Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. II-II, q. 17, a. 1, 5, 6, 7, 8; de Virt., q. 4, a. 1 and 3.

810. Theological hope is a morally good and honest habit, because it has a good object: God, our supreme good, to be obtained by divine help. Indeed it is a virtue because it is a habit making man perfect: for it causes him to adhere to divine help and so to attain God, the supreme rule of human acts; but the perfection of man consists in this, that he adheres to God and attains his proper rule. Whence in the Scriptures the praise of hope is deduced from the fact that through it man is united to God (Ps. XVII, 3; LXI, 8; XC, 1; Jer. XVII, 5, 7).

Nor should one say: hope includes imperfection, because it is about a future and absent good. — The reply is given: although this is in itself imperfect, nevertheless for man in the state of the way it is not an imperfection but a perfection to expect, on account of the divine help, those things which we cannot acquire by human power (q. 17, a. 1, ad 3; de Virt., q. 4, a. 1, ad 4).

811. Opposite errors. — Lutherans, Calvinists, Baius, Jansenists, and many modern philosophers, especially Kantians and evolutionists, have said that hope is inordinate; the Quietists and Semi-Quietists said that it is imperfect: because it includes the love of concupiscence by which we wish God as a good to us and expect him as a reward; which love is inordinate because it refers God to a creature, or at least is an imperfect, interested, and mercenary love. — The reply is given: a) In two ways we refer something to ourselves: as a means to an end, and as a perfect to what is perfectible, i.e. as an end which we desire for ourselves. Now by the love of concupiscence we refer God to ourselves, as the source of supreme perfection by which we must be perfected; which certainly is not inordinate: for so God himself willed to incarnate his Son for our sake. But hope does not refer God to us as a means to an end; but rather on the contrary it refers us to God as to an end, because it desires God as our supreme good or our supreme end. And surely, our end is not for us, but we are for the end. Whence to desire an end is not to order it as a means to us, but ourselves as a means to it. — In other words, we are only the end for whom we desire, in no way the end which.

That this is lawful the Scriptures teach, constantly exhorting the faithful to act for the sake of heavenly beatitude (Mt. VI, 33; XIX, 29; I Cor. IX, 25; Eph. I, 16; Col. III, 23-24; Heb. XI, 25-26; Apoc. II, 10; Ps. CXVIII, 112; Prov. XI, 18; Eccli. XII, 2; I Jn. III, 3); likewise the Church by the voice of Councils, e.g. Trid. sess. 6, c. 11 and 16, can. 31, and of Popes, e.g. Alex. VIII (prop. 10 and 13 damn.).

b) Moreover that love, although it is less perfect than the love of dilection and charity, is nevertheless not inordinate and positively imperfect, because it does not positively exclude the motive and love of charity, but only abstracts from them: for since we love God as our supreme good, we do not therefore deny that he is in himself supremely good and supremely lovable.

812. They object that a work done in view of a reward, in the case of eternal life, is mercenary. But it is inordinate and base to act for the sake of a reward. — The reply is given:

a) A mercenary properly is one who orders what is more noble as a means to what is base, e.g. to money, or who does not act except for the sake of a reward, or even for a merely temporal good. Hence by S. Thomas, q. 19, a. 4, ad 3, mercenary love is rather that which loves God for the sake of temporal goods. Of hope however it cannot be said 1) that it acts for a temporal reward; or 2) that it does not act except for the sake of a reward, because it does not exclude another honest motive, although the hope of a merely spiritual and future reward powerfully incites to the good. Whence the reward is not the exclusive motive of acting but adjunct, as a help. — Nor 3) does hope order God to beatitude, but it asks for beatitude and further orders it to God, as was said in the preceding n., a, and n. 805.

b) But those who boast of acting for duty's sake, as they say, and not for the sake of a reward, deceive themselves or others: for experience shows that men begin to act in view of a reward, and only little by little are allured to a good of a higher order and to pure love, elicited without any view of reward. Indeed the condition necessary for us to will and love anything is that it also be our good; otherwise we could not desire it. But therefore our good will not always and necessarily be the motive of acting, namely in every act, nor a fortiori the principal or exclusive one.

813. Hope is a theological virtue, because it attains the very supreme rule of human acts, God; for 1) it has God as formal object: for it attains the omnipotence of God as efficient cause, inasmuch as it rests on his help; 2) it has also God as primary material object: it attains God as final cause inasmuch as in his possession it expects beatitude.

It is however a virtue distinct from the other theological ones: for we can adhere to God either for himself, and this we do through charity; or as a principle from which something comes to us: now from God comes to us both the knowledge of truth, and about this faith is concerned, and the possession of divine goodness, about which hope is concerned.

Faith precedes hope, because it sets forth the object of hope as possible, but hope precedes charity and introduces to it: inasmuch as one hoping to be rewarded by God is kindled to love God for himself; as was said in tr. on the Virtues, n. 625.

814. Hope without charity is called imperfect or formless, because it lacks the ultimate perfection, namely a perfect tending toward the last end; and because it hopes for beatitude only from future merits which one thinks he will acquire, not however from present merits already had.

815. Hope is a supernatural virtue, both objectively, because as object it has the very omnipotence of God supernaturally helping us to supernatural things; and subjectively, because it is produced by a supernatural principle: for since the act of hope is a means toward a supernatural end, it must itself be supernatural; furthermore it will not be supernatural unless produced by a supernatural principle, the grace of God. Hence

1) hope is a virtue per se infused;

2) the act of hope is produced by the habit of hope, as by a principle, in those who possess it; in others it will be only from actual grace;

3) the act of hope is supernatural not only as to the mode but in itself and as to substance: it is indeed divine because as material and formal object it has God to be possessed in himself, whom we expect with the help of divine omnipotence. Whence, just as God in his works rests on his sole power, so through hope in our acts toward divine things, even toward a possession of God similar to that which he himself has in heaven, we tend by resting on the sole divine power;

4) whence hope raises us to the supernatural and divine order.