Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. C. Gent. III, 140-141.

254. Notions. — Sanction a) on the part of cause or origin, is internal (and concomitant), which proceeds naturally and by the very fact, from the very action or from the nature of the thing, following the observance or violation of law, e.g. tranquility and remorse of conscience, good and evil fame, bodily indisposition from drunkenness ; — and external (or inflicted), which comes from an extrinsic cause, or from the disposition of law connecting with the observance or violation of law, e.g. if a drunkard is punished by a judge with a fine ;

b) on the part of effect, is perfect or sufficient, which by its nature is able to move all subjects (whether absolutely, or relatively for certain circumstances) in every case to the observance of the law, and has due proportion with merit and demerit ; — or imperfect and insufficient.

255. Thesis. The sanction of natural law, imperfect and internal, exists in the present life ; — perfect [sanction] is in the other life, from the attainment or loss of the ultimate end.

a) The first part is proved. There is an internal sanction, for virtue is the perfect good of this life ; and fault is more often followed by 1) remorse of conscience, because « the impulse of malice or passion ceasing, by which they do evil, according to reason they know that they have done evil and grieve¹. » ; 2) pain in the soul ; 3) sickness in the body. Whence Wis. XI, 17 : By the things by which one sins, by the same is he also tormented. It is however imperfect, both because it does not sufficiently induce to the observance of the law, for we are sometimes bound to lay down even life itself, and there are many seductions in this life to overcome which there is required a sanction superior to the goods of this life ; and because, as experience witnesses, it does not render to each one according to justice.

b) The second part is proved 1) from the essential order of things : Where there is the due order to an end, the order must lead to that end, and a departure from the order must exclude the end. But by God's disposition and law human acts are essentially ordered to the ultimate end. Therefore those keeping the order must attain the ultimate end (which is to be rewarded) ; but those departing from the order must be excluded from the end (which is to be punished). It is confirmed :

a) As natural things are subject to the ordination of divine providence, so also human nature ; therefore as in natural things the order kept necessarily produces conservation and good in them, so in human things the order of the law divinely imposed, when kept, must by the disposition of the governor lead to the good of retribution, the order of the law, when omitted, to the evil of penalty.

b) For matter does not attain form unless it has been suitably disposed. But the end is the perfection of the will, as form is the perfection of matter. Therefore the will does not attain the end unless it has been suitably disposed. But it is disposed by the intention and desire and pursuit of the end. Therefore he whose intention is turned away from the end will not attain it.

c) Which also holds for the supernatural end. For he who departs from the natural end, also departs from the supernatural end, because the natural order is the foundation of the elevation to the supernatural end. He departs, namely, from God as the principle of every perfection.

2. from the wisdom of the supreme legislator : God, as being a most wise and provident legislator, intends that natural law be observed by all. But, as experience witnesses, one efficacious and necessary means of inducing free men, moved by depraved cupidities and pleasures, to this, is a perfect sanction, so proportioned to every virtue and difficulty of the law that, all things considered, it is never truly useful for a man to depart from the law. Therefore God has established a perfect sanction. But in the present life such a perfect sanction is lacking. Therefore the perfect sanction pertains to the future life, or to the state of the term and end, so that the human will, which naturally tends to happiness, by the hope of this attainment and fear of its loss may be efficaciously moved to the observance of the law.

3. from the sanctity and justice of the supreme lord : Men are distinguished from one another by their acts, to which imputability and merit pertain. But divine sanctity requires that this distinction, resulting from the imputability of human acts, be preserved in the future life ; and justice requires that reward be given for merit, penalty for demerit. Therefore. For, if good and evil with respect to the essential attainment of the end were on a par, there would be no essential distinction of morality, since all morality depends on the relation to the ultimate end ; and so : a) in practice the intrinsic difference between good and evil would be destroyed, and God would seem indifferent to good and evil ; which contradicts his sanctity ; — b) the law of God would be violated with impunity, and the rebellious creature could escape his will and, as it were, triumph over him ; which is repugnant to the justice of the divine lord.

256. Sanction does not harm morality. — For to do good for the sake of reward, to avoid evil for fear of punishment, can happen in a twofold way : a) so that reward or punishment is the sole motive of the act, without any respect to its goodness or malice, and such a manner is evil because it perverts the order, the means being placed before the end ; b) so that one uses the hope of reward or the fear of punishment in order more efficaciously to pursue good and more efficaciously to avoid evil, and such a manner is conformed to the order intended by the legislator who appends sanction as a means of urging the obligation of the law. This is confirmed by the universal practice of parents and teachers in educating children (n. 133, 3).

Hence the Kantian ethics which posited only the motive of obligation is not more perfect than the Christian, which they say is founded on fear and hope. For on the one hand the Christian ethics does not teach that morality depends on fear and hope, but that these are an aid ; on the other hand Kant refuses to admit that rational human nature and the essential order of things are the foundation of morality. And yet ethics does not have the task of correcting nature, but of taking it as it in fact is and of directing human actions so that they are conformed to rational nature².