Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis
Benedictus Henricus Merkelbach (1871–1942)
Summa Theologiae Moralis ad mentem D. Thomae et ad normam iuris novi
First published 1935
Volume I (De principiis) of Benedictus Henricus Merkelbach's Summa theologiae moralis sets out the foundations of Catholic moral theology within a Thomistic framework. It treats human acts, conscience, law, sin, and merit in relation to the canon law of its period. The present edition follows the Paris text published by Desclée de Brouwer in 1935 and includes the Latin text with an English translation. It comprises the first volume of the three-volume Summa.
Prologus
Introductio I: Theologia Moralis Generalis: Introductio
Tractatus I: Tractatus de ultimo actu humanorum fine seu de beatitudine
Introductio
Quaestio I: DE FINE ULTIMO IN COMMUNI
Quaestio II: DE BEATITUDINE OBIECTIVA
Quaestio III: DE BEATITUDINE FORMALI
Quaestio IV: DE QUALITATIBUS BEATITUDINIS
Quaestio V: DE MODO OBTINENDI BEATITUDINEM
Tractatus II: De actibus humanis in se
Introductio
Pars I: De actibus humanis secundum esse materiale et psychologicum
§ I: De conditione actuum humanorum
Caput I: De elemento subiectivo actus humani
Quaestio I: De voluntario
Articulus I: De voluntario in se
Articulus II: De voluntario tum positivo et directo, tum negativo et indirecto
Articulus III: De voluntario in se et in causa
Quaestio II: De impedimentis voluntarii seu de involuntario
Articulus I: De violentia
Articulus II: De metu
Articulus III: De concupiscentia
Articulus IV: De ignorantia
Quaestio III: De libero
Quaestio IV: De impedimentis liberi
Articulus I: De passionibus
Articulus II: De habitu et consuetudine
Articulus III: De impedimentis liberi remotioribus
Caput II: De elemento obiectivo actus humani
Quaestio I: De elemento essentiali seu obiecto
Quaestio II: De elemento accidentali seu de circumstantiis
§ II: De distinctione actuum humanorum
Quaestio I: De actibus elicitis
Quaestio II: De actibus imperatis
Pars II: De actibus humanis secundum esse morale
§ I: De moralitate actus humani in genere
Quaestio I: De essentia et speciebus moralitatis
Quaestio II: De fundamentis moralitatis
Articulus I: De intrinseca differentia boni inter et mali
Articulus II: De norma moralitatis
Articulus III: De fundamento obiectivo moralitatis
Articulus IV: De falsis systematibus circa fundamenta moralitatis
Articulus V: De facultate apprehensiva moralitatis
Quaestio III: De principiis seu fontibus moralitatis
Quaestio IV: De distinctione specifica inter actum bonum et malum
Quaestio V: De distinctione specifica inter varios actus bonos vel malos
Articulus I: De obiecto
Articulus II: De circumstantiis
Articulus III: De fine
§ II: De moralitate actuum humanorum in specie
Quaestio I: De bonitate et malitia actus interioris
Quaestio II: De bonitate et malitia actus exterioris
Quaestio III: De bonitate et malitia effectus externi
Quaestio IV: De bonitate et malitia passionum
Quaestio V: De bonitate et malitia circumstantiarum
Pars III: De actibus humanis secundum esse supernaturale et meritorium
Quaestio I: De merito praesertim supernaturali
Quaestio II: De conditionibus meriti supernaturalis
Tractatus III: De conscientia in generali
Introductio
Quaestio I: De conscientia morali secundum se in esse psychologico
Quaestio II: De conscientia prout est regula actuum moralium
Articulus I: De rectitudine conscientiae
Articulus II: De conscientiae certitudine
Quaestio III: De conscientia christiana prout est regula actuum supernaturalium
Tractatus IV: De legibus in genere
Introductio
§ I: De lege secundum esse psychologicum
Pars I: De lege in genere
Quaestio I: De ipsa lege in se
Articulus I: De essentia legis
Articulus II: De promulgatione legis
Quaestio II: De distinctione legum
Quaestio III: De effectibus legis
Articulus I: De vi directivâ seu obligatione legis
Articulus II: De vi coactivâ seu sanctione legis
Pars II: De lege aeterna quae est fundamentum omnis legis
Quaestio I: De essentia legis aeternae
Quaestio II: De potestate legis aeternae
Quaestio III: De mutabilitate legis aeternae
§ I: De legibus quae regunt actus morales
Pars III: De lege naturali
Quaestio I: De essentia legis naturalis
Quaestio II: De potestate legis naturalis
Articulus I: De vi directivâ seu obligatione legis naturalis
Articulus II: De vi coactivâ seu sanctione legis naturalis
Quaestio III: De mutabilitate legis naturalis
Quaestio IV: De Lege Humana in Se
Articulus I: De Auctore legis civilis
Articulus II: De Qualitate legis humanae
On the Quality of Human Law.
S. Th. I-II, q. 95, a. 2 and 3.
270. Principle I. Human law is a derivation of natural law.
It is proved : Law, since it is an ordinance of reason, must be conformed to the rule of reason : for it is not true law unless it be just ; just is the same as right according to the rule of reason ; therefore, inasmuch as law has of justice or of the rectitude of reason, so much does it have of the virtue of law. But the first rule of reason is natural law. Therefore human law, inasmuch as it has of the virtue of law, has it insofar as it is derived from natural law. — If however in anything it disagrees with it, it will no longer be law but a corruption of law (Greg. XVI, enc. Qui pluribus, 9 Nov. 1846 ; Pius IX, enc. Quanta Cura, 8 Dec. 1864).
271. Principle II. Human law is the complement of natural law.
It is proved : From natural law something can be derived 1) as a necessary conclusion from the principles, e.g. one is not to kill from this, that evil is to be done to no one, and this pertains not to human law alone but also from the law of nature has the force of obliging ; 2) as a fitting conclusion or particular determination of a common and indeterminate principle, either for directing men or for compelling them, and this immediately has force from human law alone. Thus e.g. that a contract is to be made in such a way that better provision be made for justice, is a determination of the directive principle : contracts are to be entered into according to justice ; and that thieves are to be punished by prison rather than another penalty, is a determination of the coercive principle : thieves are to be punished.
It is said : immediately, because all just human laws oblige mediately by the force of this natural principle, that inferiors ought to obey superiors.
272. Principle III. Human law must be proportioned both to the end, and to natural and divine law.
It is proved : For human law is a means to an end, and is a rule and measure regulated and measured by the superior natural and eternal law of God ; therefore it must be proportioned to these three. Hence :
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inasmuch as it is proportioned to the law of God, it must be congruous ;
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and consequently honest, not contradicting the eternal law ; to religion inasmuch as it is conformed to natural law, it must be fitting to discipline, i.e. a) as to object : just, i.e. establishing what is right according to reason ; b) as to the faculty of acting or the power of the subjects : possible and according to nature, because impossible things are not to be imposed on men, and according to the custom of the country, because in living in society a man follows the manner of others, not bearing their burden ; c) as to due circumstances : fitting to place and time ;
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inasmuch as it is proportioned to the end, it must be expedient for salvation or for the utility of men, and therefore a) necessary for removing evil or useful for obtaining good ; b) manifest, i.e. clear so that it can be understood, lest it be harmful to men ; c) handed down for the benefit of the commonwealth, i.e. ordered to the common good.