Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. II-II, q. 17, a. 1 and 4; de Virt., q. 4, a. 1.

799. Thesis. The formal object of hope is the helping omnipotence of God. — The formal object of hope is that on account of which we hope for that which we hope. Now we hope for something because it seems to us possible of attainment; but something is possible for us in two ways, either by our own power or by the power or help of another. Whence by divine hope we hope on account of the divine power or help. Now: 1) The divine power or help, i.e. the attribute by which God assists us, is the helping virtue of God, or the very omnipotence of God inasmuch as in fact he helps us. For if we ask anyone: why do you hope for beatitude? he will rightly answer: because God is ready to assist us; and if we ask: by what does he assist us? he will answer: by his power. Whence the Scriptures constantly indicate as the motive of hope the help and strength of God (Gen. XV, 1; Ps. XVII, 3; LVI, 2; LXI, 7; CXVIII frequently; Is. XXVI, 4; II Reg. XXII, 3; Prov. XVIII, 10; II Cor. IX, 8; C. Trid., sess. 6, c. 13).

2) However, the omnipotence of God would not help us unless God were benign and merciful (good toward us). Whence the Scriptures sometimes ground hope in divine mercy (Ps. XII, 6; LI, 10; CXVIII).

3) Likewise we would not be certain nor firmly hope that God's power helps us, unless he had promised it and were faithful in his promises. Whence the Scriptures ground the certitude of hope in fidelity (Heb. X, 23; Tit. I, 2).

Hence theologians say that the formal object of hope is helping omnipotence, inasmuch as it supposes the benignity of God by which it is moved and commanded, and inasmuch as it supposes the fidelity by which it is bound to help us. The last and immediate motive of hope however is helping omnipotence alone.

Aptly S. Thomas, Q. D. de Virt. 4, a. 1:

"Something is possible to be had from someone in two ways: in one way through one's own power; in another way through the help of another... Thus therefore sometimes a man hopes to obtain something through his own power, sometimes through the help of another... And then it is necessary that the movement of hope be carried to two objects, namely to the good to be obtained, and to him by whose help he is supported ("The good, which someone hopes to obtain, he says in II-II, q. 17, a. 4, has the notion of final cause, but the help by which someone hopes to obtain that good has the notion of efficient cause"). But the supreme good which is eternal beatitude man cannot obtain except through divine help... and therefore the hope of obtaining eternal life has two objects, namely eternal life itself, which one hopes for, and the divine help from which he hopes. Just as also faith has two objects, namely the thing which he believes, and the first truth (in saying) to which it corresponds. Faith however does not have the notion of virtue except inasmuch as it adheres to the testimony of the first truth... Whence also hope has the notion of virtue from this very fact that man adheres to the help of divine power for obtaining eternal life..."

800. Corollaries on various opinions not to be approved. — From the aforesaid it is easy to understand what is to be thought of the various opinions of theologians, who labor much in designating the divine attribute which functions as the formal object of hope.

a) Others simply say it is the omnipotence of God¹. — But that we expect something from God, it is not enough that God be able to bring us help to obtain it, but it is also required that he in fact bring it and help us. Whence the formal object taken comprehensively is not omnipotence, considered in itself and as it were abstractly, but only inasmuch as in fact it is helping.

b) Others hold it to be divine mercy². — But although mercy moves God to bring help, it is not however that by which he immediately helps us and assists us; but this is his power. For if a merciful one wished to bring help, but did not have the power to do so, all hope would become impossible; on the contrary, if without benignity he could help and in fact did help: whether he helped out of mercy or not, provided however that he helped, hope would equally remain.

c) Others say it is God's fidelity in his promises³. — But again fidelity is not that by which he immediately brings help to us, although it gives certitude and firmness to hope. For if a faithful God wished to fulfill his promises, but did not have the power, hope would be impossible; on the contrary, even if God had promised nothing or were not faithful in his promises, provided it appeared with some probability to be likely that he would help by his power, this would be a sufficient foundation for hoping, although this hope would not be certain.

d) Others, especially the most recent with S. Alphonsus, hold that those three together constitute the formal object⁴. — But these do not solve the knot of the question, nor do they touch it. For 1) of every habit, as also of every act, there is only one formal object and proximate motive; whence it is impossible that these three equally principally concur to the motive of hope. Moreover 2) if from these three one formal object is to be constituted, it must still be shown how they concur into one, which the aforesaid authors do not sufficiently or even in no way indicate; furthermore this cannot be done otherwise than in the way indicated above, inasmuch as God's mercy moves omnipotence to help and this is entirely certain from his fidelity.

It remains therefore that helping omnipotence alone, which is commanded by God's mercy and executes his fidelity, is the formal object and immediate motive of hope: mercy namely and fidelity are rather the reason why omnipotence helps than why we hope. — Or also these two are necessary for hope as a preamble, just as the motives of credibility are the preamble of faith; but they are not the motive of hope itself.

e) Others finally do not indicate a divine attribute as the formal object of hope, but speak too soberly by assigning only divine help⁵. — This however is not to be understood as the help of the creation of grace: for that is something which we hope for, and pertains to the material object; — and besides, nothing created can be the motive of a theological or divine virtue (cfr. n. 669). It remains therefore that help is understood as uncreated, and this in turn is nothing other than helping omnipotence (q. 18, a. 4, ad 2; q. 17, a. 6, ad 3).

801. The proper motive of hope is not God as our supreme good. — Scotus teaches, whom Suarez follows, that the motive of hope is God inasmuch as he is our supreme good⁶, or the goodness of God relative to us⁷, i.e. the infinite perfection of God inasmuch as, possessed by us, it perfectly satisfies our appetite and fulfills all our desires. — This indeed is the motive of the love of concupiscence and of desire, which are necessarily presupposed by hope (as a preamble) and are virtually included in it; for we covet and desire God because to possess him is for us good and delectable. But this is not the motive of the act which is proper to hope, and which adds above desire the expectation of a beatitude which is difficult to obtain. For that which is difficult to obtain, we nevertheless hope for, on account of the power of him by whose power we can obtain it.

802. Secondary motives of hope. — The power of God alone is the principal efficient cause which leads us to beatitude; whence from him alone, as from the principal cause or from the first moving cause, can we hope. But God uses creatures as instruments by which he helps us in some way toward beatitude. From creatures therefore, as from secondary and instrumental causes, acting under God, we can hope for some help toward obtaining the goods ordered to beatitude.

In which way 1) we hope on account of the merits of Christ, our head, in view of which God promised eternal life and the helps thereto (C. Trid. sess. 6, c. 3 and 7); moreover through his virtue we must ask all things from God;

2) we hope on account of the prayers and merits of the Saints, especially of the B. V. M. as mediatrix; indeed on account of the prayers and helps of men living on earth, and therefore we ask something from them;

3) we hope on account of our own merits, inasmuch as they are from grace and are God's gifts; not indeed that they are so much the motive of hoping, but because they are dispositions required, in order that we may arrive at eternal life (C. Trid. sess. 6, c. 16, can. 26).

However, the power of God alone is the formal object of hope: for the merits of Christ, of the Saints, or of the one hoping himself do not help us, nor therefore move us to hope, unless they depend on the very omnipotence of God, which uses them and from which they have their efficacy, and which remains the foundation on which our hope rests.

S. Th. II-II, q. 17, a. 2.

803. The material object of hope is that which we hope for; this object however is twofold: one principal or primary which we hope for on its own account and for the sake of which we hope for the rest, and this is God himself as the supernatural end to be possessed by us, for all other things, such as the remission of sins, grace, etc., we hope for only inasmuch as they have an order to God, so that we may be able to arrive at him as our supernatural end, or arrive better. The other is the secondary object, and this is all the means which lead to beatitude.

804. Thesis. The primary material object of hope is God to be possessed. — It is proved:

a) In Holy Scripture hope is constantly described in relation to eternal life; it is called the hope of eternal life (Tit. I, 2; II, 13), — and the hope of the glory of the sons of God (Rom. V, 2); — it is the hope by which we expect that life which God will give to those who never change their faith from it (Tob. II, 18), and by which we know that we shall be like to God because we shall see God as he is (I Jn. III, 2); — it is the hope which enters, i.e. penetrates even to the interior of the veil, i.e. to the hidden things, where Jesus has entered as a forerunner for us (Heb. VI, 18). From all of which it is clear that eternal life is the principal object of hope, whence Mt. VI, 33: "Seek first the kingdom of God, and all things shall be added unto you". — This being posited, we thus reason¹: The object which we hope to obtain, and that in which we rest when we have obtained it, are the same. But the principal object in which we rest in eternal life is God himself. Therefore God himself is the principal object of hope. Whence Ps. LXXII, 25: "What have I in heaven, and from you what would I have upon earth?... God of my heart, and my portion God forever".

b) The material object of hope is everything that can be attained through the formal object; but the primary material object is that which is proportioned to the formal object. Now the formal object, the helping omnipotence of God, is infinite. Therefore the material object which is proportioned to it cannot be other than an infinite good; and consequently it is God himself.

805. Opinion not to be approved. — Certain theologians think that the principal object of hope is not God to be possessed by us, but the very vision or possession of God, or the act by which we possess God². Against which opinion not only do the two reasons given in the preceding n. militate, but also this fact, that the primary object of a theological virtue is God alone, and in no way something created (cfr. n. 800, e); and that the one hoping does not seek God on account of possession, otherwise he would place the last end in a creature, but seeks possession of God on account of God. It remains therefore that the vision and possession of God is only the condition required that God be attained and possessed, and the application of God possessed and beatifying made to us³.

806. The secondary material object of hope is everything which leads to beatitude. And indeed the secondary object per se is the supernatural means which by their nature lead to beatitude, namely sanctifying grace together with the supernatural virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit⁴, remission of sins, sacramental graces and actual graces. The object per accidens however is all created goods, even natural and temporal (which per se are indifferent to beatitude and by their nature do not tend toward it), inasmuch as sometimes in certain circumstances they can in some way lead us to beatitude; whence we also ask for them in the Lord's Prayer.

807. Remarks. — 1st That something be capable of being hoped for, it is required that it be both future and arduous. These indeed are not the motive of hope, but they are conditions required for the material object, just as obscurity is the condition of the material object of faith.

2nd "Movement is toward a terminus proportioned to the mobile. And therefore hope directly regards its proper good, not however what pertains to another. But presupposing the union of love toward another (by which someone has another as one with himself and the other himself), one can already hope and desire something for another as for himself; and according to this one can hope for another eternal life, inasmuch as he is united to him through love" (a. 3).

808. Principle I. Hope is necessary by necessity of means. — By necessity of means for salvation, both for little ones and for adults, from the nature of the thing, the habit of hope is necessary, because without it charity cannot be had (C. Trid., sess. 6, c. 7).

By necessity of means for justification, and in this way for salvation, for adults having the use of reason, from the nature of the thing, the act of hope is necessary. For no one can have supernatural contrition for sin unless he hopes for forgiveness; no one will be justified unless he hopes to be justified by God (C. Trid., sess. 14, c. 4; sess. 6, c. 6).

809. Principle II. Hope is necessary by necessity of precept. — The act of hope is also necessary by necessity of precept, not only for sinners that they may arrive at justice, but also for the just; not only ordinarily and regularly, but always and for all, even the perfect.

The Quietists deny the necessity of hope for the perfect¹, thus they speak of a quietness or indifference about one's own salvation, who said that perfection consists in a passive act received and continuous of contemplation and love, and in a passivity excluding all desire of beatitude, all activity in good works, indeed all resistance to temptations. Likewise the Semi-Quietists, saying that there is a habitual state of pure love and consummate perfection, which excludes the fear of punishments, the desire of beatitude, and consequently the exercise of hope.

Now these opinions were condemned as erroneous, respectively by Innocent XI (20 Nov. 1687, cfr. prop. 7 and 12 Molinos) and by Innocent XII (12 March 1699, prop. 1, 2 and 11 Fénelon); and rightly.

It is clear: 1) From the Scriptures, in which faith is called the substance of things to be hoped for, to which therefore hope naturally follows; but faith is necessary for all. Whence also in many places, either in the manner of a promise or in the manner of an admonition, hope is commended and indeed for all (Ps. IV; LXI, 9; Sap. II, 22; Eccli. II, 6; Os. XII; I Cor. IX, 24, 25; Rom. XII, 12; VIII, 23-25; Col. I, 4, 5; I Thes. V, 8; Tit. II, 13; Heb. III, 6; VI, 18, 19; I Tim. VI, 17; I Jn. III, 3). Which suppose that the act of hope must be elicited at least sometimes.

2) From the necessity of good works: eternal salvation is given to all adults as a reward and not as a pure inheritance; but no one works for a reward unless he has confidence and hope of obtaining it. Whence C. Trid., sess. 6, can. 26:

"If anyone says that the just ought not to expect and hope for eternal retribution from God, for the good works which are done in God, through his mercy and the merit of Jesus Christ, if they persevere in doing well and keeping the divine commandments until the end; a. s." Cfr. Phil. III, 14; II Tim. IV, 8.

3) From the necessity of prayer for perseverance; but prayer to God supposes and includes hope (Jas. I, 6); whence also in the Lord's Prayer we are commanded to express the desire of beatitude and to ask for it: Thy kingdom come.

4) From the nature of pure love or perfect charity, which does not exclude the desire and hope of beatitude. The perfection of charity consists namely a) on the part of the act of love, in this that one's own good is not the motive of the act of charity itself, and b) on the part of the state of the one loving, that all acts are ordered to charity and so stand under the end of charity, which is God to be loved and glorified for himself; — not however that other acts are excluded, e.g. that we should not desire beatitude, since this is a condition required that we may perfectly love God for himself, and so it can be ordered to God to be glorified for himself. Whence indifference to beatitude and salvation is altogether impossible speaking of beatitude in the abstract; it is sinful speaking of beatitude as in the concrete it consists in God, indeed it renders charity impossible².

But if the adversaries have an imperfect hope, they err. The whole imperfection is in this, that we do not possess God, which is the imperfection of the state of the way, not of hope itself. And although this is less perfect than charity, it is nevertheless in itself perfect, as being a true virtue uniting to God, as we are now to see.