Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. II-II, q. 17, a. 1, 5, 6, 7, 8; de Virt., q. 4, a. 1 and 3.

810. Theological hope is a morally good and honest habit, because it has a good object: God, our supreme good, to be obtained by divine help. Indeed it is a virtue because it is a habit making man perfect: for it causes him to adhere to divine help and so to attain God, the supreme rule of human acts; but the perfection of man consists in this, that he adheres to God and attains his proper rule. Whence in the Scriptures the praise of hope is deduced from the fact that through it man is united to God (Ps. XVII, 3; LXI, 8; XC, 1; Jer. XVII, 5, 7).

Nor should one say: hope includes imperfection, because it is about a future and absent good. — The reply is given: although this is in itself imperfect, nevertheless for man in the state of the way it is not an imperfection but a perfection to expect, on account of the divine help, those things which we cannot acquire by human power (q. 17, a. 1, ad 3; de Virt., q. 4, a. 1, ad 4).

811. Opposite errors. — Lutherans, Calvinists, Baius, Jansenists, and many modern philosophers, especially Kantians and evolutionists, have said that hope is inordinate; the Quietists and Semi-Quietists said that it is imperfect: because it includes the love of concupiscence by which we wish God as a good to us and expect him as a reward; which love is inordinate because it refers God to a creature, or at least is an imperfect, interested, and mercenary love. — The reply is given: a) In two ways we refer something to ourselves: as a means to an end, and as a perfect to what is perfectible, i.e. as an end which we desire for ourselves. Now by the love of concupiscence we refer God to ourselves, as the source of supreme perfection by which we must be perfected; which certainly is not inordinate: for so God himself willed to incarnate his Son for our sake. But hope does not refer God to us as a means to an end; but rather on the contrary it refers us to God as to an end, because it desires God as our supreme good or our supreme end. And surely, our end is not for us, but we are for the end. Whence to desire an end is not to order it as a means to us, but ourselves as a means to it. — In other words, we are only the end for whom we desire, in no way the end which.

That this is lawful the Scriptures teach, constantly exhorting the faithful to act for the sake of heavenly beatitude (Mt. VI, 33; XIX, 29; I Cor. IX, 25; Eph. I, 16; Col. III, 23-24; Heb. XI, 25-26; Apoc. II, 10; Ps. CXVIII, 112; Prov. XI, 18; Eccli. XII, 2; I Jn. III, 3); likewise the Church by the voice of Councils, e.g. Trid. sess. 6, c. 11 and 16, can. 31, and of Popes, e.g. Alex. VIII (prop. 10 and 13 damn.).

b) Moreover that love, although it is less perfect than the love of dilection and charity, is nevertheless not inordinate and positively imperfect, because it does not positively exclude the motive and love of charity, but only abstracts from them: for since we love God as our supreme good, we do not therefore deny that he is in himself supremely good and supremely lovable.

812. They object that a work done in view of a reward, in the case of eternal life, is mercenary. But it is inordinate and base to act for the sake of a reward. — The reply is given:

a) A mercenary properly is one who orders what is more noble as a means to what is base, e.g. to money, or who does not act except for the sake of a reward, or even for a merely temporal good. Hence by S. Thomas, q. 19, a. 4, ad 3, mercenary love is rather that which loves God for the sake of temporal goods. Of hope however it cannot be said 1) that it acts for a temporal reward; or 2) that it does not act except for the sake of a reward, because it does not exclude another honest motive, although the hope of a merely spiritual and future reward powerfully incites to the good. Whence the reward is not the exclusive motive of acting but adjunct, as a help. — Nor 3) does hope order God to beatitude, but it asks for beatitude and further orders it to God, as was said in the preceding n., a, and n. 805.

b) But those who boast of acting for duty's sake, as they say, and not for the sake of a reward, deceive themselves or others: for experience shows that men begin to act in view of a reward, and only little by little are allured to a good of a higher order and to pure love, elicited without any view of reward. Indeed the condition necessary for us to will and love anything is that it also be our good; otherwise we could not desire it. But therefore our good will not always and necessarily be the motive of acting, namely in every act, nor a fortiori the principal or exclusive one.

813. Hope is a theological virtue, because it attains the very supreme rule of human acts, God; for 1) it has God as formal object: for it attains the omnipotence of God as efficient cause, inasmuch as it rests on his help; 2) it has also God as primary material object: it attains God as final cause inasmuch as in his possession it expects beatitude.

It is however a virtue distinct from the other theological ones: for we can adhere to God either for himself, and this we do through charity; or as a principle from which something comes to us: now from God comes to us both the knowledge of truth, and about this faith is concerned, and the possession of divine goodness, about which hope is concerned.

Faith precedes hope, because it sets forth the object of hope as possible, but hope precedes charity and introduces to it: inasmuch as one hoping to be rewarded by God is kindled to love God for himself; as was said in tr. on the Virtues, n. 625.

814. Hope without charity is called imperfect or formless, because it lacks the ultimate perfection, namely a perfect tending toward the last end; and because it hopes for beatitude only from future merits which one thinks he will acquire, not however from present merits already had.

815. Hope is a supernatural virtue, both objectively, because as object it has the very omnipotence of God supernaturally helping us to supernatural things; and subjectively, because it is produced by a supernatural principle: for since the act of hope is a means toward a supernatural end, it must itself be supernatural; furthermore it will not be supernatural unless produced by a supernatural principle, the grace of God. Hence

1) hope is a virtue per se infused;

2) the act of hope is produced by the habit of hope, as by a principle, in those who possess it; in others it will be only from actual grace;

3) the act of hope is supernatural not only as to the mode but in itself and as to substance: it is indeed divine because as material and formal object it has God to be possessed in himself, whom we expect with the help of divine omnipotence. Whence, just as God in his works rests on his sole power, so through hope in our acts toward divine things, even toward a possession of God similar to that which he himself has in heaven, we tend by resting on the sole divine power;

4) whence hope raises us to the supernatural and divine order.

S. Th. II-II, q. 18; de Virt., q. 4, a. 2 and 4.

816. The proximate subject of theological hope is the will. — It is proved: a habit resides where its act is; but the act of hope is a movement of the appetitive power; since however theological hope has as object not a sensible good but a divine good, it is not in the irascible appetite but in the will. Therefore the habit of theological hope also is in the will.

From this it follows that the act of hope is free, because it is an act of the will. Nor should one say: man necessarily wills his beatitude; therefore he necessarily hopes. For although man necessarily wills his beatitude considered in the abstract, he nevertheless freely chooses this or that, in the case God, as the object in which he constitutes his beatitude in the concrete.

817. The remote subject of hope can be known from the fact that the object of hope is a good, future, arduous, possible of attainment. Hence

1) hope does not remain in the blessed, because beatitude is not future for them. Nor can they hope for future glory of the body, because it has not the notion of the arduous;

2) in Christ there was not the virtue of hope, because beatitude was never future for him; he could however hope for the glory of the body which was arduous for him, inasmuch as it had to be merited by his passion. But he did not hope for it by theological hope, whose object, future beatitude, was lacking; the primary object being removed, the habit does not remain; — on the contrary, hope was in the B. Virgin;

3) in the souls of purgatory hope remains, because future beatitude is for them and arduous, inasmuch as it is to be obtained through pains. Nor does it hinder that beatitude is certain for them, for certitude is not contrary to the nature of hope;

4) in the damned hope does not remain, because beatitude is impossible for them.

818. Hope is infused together with sanctifying grace, faith and charity; it is lost a) directly by sins directly contrary, namely by despair, and by that presumption which removes the motive of hope; b) indirectly it is lost, when its foundation is destroyed: faith, which is done by the sin of infidelity.

819. The hope of wayfarers is certain. — For although certitude essentially belongs only to the act of the intellect, nevertheless the acts of other powers can participate in it inasmuch as they are moved by the intellect infallibly toward something. The act of hope therefore is certain with a certitude derived from the certitude of faith. Hence:

a) Hope is absolutely certain and infallible on its part, i.e. on the part of the motive, for by faith it is certain that the omnipotence of God does not fail in helping; whence faith moves the will, so that it is without any fear, diffidence, hesitation that something necessary for salvation fails on God's part, but that it firmly adheres to God helping.

b) However on our part, i.e. on the part of the subject hoping, hope is not certain because, although God will not fail us, nevertheless our free will can fail, put an obstacle of sin, and so fail God.

On our part therefore hope has only a conditional certitude by which we are certain of obtaining eternal life, if we use the means of salvation and persevere until the end. Whence hope stands together with fear that something may fail on our part, on account of our fragility and instability. Therefore the Apostle, I Cor. X, 12: "He who thinks he stands, let him see that he does not fall", and Phil. II, 12: "With fear and trembling work out your salvation".

Which however is per accidens in relation to the nature of hope, for it does not arise from its object or motive, but from the conditions of the subject in which hope inheres. Whence simply hope is certain. Which the Scriptures teach Ps. XXX, 2; Eccli. II, 6, 12-13; Rom. V, 2; Heb. VI, 18, 19; II Tim. I, 12.

The whole doctrine is set forth by the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 9 and 13, can. 18 and 16.

S. Th. II-II, q. 19.

820. Notions. — Fear is a movement of the appetite by which one flees an imminent evil which, although difficult to be avoided, can nevertheless be avoided. It arises from love and hope: for one fears to lose or not obtain what one loves or hopes. — Then fear and hope mutually help one another to preserve man from presumption and despair: for fear mediates between hope and despair. Whence, after we have treated of hope, and before we treat of despair, it is fitting to treat of fear.

821. What is the fear of God? — We cannot fear God inasmuch as he is an evil which we flee, for he is the supreme good; we can however fear some evil on account of God, inasmuch as from God or by comparison to God some evil can befall us: 1) from God indeed the evil of punishment, eternal or temporal, which he can inflict on us; 2) by comparison to God the evil of guilt can befall us, by which we offend him and are separated from him.

822. How manyfold is the fear of God. — Fear by which we turn to God and adhere to him is threefold: 1° if we turn to him and avoid sins solely on account of the evil of punishment, it is servile fear, by which a man fears guilt (i.e. offense of God) on account of the punishment: for in this way servants are wont to fear punishments inflicted by the master; — 2° if we turn and avoid sins solely on account of the evil of guilt, it is filial fear, by which a man fears guilt as guilt, or inasmuch as it is an offense of God: for it belongs to sons to fear the offense of a father; — 3° if however on account of both we avoid sins and adhere to God, it is initial fear, midway between servile and filial, and as it were the beginning of filial fear.

To these is opposed worldly or human fear by which a man withdraws from God, and on account of the evil he fears, is ready to offend God. Which fear is always a grave or light sin, according as it leads us to sin mortally or venially.

823. Principle I. Servile fear in itself, considered according to its essence, is good: for it is nothing else than fear of punishment to be inflicted by God, which is rightly feared. Whence Mt. X, 28: "Fear him who can destroy both soul and body in gehenna" (cfr. Lk. XII, 5; Mt. III, 7-10). Which can be honest, because it does not positively exclude the fear of guilt (just as it does not include it), but abstracts from the comparison with guilt. Cfr. C. Trid., sess. 6, c. 6, can. 8; sess. 14, c. 4; prop. damn. 14 and 15 by Al. VIII; and 60-64 Quesnell's, by Clem. XI.

Nor does it hinder that to fear solely punishment is inordinate. For from its essence and proper object, servile fear fears simply punishment, abstracting from this that guilt as guilt is also to be feared or not, for it does not exclude another fear: so that it is neither affirmed that punishment alone is feared nor that guilt is also feared. — But that someone fears punishment solely and does not fear guilt on its own account, does not arise from the essence or object of this fear, but because it is in fact found in a sinner who does not fear God's guilt: it becomes therefore servile, by reason of something extrinsic, namely the state of the one fearing, from the sole absence of charity and filial fear. Hence

1) from the absence of charity it is evil, whence it is said by S. Thomas that the servility of fear is evil;

2) since the absence of charity is extrinsic to fear, the servility is extrinsic to it;

3) whence, charity and the fear of guilt being present, the fear of punishment according to its essence remains but is no longer servile.

824. Corollary. — Many modern theologians distinguish servile fear as a genus into two species, namely into simply servile and servilely servile; not rightly however, for fear that is servilely servile has nothing in common with the fear of a servant except the name. Simply servile namely is the fear described above; servilely servile however is the fear by which a man fears punishment more than guilt, and indeed so that here and now he is so disposed that he would sin if there were no punishment. It is a fear which positively excludes the fear of guilt, whereby namely a man says: I fear only punishment, so that the servility is intrinsic to it and belongs to it from its proper object and is of its essence. But such fear is not true fear of God, by which we turn to God out of reverence and avoid sins, but it is sin; whence rather than being numbered among the fears of God, it seems to be reduced to worldly fear.

825. Principle II. Servile and filial fear differ specifically, since they are concerned with different objects of evil; initial fear by which we tend to God, fearing primarily the evil of guilt and secondarily the evil of punishment, is not a new species of fear, but is filial fear, with which it has the same primary object, which however is in an imperfect state.

For those who do not yet have the perfection of charity, but begin to love God, do not yet adhere to God and avoid sins solely out of fear of guilt, but also out of fear of punishment. Whence in them there is the fear of guilt which necessarily presupposes the fear of punishment, and this is initial fear. Charity increasing, the fear of punishment diminishes, but filial fear grows.

Filial fear does not exclude the fear of punishment, but causes that the fear of punishment is not the reason why we adhere to God: for in those who have filial fear, this is solely fear of the offense of God.

826. Does the fear of God remain after this life? — In heaven the fear of punishment does not remain; filial fear however has two acts, namely 1) to fear separation from God, and as to this act it does not remain in heaven, where no guilt is to be feared; 2) to reverence God, and as to this act it remains, for the blessed, considering the loftiness of God and their own smallness, worship God with the greatest submission of soul, and are perfectly subjected to him: it is reverential fear.

827. The fear of the Lord is called the beginning of wisdom, not according to its essence, but as to the effect from which wisdom begins to operate (Ps. CX, 10; Eccli. I, 16):

1) servile fear, inasmuch as it is the first thing that disposes to wisdom from outside (Eccli. I, 27);

2) filial fear, because the first effect of wisdom is reverence and subjection toward God (ib. 20-22).

828. Remark. — Servile fear, although it is from the Holy Spirit, is nevertheless not numbered among his seven special gifts; because it is found in a sinner who does not possess the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Among those gifts however filial is numbered: for gifts dispose us to obey promptly the motion of the Holy Spirit; for this however it is required, and indeed first, that we are not resistant to the motion; but this is done by filial fear by which we reverence God and subject ourselves. And therefore filial fear holds the first place among the gifts of the Holy Spirit, ascending from the less perfect to the more perfect.

To this gift corresponds 1st the beatitude: Blessed are the poor in spirit...: for filial fear causes us to reverence God and subject ourselves to him; whence we seek to be magnified in God alone, and not in ourselves through pride or in honors or in riches.