S. Th. I-II, q. 94, a. 4, 5, 6 ; q. 100, a. 1 and 8.

257. Natural law is one among all, considered in the first act : for the habitual inclination of reason to right judging conformably to the eternal law is the same, whence it is the same participation and conformity with the eternal law ; — in the second act, i.e. as to the actual judgments of reason :

1. it is altogether the same as to substance, i.e. as to the most common principles ;

2. but as to application, i.e. as to the proper principles deduced from the first, especially the more remote, it is the same among all generally and for the most part ; because however not all always judge in the same way and apply the principles, therefore sometimes it is not the same as in the fewer, whether

a) as to subjective knowledge : for as some are ignorant of the deductions from speculative principles, as these principles are ignorant of the deductions from speculative principles, so those having a depraved reason are ignorant of these practical principles because of passion, evil custom, or evil disposition of nature ; whether

b) also as to objective rectitude : the deductions of speculative principles are necessary and the same among all, although they are not known equally by all ; but practical reason is concerned with contingent things in which human operations exist, whence, because of particular impediments, the principles sometimes cannot be rightly applied. Thus e.g. the principle : deposits are to be returned, would not be rightly applied if the one making the deposit should demand its return to his own or another's harm. And similar exceptions are given for keeping a secret or private dominion. Whence what is right in one case is not right in another.

258. Natural law is intrinsically immutable. — Although it can be changed by the addition of other laws, formally (according to the very principles or tenor of the law) it is intrinsically immutable as to subtraction, so that nothing ceases to be of natural law that was previously of it : for it is founded in rational nature with its necessary relations to other things, especially to the ultimate end, and arises necessarily from the nature of things ; whence it contains only that which by its nature is intrinsically good or evil, necessarily leading to the ultimate end or turning away from it, independently of every positive will even of God. Whence just as its foundation in itself, its object, and its ultimate end are immutable, so also the law itself.

Nevertheless the matter of certain precepts or its circumstances can be changed, which being changed, the law no longer holds : for some precepts are immediately and independently of every condition founded in the very immutable essences of things, and in these there is no change : for they regard those things that essentially are good or evil ; — others are founded in the natural and ordinary conditions of things and regard those things that ordinarily and regularly are good or evil, yet not under every condition and in every case : for God by a miracle can change the conditions of things which are the matter of law, and second causes also can change the circumstances of things, which being changed, the principles of law and the law itself are not changed, but they are not applicable. Whence it can happen that the same action, physically considered, which was prescribed or forbidden by natural law, here and now is no longer so, because morally it is another, either because of a change of matter by God's miracle, or because of a change of circumstances.

Therefore 1° no change occurs in natural law : a) as to the primary principles of cognition altogether general and immediately evident ;

b) of itself as to the primary principles of intention, which directly and immediately state the necessary order or repugnance to God, because they are of things essentially good and evil : for subjection to the first cause is immutable and the order to the ultimate end is altogether necessary ; are excepted those things which have arisen from the free will of men, as a vow and an oath of promise, whose obligation, or debt, as not necessary of itself but voluntarily assumed, can be remitted by God, just as a man can yield his own voluntarily acquired right.

2° No change occurs generally for the most part, but of itself there can occur sometimes in the fewer cases, in the precepts which directly and immediately concern the means to the end, because ordinarily they depend on certain conditions. Thus

a) as to the primarily intended principles, for one or another particular case, if the conditions of things are changed (as in the case of a deposit or a secret), or also if they can be changed miraculously by God : thus homicide, adultery, theft are evils, but the same actions could be licit if God removed in the other the right to life, to the body of a spouse, to temporal goods. Are excepted those that are exceptionally founded immediately in the essences of things, independently of every condition : thus sins of lust against nature and lying are always evils ;

b) a fortiori as to the secondarily intended principles, even commonly and for all, during some time : for although regularly they must be observed, they can nevertheless sometimes not oblige because of special causes even natural impeding their observance. Thus unity generally and of itself befits the primary end and is necessary for the secondary end of matrimony, yet accidentally polygamy can be licit because of the propagation of the people ; matrimony between brother and sister is of itself evil, but it was licit at the beginning of the human race : for always the end of lesser moment must yield to the greater, and the lesser precept to the greater.

Note moreover that most principles which are proposed in a general formula are expressed inadequately and are not universal, but include an understood restriction, condition, or determination. Thus e.g. the precept : Thou shalt not kill, adequately expressed, sounds : Thou shalt not kill an innocent person by private authority and in the manner of aggression. Whence the exceptions of such a principle are only emendations of our manner of speaking, not of the law itself.

259. Natural law is immutably from without, or indispensable. — For God cannot change it or abrogate it, because he cannot fail to prescribe good or to forbid evil, and otherwise his will would not suffice to change a law which is the very nature ; dispensation, however, is a true change and as it were abrogation of law, i.e. its relaxation and cessation of obligation in a particular case, made by one having power, the matter of the law remaining immutable. But if God is said to dispense, it must be understood as improperly so called rightly, either a) of a change of matter, as when he yields his right and so remits the obligation in a vow or oath, whereby it comes about

Summa Theologiae Moralis I. — 16 that the matter promised is withdrawn from the law saying that to each his own is to be rendered ; or b) of an authentic declaration and interpretation that the law does not oblige because of a change of circumstances, as was done for the polygamy of the patriarchs : for it is often dangerous for men to leave to them the judgment whether the circumstances are verified in which the law does not oblige, and then the authority of law is reserved the power of declaring to what cases it ought not to extend itself.

A fortiori the Church cannot change natural law or dispense in it. She can however simply interpret it, i.e. explain it nakedly, and indeed authentically and infallibly, both because natural law has also been revealed, and because it is the necessary foundation for Christian morals. She can also in the name of God dispense in a vow, oath, and matrimony, but improperly, inasmuch as she declares that in certain cases the law no longer holds, i.e. that God yields his right or annuls the bond.

260. Natural law cannot be abolished from the heart of men, if it is considered in the first act as the habitual light of reason ; — in the second act as to actual knowledge :

1. As to the primary principles of cognition or the most universal, it cannot be abolished or ignored, because they are known in themselves and therefore altogether indelible ; in their application, however, we can err because of passion.

2. As to the proper and particular principles deduced proximately from the first :

a) of itself there is no ignorance in one who uses a suitably developed reason, because they can be known by very easy diligence (Rom. II, 16) ;

b) accidentally, however, there can be vincible, and even invincible for a short time, ignorance, because of the impediments of reason, such as are evil persuasions from insufficient development or culture of reason in children and very rude [people], depraved customs, corrupt habits, etc., or also when it is a question of the application of principles, especially if certain circumstances seem to excuse the evil of the act ;

c) indeed perhaps for a long time in the absence of all culture whatsoever.

3. As to the more remote principles, because they are not deduced except by more subtle consideration and often require attention to multiple and complicated circumstances, there can be invincible ignorance even among the pious and learned, as experience confirms.

Authors admit that malice can be invincibly ignored in internal acts, namely at least of depraved pleasures and perhaps also of desires, of officious lying, of perjury to protect life, of theft to relieve the needy, of pollution in children, of fornication.

261. Corollary. — From a natural negative precept nothing excuses, not even the danger of death, because it forbids that which is intrinsically evil. From a natural affirmative precept an inconvenience proportionately grave excuses : for an affirmative law does not oblige for every single moment ; therefore ordinarily it does not oblige especially when there is present a grave inconvenience, but one can await the moment when it is not present. From this, however, it does not excuse the danger of death, in the case in which the violation would redound either to a great common harm (the common good is to be preferred to a private good), or to the extreme spiritual necessity of one's neighbor (the spiritual good of one's neighbor is to be preferred to one's own temporal good), or to the hatred of God and religion or the contempt of the Church ; as will be said in its own place.

FOURTH PART

ON HUMAN AND CIVIL LAW.

S. Th. I-II, q. 91, a. 3 ; q. 95, a. 1.

262. Human law in the broader sense is that which is enacted by the positive will of any human legislator to direct a society and its members to their end ; in the present however it is taken in the stricter sense for civil law, because this is enacted by a power which naturally belongs to man¹, as destined for society, which by its nature is human, and so it is distinguished from Christian and ecclesiastical law which is enacted by man but by a power positively granted to him by the free will of God.

263. Human law is necessary to supply that which is lacking to natural law, both 1° according to directive force : to instill natural law which is ignored by many, to determine it more, and to supply other useful things for living rightly ; and 2° according to coercive force : to obtain its observance from the wicked, restraining them. For :

1. The principles of natural law are ignored by many, are to some extent abstract, universal, indeterminate as to manner, time and place, nor do they contain all the things by which man is moved to the good ; whence it is not sufficient to direct society, but needs practical determination and sanction. And this determination, in order that society be ordered, a casual and particular determination is not sufficient, but a common and stable one by which all, with united forces, tend in the same way to the good. Such a determination, stable and common, supplying the defect of natural law and completing it, is human law.

2. The inclination or aptitude for virtue is naturally in man, but the very perfection and consummation of virtue does not come to man except by industry and discipline. For which discipline men ordinarily are not sufficient to themselves, because the perfection of virtue consists chiefly in withdrawing men from undue pleasures to which they are most inclined ; therefore men must be ruled by others. — From which being supposed, it can be so argued :

Man, in order that he decline from evil and attain virtue, needs the governance of others. And indeed for those who by natural disposition or custom or gift of God are inclined to virtue, paternal discipline suffices, which is done by admonitions ; but many are corrupt or prone to vices who are not easily moved by words and admonitions. Therefore it was necessary that they be restrained from evil by force or fear, says S. Thomas, q. 95, a. 1, « so that at least thus they might cease to do evil and render a quiet life to others, and they themselves might at length be brought by this kind of habit to do voluntarily the good which they previously fulfilled from fear, and thus become virtuous ». This human law does.

264. Objection. — Nor may one say that the arbitraments of judges suffice. « First, because it is easier to find a few wise men who suffice to lay down right laws than the many who would be required to judge rightly about individual cases. Second, because those who lay down laws consider from much time beforehand what is to be enacted by law ; but judgments about singular facts are made from cases suddenly arising. Now it is easier, from many things considered, for a man to see what is right, than from some one fact alone. Third, because legislators judge universally and about the future ; but men presiding as judges judge about present things, to which they are affected by love or hatred, or by some cupidity, and so their judgment is depraved. Because therefore justice animated is not found in many judges, and because it is flexible, therefore it was necessary, in whatever things are possible, to determine by law what is to be judged, and to leave very few things to the discretion of men ». Ibidem, ad 2.