Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. II-II, q. 17, a. 1 and 4; de Virt., q. 4, a. 1.

799. Thesis. The formal object of hope is the helping omnipotence of God. — The formal object of hope is that on account of which we hope for that which we hope. Now we hope for something because it seems to us possible of attainment; but something is possible for us in two ways, either by our own power or by the power or help of another. Whence by divine hope we hope on account of the divine power or help. Now: 1) The divine power or help, i.e. the attribute by which God assists us, is the helping virtue of God, or the very omnipotence of God inasmuch as in fact he helps us. For if we ask anyone: why do you hope for beatitude? he will rightly answer: because God is ready to assist us; and if we ask: by what does he assist us? he will answer: by his power. Whence the Scriptures constantly indicate as the motive of hope the help and strength of God (Gen. XV, 1; Ps. XVII, 3; LVI, 2; LXI, 7; CXVIII frequently; Is. XXVI, 4; II Reg. XXII, 3; Prov. XVIII, 10; II Cor. IX, 8; C. Trid., sess. 6, c. 13).

2) However, the omnipotence of God would not help us unless God were benign and merciful (good toward us). Whence the Scriptures sometimes ground hope in divine mercy (Ps. XII, 6; LI, 10; CXVIII).

3) Likewise we would not be certain nor firmly hope that God's power helps us, unless he had promised it and were faithful in his promises. Whence the Scriptures ground the certitude of hope in fidelity (Heb. X, 23; Tit. I, 2).

Hence theologians say that the formal object of hope is helping omnipotence, inasmuch as it supposes the benignity of God by which it is moved and commanded, and inasmuch as it supposes the fidelity by which it is bound to help us. The last and immediate motive of hope however is helping omnipotence alone.

Aptly S. Thomas, Q. D. de Virt. 4, a. 1:

"Something is possible to be had from someone in two ways: in one way through one's own power; in another way through the help of another... Thus therefore sometimes a man hopes to obtain something through his own power, sometimes through the help of another... And then it is necessary that the movement of hope be carried to two objects, namely to the good to be obtained, and to him by whose help he is supported ("The good, which someone hopes to obtain, he says in II-II, q. 17, a. 4, has the notion of final cause, but the help by which someone hopes to obtain that good has the notion of efficient cause"). But the supreme good which is eternal beatitude man cannot obtain except through divine help... and therefore the hope of obtaining eternal life has two objects, namely eternal life itself, which one hopes for, and the divine help from which he hopes. Just as also faith has two objects, namely the thing which he believes, and the first truth (in saying) to which it corresponds. Faith however does not have the notion of virtue except inasmuch as it adheres to the testimony of the first truth... Whence also hope has the notion of virtue from this very fact that man adheres to the help of divine power for obtaining eternal life..."

800. Corollaries on various opinions not to be approved. — From the aforesaid it is easy to understand what is to be thought of the various opinions of theologians, who labor much in designating the divine attribute which functions as the formal object of hope.

a) Others simply say it is the omnipotence of God¹. — But that we expect something from God, it is not enough that God be able to bring us help to obtain it, but it is also required that he in fact bring it and help us. Whence the formal object taken comprehensively is not omnipotence, considered in itself and as it were abstractly, but only inasmuch as in fact it is helping.

b) Others hold it to be divine mercy². — But although mercy moves God to bring help, it is not however that by which he immediately helps us and assists us; but this is his power. For if a merciful one wished to bring help, but did not have the power to do so, all hope would become impossible; on the contrary, if without benignity he could help and in fact did help: whether he helped out of mercy or not, provided however that he helped, hope would equally remain.

c) Others say it is God's fidelity in his promises³. — But again fidelity is not that by which he immediately brings help to us, although it gives certitude and firmness to hope. For if a faithful God wished to fulfill his promises, but did not have the power, hope would be impossible; on the contrary, even if God had promised nothing or were not faithful in his promises, provided it appeared with some probability to be likely that he would help by his power, this would be a sufficient foundation for hoping, although this hope would not be certain.

d) Others, especially the most recent with S. Alphonsus, hold that those three together constitute the formal object⁴. — But these do not solve the knot of the question, nor do they touch it. For 1) of every habit, as also of every act, there is only one formal object and proximate motive; whence it is impossible that these three equally principally concur to the motive of hope. Moreover 2) if from these three one formal object is to be constituted, it must still be shown how they concur into one, which the aforesaid authors do not sufficiently or even in no way indicate; furthermore this cannot be done otherwise than in the way indicated above, inasmuch as God's mercy moves omnipotence to help and this is entirely certain from his fidelity.

It remains therefore that helping omnipotence alone, which is commanded by God's mercy and executes his fidelity, is the formal object and immediate motive of hope: mercy namely and fidelity are rather the reason why omnipotence helps than why we hope. — Or also these two are necessary for hope as a preamble, just as the motives of credibility are the preamble of faith; but they are not the motive of hope itself.

e) Others finally do not indicate a divine attribute as the formal object of hope, but speak too soberly by assigning only divine help⁵. — This however is not to be understood as the help of the creation of grace: for that is something which we hope for, and pertains to the material object; — and besides, nothing created can be the motive of a theological or divine virtue (cfr. n. 669). It remains therefore that help is understood as uncreated, and this in turn is nothing other than helping omnipotence (q. 18, a. 4, ad 2; q. 17, a. 6, ad 3).

801. The proper motive of hope is not God as our supreme good. — Scotus teaches, whom Suarez follows, that the motive of hope is God inasmuch as he is our supreme good⁶, or the goodness of God relative to us⁷, i.e. the infinite perfection of God inasmuch as, possessed by us, it perfectly satisfies our appetite and fulfills all our desires. — This indeed is the motive of the love of concupiscence and of desire, which are necessarily presupposed by hope (as a preamble) and are virtually included in it; for we covet and desire God because to possess him is for us good and delectable. But this is not the motive of the act which is proper to hope, and which adds above desire the expectation of a beatitude which is difficult to obtain. For that which is difficult to obtain, we nevertheless hope for, on account of the power of him by whose power we can obtain it.

802. Secondary motives of hope. — The power of God alone is the principal efficient cause which leads us to beatitude; whence from him alone, as from the principal cause or from the first moving cause, can we hope. But God uses creatures as instruments by which he helps us in some way toward beatitude. From creatures therefore, as from secondary and instrumental causes, acting under God, we can hope for some help toward obtaining the goods ordered to beatitude.

In which way 1) we hope on account of the merits of Christ, our head, in view of which God promised eternal life and the helps thereto (C. Trid. sess. 6, c. 3 and 7); moreover through his virtue we must ask all things from God;

2) we hope on account of the prayers and merits of the Saints, especially of the B. V. M. as mediatrix; indeed on account of the prayers and helps of men living on earth, and therefore we ask something from them;

3) we hope on account of our own merits, inasmuch as they are from grace and are God's gifts; not indeed that they are so much the motive of hoping, but because they are dispositions required, in order that we may arrive at eternal life (C. Trid. sess. 6, c. 16, can. 26).

However, the power of God alone is the formal object of hope: for the merits of Christ, of the Saints, or of the one hoping himself do not help us, nor therefore move us to hope, unless they depend on the very omnipotence of God, which uses them and from which they have their efficacy, and which remains the foundation on which our hope rests.