Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis
Benedictus Henricus Merkelbach (1871–1942)
Summa Theologiae Moralis ad mentem D. Thomae et ad normam iuris novi
First published 1935
Volume I (De principiis) of Benedictus Henricus Merkelbach's Summa theologiae moralis sets out the foundations of Catholic moral theology within a Thomistic framework. It treats human acts, conscience, law, sin, and merit in relation to the canon law of its period. The present edition follows the Paris text published by Desclée de Brouwer in 1935 and includes the Latin text with an English translation. It comprises the first volume of the three-volume Summa.
Prologus
Introductio I: Theologia Moralis Generalis: Introductio
Tractatus I: Tractatus de ultimo actu humanorum fine seu de beatitudine
Introductio
Quaestio I: DE FINE ULTIMO IN COMMUNI
Quaestio II: DE BEATITUDINE OBIECTIVA
Quaestio III: DE BEATITUDINE FORMALI
Quaestio IV: DE QUALITATIBUS BEATITUDINIS
Quaestio V: DE MODO OBTINENDI BEATITUDINEM
Tractatus II: De actibus humanis in se
Introductio
Pars I: De actibus humanis secundum esse materiale et psychologicum
§ I: De conditione actuum humanorum
Caput I: De elemento subiectivo actus humani
Quaestio I: De voluntario
Articulus I: De voluntario in se
Articulus II: De voluntario tum positivo et directo, tum negativo et indirecto
Articulus III: De voluntario in se et in causa
Quaestio II: De impedimentis voluntarii seu de involuntario
Articulus I: De violentia
Articulus II: De metu
Articulus III: De concupiscentia
Articulus IV: De ignorantia
Quaestio III: De libero
Quaestio IV: De impedimentis liberi
Articulus I: De passionibus
Articulus II: De habitu et consuetudine
Articulus III: De impedimentis liberi remotioribus
Caput II: De elemento obiectivo actus humani
Quaestio I: De elemento essentiali seu obiecto
Quaestio II: De elemento accidentali seu de circumstantiis
§ II: De distinctione actuum humanorum
Quaestio I: De actibus elicitis
Quaestio II: De actibus imperatis
Pars II: De actibus humanis secundum esse morale
§ I: De moralitate actus humani in genere
Quaestio I: De essentia et speciebus moralitatis
Quaestio II: De fundamentis moralitatis
Articulus I: De intrinseca differentia boni inter et mali
Articulus II: De norma moralitatis
Articulus III: De fundamento obiectivo moralitatis
Articulus IV: De falsis systematibus circa fundamenta moralitatis
Articulus V: De facultate apprehensiva moralitatis
Quaestio III: De principiis seu fontibus moralitatis
Quaestio IV: De distinctione specifica inter actum bonum et malum
Quaestio V: De distinctione specifica inter varios actus bonos vel malos
Articulus I: De obiecto
Articulus II: De circumstantiis
Articulus III: De fine
§ II: De moralitate actuum humanorum in specie
Quaestio I: De bonitate et malitia actus interioris
Quaestio II: De bonitate et malitia actus exterioris
Quaestio III: De bonitate et malitia effectus externi
Quaestio IV: De bonitate et malitia passionum
Quaestio V: De bonitate et malitia circumstantiarum
Pars III: De actibus humanis secundum esse supernaturale et meritorium
Quaestio I: De merito praesertim supernaturali
Quaestio II: De conditionibus meriti supernaturalis
Tractatus III: De conscientia in generali
Introductio
Quaestio I: De conscientia morali secundum se in esse psychologico
Quaestio II: De conscientia prout est regula actuum moralium
Articulus I: De rectitudine conscientiae
Articulus II: De conscientiae certitudine
Quaestio III: De conscientia christiana prout est regula actuum supernaturalium
Tractatus IV: De legibus in genere
Introductio
§ I: De lege secundum esse psychologicum
Pars I: De lege in genere
Quaestio I: De ipsa lege in se
Articulus I: De essentia legis
Articulus II: De promulgatione legis
Quaestio II: De distinctione legum
Quaestio III: De effectibus legis
Articulus I: De vi directivâ seu obligatione legis
Articulus II: De vi coactivâ seu sanctione legis
Pars II: De lege aeterna quae est fundamentum omnis legis
Quaestio I: De essentia legis aeternae
Quaestio II: De potestate legis aeternae
Quaestio III: De mutabilitate legis aeternae
§ I: De legibus quae regunt actus morales
Pars III: De lege naturali
Quaestio I: De essentia legis naturalis
Quaestio II: De potestate legis naturalis
Articulus I: De vi directivâ seu obligatione legis naturalis
Articulus II: De vi coactivâ seu sanctione legis naturalis
Quaestio III: De mutabilitate legis naturalis
Quaestio IV: De Lege Humana in Se
Articulus I: De Auctore legis civilis
Articulus II: De Qualitate legis humanae
Articulus III: De Efformatione legis humanae
Articulus IV: De Divisione legis humanae
Quaestio V: De Potestate Legis Humanae
Articulus I: De Materia legis humanae
Articulus II: De Obligatione legis humanae
Articulus III: De Subditis legis civilis
Articulus IV: De Impletione et Interpretatione legis humanae
Quaestio VI: De Mutabilitate Legis Humanae
Caput I: De Lege Vetere
Quaestio I: De Lege Vetere Secundum Se
Quaestio II: De Potestate Legis Veteris
Quaestio III: De Mutabilitate Veteris Legis
Caput II: De Lege Nova
Quaestio I: De Essentia Legis Novae
Quaestio II: De Potestate Legis Novae
Quaestio III: De Lege Ecclesiastica Secundum Se
Articulus I: De Auctore legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus II: De Materia et Qualitate legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus III: De Efformatione legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus IV: De Divisione legis ecclesiasticae
Quaestio IV: De Potestate seu Obligatione Legis Ecclesiasticae
Articulus I: De Quantitate seu Gravitate Obligationis
Articulus II: De Qualitate et Extensione Obligationis legis praeceptivae
Articulus III: De Qualitate et Extensione Obligationis legis poenalis
Articulus IV: De Qualitate et Extensione Obligationis legis irritantis
Articulus V: De Subditis legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus VI: De Impletione legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus VII: De Interpretatione legis ecclesiasticae
Quaestio V: De Mutabilitate Legis Ecclesiasticae
Articulus I: De Ignorantia
Articulus II: De Impotentia
Articulus III: De Dispensatione
Articulus IV: De privilegio
Articulus V: De cessatione finis
Articulus VI: De abrogatione et derogatione
Articulus VII: De consuetudine
Tractatus V: De peccatis in genere
Introductio I: De Peccatis in Genere
Quaestio I: De essentia peccati
Articulus I: De notione et conditionibus peccati
Articulus II: De peccato omissionis negative voluntario
Articulus III: De peccato commissionis externo, indirecte aut in causa voluntario
Articulus IV: De elementis constitutivis peccati
Articulus V: De definitione peccati
Quaestio II: De distinctione peccatorum
Articulus I: De distinctione specifica
Articulus II: De distinctione numerica
Quaestio III: De comparatione et gravitate peccatorum
Quaestio IV: De subiecto peccati
Articulus I: De motibus seu peccatis sensualitatis
Articulus II: De consensu in delectationem seu de delectatione morosa
Articulus III: De consensu in actum seu de desiderio et gaudio
Pars I: De causis peccatorum
Quaestio I: De causis peccati interioribus
Articulus I: De ignorantia causa peccati ex parte rationis
Articulus II: De passione causa peccati ex parte appetitus sensitivi
Articulus III: De malitia causa peccati ex parte voluntatis
Quaestio II: De causis peccatorum exterioribus
Articulus I: De deo permittente
Articulus II: De diabolo tentante
Articulus III: De homine cooperante
Quaestio III: De peccato quod est causa alterius peccati
Articulus I: De modo quo unum peccatum alterum causat
Articulus II: De superbia et inani gloria
Articulus III: De avaritia
Articulus IV: De luxuria et gula
Articulus V: De invidia et ira
Articulus VI: De acedia
Pars II: De effectibus peccatorum
Quaestio I: De diminutione boni naturae
Quaestio II: De reatu culpae seu macula peccati
Quaestio III: De reatu poenae
Quaestio IV: De peccato mortali et veniali
Articulus I: De differentia inter peccatum mortale et veniale
Articulus II: De gravitate peccati mortalis
Articulus III: De conditionibus ad peccatum mortale requisitis
Articulus IV: De divisione peccati mortalis et venialis
Articulus V: De conversione peccati mortalis et venialis
Articulus VI: De peccato veniali secundum se
Tractatus VI: De habitibus et virtutibus in genere
Introductio I: De Habitibus et Virtutibus in Genere
Pars I: De habitibus in genere secundum esse psychologicum
Quaestio I: De essentia habitus
Quaestio II: De subiecto habitus
Quaestio III: De causa habituum
Quaestio IV: De distinctione habituum
Pars II: De habitibus secundum esse morale seu de virtutibus acquisitis
Quaestio I: De essentia virtutis
Quaestio II: De subiecto virtutis
Quaestio III: De distinctione virtutum
Articulus I: De virtutibus intellectualibus
Articulus II: De virtutibus moralibus
Articulus III: De virtutibus cardinalibus
Quaestio IV: De proprietatibus virtutum
Articulus I: De medio virtutis
Articulus II: De connexione virtutum
Articulus III: De aequalitate virtutum
Articulus IV: De duratione virtutum
Pars III: De habitibus secundum esse supernaturale seu de virtutibus infusis
Quaestio I: De existentia et essentia infusorum habituum ac virtutum
Quaestio II: De distinctione infusorum habituum et virtutum
Articulus I: De virtutibus theologicis
Articulus II: De virtutibus moralibus
Articulus III: De donis spiritus sancti
Quaestio III: De causa infusorum habituum et virtutum
Quaestio IV: De proprietatibus infusorum habituum et virtutum
Articulus I: De medio virtutum infusarum
Articulus II: De connexione habituum infusorum
Articulus III: De aequalitate habituum infusorum
Articulus IV: De duratione habituum infusorum
Tractatus VII: De fide divina
Introductio
Quaestio I: De Obiecto Formali Fidei
Quaestio II: De Obiecto Materiali Fidei
Articulus I: De obiecto materiali in se
Articulus II: De conditionibus ad obiectum materiale requisitis
Articulus III: De evolutione obiecti materialis
Articulus IV: De ecclesia proponente obiectum fidei
Pars I: De Actu Fidei
Caput I: De Actu Fidei Interiore
Quaestio I: De Essentia Actus Fidei
Quaestio II: De Analysi Actus Fidei
Articulus I: De ipso actu fidei
Articulus II: De ipso credulitatis affectu
Articulus III: De iudicio credibilitatis seu de praeambulis fidei
Quaestio III: De Necessitate Fidei
Caput II: De Actu Fidei Exteriore seu de Eius Confessione
Pars II: De Habitu Fidei
Quaestio I: De Ipsa Fide
Articulus I: De fide in ordine ad subiectum spectata
Articulus II: De fide spectata relative ad virtutes supernaturales
Articulus III: De fide spectata relative ad habitus intellectuales
Quaestio II: De habentibus fidem
Quaestio III: De causa et effectibus fidei
Quaestio IV: De donis fidei correspondentibus
Pars III: De vitiis et peccatis fidei oppositis
Quaestio I: De peccatis directe oppositis fidei
Articulus I: De infidelitate
Articulus II: De haeresi et apostasia
Quaestio II: De peccatis indirecte oppositis fidei
Articulus I: De communicatione cum infidelibus et haereticis
Articulus II: De cooperatione ad infidelitatem et haeresim
Articulus III: De lectione et evulgatione scriptorum prohibitorum
Articulus IV: De admissione vel professione doctrinae quae pro fide est periculosa
Quaestio III: De blasphemia quae opponitur confessioni fidei
Pars IV: De praecepto fidei
Quaestio I: Quaestio unica
Tractatus VIII: De spe divina
Introductio
Pars I: De obiecto et actu spei
Quaestio I: De obiecto formali spei
Quaestio II: De obiecto materiali spei
Quaestio III: De necessitate spei
Pars II: De habitu et subiecto spei
Quaestio I: De spe ut est virtus
Quaestio II: De subiecto spei
Quaestio III: De timore dei
Pars III: De peccatis spei oppositis
Quaestio I: De desperatione
Quaestio II: De praesumptione
S. Th. II-II, q. 21.
**833. Presumption is any immoderate or excessive hope1, not however every presumption is opposed to divine hope. For the object of every hope is an arduous possible good. But something is possible for a man in two ways: by his own virtue, and by divine virtue. Whence there are two kinds of presumption: one by which someone tends toward a good as possible for him, which however exceeds his own power; and such presumption per se is opposed to the virtue of magnanimity which is concerned with this kind of hope, and is opposed to the theological virtue of hope only per accidens, inasmuch as one would presume to obtain by his own powers that which is possible only by divine virtue. — The other is that which tends toward some good as possible by divine virtue, which is not possible, as when someone hopes to obtain pardon without penitence; this per se concerns the theological virtue of hope, by which one adheres to divine power.
Presumption therefore opposed to divine hope can be defined: a rash and inordinate expectation of beatitude or of the means thereto. It is born of following heresy or infidelity, and is easily joined with it; without these however it can exist, in the same way as despair: for it is not required for presumption that one affirm by a speculative judgment something against faith, e.g. that pardon can be obtained without penitence; but it suffices that practically one acts as if he so believed, or even thinks that God will use with him some singular privilege.
834. Presumption opposed to divine hope is manifold. — One presumption is directly against hope, another beside hope.
The first is directly opposed to the motive of hope: to the helping virtue of God, and therefore destroys hope. It is committed in two ways: a) by trusting too much to one's own powers, as if someone positively refuses to hope for beatitude or remission of sin from divine virtue, but intends to obtain this or that by his own powers alone; and this presumption is called Pelagian; — b) by trusting inordinately to God's virtue, as if one attributes to him what does not befit him, and so detracts from him and diminishes him, hoping e.g. for remission of sin without penitence or glory without merits; and this presumption is called Lutheran2.
The other is beside hope: this does not remove the motive of hoping, nor does it destroy hope, but it hopes in an inordinate and rash manner for what befits God. It is committed in various ways: a) by hoping from God supernatural goods beyond the common order of divine providence, as if someone hopes to have as much glory as the B. V. M.; — b) by hoping from God ordinary supernatural goods, but which are not promised, such as time for penitence precisely at the end of life, caring nothing for salvation; — c) by taking confidence in God as a motive for sinning more freely, or for increasing or multiplying sins, or for persevering long in sin, as if one commits more sins precisely because their remission is easily obtained, or because as easily are remitted many as one. He however who sins many times solely because as many sins are as easily accused in confession as one, although he has a bad disposition, does not seem to commit the sin of presumption.
835. Gravity of presumption. — I. Presumption which is against hope is a sin mortal of its whole genus; because it removes the motive of hope and therefore hope itself. Lutheran presumption however is graver than Pelagian: for it is graver to diminish the divine virtue than to extol one's own. Indeed it is a sin against the Holy Spirit: for it is most injurious to God to think that he gives pardon of sin without penitence, or glory without merits; for by despising the divine omnipotence helping under the aspect of justice, the fear of God is cast away, which is the special remedy granted by the Holy Spirit that we may be drawn back from sin.
Presumption however is less grave than despair, because it is more proper to God to have mercy and to spare than to punish: for the former befits God according to himself, the latter however according to our sins.
The sin of presumption is rarely fully deliberate; if it is not, it is not a sin against the Holy Spirit nor does it remove hope.
II. Presumption which is only beside hope is a sin mortal of its own genus, which admits of lightness of matter. It is light a) if one hopes for an extraordinary supernatural good, but with full subjection toward divine providence; — b) if in some danger, without prayer and preparation, one hopes for an ordinary but small help, which God has not promised; — c) if the hope of pardon is the motive for committing only venial sins.
836. Causes of presumption and remedies. — Presumption indirectly arises from the errors in faith described above; moreover that which rests on one's own virtue directly proceeds from vainglory: for from the fact that someone greatly desires glory, it follows that he attempts something beyond his powers. — Presumption which rests inordinately on divine virtue directly arises from pride, from which it happens that someone esteems himself so much, that he does not think he is to be punished for sins or excluded from beatitude.
Remedies against presumption are: a) humility, which is directly opposed to the causes of presumption, namely pride and vainglory; — b) meditation on the inscrutable judgments of God, which directly fosters the fear of God, by which presumption is excluded: "For God is not mocked, and those who presume too much of themselves he punishes by a just judgment".
837. Practical corollaries. — 1. The hope of pardon can be a motive of sinning, in which case the sin is aggravated by the malice of presumption; but if it is not a motive of sinning, but only accompanies the sin, it is not presumption, indeed it diminishes the sin: "To sin with the purpose of persevering in sin under the hope of pardon, pertains to presumption, and this does not diminish but increases the sin. But to sin under the hope of pardon... with the purpose... of doing penance (afterwards) for the sin (if the hope is not a motive of sinning but only accompanies the sin), this is not of presumption, but this diminishes the sin, because by this one seems to have a will less firmly fixed on sinning", q. 21, a. 2, ad 3.
2. Since presumption that is mortally bad is a special sin, hence it must be declared in confession if one has committed any sin from this motive, because it is a circumstance changing the species.