Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis
Benedictus Henricus Merkelbach (1871–1942)
Summa Theologiae Moralis ad mentem D. Thomae et ad normam iuris novi
First published 1935
Volume I (De principiis) of Benedictus Henricus Merkelbach's Summa theologiae moralis sets out the foundations of Catholic moral theology within a Thomistic framework. It treats human acts, conscience, law, sin, and merit in relation to the canon law of its period. The present edition follows the Paris text published by Desclée de Brouwer in 1935 and includes the Latin text with an English translation. It comprises the first volume of the three-volume Summa.
Prologus
Introductio I: Theologia Moralis Generalis: Introductio
Tractatus I: Tractatus de ultimo actu humanorum fine seu de beatitudine
Introductio
Quaestio I: DE FINE ULTIMO IN COMMUNI
Quaestio II: DE BEATITUDINE OBIECTIVA
Quaestio III: DE BEATITUDINE FORMALI
Quaestio IV: DE QUALITATIBUS BEATITUDINIS
Quaestio V: DE MODO OBTINENDI BEATITUDINEM
Tractatus II: De actibus humanis in se
Introductio
Pars I: De actibus humanis secundum esse materiale et psychologicum
§ I: De conditione actuum humanorum
Caput I: De elemento subiectivo actus humani
Quaestio I: De voluntario
Articulus I: De voluntario in se
Articulus II: De voluntario tum positivo et directo, tum negativo et indirecto
Articulus III: De voluntario in se et in causa
Quaestio II: De impedimentis voluntarii seu de involuntario
Articulus I: De violentia
Articulus II: De metu
Articulus III: De concupiscentia
Articulus IV: De ignorantia
Quaestio III: De libero
Quaestio IV: De impedimentis liberi
Articulus I: De passionibus
Articulus II: De habitu et consuetudine
Articulus III: De impedimentis liberi remotioribus
Caput II: De elemento obiectivo actus humani
Quaestio I: De elemento essentiali seu obiecto
Quaestio II: De elemento accidentali seu de circumstantiis
§ II: De distinctione actuum humanorum
Quaestio I: De actibus elicitis
Quaestio II: De actibus imperatis
Pars II: De actibus humanis secundum esse morale
§ I: De moralitate actus humani in genere
Quaestio I: De essentia et speciebus moralitatis
Quaestio II: De fundamentis moralitatis
Articulus I: De intrinseca differentia boni inter et mali
Articulus II: De norma moralitatis
Articulus III: De fundamento obiectivo moralitatis
Articulus IV: De falsis systematibus circa fundamenta moralitatis
Articulus V: De facultate apprehensiva moralitatis
Quaestio III: De principiis seu fontibus moralitatis
Quaestio IV: De distinctione specifica inter actum bonum et malum
Quaestio V: De distinctione specifica inter varios actus bonos vel malos
Articulus I: De obiecto
Articulus II: De circumstantiis
Articulus III: De fine
§ II: De moralitate actuum humanorum in specie
Quaestio I: De bonitate et malitia actus interioris
Quaestio II: De bonitate et malitia actus exterioris
Quaestio III: De bonitate et malitia effectus externi
Quaestio IV: De bonitate et malitia passionum
Quaestio V: De bonitate et malitia circumstantiarum
Pars III: De actibus humanis secundum esse supernaturale et meritorium
Quaestio I: De merito praesertim supernaturali
Quaestio II: De conditionibus meriti supernaturalis
Tractatus III: De conscientia in generali
Introductio
Quaestio I: De conscientia morali secundum se in esse psychologico
Quaestio II: De conscientia prout est regula actuum moralium
Articulus I: De rectitudine conscientiae
Articulus II: De conscientiae certitudine
Quaestio III: De conscientia christiana prout est regula actuum supernaturalium
Tractatus IV: De legibus in genere
Introductio
§ I: De lege secundum esse psychologicum
Pars I: De lege in genere
Quaestio I: De ipsa lege in se
Articulus I: De essentia legis
Articulus II: De promulgatione legis
Quaestio II: De distinctione legum
Quaestio III: De effectibus legis
Articulus I: De vi directivâ seu obligatione legis
Articulus II: De vi coactivâ seu sanctione legis
Pars II: De lege aeterna quae est fundamentum omnis legis
Quaestio I: De essentia legis aeternae
Quaestio II: De potestate legis aeternae
Quaestio III: De mutabilitate legis aeternae
§ I: De legibus quae regunt actus morales
Pars III: De lege naturali
Quaestio I: De essentia legis naturalis
Quaestio II: De potestate legis naturalis
Articulus I: De vi directivâ seu obligatione legis naturalis
Articulus II: De vi coactivâ seu sanctione legis naturalis
Quaestio III: De mutabilitate legis naturalis
Quaestio IV: De Lege Humana in Se
Articulus I: De Auctore legis civilis
Articulus II: De Qualitate legis humanae
Articulus III: De Efformatione legis humanae
Articulus IV: De Divisione legis humanae
Quaestio V: De Potestate Legis Humanae
Articulus I: De Materia legis humanae
Articulus II: De Obligatione legis humanae
Articulus III: De Subditis legis civilis
Articulus IV: De Impletione et Interpretatione legis humanae
Quaestio VI: De Mutabilitate Legis Humanae
Caput I: De Lege Vetere
Quaestio I: De Lege Vetere Secundum Se
Quaestio II: De Potestate Legis Veteris
ON THE POWER OF THE OLD LAW.
S. Th. I-II, q. 99 and 100 ; 101 and 104 ; 103, a. 2 ; II-II, q. 122.
305. The old law, although with respect to the matter about which it is concerned it contains many precepts, in itself however is one, because all were ordered to one end (q. 99, a. 1).
For since, — in distinction from human law, which principally orders men to one another, — divine law principally orders men to God, and secondarily to one another ; hence it contains precepts of a threefold kind :
1° some are moral precepts about the acts of the virtues, by which men were rendered good and like to God : for the law intended friendship with the best God, which cannot be without likeness to him (a. 2) ;
2° others are ceremonial, by which they were ordered to the worship of God, which must be done not only by interior acts, but also by exterior works by which man protests servitude (a. 3) ;
3° others are judicial, by which men were ordered to one another, the manner of justice between them being observed (a. 4).
Now A. to the aforesaid precepts, all others are reduced which pertain to the directive force of law : for either they are dictated by reason itself and are due according to the rule of reason, and then they pertain to the moral precepts which are conclusions of natural right (even if they are commands and counsels) ; or they are due from positive law determining natural law, and they are either ceremonial, which are determinations of natural precepts in divine things, or judicial, or determinations in human things (Deut. V, 1 ; VI, 1, 17). Hence it is said by the Apostle (Rom. VII, 12) the commandment is just, holy, good (a. 5).
B. as to coercive force : to the observance of these the law induced by temporal promises and threats, because it did not direct to the perfect who, despising temporal things, cling to spiritual ones, but to the imperfect who desire temporal goods, although in order to God. For means are to be proposed to men according to their condition (a. 5 and 6).
Eternal goods, namely, did not immediately pertain to the pact entered into between God and the Jewish people, but only through the promise of the Redeemer and the future pact. Whence the law which regards the people contained only temporal promises ; eternal goods could be obtained by individuals through faith and hope in the Redeemer, from the merits and force of his grace or by the force of the new law, for according to this they pertained to the new law (q. 106, a. 1, ad 3 and 107, a. 1, ad 2 and 3).
306. Especially A. all the moral precepts can in some way be reduced to the ten precepts of the decalogue proposed to the people (q. 100, a. 3).
It is proved : In natural law indeed a) some precepts are primary in cognition, evident in themselves, known to all, which it was not necessary to promulgate again ; — but others are secondary, conclusions deduced from the first, of which b) many are more remote which were not to be placed in the decalogue, because the reason of them is not manifest except to the wise alone, to whom it pertains to teach the people, and because the multitude of precepts would create confusion, whence they were not to be proposed to the people ; — c) some are proximate and immediate, which by a little consideration are immediately and evidently deduced from the first precepts and the reason of which appears to all, and these were placed in the decalogue, because in few cases or with some the human judgment about them happens to be perverted.
Now the primary and common (e.g. love of God and of neighbor) are contained in the precepts of the decalogue as principles in conclusions (ad 1) ; but the more remote and conversely are contained in them as conclusions in their principles.
The precepts therefore of the decalogue are all moral, except the third, which is partly moral, inasmuch as man owes some time to divine worship, and partly ceremonial, as to the determination of a special time, namely the sabbath (ad 2).
B. The ceremonial precepts determined the special manner in which God was to be worshiped ; which had to be many and solemn, to promote the worship of God and turn away from idolatry. They were of four kinds : a) either about the very worship which specially consists in sacrifices, or b) about sacred instruments, or c) about those worshipping who are consecrated by sacraments, and d) they are distinguished from others by various observances. All of these prefigured Christ to come (q. 101).
C. Likewise the judicial (or political) precepts regarded human affairs according to a fourfold order which can be found in a people : a) some were of rulers toward subjects, b) others of subjects toward one another, c) some of the people toward foreigners, d) some toward domestics (wife, children, servants). These prefigured the Church (q. 104).
The ceremonial and judicial were subject to various changes, for God did not cease to accommodate his laws to the conditions of the Jews, whence he sent Prophets who authentically interpreted and completed the law.
307. The moral precepts are about all the acts of the virtues (q. 100, a. 2). — In distinction from human law, which orders toward the mutual communication of men (which is done by exterior operations), and prescribes only acts of justice and acts of the other virtues inasmuch as they take on the character of justice, divine law prescribes about all those things by which men are ordered to communication with God. Now man is joined to God by reason (and will). Whence divine law prescribes about all those things by which human reason (and will) is duly ordered, which happens by the acts of all the virtues1.
some, without which the order of reason cannot be observed, fall under the obligation of precept, but some which pertain to the well-being of perfect virtue fall under admonition and counsel.
However the precepts of the decalogue all pertain to justice (q. 100, a. 3, ad 3 and II-II, q. 122, a. 1). — For the precepts of the decalogue are principles of natural law to which reason by a little consideration adheres and which it immediately recognizes as due. Now the reason of what is due is most evident in justice which is toward another (in those things which are toward oneself it seems at first glance that man is his own master, and that he can licitly do anything2). And therefore the precepts of the decalogue pertain to justice : the first three are about the acts of religion which is the chief among the virtues annexed to justice, the fourth is about the acts of piety which is second among these virtues, the other six are about the acts of justice commonly and strictly so called which is among equals.
308. The precepts of the decalogue are conveniently distinguished according to their diverse objects and are enumerated in a fitting number (q. 100, a. 4 and 5). — It is proved :
As human laws order men to a certain human community, so divine law to a community of men under God. But, for someone to be well ordered in society, two things are required : that he behave well both toward him who presides over the community and toward the other fellow citizens. Whence in divine law there are placed first the precepts which order men to God, and then those which order them to other neighbors, living together under God, whether by deed, or by word, or by heart.
A. Now to the ruler of the community man owes three :
I. Fidelity in deed, by which he alone is acknowledged, which is handed down in the 1st precept : Thou shalt have no strange gods ; by which we acknowledge the unity of God ; — then
II. Reverence especially in word, by which nothing injurious be said against him, which is handed down in the 2nd precept : Thou shalt not take the name of God in vain, i.e. thou shalt not commit perjury ; by which we reverence God's truth ; — finally
III. Service also in heart, in recompense for benefits received (first of all creation), which pertains to the 3rd precept : Remember that thou hallow the sabbath day ; by which we worship God's goodness.
B. Toward neighbors indeed one behaves well :
a) either specifically toward those to whom he is a debtor, if he renders what is due, which
IV. is to be done especially toward parents, whence the 4th precept is placed : Honor thy father and mother ;
b) or generally toward all, if he does no harm, neither α) by deed, committing injury, whether
V. against his own person as to individual life, which the 5th precept forbids : Thou shalt not kill ; — or
VI. against the joined person as to the propagation of offspring, which the 6th precept forbids : Thou shalt not commit adultery ; — or
VII. against exterior goods possessed, which are ordered to both, which the 7th precept forbids : Thou shalt not steal ; — nor β) is harm done by word
VIII. as to fame and honor, which the 8th precept forbids : Thou shalt not speak false witness ; — nor by heart, either
IX. by concupiscence of the flesh, desiring the wife of another, which the 9th precept forbids : Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife ; — or
X. by concupiscence of the eyes, coveting his goods, which the 10th forbids : Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house, etc.
309. The precepts of the decalogue are handed down in a fitting order (q. 100, a. 6 and 7). — It is proved :
The precepts of the decalogue are given about those things which are immediately at hand and admitted by reason ; but something is so much the more easily admitted by reason as its contrary is graver or more repugnant to reason. Therefore according to the order of gravity the precepts had to be placed. Now that which is more repugnant to reason is the disorder toward the very end, God, and therefore the first precepts of the decalogue order man to God, and indeed graver is 1) infidelity toward the superior which is forbidden by the 1st precept, than 2) irreverence which is forbid-[^1. A special precept about the concupiscence of homicide and false witness is not handed down, as it is about the delight of adultery and theft : the delight of the flesh and the utility of riches are most desirable and as it were naturally loved ; homicide and falsehood of themselves are not goods but rather inspire horror rather than delight (a. 5, ad 5).]
den by the 2nd ; and this is graver than 3) the absence of due observance, of which the 3rd treats. — In the precepts ordering toward one's neighbor, it is more repugnant to reason and graver to sin if man does not keep the due order toward the persons to whom he is most indebted, and therefore after the three precepts toward God is placed 4) the precept toward parents. Toward the other neighbors, it is graver to sin by deed than by word, and indeed graver is 5) homicide by which the life of an existing man is taken, than 6) adultery by which the certainty of offspring to be born is hindered, and this is graver than 7) theft which pertains to external goods ; then 8) sins of the mouth which are graver than sins of the heart, and among these graver is 9) the concupiscence of adultery, than 10) the concupiscence of theft.
All of which are negative precepts, except the 3rd and 4th : for the negative extend to all persons and cases ; not so the affirmative, because benefits and services are not to be rendered to all nor always, and therefore only two are placed, as to God and parents because of the greatest benefits which cannot be sufficiently recompensed (a. 7, ad 1).
310. All the moral precepts are easily distinguished according to the precepts of the decalogue (q. 100, a. 11).
It is proved :
A. Some altogether universal and evident in themselves are presupposed as principles for conclusions. Thus the precept of acknowledging the supernatural end and tending to it by faith, hope, and divine charity is presupposed by the first three ; and the precept of loving neighbor as oneself is gathered from them. Likewise the precept of loving oneself and preserving one's own life, which man naturally fulfills and includes others in the love of God and of neighbor : for in this man truly loves himself, that he orders himself to God, and truly loves his neighbor if he orders him to the end as himself.
B. Other particular and determinate ones, the reason of which is not manifest to all but to the wiser, are added as conclusions, either mediately, as all those that necessarily lead to those which the precepts themselves prescribe or forbid, or indirectly, because a similar reason exists for prescribing or forbidding them. Hence
to the 1st pr. : are reduced all those things which are ordered to idolatry or have a likeness to it : sorcery, divination, vain observance, those things which are against fidelity such as the tempting of God, or against the works of worship by which we render fidelity, such as sacrilege and simony ;
to the 2nd pr. : blasphemy and false doctrine, all unlawful or violated oaths and vows, every vain assumption of divine things ; to the 3rd pr. : all ceremonial things which regard sacrifices and sacraments ;
to the 4th pr. : all precepts about honoring superiors and elders, and about benefits to be rendered to equals and minors and the poor ;
to the 5th pr. : all violations against the body of neighbor, hatred and anger which lead to them, and scandal which violates the soul ;
to the 6th and 9th pr. : fornication, vices against nature, and those which initiate luxury, or lead to all those things ;
to the 7th and 10th pr. : usury, fraud, rapine and all injustice toward external goods, and all things which lead to them ;
to the 8th pr. : false judgment, lying, detraction and all injury done by word against fame and honor.
Precepts about oneself ought not to have been enunciated in the decalogue (cf. n. 307) and otherwise they are easily reduced to them. For
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the precept of loving and preserving oneself is known to all and is naturally observed, and therefore it was not to be promulgated ; moreover it is included in the love of God and neighbor (1st and 5th pr.) : for in this man truly loves himself, that he orders himself to God, and truly loves his neighbor if he loves him and orders him to the end as himself (q. 100, a. 5, ad 1) ;
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but others are remote conclusions the reason of which is not manifest to all, and therefore they were not to be directly proposed to the people but to the wise who can teach the people ; they are however easily reduced to the precepts of neighbor according to the diverse goods about which they are concerned : thus the precepts about one's own health and about food and drink which are ordered to it, are reduced to the 5th ; those which are about the goods of fortune to the 7th and 10th ; those which are about honor, fame and glory to the 8th ; the precept of fortitude according to the various motives why someone ought to despise death.
311. The old law does not justify (q. 100, a. 12) properly and perfectly, because it could not cause the justice infused by God by moral or judicial precepts, which are only about human acts which cannot cause grace ; nor by ceremonial precepts, for the sacraments of the Old Law did not confer grace. It did however justify in a certain sense inasmuch as it prescribed acts of justice ; also improperly inasmuch as it aroused faith and hope and so disposed for the justifying grace of Christ and signified it, and inasmuch as the ceremonial precepts conferred a « legal » justification and cleanness by which men according to external justice, in the face of the law and of society, were held just before the law and fit for the worship of God.