Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis
Benedictus Henricus Merkelbach (1871–1942)
Summa Theologiae Moralis ad mentem D. Thomae et ad normam iuris novi
First published 1935
Volume I (De principiis) of Benedictus Henricus Merkelbach's Summa theologiae moralis sets out the foundations of Catholic moral theology within a Thomistic framework. It treats human acts, conscience, law, sin, and merit in relation to the canon law of its period. The present edition follows the Paris text published by Desclée de Brouwer in 1935 and includes the Latin text with an English translation. It comprises the first volume of the three-volume Summa.
Prologus
Introductio I: Theologia Moralis Generalis: Introductio
Tractatus I: Tractatus de ultimo actu humanorum fine seu de beatitudine
Introductio
Quaestio I: DE FINE ULTIMO IN COMMUNI
Quaestio II: DE BEATITUDINE OBIECTIVA
Quaestio III: DE BEATITUDINE FORMALI
Quaestio IV: DE QUALITATIBUS BEATITUDINIS
Quaestio V: DE MODO OBTINENDI BEATITUDINEM
Tractatus II: De actibus humanis in se
Introductio
Pars I: De actibus humanis secundum esse materiale et psychologicum
§ I: De conditione actuum humanorum
Caput I: De elemento subiectivo actus humani
Quaestio I: De voluntario
Articulus I: De voluntario in se
Articulus II: De voluntario tum positivo et directo, tum negativo et indirecto
Articulus III: De voluntario in se et in causa
Quaestio II: De impedimentis voluntarii seu de involuntario
Articulus I: De violentia
Articulus II: De metu
Articulus III: De concupiscentia
Articulus IV: De ignorantia
Quaestio III: De libero
Quaestio IV: De impedimentis liberi
Articulus I: De passionibus
Articulus II: De habitu et consuetudine
Articulus III: De impedimentis liberi remotioribus
Caput II: De elemento obiectivo actus humani
Quaestio I: De elemento essentiali seu obiecto
Quaestio II: De elemento accidentali seu de circumstantiis
§ II: De distinctione actuum humanorum
Quaestio I: De actibus elicitis
Quaestio II: De actibus imperatis
Pars II: De actibus humanis secundum esse morale
§ I: De moralitate actus humani in genere
Quaestio I: De essentia et speciebus moralitatis
Quaestio II: De fundamentis moralitatis
Articulus I: De intrinseca differentia boni inter et mali
Articulus II: De norma moralitatis
Articulus III: De fundamento obiectivo moralitatis
Articulus IV: De falsis systematibus circa fundamenta moralitatis
Articulus V: De facultate apprehensiva moralitatis
Quaestio III: De principiis seu fontibus moralitatis
Quaestio IV: De distinctione specifica inter actum bonum et malum
Quaestio V: De distinctione specifica inter varios actus bonos vel malos
Articulus I: De obiecto
Articulus II: De circumstantiis
Articulus III: De fine
§ II: De moralitate actuum humanorum in specie
Quaestio I: De bonitate et malitia actus interioris
Quaestio II: De bonitate et malitia actus exterioris
Quaestio III: De bonitate et malitia effectus externi
Quaestio IV: De bonitate et malitia passionum
Quaestio V: De bonitate et malitia circumstantiarum
Pars III: De actibus humanis secundum esse supernaturale et meritorium
Quaestio I: De merito praesertim supernaturali
Quaestio II: De conditionibus meriti supernaturalis
Tractatus III: De conscientia in generali
Introductio
Quaestio I: De conscientia morali secundum se in esse psychologico
Quaestio II: De conscientia prout est regula actuum moralium
Articulus I: De rectitudine conscientiae
Articulus II: De conscientiae certitudine
Quaestio III: De conscientia christiana prout est regula actuum supernaturalium
Tractatus IV: De legibus in genere
Introductio
§ I: De lege secundum esse psychologicum
Pars I: De lege in genere
Quaestio I: De ipsa lege in se
Articulus I: De essentia legis
Articulus II: De promulgatione legis
Quaestio II: De distinctione legum
Quaestio III: De effectibus legis
Articulus I: De vi directivâ seu obligatione legis
Articulus II: De vi coactivâ seu sanctione legis
Pars II: De lege aeterna quae est fundamentum omnis legis
Quaestio I: De essentia legis aeternae
Quaestio II: De potestate legis aeternae
Quaestio III: De mutabilitate legis aeternae
§ I: De legibus quae regunt actus morales
Pars III: De lege naturali
Quaestio I: De essentia legis naturalis
Quaestio II: De potestate legis naturalis
Articulus I: De vi directivâ seu obligatione legis naturalis
Articulus II: De vi coactivâ seu sanctione legis naturalis
Quaestio III: De mutabilitate legis naturalis
Quaestio IV: De Lege Humana in Se
Articulus I: De Auctore legis civilis
Articulus II: De Qualitate legis humanae
Articulus III: De Efformatione legis humanae
Articulus IV: De Divisione legis humanae
Quaestio V: De Potestate Legis Humanae
Articulus I: De Materia legis humanae
Articulus II: De Obligatione legis humanae
Articulus III: De Subditis legis civilis
Articulus IV: De Impletione et Interpretatione legis humanae
Quaestio VI: De Mutabilitate Legis Humanae
Caput I: De Lege Vetere
Quaestio I: De Lege Vetere Secundum Se
Quaestio II: De Potestate Legis Veteris
Quaestio III: De Mutabilitate Veteris Legis
Caput II: De Lege Nova
Quaestio I: De Essentia Legis Novae
Quaestio II: De Potestate Legis Novae
Quaestio III: De Lege Ecclesiastica Secundum Se
Articulus I: De Auctore legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus II: De Materia et Qualitate legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus III: De Efformatione legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus IV: De Divisione legis ecclesiasticae
Quaestio IV: De Potestate seu Obligatione Legis Ecclesiasticae
Articulus I: De Quantitate seu Gravitate Obligationis
Articulus II: De Qualitate et Extensione Obligationis legis praeceptivae
Articulus III: De Qualitate et Extensione Obligationis legis poenalis
Articulus IV: De Qualitate et Extensione Obligationis legis irritantis
On the Quality and Extension of the Obligation of Irritant Law.
352. An irritant law is one which renders some act invalid or null. To it are reduced, as species to genus, an inhabilitating law, which decrees that some person is incapable for this or that act ; whence irritation directly regards the act, and incapacity directly regards the person ; in practice however and morally speaking both come to the same, because the act is always rendered invalid whether immediately or mediately.
Irritant law differs a) from a prohibiting law, because the latter renders the prohibited act illicit, not invalid ; whence are distinguished a merely prohibiting law (e.g. an impeding impediment of matrimony), a merely irritant law which only irritates and does not prohibit the act (as can happen if the superior irritates a religious vow), and a law both prohibiting and irritant (e.g. a diriment impediment of matrimony) ;
b) from a penal law strictly so called, because the latter establishes a penalty because of fault ; whence are distinguished a penal irritant law which irritates as a penalty for the offense (e.g. formerly ordained without a certain title, and still today a beneficiary omitting his office invalidly receives the fruits), and a directive irritant law which irritates for the common good (e.g. clandestine marriage) or for the protection of certain persons (e.g. religious profession before the age of 16, a promise extorted by fear, alienation of the goods of the Church without the consent of the chapter) : then the irritation is a penalty improperly so called ;
c) from a permissive law which does not acknowledge the act or allows it to be neglected by others, or from a simple absence of law by which the act is not protected in the external forum (irritation improperly so called).
Moreover, as penal law, so irritant law has effects by the very fact, or by the judgment of a judge : for sometimes by the very law or right the act is most fully irritated, as happens for matrimonial impediments, and for the simoniacal collation of a benefice (can. 729) ; — sometimes it is irritated by the law so that for the full effect the declaratory judgment of a judge is required, e.g. an election made if more than a third part of the electors were not lawfully convoked (can. 162, § 3), a resignation made from grave unjustly inflicted fear, fraud or substantial error or simony (can. 185) ; cf. also can. 1679, 2238 : in which case the force of the judgment is retroacted to the moment when the act was done and it is null from the beginning (can. 1679-1682) ; — sometimes it is not irritated by the law, but by a decreeing or annulling judgment of a judge, because the law establishes that the act can be invalidated by competent authority, or rescinded, as acts proceeding from grave fear or fraud (can. 103 § 2, 104, 153, 162 § 2, 1317 § 2, 1684 § I, 1689) : then the invalidity is from the moment of the judgment.
The judgment of the judge and consequently the annulment can be impeded by licit means, indeed the act remains valid, even if the judgment is impeded by illicit means ; which if done by unjust means, an obligation to repair the damage can arise.
353. Principles. I. An irritant law obliges judges to regard the act as invalid or to invalidate it ; others, not to omit the act, but to regard it as invalid or not to insist on an invalid act.
II. A penal irritant law does not oblige against a non-committed fault nor has effect if fault is lacking : for it is founded on a presumption of a particular fact ; whence invincible ignorance excuses from it, because the established penalty is for fault and supposes it. Thus if a beneficiary from inculpable forgetfulness omits, e.g. vespers of the office and compline, he makes his fruits.
III. An irritant law which is also directive always obliges and has effect even if fault is lacking or the law is ignored : it is founded on a presumption of common danger, and the cause of annulment subsists even in the case of ignorance, namely the common good. Hence canon 16, § 1 : « No ignorance of irritant or inhabilitating laws excuses from them, unless something else is expressly said ».
Accidentally however the obligation ceases
a) because of common necessity : thus the impediment of clandestinity ceases, if the parish priest or the Ordinary or the delegated priest who should assist at the marriage cannot be approached, and it is foreseen that this condition of things will last for a month (can. 1098) ;
b) also because of private necessity in a more urgent case, if the Church is known to dispense (or it can be presumed), as happens for almost all impediments of ecclesiastical law, both when the danger of death is urgent, and if, with all things ready for the marriage, the marriage cannot be deferred without probable danger of grave evil (can. 1043-1045 ; 1098).
354. Remarks. — 1) About irritant laws let there be noted can. 11 : « Those laws alone are to be regarded as irritant or inhabilitating by which either the act is null or the person is incapable is established expressly or equivalently (i.e. by words equivalent to it, e.g. by prescribing the necessary form of the act or the substantial conditions) ».
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Hence irritation of itself is not presumed annexed to a prohibiting law, but of itself and certainly is to be proved. Whence can. 15 : « Laws, even irritant and inhabilitating, in doubt of law (founded and reasonable) do not urge ».
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On the contrary, for an irritant law to be also prohibiting, an express declaration is required, unless the act is in itself base or otherwise illicit.