Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. II-II, q. 17, a. 2.

803. The material object of hope is that which we hope for; this object however is twofold: one principal or primary which we hope for on its own account and for the sake of which we hope for the rest, and this is God himself as the supernatural end to be possessed by us, for all other things, such as the remission of sins, grace, etc., we hope for only inasmuch as they have an order to God, so that we may be able to arrive at him as our supernatural end, or arrive better. The other is the secondary object, and this is all the means which lead to beatitude.

804. Thesis. The primary material object of hope is God to be possessed. — It is proved:

a) In Holy Scripture hope is constantly described in relation to eternal life; it is called the hope of eternal life (Tit. I, 2; II, 13), — and the hope of the glory of the sons of God (Rom. V, 2); — it is the hope by which we expect that life which God will give to those who never change their faith from it (Tob. II, 18), and by which we know that we shall be like to God because we shall see God as he is (I Jn. III, 2); — it is the hope which enters, i.e. penetrates even to the interior of the veil, i.e. to the hidden things, where Jesus has entered as a forerunner for us (Heb. VI, 18). From all of which it is clear that eternal life is the principal object of hope, whence Mt. VI, 33: "Seek first the kingdom of God, and all things shall be added unto you". — This being posited, we thus reason¹: The object which we hope to obtain, and that in which we rest when we have obtained it, are the same. But the principal object in which we rest in eternal life is God himself. Therefore God himself is the principal object of hope. Whence Ps. LXXII, 25: "What have I in heaven, and from you what would I have upon earth?... God of my heart, and my portion God forever".

b) The material object of hope is everything that can be attained through the formal object; but the primary material object is that which is proportioned to the formal object. Now the formal object, the helping omnipotence of God, is infinite. Therefore the material object which is proportioned to it cannot be other than an infinite good; and consequently it is God himself.

805. Opinion not to be approved. — Certain theologians think that the principal object of hope is not God to be possessed by us, but the very vision or possession of God, or the act by which we possess God². Against which opinion not only do the two reasons given in the preceding n. militate, but also this fact, that the primary object of a theological virtue is God alone, and in no way something created (cfr. n. 800, e); and that the one hoping does not seek God on account of possession, otherwise he would place the last end in a creature, but seeks possession of God on account of God. It remains therefore that the vision and possession of God is only the condition required that God be attained and possessed, and the application of God possessed and beatifying made to us³.

806. The secondary material object of hope is everything which leads to beatitude. And indeed the secondary object per se is the supernatural means which by their nature lead to beatitude, namely sanctifying grace together with the supernatural virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit⁴, remission of sins, sacramental graces and actual graces. The object per accidens however is all created goods, even natural and temporal (which per se are indifferent to beatitude and by their nature do not tend toward it), inasmuch as sometimes in certain circumstances they can in some way lead us to beatitude; whence we also ask for them in the Lord's Prayer.

807. Remarks. — 1st That something be capable of being hoped for, it is required that it be both future and arduous. These indeed are not the motive of hope, but they are conditions required for the material object, just as obscurity is the condition of the material object of faith.

2nd "Movement is toward a terminus proportioned to the mobile. And therefore hope directly regards its proper good, not however what pertains to another. But presupposing the union of love toward another (by which someone has another as one with himself and the other himself), one can already hope and desire something for another as for himself; and according to this one can hope for another eternal life, inasmuch as he is united to him through love" (a. 3).