Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. I-II, q. 40, a. 1 and 2; q. 25, a. 1; Q. D. de Virt. 4, a. 1.

794. Hope according to the name (ἐλπίς) in the proper sense signifies a certain passion of the sensitive appetite of the irascible; whence the word was also used to designate both an act of the will similar to the passion of hope, and the habit inclining to this act (I Cor. XIII, 13).

In a derived and improper sense it is also taken a) for the thing hoped for (Tit. II, 13; Rom. VIII, 24-25); — b) for the one from whom we hope (Ps. XIII, 6; XXI, 10), in which sense we invoke the B. V., saying: our hope, hail; — c) for the means of acquiring the thing hoped for (merits, prayers of the saints, sacraments); — d) for the certitude of hope which is its perfection (Rom. V, 4-5).

795. Hope, taken in the proper sense, is rightly defined: a movement of the appetitive power, tending toward a future good, arduous, possible of attainment. It is called

1) a movement of the appetitive power, i.e. either of the sensitive appetite, or of the rational appetite or will, as was said in the preceding n.;

2) tending toward a good, and so it differs from fear which is of an evil; furthermore this good is sensible if it is a question of the passion of hope, but it is spiritual or even divine when it is a question of hope pertaining to the will;

3) future: for no one hopes for what he already has; and so hope is distinguished from joy or delight which are about a good already had;

4) arduous, i.e. difficult of attainment: for no one hopes for what is immediately and easily in his power; and so hope is distinguished from desire, which is for any good whatsoever, without considering its difficulty or possibility;

5) possible of attainment, at least according to one's estimation, and therefore probably to be obtained; and so it is distinguished from despair.

To hope, therefore, is to desire vividly some good for oneself, and to be confident of obtaining it.

796. Hope necessarily presupposes the love of concupiscence and desire; indeed it virtually includes them: for although one can love, and even desire, what one does not hope for, no one however can hope for what he does not covet and desire. That love is a simple complacence in the good, i.e. a coaptation of the appetite to something good, by which the appetite becomes conformed and proportioned to what is loved, and this is connatural and fitting to it; desire is a movement, a tendency toward obtaining that good; but beyond these, hope adds a firmer effort toward the attainment of the good, notwithstanding its difficulty. For when difficulties appear which entice a man not to pursue the good, and at the same time the possibility of obtaining the good appears, hope causes a man not to abandon the pursuit of the good, but to persevere firmly in it, indeed to tend more toward the good on account of the difficulties. Hope therefore strengthens the appetite, makes it firm, fights against the difficulties that arise, and raises us above the difficulties.

When someone hopes for the attainment of a good from the help of another, the act of hope is properly called expectation.

797. Divine or theological hope is defined: a virtue divinely infused by which, with certain confidence, we expect eternal beatitude and the means thereto, to be obtained by divine help. There is indicated

1) the genus to which hope belongs: a virtue divinely infused or supernatural;

2) the proper act of hope, by which it is distinguished from other virtues: by which we expect;

3) the material object or matter with which it is concerned, both principal: eternal beatitude; and secondary: the means of obtaining it; 4) the formal object or motive of hope: by divine help;

5) the essential property of hope: with certain confidence.

798. Division of the treatise. — The treatise on hope comprises 4 parts:

1st treats of the object of hope and of the act of hope which is known through the object: 1. of the formal object, 2. of the material object, 3. of the necessity of hope;

2nd treats of the habit of hope, which is known through the act, and of the subject in which it inheres: 1. of hope as it is a virtue, 2. of the subject of hope and of those having hope; 3. of the gift of the fear of God;

3rd treats of the sins opposed: 1. of despair, 2. of presumption;

4th treats of the precept of hope¹.

S. Th. II-II, q. 17, a. 1 and 4; de Virt., q. 4, a. 1.

799. Thesis. The formal object of hope is the helping omnipotence of God. — The formal object of hope is that on account of which we hope for that which we hope. Now we hope for something because it seems to us possible of attainment; but something is possible for us in two ways, either by our own power or by the power or help of another. Whence by divine hope we hope on account of the divine power or help. Now: 1) The divine power or help, i.e. the attribute by which God assists us, is the helping virtue of God, or the very omnipotence of God inasmuch as in fact he helps us. For if we ask anyone: why do you hope for beatitude? he will rightly answer: because God is ready to assist us; and if we ask: by what does he assist us? he will answer: by his power. Whence the Scriptures constantly indicate as the motive of hope the help and strength of God (Gen. XV, 1; Ps. XVII, 3; LVI, 2; LXI, 7; CXVIII frequently; Is. XXVI, 4; II Reg. XXII, 3; Prov. XVIII, 10; II Cor. IX, 8; C. Trid., sess. 6, c. 13).

2) However, the omnipotence of God would not help us unless God were benign and merciful (good toward us). Whence the Scriptures sometimes ground hope in divine mercy (Ps. XII, 6; LI, 10; CXVIII).

3) Likewise we would not be certain nor firmly hope that God's power helps us, unless he had promised it and were faithful in his promises. Whence the Scriptures ground the certitude of hope in fidelity (Heb. X, 23; Tit. I, 2).

Hence theologians say that the formal object of hope is helping omnipotence, inasmuch as it supposes the benignity of God by which it is moved and commanded, and inasmuch as it supposes the fidelity by which it is bound to help us. The last and immediate motive of hope however is helping omnipotence alone.

Aptly S. Thomas, Q. D. de Virt. 4, a. 1:

"Something is possible to be had from someone in two ways: in one way through one's own power; in another way through the help of another... Thus therefore sometimes a man hopes to obtain something through his own power, sometimes through the help of another... And then it is necessary that the movement of hope be carried to two objects, namely to the good to be obtained, and to him by whose help he is supported ("The good, which someone hopes to obtain, he says in II-II, q. 17, a. 4, has the notion of final cause, but the help by which someone hopes to obtain that good has the notion of efficient cause"). But the supreme good which is eternal beatitude man cannot obtain except through divine help... and therefore the hope of obtaining eternal life has two objects, namely eternal life itself, which one hopes for, and the divine help from which he hopes. Just as also faith has two objects, namely the thing which he believes, and the first truth (in saying) to which it corresponds. Faith however does not have the notion of virtue except inasmuch as it adheres to the testimony of the first truth... Whence also hope has the notion of virtue from this very fact that man adheres to the help of divine power for obtaining eternal life..."

800. Corollaries on various opinions not to be approved. — From the aforesaid it is easy to understand what is to be thought of the various opinions of theologians, who labor much in designating the divine attribute which functions as the formal object of hope.

a) Others simply say it is the omnipotence of God¹. — But that we expect something from God, it is not enough that God be able to bring us help to obtain it, but it is also required that he in fact bring it and help us. Whence the formal object taken comprehensively is not omnipotence, considered in itself and as it were abstractly, but only inasmuch as in fact it is helping.

b) Others hold it to be divine mercy². — But although mercy moves God to bring help, it is not however that by which he immediately helps us and assists us; but this is his power. For if a merciful one wished to bring help, but did not have the power to do so, all hope would become impossible; on the contrary, if without benignity he could help and in fact did help: whether he helped out of mercy or not, provided however that he helped, hope would equally remain.

c) Others say it is God's fidelity in his promises³. — But again fidelity is not that by which he immediately brings help to us, although it gives certitude and firmness to hope. For if a faithful God wished to fulfill his promises, but did not have the power, hope would be impossible; on the contrary, even if God had promised nothing or were not faithful in his promises, provided it appeared with some probability to be likely that he would help by his power, this would be a sufficient foundation for hoping, although this hope would not be certain.

d) Others, especially the most recent with S. Alphonsus, hold that those three together constitute the formal object⁴. — But these do not solve the knot of the question, nor do they touch it. For 1) of every habit, as also of every act, there is only one formal object and proximate motive; whence it is impossible that these three equally principally concur to the motive of hope. Moreover 2) if from these three one formal object is to be constituted, it must still be shown how they concur into one, which the aforesaid authors do not sufficiently or even in no way indicate; furthermore this cannot be done otherwise than in the way indicated above, inasmuch as God's mercy moves omnipotence to help and this is entirely certain from his fidelity.

It remains therefore that helping omnipotence alone, which is commanded by God's mercy and executes his fidelity, is the formal object and immediate motive of hope: mercy namely and fidelity are rather the reason why omnipotence helps than why we hope. — Or also these two are necessary for hope as a preamble, just as the motives of credibility are the preamble of faith; but they are not the motive of hope itself.

e) Others finally do not indicate a divine attribute as the formal object of hope, but speak too soberly by assigning only divine help⁵. — This however is not to be understood as the help of the creation of grace: for that is something which we hope for, and pertains to the material object; — and besides, nothing created can be the motive of a theological or divine virtue (cfr. n. 669). It remains therefore that help is understood as uncreated, and this in turn is nothing other than helping omnipotence (q. 18, a. 4, ad 2; q. 17, a. 6, ad 3).

801. The proper motive of hope is not God as our supreme good. — Scotus teaches, whom Suarez follows, that the motive of hope is God inasmuch as he is our supreme good⁶, or the goodness of God relative to us⁷, i.e. the infinite perfection of God inasmuch as, possessed by us, it perfectly satisfies our appetite and fulfills all our desires. — This indeed is the motive of the love of concupiscence and of desire, which are necessarily presupposed by hope (as a preamble) and are virtually included in it; for we covet and desire God because to possess him is for us good and delectable. But this is not the motive of the act which is proper to hope, and which adds above desire the expectation of a beatitude which is difficult to obtain. For that which is difficult to obtain, we nevertheless hope for, on account of the power of him by whose power we can obtain it.

802. Secondary motives of hope. — The power of God alone is the principal efficient cause which leads us to beatitude; whence from him alone, as from the principal cause or from the first moving cause, can we hope. But God uses creatures as instruments by which he helps us in some way toward beatitude. From creatures therefore, as from secondary and instrumental causes, acting under God, we can hope for some help toward obtaining the goods ordered to beatitude.

In which way 1) we hope on account of the merits of Christ, our head, in view of which God promised eternal life and the helps thereto (C. Trid. sess. 6, c. 3 and 7); moreover through his virtue we must ask all things from God;

2) we hope on account of the prayers and merits of the Saints, especially of the B. V. M. as mediatrix; indeed on account of the prayers and helps of men living on earth, and therefore we ask something from them;

3) we hope on account of our own merits, inasmuch as they are from grace and are God's gifts; not indeed that they are so much the motive of hoping, but because they are dispositions required, in order that we may arrive at eternal life (C. Trid. sess. 6, c. 16, can. 26).

However, the power of God alone is the formal object of hope: for the merits of Christ, of the Saints, or of the one hoping himself do not help us, nor therefore move us to hope, unless they depend on the very omnipotence of God, which uses them and from which they have their efficacy, and which remains the foundation on which our hope rests.

S. Th. II-II, q. 17, a. 2.

803. The material object of hope is that which we hope for; this object however is twofold: one principal or primary which we hope for on its own account and for the sake of which we hope for the rest, and this is God himself as the supernatural end to be possessed by us, for all other things, such as the remission of sins, grace, etc., we hope for only inasmuch as they have an order to God, so that we may be able to arrive at him as our supernatural end, or arrive better. The other is the secondary object, and this is all the means which lead to beatitude.

804. Thesis. The primary material object of hope is God to be possessed. — It is proved:

a) In Holy Scripture hope is constantly described in relation to eternal life; it is called the hope of eternal life (Tit. I, 2; II, 13), — and the hope of the glory of the sons of God (Rom. V, 2); — it is the hope by which we expect that life which God will give to those who never change their faith from it (Tob. II, 18), and by which we know that we shall be like to God because we shall see God as he is (I Jn. III, 2); — it is the hope which enters, i.e. penetrates even to the interior of the veil, i.e. to the hidden things, where Jesus has entered as a forerunner for us (Heb. VI, 18). From all of which it is clear that eternal life is the principal object of hope, whence Mt. VI, 33: "Seek first the kingdom of God, and all things shall be added unto you". — This being posited, we thus reason¹: The object which we hope to obtain, and that in which we rest when we have obtained it, are the same. But the principal object in which we rest in eternal life is God himself. Therefore God himself is the principal object of hope. Whence Ps. LXXII, 25: "What have I in heaven, and from you what would I have upon earth?... God of my heart, and my portion God forever".

b) The material object of hope is everything that can be attained through the formal object; but the primary material object is that which is proportioned to the formal object. Now the formal object, the helping omnipotence of God, is infinite. Therefore the material object which is proportioned to it cannot be other than an infinite good; and consequently it is God himself.

805. Opinion not to be approved. — Certain theologians think that the principal object of hope is not God to be possessed by us, but the very vision or possession of God, or the act by which we possess God². Against which opinion not only do the two reasons given in the preceding n. militate, but also this fact, that the primary object of a theological virtue is God alone, and in no way something created (cfr. n. 800, e); and that the one hoping does not seek God on account of possession, otherwise he would place the last end in a creature, but seeks possession of God on account of God. It remains therefore that the vision and possession of God is only the condition required that God be attained and possessed, and the application of God possessed and beatifying made to us³.

806. The secondary material object of hope is everything which leads to beatitude. And indeed the secondary object per se is the supernatural means which by their nature lead to beatitude, namely sanctifying grace together with the supernatural virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit⁴, remission of sins, sacramental graces and actual graces. The object per accidens however is all created goods, even natural and temporal (which per se are indifferent to beatitude and by their nature do not tend toward it), inasmuch as sometimes in certain circumstances they can in some way lead us to beatitude; whence we also ask for them in the Lord's Prayer.

807. Remarks. — 1st That something be capable of being hoped for, it is required that it be both future and arduous. These indeed are not the motive of hope, but they are conditions required for the material object, just as obscurity is the condition of the material object of faith.

2nd "Movement is toward a terminus proportioned to the mobile. And therefore hope directly regards its proper good, not however what pertains to another. But presupposing the union of love toward another (by which someone has another as one with himself and the other himself), one can already hope and desire something for another as for himself; and according to this one can hope for another eternal life, inasmuch as he is united to him through love" (a. 3).

808. Principle I. Hope is necessary by necessity of means. — By necessity of means for salvation, both for little ones and for adults, from the nature of the thing, the habit of hope is necessary, because without it charity cannot be had (C. Trid., sess. 6, c. 7).

By necessity of means for justification, and in this way for salvation, for adults having the use of reason, from the nature of the thing, the act of hope is necessary. For no one can have supernatural contrition for sin unless he hopes for forgiveness; no one will be justified unless he hopes to be justified by God (C. Trid., sess. 14, c. 4; sess. 6, c. 6).

809. Principle II. Hope is necessary by necessity of precept. — The act of hope is also necessary by necessity of precept, not only for sinners that they may arrive at justice, but also for the just; not only ordinarily and regularly, but always and for all, even the perfect.

The Quietists deny the necessity of hope for the perfect¹, thus they speak of a quietness or indifference about one's own salvation, who said that perfection consists in a passive act received and continuous of contemplation and love, and in a passivity excluding all desire of beatitude, all activity in good works, indeed all resistance to temptations. Likewise the Semi-Quietists, saying that there is a habitual state of pure love and consummate perfection, which excludes the fear of punishments, the desire of beatitude, and consequently the exercise of hope.

Now these opinions were condemned as erroneous, respectively by Innocent XI (20 Nov. 1687, cfr. prop. 7 and 12 Molinos) and by Innocent XII (12 March 1699, prop. 1, 2 and 11 Fénelon); and rightly.

It is clear: 1) From the Scriptures, in which faith is called the substance of things to be hoped for, to which therefore hope naturally follows; but faith is necessary for all. Whence also in many places, either in the manner of a promise or in the manner of an admonition, hope is commended and indeed for all (Ps. IV; LXI, 9; Sap. II, 22; Eccli. II, 6; Os. XII; I Cor. IX, 24, 25; Rom. XII, 12; VIII, 23-25; Col. I, 4, 5; I Thes. V, 8; Tit. II, 13; Heb. III, 6; VI, 18, 19; I Tim. VI, 17; I Jn. III, 3). Which suppose that the act of hope must be elicited at least sometimes.

2) From the necessity of good works: eternal salvation is given to all adults as a reward and not as a pure inheritance; but no one works for a reward unless he has confidence and hope of obtaining it. Whence C. Trid., sess. 6, can. 26:

"If anyone says that the just ought not to expect and hope for eternal retribution from God, for the good works which are done in God, through his mercy and the merit of Jesus Christ, if they persevere in doing well and keeping the divine commandments until the end; a. s." Cfr. Phil. III, 14; II Tim. IV, 8.

3) From the necessity of prayer for perseverance; but prayer to God supposes and includes hope (Jas. I, 6); whence also in the Lord's Prayer we are commanded to express the desire of beatitude and to ask for it: Thy kingdom come.

4) From the nature of pure love or perfect charity, which does not exclude the desire and hope of beatitude. The perfection of charity consists namely a) on the part of the act of love, in this that one's own good is not the motive of the act of charity itself, and b) on the part of the state of the one loving, that all acts are ordered to charity and so stand under the end of charity, which is God to be loved and glorified for himself; — not however that other acts are excluded, e.g. that we should not desire beatitude, since this is a condition required that we may perfectly love God for himself, and so it can be ordered to God to be glorified for himself. Whence indifference to beatitude and salvation is altogether impossible speaking of beatitude in the abstract; it is sinful speaking of beatitude as in the concrete it consists in God, indeed it renders charity impossible².

But if the adversaries have an imperfect hope, they err. The whole imperfection is in this, that we do not possess God, which is the imperfection of the state of the way, not of hope itself. And although this is less perfect than charity, it is nevertheless in itself perfect, as being a true virtue uniting to God, as we are now to see.

S. Th. II-II, q. 17, a. 1, 5, 6, 7, 8; de Virt., q. 4, a. 1 and 3.

810. Theological hope is a morally good and honest habit, because it has a good object: God, our supreme good, to be obtained by divine help. Indeed it is a virtue because it is a habit making man perfect: for it causes him to adhere to divine help and so to attain God, the supreme rule of human acts; but the perfection of man consists in this, that he adheres to God and attains his proper rule. Whence in the Scriptures the praise of hope is deduced from the fact that through it man is united to God (Ps. XVII, 3; LXI, 8; XC, 1; Jer. XVII, 5, 7).

Nor should one say: hope includes imperfection, because it is about a future and absent good. — The reply is given: although this is in itself imperfect, nevertheless for man in the state of the way it is not an imperfection but a perfection to expect, on account of the divine help, those things which we cannot acquire by human power (q. 17, a. 1, ad 3; de Virt., q. 4, a. 1, ad 4).

811. Opposite errors. — Lutherans, Calvinists, Baius, Jansenists, and many modern philosophers, especially Kantians and evolutionists, have said that hope is inordinate; the Quietists and Semi-Quietists said that it is imperfect: because it includes the love of concupiscence by which we wish God as a good to us and expect him as a reward; which love is inordinate because it refers God to a creature, or at least is an imperfect, interested, and mercenary love. — The reply is given: a) In two ways we refer something to ourselves: as a means to an end, and as a perfect to what is perfectible, i.e. as an end which we desire for ourselves. Now by the love of concupiscence we refer God to ourselves, as the source of supreme perfection by which we must be perfected; which certainly is not inordinate: for so God himself willed to incarnate his Son for our sake. But hope does not refer God to us as a means to an end; but rather on the contrary it refers us to God as to an end, because it desires God as our supreme good or our supreme end. And surely, our end is not for us, but we are for the end. Whence to desire an end is not to order it as a means to us, but ourselves as a means to it. — In other words, we are only the end for whom we desire, in no way the end which.

That this is lawful the Scriptures teach, constantly exhorting the faithful to act for the sake of heavenly beatitude (Mt. VI, 33; XIX, 29; I Cor. IX, 25; Eph. I, 16; Col. III, 23-24; Heb. XI, 25-26; Apoc. II, 10; Ps. CXVIII, 112; Prov. XI, 18; Eccli. XII, 2; I Jn. III, 3); likewise the Church by the voice of Councils, e.g. Trid. sess. 6, c. 11 and 16, can. 31, and of Popes, e.g. Alex. VIII (prop. 10 and 13 damn.).

b) Moreover that love, although it is less perfect than the love of dilection and charity, is nevertheless not inordinate and positively imperfect, because it does not positively exclude the motive and love of charity, but only abstracts from them: for since we love God as our supreme good, we do not therefore deny that he is in himself supremely good and supremely lovable.

812. They object that a work done in view of a reward, in the case of eternal life, is mercenary. But it is inordinate and base to act for the sake of a reward. — The reply is given:

a) A mercenary properly is one who orders what is more noble as a means to what is base, e.g. to money, or who does not act except for the sake of a reward, or even for a merely temporal good. Hence by S. Thomas, q. 19, a. 4, ad 3, mercenary love is rather that which loves God for the sake of temporal goods. Of hope however it cannot be said 1) that it acts for a temporal reward; or 2) that it does not act except for the sake of a reward, because it does not exclude another honest motive, although the hope of a merely spiritual and future reward powerfully incites to the good. Whence the reward is not the exclusive motive of acting but adjunct, as a help. — Nor 3) does hope order God to beatitude, but it asks for beatitude and further orders it to God, as was said in the preceding n., a, and n. 805.

b) But those who boast of acting for duty's sake, as they say, and not for the sake of a reward, deceive themselves or others: for experience shows that men begin to act in view of a reward, and only little by little are allured to a good of a higher order and to pure love, elicited without any view of reward. Indeed the condition necessary for us to will and love anything is that it also be our good; otherwise we could not desire it. But therefore our good will not always and necessarily be the motive of acting, namely in every act, nor a fortiori the principal or exclusive one.

813. Hope is a theological virtue, because it attains the very supreme rule of human acts, God; for 1) it has God as formal object: for it attains the omnipotence of God as efficient cause, inasmuch as it rests on his help; 2) it has also God as primary material object: it attains God as final cause inasmuch as in his possession it expects beatitude.

It is however a virtue distinct from the other theological ones: for we can adhere to God either for himself, and this we do through charity; or as a principle from which something comes to us: now from God comes to us both the knowledge of truth, and about this faith is concerned, and the possession of divine goodness, about which hope is concerned.

Faith precedes hope, because it sets forth the object of hope as possible, but hope precedes charity and introduces to it: inasmuch as one hoping to be rewarded by God is kindled to love God for himself; as was said in tr. on the Virtues, n. 625.

814. Hope without charity is called imperfect or formless, because it lacks the ultimate perfection, namely a perfect tending toward the last end; and because it hopes for beatitude only from future merits which one thinks he will acquire, not however from present merits already had.

815. Hope is a supernatural virtue, both objectively, because as object it has the very omnipotence of God supernaturally helping us to supernatural things; and subjectively, because it is produced by a supernatural principle: for since the act of hope is a means toward a supernatural end, it must itself be supernatural; furthermore it will not be supernatural unless produced by a supernatural principle, the grace of God. Hence

1) hope is a virtue per se infused;

2) the act of hope is produced by the habit of hope, as by a principle, in those who possess it; in others it will be only from actual grace;

3) the act of hope is supernatural not only as to the mode but in itself and as to substance: it is indeed divine because as material and formal object it has God to be possessed in himself, whom we expect with the help of divine omnipotence. Whence, just as God in his works rests on his sole power, so through hope in our acts toward divine things, even toward a possession of God similar to that which he himself has in heaven, we tend by resting on the sole divine power;

4) whence hope raises us to the supernatural and divine order.

S. Th. II-II, q. 18; de Virt., q. 4, a. 2 and 4.

816. The proximate subject of theological hope is the will. — It is proved: a habit resides where its act is; but the act of hope is a movement of the appetitive power; since however theological hope has as object not a sensible good but a divine good, it is not in the irascible appetite but in the will. Therefore the habit of theological hope also is in the will.

From this it follows that the act of hope is free, because it is an act of the will. Nor should one say: man necessarily wills his beatitude; therefore he necessarily hopes. For although man necessarily wills his beatitude considered in the abstract, he nevertheless freely chooses this or that, in the case God, as the object in which he constitutes his beatitude in the concrete.

817. The remote subject of hope can be known from the fact that the object of hope is a good, future, arduous, possible of attainment. Hence

1) hope does not remain in the blessed, because beatitude is not future for them. Nor can they hope for future glory of the body, because it has not the notion of the arduous;

2) in Christ there was not the virtue of hope, because beatitude was never future for him; he could however hope for the glory of the body which was arduous for him, inasmuch as it had to be merited by his passion. But he did not hope for it by theological hope, whose object, future beatitude, was lacking; the primary object being removed, the habit does not remain; — on the contrary, hope was in the B. Virgin;

3) in the souls of purgatory hope remains, because future beatitude is for them and arduous, inasmuch as it is to be obtained through pains. Nor does it hinder that beatitude is certain for them, for certitude is not contrary to the nature of hope;

4) in the damned hope does not remain, because beatitude is impossible for them.

818. Hope is infused together with sanctifying grace, faith and charity; it is lost a) directly by sins directly contrary, namely by despair, and by that presumption which removes the motive of hope; b) indirectly it is lost, when its foundation is destroyed: faith, which is done by the sin of infidelity.

819. The hope of wayfarers is certain. — For although certitude essentially belongs only to the act of the intellect, nevertheless the acts of other powers can participate in it inasmuch as they are moved by the intellect infallibly toward something. The act of hope therefore is certain with a certitude derived from the certitude of faith. Hence:

a) Hope is absolutely certain and infallible on its part, i.e. on the part of the motive, for by faith it is certain that the omnipotence of God does not fail in helping; whence faith moves the will, so that it is without any fear, diffidence, hesitation that something necessary for salvation fails on God's part, but that it firmly adheres to God helping.

b) However on our part, i.e. on the part of the subject hoping, hope is not certain because, although God will not fail us, nevertheless our free will can fail, put an obstacle of sin, and so fail God.

On our part therefore hope has only a conditional certitude by which we are certain of obtaining eternal life, if we use the means of salvation and persevere until the end. Whence hope stands together with fear that something may fail on our part, on account of our fragility and instability. Therefore the Apostle, I Cor. X, 12: "He who thinks he stands, let him see that he does not fall", and Phil. II, 12: "With fear and trembling work out your salvation".

Which however is per accidens in relation to the nature of hope, for it does not arise from its object or motive, but from the conditions of the subject in which hope inheres. Whence simply hope is certain. Which the Scriptures teach Ps. XXX, 2; Eccli. II, 6, 12-13; Rom. V, 2; Heb. VI, 18, 19; II Tim. I, 12.

The whole doctrine is set forth by the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 9 and 13, can. 18 and 16.

S. Th. II-II, q. 19.

820. Notions. — Fear is a movement of the appetite by which one flees an imminent evil which, although difficult to be avoided, can nevertheless be avoided. It arises from love and hope: for one fears to lose or not obtain what one loves or hopes. — Then fear and hope mutually help one another to preserve man from presumption and despair: for fear mediates between hope and despair. Whence, after we have treated of hope, and before we treat of despair, it is fitting to treat of fear.

821. What is the fear of God? — We cannot fear God inasmuch as he is an evil which we flee, for he is the supreme good; we can however fear some evil on account of God, inasmuch as from God or by comparison to God some evil can befall us: 1) from God indeed the evil of punishment, eternal or temporal, which he can inflict on us; 2) by comparison to God the evil of guilt can befall us, by which we offend him and are separated from him.

822. How manyfold is the fear of God. — Fear by which we turn to God and adhere to him is threefold: 1° if we turn to him and avoid sins solely on account of the evil of punishment, it is servile fear, by which a man fears guilt (i.e. offense of God) on account of the punishment: for in this way servants are wont to fear punishments inflicted by the master; — 2° if we turn and avoid sins solely on account of the evil of guilt, it is filial fear, by which a man fears guilt as guilt, or inasmuch as it is an offense of God: for it belongs to sons to fear the offense of a father; — 3° if however on account of both we avoid sins and adhere to God, it is initial fear, midway between servile and filial, and as it were the beginning of filial fear.

To these is opposed worldly or human fear by which a man withdraws from God, and on account of the evil he fears, is ready to offend God. Which fear is always a grave or light sin, according as it leads us to sin mortally or venially.

823. Principle I. Servile fear in itself, considered according to its essence, is good: for it is nothing else than fear of punishment to be inflicted by God, which is rightly feared. Whence Mt. X, 28: "Fear him who can destroy both soul and body in gehenna" (cfr. Lk. XII, 5; Mt. III, 7-10). Which can be honest, because it does not positively exclude the fear of guilt (just as it does not include it), but abstracts from the comparison with guilt. Cfr. C. Trid., sess. 6, c. 6, can. 8; sess. 14, c. 4; prop. damn. 14 and 15 by Al. VIII; and 60-64 Quesnell's, by Clem. XI.

Nor does it hinder that to fear solely punishment is inordinate. For from its essence and proper object, servile fear fears simply punishment, abstracting from this that guilt as guilt is also to be feared or not, for it does not exclude another fear: so that it is neither affirmed that punishment alone is feared nor that guilt is also feared. — But that someone fears punishment solely and does not fear guilt on its own account, does not arise from the essence or object of this fear, but because it is in fact found in a sinner who does not fear God's guilt: it becomes therefore servile, by reason of something extrinsic, namely the state of the one fearing, from the sole absence of charity and filial fear. Hence

1) from the absence of charity it is evil, whence it is said by S. Thomas that the servility of fear is evil;

2) since the absence of charity is extrinsic to fear, the servility is extrinsic to it;

3) whence, charity and the fear of guilt being present, the fear of punishment according to its essence remains but is no longer servile.

824. Corollary. — Many modern theologians distinguish servile fear as a genus into two species, namely into simply servile and servilely servile; not rightly however, for fear that is servilely servile has nothing in common with the fear of a servant except the name. Simply servile namely is the fear described above; servilely servile however is the fear by which a man fears punishment more than guilt, and indeed so that here and now he is so disposed that he would sin if there were no punishment. It is a fear which positively excludes the fear of guilt, whereby namely a man says: I fear only punishment, so that the servility is intrinsic to it and belongs to it from its proper object and is of its essence. But such fear is not true fear of God, by which we turn to God out of reverence and avoid sins, but it is sin; whence rather than being numbered among the fears of God, it seems to be reduced to worldly fear.

825. Principle II. Servile and filial fear differ specifically, since they are concerned with different objects of evil; initial fear by which we tend to God, fearing primarily the evil of guilt and secondarily the evil of punishment, is not a new species of fear, but is filial fear, with which it has the same primary object, which however is in an imperfect state.

For those who do not yet have the perfection of charity, but begin to love God, do not yet adhere to God and avoid sins solely out of fear of guilt, but also out of fear of punishment. Whence in them there is the fear of guilt which necessarily presupposes the fear of punishment, and this is initial fear. Charity increasing, the fear of punishment diminishes, but filial fear grows.

Filial fear does not exclude the fear of punishment, but causes that the fear of punishment is not the reason why we adhere to God: for in those who have filial fear, this is solely fear of the offense of God.

826. Does the fear of God remain after this life? — In heaven the fear of punishment does not remain; filial fear however has two acts, namely 1) to fear separation from God, and as to this act it does not remain in heaven, where no guilt is to be feared; 2) to reverence God, and as to this act it remains, for the blessed, considering the loftiness of God and their own smallness, worship God with the greatest submission of soul, and are perfectly subjected to him: it is reverential fear.

827. The fear of the Lord is called the beginning of wisdom, not according to its essence, but as to the effect from which wisdom begins to operate (Ps. CX, 10; Eccli. I, 16):

1) servile fear, inasmuch as it is the first thing that disposes to wisdom from outside (Eccli. I, 27);

2) filial fear, because the first effect of wisdom is reverence and subjection toward God (ib. 20-22).

828. Remark. — Servile fear, although it is from the Holy Spirit, is nevertheless not numbered among his seven special gifts; because it is found in a sinner who does not possess the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Among those gifts however filial is numbered: for gifts dispose us to obey promptly the motion of the Holy Spirit; for this however it is required, and indeed first, that we are not resistant to the motion; but this is done by filial fear by which we reverence God and subject ourselves. And therefore filial fear holds the first place among the gifts of the Holy Spirit, ascending from the less perfect to the more perfect.

To this gift corresponds 1st the beatitude: Blessed are the poor in spirit...: for filial fear causes us to reverence God and subject ourselves to him; whence we seek to be magnified in God alone, and not in ourselves through pride or in honors or in riches.

S. Th. II-II, q. 20.

829. Despair is the sin opposed to hope by defect. It is not the simple absence of hope, but is the act contrary to hope, by which one positively withdraws from beatitude and flees it, and so casts away hope of beatitude.

Despair is twofold:

1) Despair improperly so called, by which someone despises and loathes beatitude, because he judges it not good and not desirable. Thus he acts who despises the supernatural end; or who would wish to leave heaven to God, if he would leave the earth to him; or who seriously wishes to live forever in the world, precisely because he prefers this life to eternal life; — not however he who, speaking in this way, would simply show a great natural inclination to earthly things, or a fear of undergoing damnation.

2) Despair properly so called is that by which someone flees beatitude because he judges it impossible for him, or too difficult of attainment, or not future, e.g. because one thinks that God will deny pardon to a sinner, or will not give grace for conversion. But just as the act of hope is an act of the will which presupposes a judgment of the intellect by which beatitude is judged possible, so despair presupposes a prior judgment of the intellect by which one thinks he will not obtain beatitude; but that judgment leading to despair is not despair itself: for this is the act of the will which follows, by which we positively withdraw from beatitude.

830. Despair differs from infidelity. — Despair, although it is easily joined with infidelity, can nevertheless be had without it, inasmuch as someone, believing (by a speculative judgment) in the abstract and universal that beatitude or the remission of sins is possible, yet despairs of this or that, because he falsely judges (by a practical judgment) in this particular case or state that he is not to hope for pardon or beatitude, e.g. because he judges himself not to be predestined, or that beatitude is too difficult of attainment, or that God will not give him pardon. In the same way: he who fornicates, judges that fornication here and now is good for him, although in the universal he judges according to faith that it is evil.

831. Despair is a mortal sin of its whole genus: for it is always most injurious to God, to have beatitude as not good, or as not possible; — indeed it is a sin against the Holy Spirit, because through contempt of the divine omnipotence mercifully helping, it casts away hope, which is the special remedy against sin granted to us by the Holy Spirit. — Often however despair is venial on account of lack of deliberation, if it arises from impatience, sadness, melancholic complexion or scruples. — Hence:

1) It is a graver sin than those which are opposed to moral virtues. For since by theological virtues we are turned directly and principally to God, hence the sins directly opposed to them directly and principally involve aversion from God; and therefore they are graver than the sins opposed to moral virtues, which directly involve conversion to some created good, and only by a certain consequence aversion from God.

2) But infidelity and hatred of God are graver than despair, because they are opposed to the truth and goodness of God as they are in themselves; despair however is against God inasmuch as goodness is participated by us.

3) Nevertheless despair is more dangerous than these, because through hope we are recalled from evils and led to good; and therefore, hope being removed, men unrestrainedly fall into vices.

832. Causes of despair and remedies. — Despair improperly so called arises from lust: for from a great love of bodily pleasures, among which especially are venereal pleasures, it happens that a man loathes spiritual goods and does not hope for them as certain great goods. — Despair properly so called however arises from acedia or spiritual sadness, by which one judges it too difficult to live well, and flees the labors of good works.

Remedies some are against the causes of despair; concerning which S. Thomas, II-II, q. 35, a. 1, ad 4: "The attack on sin is sometimes by conquering and fleeing, sometimes by resisting: by fleeing, indeed, when the thought continuously increases the incentive to sin, as in lust..., by resisting however, when persevering thought removes the incentive to sin, which arises from some slight apprehension. And this happens in acedia, because the more we think of spiritual goods, the more pleasing they become to us; from which acedia ceases" (I Pet. I, 10; Rom. XII, 11, 12). — Other remedies are those which directly foster hope: firm faith in the mercy of God toward sinners (which shines forth greatly in the evangelical parables), consideration of the love and passion of Christ, meditation on the divine promises, examples of great sinners who escaped as saints, prayer and devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus, and to the B. V. M. who is called the salvation of the despairing.