, because it is only an inordination about the means to the end, while charity is about the end itself.

3° Neither does God diminish charity in us, because he does not take away from us a good unless we merit it; but venial sin does not merit the diminution of charity: for when one sins in a smaller matter, he does not deserve to suffer loss in a greater; hence he who is inordinately disposed about the means to the end does not deserve to suffer loss in charity by which he is ordered to the last end itself. God namely does not turn away from man more than man turns away from him.

However the cooling of charity (Mt. XXIV, 12) which consists in the diminution or cessation of fervor i.e. of the frequency of acts or exercise of charity, disposes indirectly to its corruption; and venial sins also dispose directly to it: this disposition toward corruption can be called indirect and improperly so called diminution.

873. The charity of the way on our part can be lost. — Charity according to itself cannot fail, neither 1) on the part of God moving, who through it can infallibly move to an act of charity (Rom. VIII, 38), nor 2) according to its proper notion and power of charity which excludes all sin (I Jn. III, 9); but only 3) on the part of the subject, of our will, which is changeable according to the freedom of choice, and so can cast away charity.

The charity of the fatherland however cannot be lost because it is always actually carried toward God; but the charity of the way can be lost on account of the change of our will: for when charity is not actually carried toward God, something can occur by which it is lost, namely the motive of sinning to which consent is given.

So define the Council of Vienne against the Beguards, and the Council of Trent against the Calvinists, sess. 6, c. 12, 14, 15, can. 23 and 27 (Cfr. Ezech. XVIII, 26; XXXIII, 12-13; Rom. XI, 20-22; Gal. V, 4; I Cor. IX, 27; Apoc. II, 4, 5).

Charity is lost by any mortal sin whatever (C. Trid. sess. 6, c. 15). For:

1) "He who has my commandments and keeps them, he it is who loves me" (Jn. XIV, 21); but he who sins mortally does not keep the commandments of God; therefore he does not love God.

2) Mortal sin renders one worthy of eternal death (Rom. VI, 23); but he who has charity is worthy of eternal life (Rom. VIII, 15-17 together with II Tim. I, 7 and IV, 8). But it is impossible that one be at the same time worthy of eternal death and eternal life. Therefore mortal sin removes charity.

3) Charity requires that we love God above all things by esteem and that we wish to be subject to him in all things. But by mortal sin a man in some matter refuses and does not wish to be subject to God, but prefers sin to the friendship of God and a creature to God. Whence mortal sin is contrary to charity, and therefore removes it not only meritorily, but also physically and efficaciously expels it¹.