Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis
Benedictus Henricus Merkelbach (1871–1942)
Summa Theologiae Moralis ad mentem D. Thomae et ad normam iuris novi
First published 1935
Volume I (De principiis) of Benedictus Henricus Merkelbach's Summa theologiae moralis sets out the foundations of Catholic moral theology within a Thomistic framework. It treats human acts, conscience, law, sin, and merit in relation to the canon law of its period. The present edition follows the Paris text published by Desclée de Brouwer in 1935 and includes the Latin text with an English translation. It comprises the first volume of the three-volume Summa.
Prologus
Introductio I: Theologia Moralis Generalis: Introductio
Tractatus I: Tractatus de ultimo actu humanorum fine seu de beatitudine
Introductio
Quaestio I: DE FINE ULTIMO IN COMMUNI
Quaestio II: DE BEATITUDINE OBIECTIVA
Quaestio III: DE BEATITUDINE FORMALI
Quaestio IV: DE QUALITATIBUS BEATITUDINIS
Quaestio V: DE MODO OBTINENDI BEATITUDINEM
Tractatus II: De actibus humanis in se
Introductio
Pars I: De actibus humanis secundum esse materiale et psychologicum
§ I: De conditione actuum humanorum
Caput I: De elemento subiectivo actus humani
Quaestio I: De voluntario
Articulus I: De voluntario in se
Articulus II: De voluntario tum positivo et directo, tum negativo et indirecto
Articulus III: De voluntario in se et in causa
Quaestio II: De impedimentis voluntarii seu de involuntario
Articulus I: De violentia
Articulus II: De metu
Articulus III: De concupiscentia
Articulus IV: De ignorantia
Quaestio III: De libero
Quaestio IV: De impedimentis liberi
Articulus I: De passionibus
Articulus II: De habitu et consuetudine
Articulus III: De impedimentis liberi remotioribus
Caput II: De elemento obiectivo actus humani
Quaestio I: De elemento essentiali seu obiecto
Quaestio II: De elemento accidentali seu de circumstantiis
§ II: De distinctione actuum humanorum
Quaestio I: De actibus elicitis
Quaestio II: De actibus imperatis
Pars II: De actibus humanis secundum esse morale
§ I: De moralitate actus humani in genere
Quaestio I: De essentia et speciebus moralitatis
Quaestio II: De fundamentis moralitatis
Articulus I: De intrinseca differentia boni inter et mali
Articulus II: De norma moralitatis
Articulus III: De fundamento obiectivo moralitatis
Articulus IV: De falsis systematibus circa fundamenta moralitatis
Articulus V: De facultate apprehensiva moralitatis
Quaestio III: De principiis seu fontibus moralitatis
Quaestio IV: De distinctione specifica inter actum bonum et malum
Quaestio V: De distinctione specifica inter varios actus bonos vel malos
Articulus I: De obiecto
Articulus II: De circumstantiis
Articulus III: De fine
§ II: De moralitate actuum humanorum in specie
Quaestio I: De bonitate et malitia actus interioris
Quaestio II: De bonitate et malitia actus exterioris
Quaestio III: De bonitate et malitia effectus externi
Quaestio IV: De bonitate et malitia passionum
Quaestio V: De bonitate et malitia circumstantiarum
Pars III: De actibus humanis secundum esse supernaturale et meritorium
Quaestio I: De merito praesertim supernaturali
Quaestio II: De conditionibus meriti supernaturalis
Tractatus III: De conscientia in generali
Introductio
Quaestio I: De conscientia morali secundum se in esse psychologico
Quaestio II: De conscientia prout est regula actuum moralium
Articulus I: De rectitudine conscientiae
Articulus II: De conscientiae certitudine
Quaestio III: De conscientia christiana prout est regula actuum supernaturalium
Tractatus IV: De legibus in genere
Introductio
§ I: De lege secundum esse psychologicum
Pars I: De lege in genere
Quaestio I: De ipsa lege in se
Articulus I: De essentia legis
Articulus II: De promulgatione legis
Quaestio II: De distinctione legum
Quaestio III: De effectibus legis
Articulus I: De vi directivâ seu obligatione legis
Articulus II: De vi coactivâ seu sanctione legis
Pars II: De lege aeterna quae est fundamentum omnis legis
Quaestio I: De essentia legis aeternae
Quaestio II: De potestate legis aeternae
Quaestio III: De mutabilitate legis aeternae
§ I: De legibus quae regunt actus morales
Pars III: De lege naturali
Quaestio I: De essentia legis naturalis
Quaestio II: De potestate legis naturalis
Articulus I: De vi directivâ seu obligatione legis naturalis
Articulus II: De vi coactivâ seu sanctione legis naturalis
Quaestio III: De mutabilitate legis naturalis
Quaestio IV: De Lege Humana in Se
Articulus I: De Auctore legis civilis
Articulus II: De Qualitate legis humanae
Articulus III: De Efformatione legis humanae
Articulus IV: De Divisione legis humanae
Quaestio V: De Potestate Legis Humanae
Articulus I: De Materia legis humanae
Articulus II: De Obligatione legis humanae
Articulus III: De Subditis legis civilis
Articulus IV: De Impletione et Interpretatione legis humanae
Quaestio VI: De Mutabilitate Legis Humanae
Caput I: De Lege Vetere
Quaestio I: De Lege Vetere Secundum Se
Quaestio II: De Potestate Legis Veteris
Quaestio III: De Mutabilitate Veteris Legis
Caput II: De Lege Nova
Quaestio I: De Essentia Legis Novae
Quaestio II: De Potestate Legis Novae
Quaestio III: De Lege Ecclesiastica Secundum Se
Articulus I: De Auctore legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus II: De Materia et Qualitate legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus III: De Efformatione legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus IV: De Divisione legis ecclesiasticae
Quaestio IV: De Potestate seu Obligatione Legis Ecclesiasticae
Articulus I: De Quantitate seu Gravitate Obligationis
On the Quantity or Gravity of Obligation.
S. Th. II-II, q. 105, a. 2.
341. The gravity of obligation in ecclesiastical law depends on two things : on the gravity of the matter and on the will of the legislator, who at least must have the implicit intention of obliging under grave [matter]. Whence
a) if the matter is in every respect, even in end and circumstances considered, light, the law cannot oblige under grave [matter] : for such matter is not capable of grave obligation, nor can the legislator make it so that light matter which contributes little and influences lightly the end or common good, contribute much and influence gravely, or that small disobedience be great ; otherwise such a law is not conformed to reason, nor would it tend to the common good, but rather would be an occasion of ruin ;
b) if the matter is grave and the legislator intends to oblige under light, the obligation is only light : for in distinction from natural law, in which the obligation and its gravity necessarily and immediately arise from the very gravity and necessity of the matter, the proximate and immediate cause of obligation in positive law is the will of the legislator ; so great therefore is the obligation as the legislator wills, and just as it depends on him whether the law exists and obliges, so whether it is grave or light. And although by so acting the legislator can sometimes sin, the obligation however, because it is the effect of his will, does not extend beyond what he has willed.
342. The gravity of matter is estimated by reason of the end and of the aptitude for this end :
A. Matter is indeed grave, when it is an efficacious means for a great good, namely when the special or proximate end is of great moment as to the common good, very useful, morally necessary, and at the same time that which is prescribed by the law greatly contributes to obtaining the end. Such is the dignity of sacred worship, the service of God, penance, the sanctity of the clergy, etc. to which the use of sacred vestments, the observance of feasts, abstinence from meat, celibacy greatly contribute. Whence a thing in itself light can be grave matter, as was the eating of the forbidden fruit in paradise by reason of the acknowledgment of God and of the subjection of man to God : so e.g. entering a house by reason of scandal or danger, mixing water and wine by reason of the representation of the great mystery in the sacrifice.
B. On the contrary, if the special end is not of great moment, or if it is of great moment and the action does not greatly contribute to the end, the matter is light ; thus to the glorification of God the order between the various hours of the breviary does not greatly contribute.
343. Practical rules for discerning grave or light obligation.
A. Positive law obliges under grave [matter], when the matter is grave, i.e. greatly contributes to an end of great moment, and at the same time the legislator wishes to prescribe under grave [matter].
B. But the legislator wishes to oblige under grave [matter]
a) if he uses gravely threatening or more severe words, e.g. if he commands in virtue of holy obedience, under the indignation of God, under the threat of the divine judgment, etc.
b) if he imposes a grave penalty, e.g. of death, mutilation, perpetual prison, exile, deposition, privation of honors, censure, irregularity, reservation, privation of ecclesiastical burial (can. 2218 § 2) ; for the penalty, in order to be just, must be proportioned to the offense ;
c) if in grave matter he uses ordinary words : we command, we prescribe, we forbid, etc. and does not express that he wishes to oblige under light, nor is this gathered from the circumstances, especially e.g. from the excessive burden which the law would impose, he is considered to oblige under grave [matter] : for he is reasonably presumed to act reasonably and ordinarily to oblige according to the capacity and exigence of the matter. Nor must he explicitly intend grave obligation : just as he must not explicitly intend obligation in conscience but make a law, and so implicitly wills the obligation, in the same way by prescribing grave matter, he is considered implicitly to wish to prescribe under grave [matter] ;
d) if the custom and usage of the faithful and the practice of the God-fearing so interpret the law ;
e) if the prudent, pious and learned so unanimously judge.
C. If there is doubt about these, the law is considered to oblige under light, unless the legislator urges it under grave [matter], because then the presumption stands for him.