Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis
Benedictus Henricus Merkelbach (1871–1942)
Summa Theologiae Moralis ad mentem D. Thomae et ad normam iuris novi
First published 1935
Volume I (De principiis) of Benedictus Henricus Merkelbach's Summa theologiae moralis sets out the foundations of Catholic moral theology within a Thomistic framework. It treats human acts, conscience, law, sin, and merit in relation to the canon law of its period. The present edition follows the Paris text published by Desclée de Brouwer in 1935 and includes the Latin text with an English translation. It comprises the first volume of the three-volume Summa.
Prologus
Introductio I: Theologia Moralis Generalis: Introductio
Tractatus I: Tractatus de ultimo actu humanorum fine seu de beatitudine
Introductio
Quaestio I: DE FINE ULTIMO IN COMMUNI
Quaestio II: DE BEATITUDINE OBIECTIVA
Quaestio III: DE BEATITUDINE FORMALI
Quaestio IV: DE QUALITATIBUS BEATITUDINIS
Quaestio V: DE MODO OBTINENDI BEATITUDINEM
Tractatus II: De actibus humanis in se
Introductio
Pars I: De actibus humanis secundum esse materiale et psychologicum
§ I: De conditione actuum humanorum
Caput I: De elemento subiectivo actus humani
Quaestio I: De voluntario
Articulus I: De voluntario in se
Articulus II: De voluntario tum positivo et directo, tum negativo et indirecto
Articulus III: De voluntario in se et in causa
Quaestio II: De impedimentis voluntarii seu de involuntario
Articulus I: De violentia
Articulus II: De metu
Articulus III: De concupiscentia
Articulus IV: De ignorantia
Quaestio III: De libero
Quaestio IV: De impedimentis liberi
Articulus I: De passionibus
Articulus II: De habitu et consuetudine
Articulus III: De impedimentis liberi remotioribus
Caput II: De elemento obiectivo actus humani
Quaestio I: De elemento essentiali seu obiecto
Quaestio II: De elemento accidentali seu de circumstantiis
§ II: De distinctione actuum humanorum
Quaestio I: De actibus elicitis
Quaestio II: De actibus imperatis
Pars II: De actibus humanis secundum esse morale
§ I: De moralitate actus humani in genere
Quaestio I: De essentia et speciebus moralitatis
Quaestio II: De fundamentis moralitatis
Articulus I: De intrinseca differentia boni inter et mali
Articulus II: De norma moralitatis
Articulus III: De fundamento obiectivo moralitatis
Articulus IV: De falsis systematibus circa fundamenta moralitatis
Articulus V: De facultate apprehensiva moralitatis
Quaestio III: De principiis seu fontibus moralitatis
Quaestio IV: De distinctione specifica inter actum bonum et malum
Quaestio V: De distinctione specifica inter varios actus bonos vel malos
Articulus I: De obiecto
Articulus II: De circumstantiis
Articulus III: De fine
§ II: De moralitate actuum humanorum in specie
Quaestio I: De bonitate et malitia actus interioris
Quaestio II: De bonitate et malitia actus exterioris
Quaestio III: De bonitate et malitia effectus externi
Quaestio IV: De bonitate et malitia passionum
Quaestio V: De bonitate et malitia circumstantiarum
Pars III: De actibus humanis secundum esse supernaturale et meritorium
Quaestio I: De merito praesertim supernaturali
Quaestio II: De conditionibus meriti supernaturalis
Tractatus III: De conscientia in generali
Introductio
Quaestio I: De conscientia morali secundum se in esse psychologico
Quaestio II: De conscientia prout est regula actuum moralium
Articulus I: De rectitudine conscientiae
Articulus II: De conscientiae certitudine
Quaestio III: De conscientia christiana prout est regula actuum supernaturalium
Tractatus IV: De legibus in genere
Introductio
§ I: De lege secundum esse psychologicum
Pars I: De lege in genere
Quaestio I: De ipsa lege in se
Articulus I: De essentia legis
Articulus II: De promulgatione legis
Quaestio II: De distinctione legum
Quaestio III: De effectibus legis
Articulus I: De vi directivâ seu obligatione legis
Articulus II: De vi coactivâ seu sanctione legis
Pars II: De lege aeterna quae est fundamentum omnis legis
Quaestio I: De essentia legis aeternae
Quaestio II: De potestate legis aeternae
Quaestio III: De mutabilitate legis aeternae
§ I: De legibus quae regunt actus morales
Pars III: De lege naturali
Quaestio I: De essentia legis naturalis
Quaestio II: De potestate legis naturalis
Articulus I: De vi directivâ seu obligatione legis naturalis
Articulus II: De vi coactivâ seu sanctione legis naturalis
Quaestio III: De mutabilitate legis naturalis
Quaestio IV: De Lege Humana in Se
Articulus I: De Auctore legis civilis
On the Author of Civil Law.
267. Thesis. Legislative power originally is from God as from the author of nature. — It is clear a) from Scripture : Wis. VI, 2-4 ; Rom. XIII, 1-7 ; Prov. VIII, 15-16 ; Ecclus. XVII, 14 ; — b) from reason : for man is by nature a social animal ; but society needs a power by which it is ruled ; therefore this power is from the author of nature (Cf. Leo XIII, enc. Diuturnum, 29 June 1881 ; Immortale Dei, 1 Nov. 1885 ; and also Humanum genus, 20 April 1884).
268. Power is communicated by God as the principal cause, but through the multitude as the instrumental cause. — The community is bound to transmit that power of itself, not for a time and in a revocable manner, but in a stable manner in perpetuity, not to be exercised in its name but to be possessed as its own : for thus it is ordinarily necessary by the nature of things for the good government of society. It can however be transmitted to various subjects according to the various form or regime of society. If it resides entirely in one, the regime is monarchic ; if in a group of many of the best and most powerful, it is aristocratic or oligarchic ; if in the community itself or in a group elected from every condition, who are designated by all, it is democratic ; — finally if simultaneously but partially it resides in many, it is a mixed regime which prevails in present-day nations : thus in Belgium it resides partially in a twofold group of electors who enact the laws and in the king who can sanction or not sanction and promulgate them (Const. Belg., art. 26).
Power exists full in the supreme authority ; from it is sometimes derived a restricted [power] to certain subordinates, as happens in fiefs, confederated states, etc.
269. Power does not depend of itself on faith, uprightness of life, good morals, nor therefore on sex, age, and other conditions of the subject in whom it resides.
It is clear a) from the Council of Constance, sess. 8, condemning prop. 15 of Wyclif ;
b) from Scripture : both from the words of Christ commanding tribute to be paid to an ethnic prince (Mt. XXII, 21) and to obey the wicked and evil Pharisees (XXIII, 3) ; and from the words of the Apostles who teach that infidel princes are ministers of God who are to be obeyed in conscience (Rom. XIII, 5-7 ; Tit. III, 1 ; I Pet. II, 13-15) ;
c) by reason : a man cannot command because he is good but because he is superior.
Accidentally however power can depend on the aforesaid conditions, if it is so determined specially in Law.