Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

On the Fulfillment of Ecclesiastical Law.

360. A prohibiting law is satisfied either knowingly and willingly, by a human act also meritorious, or unknowingly, e.g. by a sleeping person, because it suffices to omit that which the law prohibits ; for omission a positive will of omitting or of abstaining from the work is not necessarily required. Hence he who fasts satisfies the law, whether he does so to save money, or for the sake of health, or because food is not given to him, or because he sleeps or does not think of food : for it is a negative precept. He who however omits unknowingly is rather to be called not to transgress the law than to fulfill it.

He who omits however cannot have a contrary will : for what the law prohibits is evil, and therefore the affection or will of this evil is prohibited by that very fact ; thus he from whom, against his will, meat is violently taken away, although he effectively does not transgress the law, sins however affectively against it and is guilty in will of violating it.

361. A preceptive law must be fulfilled by a human act, i.e. knowingly and willingly : for law is given to men, whence if it prescribes a personal act, it requires that it be done in a human way, hence a drunk or sleeping or completely forced person does not satisfy the obligation ; but if the law is real, imposing a thing to be furnished, it suffices that it be furnished by another, but by the command of him who is bound, or with his ratification.

For the law to be fulfilled in a human way, intention is required, which the substance of the act requires so that it be placed in its moral species ; whence

1. on the part of the subject the intention be at least virtual, i.e. had formerly and influencing the act here and now (e.g. one going to pray, distracted by an intention had at the beginning), and implicit, contained in another (e.g. the intention of praying in the act of taking up the breviary) ;

2. on the part of the object the intention be of placing the prescribed act, because without it the act prescribed by the law would not be placed.

There is not however required a) intention of the extrinsic end intended by the legislator (unless specially imposed) : for one thing is the end intended by the legislator, another is the act which as a means to this end he prescribes. Hence the axiom : the (extrinsic) end of the precept does not fall under the precept, and the end of the one acting can be opposed to the end of the legislator, e.g. one who eats fish from gluttony observes the precept of abstinence ; the law therefore is not deprived of common utility ;

b) nor explicit intention of satisfying or of fulfilling the law as such, because laws generally do not oblige to formal obedience, i.e. to doing because it is a precept, but only to doing that which is prescribed ; hence one who is ignorant that it is a feast day or intends to hear another Mass, nevertheless satisfies the precept ;

c) indeed probably he effectively satisfies the law with a contrary intention of not satisfying (provided the will of doing the prescribed work is predominant), because the legislator ordinarily prescribes only the substance of the work ; hence he who wishes to pray and not to satisfy the law, although he can sin affectively against the law, nevertheless effectively satisfies. For although it depends on the intention of the agent that an obligation which depends on his will, such as a vow, oath, sacramental penance, be fulfilled, nevertheless it does not depend on his but on the legislator's will that the law oblige to such a work and be fulfilled by such a work ; for the prescribed work being posited, the subject cannot prevent this work from fulfilling the law. Therefore, the substance of the work being posited, the law is necessarily fulfilled. — Exceptions occur if one is bound by several precepts, e.g. by law, vow, sacramental penance, to several similar acts : then it depends on his intention to which he satisfies.

362. Can the law be fulfilled with sin? — Law in general can be fulfilled 1) without the state of grace or having good, joy, delight, etc., because it prescribes the substance of the act, not the manner (prop. 16 of Baius damned) ; unless the manner or state of grace is positively and intrinsically required for the substance of the act, e.g. for confession (can. 907 ; prop. 14 Alex. VII) or for communion (can. 861 ; prop. 55 Inn. XI) ; — indeed 2) the law, not indeed universally taken or the law of charity, to which all sin is repugnant, but another particular law prescribing an act, can be fulfilled at the same time sinning, provided the act is fulfilled as to substance and the object and species remain good, and its goodness is not totally corrupted (as a null confession) ; namely a) by an act which is done at the same time for an extrinsic evil end which is not the sole reason for acting, e.g. to hear Mass also to see a woman (n. 156, 4°) ; b) by a good act which is merely accompanied by an evil extrinsic circumstance which does not pass into the object and does not influence the act, e.g. to hear Mass with evil thoughts or with the intention of stealing (he does not satisfy without sinning but satisfies sinning ; n. 154) : for the law does not prescribe the manner (extrinsic) but only the substance of the act ; unless the manner is of the intrinsic character of the act according to itself or as it falls under law. Hence the axiom : the (extrinsic) manner of the precept does not fall under the precept.

363. When the law must be fulfilled. — A preceptive law, if it does not determine the time of fulfillment, must be fulfilled as soon as, morally speaking, it can conveniently be done (e.g. within 3 days, if it must be done immediately), otherwise one could elude the law, always deferring. If however it determines the time, it must be fulfilled at this time ; if the time has elapsed, if it was fixed for ending the obligation, the obligation ceases, e.g. of Mass, of fasting ; if however for urging the obligation, it obliges as soon as possible, e.g. one who has not confessed within the year, or has not made paschal communion (can. 859 § 4), or who has not fulfilled a sacramental penance on a certain day.

About the time of obligation let the canons 31-35 be noted, especially can. 33 in which it is said : « In computing the hours of the day one is to stand by common use, but in the private celebration of Mass, in the private recitation of the canonical hours, in receiving holy communion, and in observing the law of fasting or abstinence, although there is another usual local computation, one can follow the time of the place, whether local, whether true or mean, or legal, whether of the region or another extraordinary ». The canon is to be understood according to the Response of the C.I.C., of 29 May 1947, in which it is declared that « the manner of computing time having been chosen here, by the force of can. 33 § 1, in formally diverse actions, it can be changed ».

Formally diverse actions are those which, even in an action perhaps materially one, regard diverse obligations or diverse precepts, which are not intrinsically connected or do not have an intrinsic affinity.

Thus : 1. Someone can on the same Friday eat meat because according to the earlier hour it is already midnight and the law of abstinence no longer urges, and satisfy the obligation of reciting the divine office of Friday, because according to the later hour it is already not midnight and the term of the obligation to be ended has not yet expired.

2. Indeed someone can on Friday eat meat because according to the earlier hour the day of abstinence has already passed and yet on Saturday celebrate Mass or go to the Sacred [rite] because according to the later hour Saturday has not yet begun. For that action, materially one, is formally manifold since it is the fulfillment of two obligations which do not have an intrinsic connection or affinity.

3. But he who on the night of the Nativity at the first Mass through error has taken the ablutions with wine so that he is no longer fasting, cannot celebrate the second and third Mass, choosing now the later hour to determine the midnight from which he must be fasting. For here it is a question of one formally action corresponding to one and the same precept.

364. To what does the law oblige. — Law 1) directly and explicitly obliges to its observance, which is the essential and chiefest obligation of the law in which others are implicitly and virtually contained ;

2. indirectly and implicitly to all the ordinary and proximately necessary means to observance : for he who is bound to the end, by that very fact is bound to the means which are proximately necessary for obtaining the end ; namely

a) to knowledge of the law, which is the previous medium immediately necessary without which it cannot be observed, and consequently to the ordinary means to be employed which conduce to the knowledge of the law ;

b) to other internal and external means, without which the law cannot be fulfilled, provided they are ordinary and the law is proximate, e.g. to procure a breviary for reciting the office ;

c) therefore to avoid or remove or prevent impediments which render its observance proximately impossible ;

d) to avoid proximate occasions which frequently expose to the danger of transgression or are morally joined with it.

365. Can several precepts be fulfilled at the same time? — Resp. 1° To several laws or precepts one can satisfy by one act, if they all prescribe the matter or act the same in species and number : thus a canon or religious priest by one recitation of the breviary satisfies ; — however he does not satisfy if they require diverse or distinct actions, e.g. a fasting prescribed by law and imposed by the confessor or superior, unless the same one impose it ; paying once 100 fr. if one owed it. When several laws are considered to fall on the same or on diverse actions, we have [it] from the intention of the one prescribing, the words, custom, other circumstances.

2° One also satisfies by several acts placed at the same time, provided they are compatible and the diversity of times is not prescribed, e.g. hearing Mass (or pilgrimaging) and reciting the hours ; — he does not satisfy if they are incompatible, e.g. hearing confession and reading the breviary.

366. Remark. — When at the same time several precepts occur that cannot be fulfilled together,

1. in law, if they are equally urgent, the greater is to be observed rather than the less : hence preference is to be given, other things being equal, to a negative precept over an affirmative, natural over positive, divine over human, ecclesiastical over civil, the precept of a higher or stricter superior or regarding the common or spiritual good over the precept of an inferior superior, of a less strict virtue, regarding a particular or corporal good ;

2. in fact the agent satisfies that which he intends to satisfy : for it depends on the intention of the agent to which he satisfies ; — if he has thought of no obligation determinately he is considered to satisfy the more urgent ; if they are equally urgent and the matter is divisible, he satisfies both in part ; if indivisible, the greater obligation, as has been said under 1°.