S. Th. I-II, q. 91, a. 2.

244. Thesis. In the rational creature there is a natural law, which is implanted with nature and essentially conjoined to it — and is known by the natural light of reason.

The first part is of certain faith, since the ordinary magisterium of the Church teaches it clearly from Scripture itself (Ps. IV, 6-7 according to the LXX and Vulgate) against atheists, materialists, defenders of moral positivism, and evolutionists ; the other is certain against traditionalists who would assert that natural law, in the present fallen state of man, is known to us only by the light of supernatural revelation or tradition.

It is proved : 1) In Scripture the Apostle teaches (Rom. II, 14-15) that the Gentiles, who have not the law (namely, the positive Mosaic law), naturally (i.e. led by the light of natural reason) do what is of the law (what is prescribed by the Mosaic law), having the law for themselves (i.e. that it is in them), having it written in their hearts ; that it is a true law for whose violation or observance they are accused or defended by conscience ; that the law is laid down by God, because conscience accuses before God who according to this will judge them.

2. The Fathers say that natural law is in all, — that it is not written but inborn, innate, implanted, — that it is inscribed in hearts, — that nature is the teacher of good work, etc.

So Justin, dial. 93 ; Origen, in Rom. l. II, n. 7, 8, 9 ; Tertullian, adv. Marc. V, 13 ; Jerome, ep. 121 ad Alg., q. 8 ; — Chrysostom, hom. 12 and 13 ad pop. Ant. ; Gregory Naz., or. 28, n. 16 ; Ambrose, ep. 73 ; Augustine, in Ps. 57, n. 1 ; in Ps. 118, serm. 25, n. 5 ; Gregory M., in Evang. hom. 31, n. 3 ; — Origen, in Num. hom. 10, n. 3 ; Augustine, conf. II, 4 ; serm. on the Mount, II, c. 9 ; Jerome, ep. 121 ; — Ambrose, de fuga saec. 3, n. 15 ; ep. 73 ; Tertullian, de cor. 6 ; Basil, in hexaem. han. 9, n. 3 and 4 ; Cyril Al., c. Jul. l. 3 ; etc.

3. The intimate sense and conscience testifies that some actions are good, others evil, that these stand in the way of the attainment of the end or perfect good,

Summa Theologiae Moralis I. — 15.

that those are necessary for the end and obligatory, so that he who obeys the command attains peace of soul, while he who transgresses the same is stirred by the stings of conscience ; — from which there arises the consensus of peoples about the existence of law independently of human power.

4. Reason itself teaches this, as S. Thomas so shows : Law can be in something in two ways, in one way in the legislator as in one regulating and measuring, in another way in the subject as in the regulated and measured, because insofar as something participates in the rule and measure, so it is regulated and measured. But all things that are subject to divine providence are regulated by the eternal law. Therefore all things in some way participate in the eternal law, inasmuch as they have an inclination to their proper acts and ends. But the rational creature is subject to providence in a more excellent way, inasmuch as it becomes a partaker of it, providing for itself and others. Therefore in it there is a special participation of the eternal law inasmuch as it has an inclination to the due act and end known to it ; and this participation is natural law.

It can be defined : the ordination of the rational creature to the ultimate end, founded in its very nature and perceived by the natural light of reason ; or the participation of the eternal law in rational nature, an ordination impressed on the mind of the creature by which the eternal law is participated in it.

S. Th. I-II, q. 91, a. 2 and q. 94, a. 1.

245. Thesis. The participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is a true law. — For it is

1. an ordinance of reason : the rational creature participates in the law intellectually and rationally, and therefore the participation of the eternal law in it is properly called law because it is something of reason : a dictate constituted by reason ; in other creatures it is not participated in rationally, whence in them the proper inclination is not called law except by similarity ;

2. it is promulgated by God to the community : for although the promulgation takes place in individuals, by the impression of reason, it nevertheless takes place by reason not indeed as it is particular, but as it is common and the same in all, proceeding from the author of nature ; 3) it is made for moral honesty, not of one, but of all humanity¹.

246. The essence of natural law. — Natural law is not law insofar as it is in the legislator as regulating, and therefore it is not the eternal law itself, but it is law as it is in the subjects as in those regulated, and therefore it is a participation, manifestation, passive promulgation of the eternal law in us.

And indeed :

1. It is not the will of God, whether necessary or free² : for actions are not good or evil because they are prescribed or forbidden by a willing God, but they are prescribed or forbidden because they are intrinsically in themselves good or evil, and indeed the good which are required as necessary by the order cannot but be prescribed, and the evil cannot but be forbidden. Whence if by an impossibility God should not will natural law, it would nevertheless become known to us in the same way and oblige, because human nature would be constituted in the same way by the divine reason commanding, and it itself as well as our acts would be ordered to the ultimate end³. Law, namely, is essentially an ordinance of reason, not will.

2. Nor does the will or power of God seem necessarily to be attended to in order that natural law be known. For moral necessity or obligation is the absolute necessity of a means to an absolutely necessary end (Q. D. de Ver. 17, a. 3), so that the means is necessary not only under the condition if one wishes the end, but absolutely because also the end is absolutely necessary and altogether imposed on us. Whence for knowing the law or obligation it suffices that there be present the absolute necessity of the end which is altogether imposed, and that the necessary connection of the means to the end be known, and consequently the obligation to those means. Now by physical necessity the end is imposed on us by nature : the supreme good of rational nature and the supreme happiness, so that we cannot not will it ; and reason a) is able to know that some particular goods befitting rational nature pertain to that end (as a necessary condition of true perfection and ultimate happiness), but others do not, and b) is able to perceive in this way the necessary connection of certain acts, as means, with that end. Therefore the absolute moral necessity of the means and the obligation arising from nature, or natural law, can be known, abstracting from God, namely without attending to the will or authority of God⁴. — Which does not however exclude that remotely and ultimately natural law and obligation depend on God, and that, with God known, it is more fully and perfectly perceived.

3. It is nevertheless not a categorical imperative of autonomous reason or will (Kant and the Rationalists). For conciliar autonomy cannot be reconciled with the idea of true obligation, because human reason cannot oblige itself. Whence obligation is not constituted by human reason, but is imposed from the necessary inclination of our nature, which cannot be changed by us and which always persists immutable. — Moreover this opinion rests on the false foundation that man is to himself an end, or an end in himself (cf. Syll. prop. 3 and 50), whereas he is essentially the creature of God, depending on him and ordered to him. The ultimate end, namely, is not constituted by reason but by the author of nature.

Therefore, considered in the first act, natural law is the habitual inclination of rational nature to its proper acts, namely to knowing and desiring the end or perfect good, and the means necessarily conducing to it, or to choosing honest acts ; whence nature is truly to itself a law, in this sense that from the necessary and inescapable inclination of nature to the end arises the obligation to employing the means. In other words, natural law is the light of natural reason by which we are able to discern what is good to be done or evil to be avoided ; which light shows goodness and malice and is the rule of our acts, inasmuch as it is derived from the divine light and is the impression of the divine light in us. — Considered in the second act, law is the actual dictate or judgment of reason, prescribing in a general way what is good to be done, what evil to be avoided. Hence

a) although natural law is not a habit, since it is not that by which reason acts, but what it dictates, the precepts of natural law are nevertheless not always actually considered by reason, and then they are in it habitually, and so natural law can be called a habit, because it is held habitually ;

b) it differs from synderesis, which is not the innate light of reason or its actual dictate, but is a habit (or facility, not strictly innate but spontaneously flowing from the intellect) by which we easily enunciate not all but the first moral principles ; whence by virtue [of this habit] it contains these principles ;

c) it differs from conscience, which is not a general norm of acting but a judgment about things to be done in particular.

247. The foundation of natural law. — Not only about the essence, but also the foundation of the law or natural obligation, and consequently of every obligation, must be sought ; for positive obligation is founded upon the obligation of natural law, inasmuch as this prescribes obedience to superiors.

Now from what has been said it is clear :

1. The unique, sufficient, or ultimate foundation is not the will of God, whether free or necessary : not free because we are dealing with a necessary law, not necessary because it depends on something prior from which it has its necessity, namely on the wisdom and essence of God (Q. D. de Ver. 23, a. 6) ; and therefore it is not the ultimate, unique, and sufficient foundation. — The adversaries indeed say that no law is given without a legislator, no precept can be conceived without the will and authority of one prescribing. But

a) this is true of positive law, which is not necessary, not of natural law whose obligation arises from the nature of things and from the necessary tendency of our nature to the end ; —

b) moreover, by saying that natural law is obligatory because reason dictates that the will of God commanding is to be obeyed, they will hardly free themselves from contradiction, because the said principle, as prescribed by reason alone, is known as obligatory and does not ultimately depend on the knowledge of the will of God ; otherwise there would be a vicious circle ; —

c) finally the first principles of natural law, e.g. good is to be done, etc., are known before the knowledge of God, just as this precedes the very knowledge of the terms of which it consists and by which, being known, it is enunciated at once⁵. Whence although God in the ontological order is the necessary foundation of natural law, not so in the logical order of knowledge.

2. Nor is the foundation human reason alone, because just as the effect depends more on the first cause than on the second cause, so obligation depends more on the author of nature and the eternal law than on the nature and human reason participated from God : for the essential order of things is not from reason nor from itself but is derived from the eternal law.

The foundation seems to be distinguished as twofold :

a) One, secondary and proximate : human nature itself, completely considered with its essential and necessary relations, — or its ultimate end absolutely imposed on it, — or the essential order of things according to which some have a necessary connection with the ultimate end ; and this is sufficient for conceiving true and properly so-called natural obligation, as we have said.

b) The other, primary, remote, and ultimate : the very intellect of God, or the eternal law with its root, the divine essence. For the eternal law is the source of nature and of human reason, and this is not the rule of our acts except from the divine reason of which it is a participation. In the same way there is a twofold foundation of the principles of speculative reason and of eternal truths : namely, the proximate, the nature of things and the relations that obtain between them (which suffices for conceiving necessary truths), and the ultimate, which is the essence and intellect of God. And just as we are able to know the truth of the first principles of speculative reason from the proximate foundation alone, the nature of things, without knowing their ultimate foundation, the divine intellect ; so we are able to know the truth and obligation of the first principles of practical reason, without knowing their ultimate foundation : the divine intellect and the eternal law.

248. Corollary : The system of lay morality, or, as they say, of obligation independent of God⁶, is therefore to be refuted by saying that it is

a) essentially incomplete, since it is silent about God the true ultimate end and about our duties toward God ; b) false, inasmuch as it affirms that natural law is founded in nature or reason alone, to the exclusion of the eternal law of God ;

c) inefficacious, because the law lacks sufficient sanction, and therefore, considering the propensities of men to vices, they do not in fact observe it sufficiently.

But it does not seem that it must be called contradictory, as if it were impossible to conceive natural law abstracting from God the legislator, obligation without God willing and commanding : for this is to say too much, and does not seem true.

If it is said that obligation cannot be conceived unless the ultimate end to be attained, concretely considered, is known, which is God ; this alone we think is necessary for complete knowledge of the whole moral law. For partial knowledge the notion of the end abstractly considered, inasmuch as it is the supreme and complete good of rational nature, suffices. — But, even this granted, God would still not be looked at as supreme legislator or as willing and commanding, but only as the Supreme Good to be sought.

249. Remark. — Therefore the eternal law and natural law differ :

1. subjectively : the former is in God, the latter in the created mind ; — and therefore

2. materially in physical being : the former is the (and essence) divine wisdom, the latter is the created light of reason participated from it ; — and consequently

3. in knowability : the former in itself is known by God alone and the blessed, the latter is perceived by the light of reason.

They agree, however : 1° formally and in the reason of dictate, because the rectitude and obligation of both is the same, since one is a participation of the other ; and therefore

2° objectively because they dictate the same, not indeed a) totally according to the whole extension : for the eternal law extends itself also to irrational creatures and to those things which God prescribes by positive law (or orders to be prescribed by others) ; but b) partially : for although not everything that the eternal law prescribes is prescribed by natural law, everything that natural law prescribes is also prescribed by the eternal law. They are therefore the same law, just as the image of the seal and the sealed [thing] are the same ; the seal, however, is more extended than the sealed [thing].

S. Th. I-II, q. 94, a. 2 and 3 ; q. 100, a. 1.

250. Natural law is one, containing several precepts. — Natural law, although with respect to the matter about which it is concerned it contains several precepts, is nevertheless in itself one, both because it tends to one ultimate end, and because all those precepts are founded on one first universal principle : Good is to be done, evil is to be avoided.

It is proved : Human reason, both speculative and practical, is essentially deductive. But just as being is the first thing known by the intellect, so good is the first thing known by practical reason. Whence just as the first speculative principle is founded on the notion of being : It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be, so the first practical principle is founded on the notion of good : Good is to be done, evil avoided ; and therefore reason prescribes or forbids nothing except what it naturally apprehends as good or evil¹.

251. Order and division of the precepts. — Natural law in a general way comprises all those things which so befit or are repugnant to rational nature that for the preservation of order they must necessarily be prescribed or forbidden by the very Creator of nature²; whence there pertain to natural law all the precepts to which by the nature of the thing and independently of any positive law we are obliged. Among which there is a manifold order :

A. By reason of matter, in a twofold way : a) according to the threefold natural inclination of man to the good, whether of natural being, i.e. the preservation of existence, or of animal life, e.g. the procreation of offspring, or of rational life proper to himself.

For good has the character of an end, whence man has as goods all those things to which he has a natural inclination. But there is in man a threefold inclination : 1) to the good according to the nature which he has in common with all substances, which all seek the preservation of their being ; 2) to the good according to the nature which he has in common with animals, such as procreation and education of offspring ; 3) to the good according to the nature of reason, which are proper to him, e.g. that he worship God and live in society.

Hence the precepts are distinguished according to the nature of substance (abstinence, fortitude), according to the nature of animal (chastity, prudence), and according to the nature of man (religion, justice) ;

b) according to the threefold natural relation or order of man : 1) to God as to his first principle and ultimate end ; — 2) to himself : for he is made up of two parts, of which the higher must rule the lower ; — 3) to his neighbor : born social, man is destined for conjugal, domestic, and political society. Hence the precepts are distinguished into those toward God, toward himself, and toward his neighbor, according as man is considered as a created, rational, or social being.

The order to God is the order of subjection ; the order to one's neighbor is the order of equality and proximity, by which his person in himself or in his goods is forbidden to be violated, and he himself is to be loved after our own likeness ; the order of man to himself is the order of conformity of himself and of his faculties (of which he is not the master) to reason and to rational nature and its proper end, and of subordination to the human species and the common good.

B. Formally, on the part of the manner in which they are contained in law, or by reason of the knowledge and logical nexus between the principles of natural law :

1. some are general, most universal, most common, indeterminate, evident in themselves, known to all from the mere understanding of the terms, e.g. Good is to be done, evil is to be avoided ; What you do not wish to be done to you, do not do to another ; One is to live according to reason ; The Creator is to be obeyed ; To each his own is to be rendered ; The Supreme Good is to be loved ; Injury is to be done to no one ; Live conformably to your nature as a rational, created, social being, etc.

2. others are more proper and determinate, particular, as conclusions deduced from the first, and these are

a) either immediately, proximately and evidently deduced from the first, which are the precepts of the decalogue ; or

b) more remote, which are not so evidently but mediately and by many consequences deduced, e.g. that usury is unjust, that lying is always illicit, that injury inflicted is not to be vindicated by one's own authority, that things found are to be restored.

C. By reason of force and efficacy, or necessity for the end, and the ontological and real nexus :

1. some precepts are primarily intended, which nature altogether requires, because they are altogether necessary for the end which nature directly and principally intends : thus matrimony is altogether necessary for the due procreation and education of offspring ;

2. others are secondarily intended, derived from the first, to which nature much inclines, which are either necessary, not indeed in order that the primary end be obtained, but in order that it be obtained becomingly, suitably, more easily, or are necessary for a secondary end which nature does not directly but concomitantly and subordinately to another intend : thus the unity of matrimony befits the education of offspring and is necessary for family peace.

Briefly : some precepts are about things necessary without which the moral order is impossible ; others, about very useful things, which are not strictly necessary, so that the order without them, although less perfectly, can subsist³.

Hence with relation to the altogether ultimate and primary end of natural law, which is God and the love of God above all things, are distinguished

a) first precepts, which strictly necessary for the love of God prescribe, or forbid those things that directly hinder it and turn away from it ; of which

1. some immediately state the necessary order, or repugnance, to the ultimate end, God : these are the precepts of the first table ;

2. others immediately state the necessary order, or repugnance, to the love of ourselves or of our neighbor, yet mediately to the ultimate end, inasmuch as they are means by the nature of the thing necessary for it : the love of ourselves indeed, because it is a necessary predisposition to the love of God and of our neighbor, since we can tend only to our own good, nor love anyone except by imitating the love of ourselves, and because our life is a necessary condition for the attainment of the end ; the love of our neighbor, because society is a medium altogether necessary by the nature of the thing for men to obtain the end, whence those that are necessary for society without which it cannot subsist pertain here : these are the precepts of the second table.

All of which are prescribed or forbidden gravely, as altogether necessary for the ultimate end or altogether opposed to it ;

b) second precepts derived from the first, which prescribe those things that are necessary in order that the end be obtained becomingly, better, more easily, and forbid those things that retard it or cannot be referred to it, such as are 1) those that include a certain small irreverence toward God, and only fall short of the due manner of worship ; 2) those that somewhat detract from justice or charity ; or 3) those that only lack necessity or utility. These are prescribed or forbidden lightly, because they are not strictly necessary for the ultimate end nor turn away from it⁴.

From the foregoing it is clear that the primary or secondary in cognition and the primary or secondary in necessity and intention of nature are not the same precepts ; for many secondary in cognition which are deduced from the first principles by conclusions (even remote) are primarily intended by nature, as the prohibition of homicide, adultery, theft ; hence one must well observe in what sense those terms are used by authors.

252. The object of natural law are the acts of the virtues. — The acts of the virtues, according to genus, inasmuch as they are virtuous, all are of natural law : for this comprises all things to which man is inclined according to nature. But each thing is inclined to the operation befitting its form ; now the form of man is the rational soul. Whence man is naturally inclined to operate according to reason, which is to act according to virtue. — If however virtuous acts are considered in themselves, inasmuch as they are such and such, according to species, not all are of natural law, because many are of counsel, or of those things to which nature does not incline, but which men have discovered by the inquiry of reason as useful for living well.

253. The subject of natural law. — Because natural law is implanted with rational nature and essentially conjoined to it, hence all rational creatures are subject to it and bound by it, not only adults (among whom the blessed and the damned), but also children and those permanently demented : these however not perfectly and in the second act, because they do not have the use of reason and knowledge of the law, but imperfectly and in the first act, because they have the potency for these. Hence

1. although in these there is no formal sin because the use of reason and of liberty is lacking, they nevertheless sin materially, by acting against the law of nature inherently in them habitually ;

2. the same is to be said of those sleeping, drunk, and others who here and now are ignorant of the law, unless however they have culpably placed the cause of sin, in which case they also sin formally ;

3. those who induce the aforesaid to act against natural law sin formally : for they are the moral or even physical cause of these sins, and therefore by their will they participate in and embrace them : for the action of the instrument is rightly imputed to the principal agent. Add that they are often the cause of evil custom in those, and of scandal in those standing by.

S. Th. C. Gent. III, 140-141.

254. Notions. — Sanction a) on the part of cause or origin, is internal (and concomitant), which proceeds naturally and by the very fact, from the very action or from the nature of the thing, following the observance or violation of law, e.g. tranquility and remorse of conscience, good and evil fame, bodily indisposition from drunkenness ; — and external (or inflicted), which comes from an extrinsic cause, or from the disposition of law connecting with the observance or violation of law, e.g. if a drunkard is punished by a judge with a fine ;

b) on the part of effect, is perfect or sufficient, which by its nature is able to move all subjects (whether absolutely, or relatively for certain circumstances) in every case to the observance of the law, and has due proportion with merit and demerit ; — or imperfect and insufficient.

255. Thesis. The sanction of natural law, imperfect and internal, exists in the present life ; — perfect [sanction] is in the other life, from the attainment or loss of the ultimate end.

a) The first part is proved. There is an internal sanction, for virtue is the perfect good of this life ; and fault is more often followed by 1) remorse of conscience, because « the impulse of malice or passion ceasing, by which they do evil, according to reason they know that they have done evil and grieve¹. » ; 2) pain in the soul ; 3) sickness in the body. Whence Wis. XI, 17 : By the things by which one sins, by the same is he also tormented. It is however imperfect, both because it does not sufficiently induce to the observance of the law, for we are sometimes bound to lay down even life itself, and there are many seductions in this life to overcome which there is required a sanction superior to the goods of this life ; and because, as experience witnesses, it does not render to each one according to justice.

b) The second part is proved 1) from the essential order of things : Where there is the due order to an end, the order must lead to that end, and a departure from the order must exclude the end. But by God's disposition and law human acts are essentially ordered to the ultimate end. Therefore those keeping the order must attain the ultimate end (which is to be rewarded) ; but those departing from the order must be excluded from the end (which is to be punished). It is confirmed :

a) As natural things are subject to the ordination of divine providence, so also human nature ; therefore as in natural things the order kept necessarily produces conservation and good in them, so in human things the order of the law divinely imposed, when kept, must by the disposition of the governor lead to the good of retribution, the order of the law, when omitted, to the evil of penalty.

b) For matter does not attain form unless it has been suitably disposed. But the end is the perfection of the will, as form is the perfection of matter. Therefore the will does not attain the end unless it has been suitably disposed. But it is disposed by the intention and desire and pursuit of the end. Therefore he whose intention is turned away from the end will not attain it.

c) Which also holds for the supernatural end. For he who departs from the natural end, also departs from the supernatural end, because the natural order is the foundation of the elevation to the supernatural end. He departs, namely, from God as the principle of every perfection.

2. from the wisdom of the supreme legislator : God, as being a most wise and provident legislator, intends that natural law be observed by all. But, as experience witnesses, one efficacious and necessary means of inducing free men, moved by depraved cupidities and pleasures, to this, is a perfect sanction, so proportioned to every virtue and difficulty of the law that, all things considered, it is never truly useful for a man to depart from the law. Therefore God has established a perfect sanction. But in the present life such a perfect sanction is lacking. Therefore the perfect sanction pertains to the future life, or to the state of the term and end, so that the human will, which naturally tends to happiness, by the hope of this attainment and fear of its loss may be efficaciously moved to the observance of the law.

3. from the sanctity and justice of the supreme lord : Men are distinguished from one another by their acts, to which imputability and merit pertain. But divine sanctity requires that this distinction, resulting from the imputability of human acts, be preserved in the future life ; and justice requires that reward be given for merit, penalty for demerit. Therefore. For, if good and evil with respect to the essential attainment of the end were on a par, there would be no essential distinction of morality, since all morality depends on the relation to the ultimate end ; and so : a) in practice the intrinsic difference between good and evil would be destroyed, and God would seem indifferent to good and evil ; which contradicts his sanctity ; — b) the law of God would be violated with impunity, and the rebellious creature could escape his will and, as it were, triumph over him ; which is repugnant to the justice of the divine lord.

256. Sanction does not harm morality. — For to do good for the sake of reward, to avoid evil for fear of punishment, can happen in a twofold way : a) so that reward or punishment is the sole motive of the act, without any respect to its goodness or malice, and such a manner is evil because it perverts the order, the means being placed before the end ; b) so that one uses the hope of reward or the fear of punishment in order more efficaciously to pursue good and more efficaciously to avoid evil, and such a manner is conformed to the order intended by the legislator who appends sanction as a means of urging the obligation of the law. This is confirmed by the universal practice of parents and teachers in educating children (n. 133, 3).

Hence the Kantian ethics which posited only the motive of obligation is not more perfect than the Christian, which they say is founded on fear and hope. For on the one hand the Christian ethics does not teach that morality depends on fear and hope, but that these are an aid ; on the other hand Kant refuses to admit that rational human nature and the essential order of things are the foundation of morality. And yet ethics does not have the task of correcting nature, but of taking it as it in fact is and of directing human actions so that they are conformed to rational nature².

S. Th. I-II, q. 94, a. 4, 5, 6 ; q. 100, a. 1 and 8.

257. Natural law is one among all, considered in the first act : for the habitual inclination of reason to right judging conformably to the eternal law is the same, whence it is the same participation and conformity with the eternal law ; — in the second act, i.e. as to the actual judgments of reason :

1. it is altogether the same as to substance, i.e. as to the most common principles ;

2. but as to application, i.e. as to the proper principles deduced from the first, especially the more remote, it is the same among all generally and for the most part ; because however not all always judge in the same way and apply the principles, therefore sometimes it is not the same as in the fewer, whether

a) as to subjective knowledge : for as some are ignorant of the deductions from speculative principles, as these principles are ignorant of the deductions from speculative principles, so those having a depraved reason are ignorant of these practical principles because of passion, evil custom, or evil disposition of nature ; whether

b) also as to objective rectitude : the deductions of speculative principles are necessary and the same among all, although they are not known equally by all ; but practical reason is concerned with contingent things in which human operations exist, whence, because of particular impediments, the principles sometimes cannot be rightly applied. Thus e.g. the principle : deposits are to be returned, would not be rightly applied if the one making the deposit should demand its return to his own or another's harm. And similar exceptions are given for keeping a secret or private dominion. Whence what is right in one case is not right in another.

258. Natural law is intrinsically immutable. — Although it can be changed by the addition of other laws, formally (according to the very principles or tenor of the law) it is intrinsically immutable as to subtraction, so that nothing ceases to be of natural law that was previously of it : for it is founded in rational nature with its necessary relations to other things, especially to the ultimate end, and arises necessarily from the nature of things ; whence it contains only that which by its nature is intrinsically good or evil, necessarily leading to the ultimate end or turning away from it, independently of every positive will even of God. Whence just as its foundation in itself, its object, and its ultimate end are immutable, so also the law itself.

Nevertheless the matter of certain precepts or its circumstances can be changed, which being changed, the law no longer holds : for some precepts are immediately and independently of every condition founded in the very immutable essences of things, and in these there is no change : for they regard those things that essentially are good or evil ; — others are founded in the natural and ordinary conditions of things and regard those things that ordinarily and regularly are good or evil, yet not under every condition and in every case : for God by a miracle can change the conditions of things which are the matter of law, and second causes also can change the circumstances of things, which being changed, the principles of law and the law itself are not changed, but they are not applicable. Whence it can happen that the same action, physically considered, which was prescribed or forbidden by natural law, here and now is no longer so, because morally it is another, either because of a change of matter by God's miracle, or because of a change of circumstances.

Therefore 1° no change occurs in natural law : a) as to the primary principles of cognition altogether general and immediately evident ;

b) of itself as to the primary principles of intention, which directly and immediately state the necessary order or repugnance to God, because they are of things essentially good and evil : for subjection to the first cause is immutable and the order to the ultimate end is altogether necessary ; are excepted those things which have arisen from the free will of men, as a vow and an oath of promise, whose obligation, or debt, as not necessary of itself but voluntarily assumed, can be remitted by God, just as a man can yield his own voluntarily acquired right.

2° No change occurs generally for the most part, but of itself there can occur sometimes in the fewer cases, in the precepts which directly and immediately concern the means to the end, because ordinarily they depend on certain conditions. Thus

a) as to the primarily intended principles, for one or another particular case, if the conditions of things are changed (as in the case of a deposit or a secret), or also if they can be changed miraculously by God : thus homicide, adultery, theft are evils, but the same actions could be licit if God removed in the other the right to life, to the body of a spouse, to temporal goods. Are excepted those that are exceptionally founded immediately in the essences of things, independently of every condition : thus sins of lust against nature and lying are always evils ;

b) a fortiori as to the secondarily intended principles, even commonly and for all, during some time : for although regularly they must be observed, they can nevertheless sometimes not oblige because of special causes even natural impeding their observance. Thus unity generally and of itself befits the primary end and is necessary for the secondary end of matrimony, yet accidentally polygamy can be licit because of the propagation of the people ; matrimony between brother and sister is of itself evil, but it was licit at the beginning of the human race : for always the end of lesser moment must yield to the greater, and the lesser precept to the greater.

Note moreover that most principles which are proposed in a general formula are expressed inadequately and are not universal, but include an understood restriction, condition, or determination. Thus e.g. the precept : Thou shalt not kill, adequately expressed, sounds : Thou shalt not kill an innocent person by private authority and in the manner of aggression. Whence the exceptions of such a principle are only emendations of our manner of speaking, not of the law itself.

259. Natural law is immutably from without, or indispensable. — For God cannot change it or abrogate it, because he cannot fail to prescribe good or to forbid evil, and otherwise his will would not suffice to change a law which is the very nature ; dispensation, however, is a true change and as it were abrogation of law, i.e. its relaxation and cessation of obligation in a particular case, made by one having power, the matter of the law remaining immutable. But if God is said to dispense, it must be understood as improperly so called rightly, either a) of a change of matter, as when he yields his right and so remits the obligation in a vow or oath, whereby it comes about

Summa Theologiae Moralis I. — 16 that the matter promised is withdrawn from the law saying that to each his own is to be rendered ; or b) of an authentic declaration and interpretation that the law does not oblige because of a change of circumstances, as was done for the polygamy of the patriarchs : for it is often dangerous for men to leave to them the judgment whether the circumstances are verified in which the law does not oblige, and then the authority of law is reserved the power of declaring to what cases it ought not to extend itself.

A fortiori the Church cannot change natural law or dispense in it. She can however simply interpret it, i.e. explain it nakedly, and indeed authentically and infallibly, both because natural law has also been revealed, and because it is the necessary foundation for Christian morals. She can also in the name of God dispense in a vow, oath, and matrimony, but improperly, inasmuch as she declares that in certain cases the law no longer holds, i.e. that God yields his right or annuls the bond.

260. Natural law cannot be abolished from the heart of men, if it is considered in the first act as the habitual light of reason ; — in the second act as to actual knowledge :

1. As to the primary principles of cognition or the most universal, it cannot be abolished or ignored, because they are known in themselves and therefore altogether indelible ; in their application, however, we can err because of passion.

2. As to the proper and particular principles deduced proximately from the first :

a) of itself there is no ignorance in one who uses a suitably developed reason, because they can be known by very easy diligence (Rom. II, 16) ;

b) accidentally, however, there can be vincible, and even invincible for a short time, ignorance, because of the impediments of reason, such as are evil persuasions from insufficient development or culture of reason in children and very rude [people], depraved customs, corrupt habits, etc., or also when it is a question of the application of principles, especially if certain circumstances seem to excuse the evil of the act ;

c) indeed perhaps for a long time in the absence of all culture whatsoever.

3. As to the more remote principles, because they are not deduced except by more subtle consideration and often require attention to multiple and complicated circumstances, there can be invincible ignorance even among the pious and learned, as experience confirms.

Authors admit that malice can be invincibly ignored in internal acts, namely at least of depraved pleasures and perhaps also of desires, of officious lying, of perjury to protect life, of theft to relieve the needy, of pollution in children, of fornication.

261. Corollary. — From a natural negative precept nothing excuses, not even the danger of death, because it forbids that which is intrinsically evil. From a natural affirmative precept an inconvenience proportionately grave excuses : for an affirmative law does not oblige for every single moment ; therefore ordinarily it does not oblige especially when there is present a grave inconvenience, but one can await the moment when it is not present. From this, however, it does not excuse the danger of death, in the case in which the violation would redound either to a great common harm (the common good is to be preferred to a private good), or to the extreme spiritual necessity of one's neighbor (the spiritual good of one's neighbor is to be preferred to one's own temporal good), or to the hatred of God and religion or the contempt of the Church ; as will be said in its own place.

FOURTH PART

ON HUMAN AND CIVIL LAW.

S. Th. I-II, q. 91, a. 3 ; q. 95, a. 1.

262. Human law in the broader sense is that which is enacted by the positive will of any human legislator to direct a society and its members to their end ; in the present however it is taken in the stricter sense for civil law, because this is enacted by a power which naturally belongs to man¹, as destined for society, which by its nature is human, and so it is distinguished from Christian and ecclesiastical law which is enacted by man but by a power positively granted to him by the free will of God.

263. Human law is necessary to supply that which is lacking to natural law, both 1° according to directive force : to instill natural law which is ignored by many, to determine it more, and to supply other useful things for living rightly ; and 2° according to coercive force : to obtain its observance from the wicked, restraining them. For :

1. The principles of natural law are ignored by many, are to some extent abstract, universal, indeterminate as to manner, time and place, nor do they contain all the things by which man is moved to the good ; whence it is not sufficient to direct society, but needs practical determination and sanction. And this determination, in order that society be ordered, a casual and particular determination is not sufficient, but a common and stable one by which all, with united forces, tend in the same way to the good. Such a determination, stable and common, supplying the defect of natural law and completing it, is human law.

2. The inclination or aptitude for virtue is naturally in man, but the very perfection and consummation of virtue does not come to man except by industry and discipline. For which discipline men ordinarily are not sufficient to themselves, because the perfection of virtue consists chiefly in withdrawing men from undue pleasures to which they are most inclined ; therefore men must be ruled by others. — From which being supposed, it can be so argued :

Man, in order that he decline from evil and attain virtue, needs the governance of others. And indeed for those who by natural disposition or custom or gift of God are inclined to virtue, paternal discipline suffices, which is done by admonitions ; but many are corrupt or prone to vices who are not easily moved by words and admonitions. Therefore it was necessary that they be restrained from evil by force or fear, says S. Thomas, q. 95, a. 1, « so that at least thus they might cease to do evil and render a quiet life to others, and they themselves might at length be brought by this kind of habit to do voluntarily the good which they previously fulfilled from fear, and thus become virtuous ». This human law does.

264. Objection. — Nor may one say that the arbitraments of judges suffice. « First, because it is easier to find a few wise men who suffice to lay down right laws than the many who would be required to judge rightly about individual cases. Second, because those who lay down laws consider from much time beforehand what is to be enacted by law ; but judgments about singular facts are made from cases suddenly arising. Now it is easier, from many things considered, for a man to see what is right, than from some one fact alone. Third, because legislators judge universally and about the future ; but men presiding as judges judge about present things, to which they are affected by love or hatred, or by some cupidity, and so their judgment is depraved. Because therefore justice animated is not found in many judges, and because it is flexible, therefore it was necessary, in whatever things are possible, to determine by law what is to be judged, and to leave very few things to the discretion of men ». Ibidem, ad 2.

ON HUMAN LAW IN ITSELF.

Article 1.

On the End of Human Law.

265. Human or civil law is rightly defined as an ordinance of human reason by which a society or State and its members, by him who has care of it, are directed immediately to temporal perfection and happiness, and mediately are aided to the ultimate end. The immediate and proximate end of law therefore is the common good of civil society and of its members, i.e. their preservation, perfection, and temporal happiness. This however imports the practice of virtue : for happiness in this life consists formally in the exercise of virtue, and instrumentally in the abundance of goods necessary for the exercise of virtue¹ (n. 44). Now virtue is ordered to eternal happiness. Therefore the remote and mediate end, to which the proximate is to be subordinated, is eternal happiness.

266. It is objected : thus with Machiavelli and other politicians, that public tranquility and temporal happiness are the end of political rule. But the precepts of honesty of rule and of religion are very much opposed to public tranquility and temporal happiness. Therefore a political prince is not bound by such rules and principles.

R. 1) I distinguish the major : Public tranquility and temporal happiness is the proximate end of society, I concede ; the ultimate, I deny. There is no rule which ought not to be referred to the glory of God and to eternal happiness, according to that of Augustine (De Civ. Dei, V, 24) : « We call those emperors happy if they command what is just (i.e. honest), if they make their power a handmaid of the divine majesty, especially for spreading the worship of God ». Nor does it follow therefrom that political rule does not differ from the rule of the Church : for there are two commonwealths adequately distinguished by reason of the proximate and immediate end, and of each one's proper matter ; which however does not prevent both from conspiring to the same spiritual end. — Although therefore the civil power, inasmuch as it directly prescribes, is restricted to its proper matter, in its proper matter nevertheless it rules subjects in order to the end of eternal salvation, as to the remote and ultimate end.

2. I deny the minor. For who, unless he is of a delirious mind, will say that the principles of religion and the rules of honesty are opposed to temporal happiness, when rather they are able to contribute to it, by directing and restraining wicked passions which overturn common tranquility and temporal happiness. Whence Aristotle says, III Pol., c. 6 : « They who have the care of well instituting a city think publicly about virtue and vice ».

On the Author of Civil Law.

267. Thesis. Legislative power originally is from God as from the author of nature. — It is clear a) from Scripture : Wis. VI, 2-4 ; Rom. XIII, 1-7 ; Prov. VIII, 15-16 ; Ecclus. XVII, 14 ; — b) from reason : for man is by nature a social animal ; but society needs a power by which it is ruled ; therefore this power is from the author of nature (Cf. Leo XIII, enc. Diuturnum, 29 June 1881 ; Immortale Dei, 1 Nov. 1885 ; and also Humanum genus, 20 April 1884).

268. Power is communicated by God as the principal cause, but through the multitude as the instrumental cause. — The community is bound to transmit that power of itself, not for a time and in a revocable manner, but in a stable manner in perpetuity, not to be exercised in its name but to be possessed as its own : for thus it is ordinarily necessary by the nature of things for the good government of society. It can however be transmitted to various subjects according to the various form or regime of society. If it resides entirely in one, the regime is monarchic ; if in a group of many of the best and most powerful, it is aristocratic or oligarchic ; if in the community itself or in a group elected from every condition, who are designated by all, it is democratic ; — finally if simultaneously but partially it resides in many, it is a mixed regime which prevails in present-day nations : thus in Belgium it resides partially in a twofold group of electors who enact the laws and in the king who can sanction or not sanction and promulgate them (Const. Belg., art. 26).

Power exists full in the supreme authority ; from it is sometimes derived a restricted [power] to certain subordinates, as happens in fiefs, confederated states, etc.

269. Power does not depend of itself on faith, uprightness of life, good morals, nor therefore on sex, age, and other conditions of the subject in whom it resides.

It is clear a) from the Council of Constance, sess. 8, condemning prop. 15 of Wyclif ;

b) from Scripture : both from the words of Christ commanding tribute to be paid to an ethnic prince (Mt. XXII, 21) and to obey the wicked and evil Pharisees (XXIII, 3) ; and from the words of the Apostles who teach that infidel princes are ministers of God who are to be obeyed in conscience (Rom. XIII, 5-7 ; Tit. III, 1 ; I Pet. II, 13-15) ;

c) by reason : a man cannot command because he is good but because he is superior.

Accidentally however power can depend on the aforesaid conditions, if it is so determined specially in Law.

On the Quality of Human Law.

S. Th. I-II, q. 95, a. 2 and 3.

270. Principle I. Human law is a derivation of natural law.

It is proved : Law, since it is an ordinance of reason, must be conformed to the rule of reason : for it is not true law unless it be just ; just is the same as right according to the rule of reason ; therefore, inasmuch as law has of justice or of the rectitude of reason, so much does it have of the virtue of law. But the first rule of reason is natural law. Therefore human law, inasmuch as it has of the virtue of law, has it insofar as it is derived from natural law. — If however in anything it disagrees with it, it will no longer be law but a corruption of law (Greg. XVI, enc. Qui pluribus, 9 Nov. 1846 ; Pius IX, enc. Quanta Cura, 8 Dec. 1864).

271. Principle II. Human law is the complement of natural law.

It is proved : From natural law something can be derived 1) as a necessary conclusion from the principles, e.g. one is not to kill from this, that evil is to be done to no one, and this pertains not to human law alone but also from the law of nature has the force of obliging ; 2) as a fitting conclusion or particular determination of a common and indeterminate principle, either for directing men or for compelling them, and this immediately has force from human law alone. Thus e.g. that a contract is to be made in such a way that better provision be made for justice, is a determination of the directive principle : contracts are to be entered into according to justice ; and that thieves are to be punished by prison rather than another penalty, is a determination of the coercive principle : thieves are to be punished.

It is said : immediately, because all just human laws oblige mediately by the force of this natural principle, that inferiors ought to obey superiors.

272. Principle III. Human law must be proportioned both to the end, and to natural and divine law.

It is proved : For human law is a means to an end, and is a rule and measure regulated and measured by the superior natural and eternal law of God ; therefore it must be proportioned to these three. Hence :

1. inasmuch as it is proportioned to the law of God, it must be congruous ;

2. and consequently honest, not contradicting the eternal law ; to religion inasmuch as it is conformed to natural law, it must be fitting to discipline, i.e. a) as to object : just, i.e. establishing what is right according to reason ; b) as to the faculty of acting or the power of the subjects : possible and according to nature, because impossible things are not to be imposed on men, and according to the custom of the country, because in living in society a man follows the manner of others, not bearing their burden ; c) as to due circumstances : fitting to place and time ;

3. inasmuch as it is proportioned to the end, it must be expedient for salvation or for the utility of men, and therefore a) necessary for removing evil or useful for obtaining good ; b) manifest, i.e. clear so that it can be understood, lest it be harmful to men ; c) handed down for the benefit of the commonwealth, i.e. ordered to the common good.

On the Formation of Human Law.

273. Human laws can be formed either by an imperative act of the legislator demanding observance from the subjects : these are constituted or statute law, which ordinarily is written ; or by the observance of the subjects to which the consent of the legislator is added : these are customary law.

1. Custom by the nature of the thing is a legitimate source of law. For it is conformed to reason that customs introduce law : for those things which are voluntarily observed by the members of society and are born of social evolution, are to be regarded (unless something prevents) as accommodated to the disposition of the subjects and conformed to the common good ; whence they cannot not be sanctioned by a prudent superior. Hence custom, which is usually defined as « a statute law introduced by the long-standing customs of the community with some consent of the legislator », was generally admitted in Roman Law ; — but not so in present-day Civil Law, neither for introducing, nor for abrogating, nor for extending or restricting a law ; unless exceptionally, if it is expressly indicated in the law, as happens in the matter of contracts and negotiation.

2. Written law can be issued in various and any forms, of decree, letter, codex or collection ; also of response and sentence, although these two are more suited to interpreting a law already enacted than to introducing a new one. Likewise by various procedures for various times among various peoples it is formed ; today the accepted procedure is the following : it is proposed by ministers of state or by members of the legislative body, in the body it is publicly discussed and accepted by vote, sanctioned by the supreme authority¹.

It is fitting to the nature of constituted law : a) that the superior not enact a law without the counsel of the prudent ; b) that it be expressed in clear and brief words in the language of the society to which it is directed ; c) that it be proposed in writing : for it could indeed be handed down by word of mouth, but by writing better provision is made for the clearness and integrity of the law. All these however are not strictly required in order that the law oblige.

274. Promulgation has been done in various ways at various times and among various nations. In Roman Law, from the year 538, under the emperor Justinian, it was to be done in each province or metropolitan city.

Today, in civilized regions, it is usually done by the act of the king, or of the supreme magistrate of the republic, by which he testifies to the law having been enacted and makes it public right by denouncement in the official gazette ; it begins however to oblige after the time which has been appointed.

Thus in Belgium, according to the law of 28 Feb. 1845, art. 2, confirmed by the law of 18 April 1898 modified 28 Dec. 1909, art. 4 (conformably to Const. Belg. art. 129), it is done by authentic testimony of the existence of the law made by the king and public insertion by him enjoined in the official State gazette : le Moniteur ; and the laws oblige throughout the whole kingdom, on the 10th day after the day of publication, unless however otherwise appointed in the law, or unless it was accidentally impossible for citizens to know it, e.g. because of war, great flooding, etc., or for subjects who are abroad : for the law clearly supposes the possibility of their knowing it (art. 1 of the law of 2 Aug. 1822). — In France, by decree of 5 Nov. 1870, the law obliges one full day having revolved after the official gazette has arrived at the capital of each district. — In Italy the laws oblige on the 15th day from the day of publication.

275. Thesis. For the value or obligating force of human law, of itself the approbative acceptance of the subjects is not required, or acceptance of law, i.e. consent to the observance of the law enacted.

It is proved : 1) The Apostle, Rom. XIII, 2, says without restriction or exception : He who resists the power, resists the ordinance of God ; but he resists the power who does not accept the law enacted by it.

2. If acceptance were required, this would be either from a defect of will in the legislator, or from a defect of power. Not the first : for if he enacts the law with preceptive words and urges it with penalties, it is a clear sign that he wishes to oblige to it ; otherwise the common good can require that he break the resistances of subjects. Not the second, because power in its exercise is not restricted at the nod of the subjects, otherwise an efficacious direction of society would be impossible ; and otherwise it would not be a true power of commanding and prescribing, but a mere faculty of giving and proposing counsel, by which the common good cannot sufficiently be procured.

3. Whence Alexander VII condemned prop. (28) : « A people does not sin even if without any cause it does not receive a law promulgated by the prince » (cf. Syll. prop. 63).

Accidentally however acceptance is necessary, if the legislator is unwilling otherwise to oblige, or if that right is reserved to the people in the law (as in Switzerland for certain laws there is a referendum to the people) ; but then the acceptance is not of a law already constituted, but concurs to constituting it.

276. A fortiori for the value to be attributed to the law the executive acceptance of fact, or the very observance of the law, is not required.

It can however be necessary for preserving the force of law, not directly, but indirectly. For if the superior is not able to obtain the fulfillment of the law from the greater or healthier part of the community, it can be fitting that he not urge the observance of the law : for by urging it he could be an occasion of ruin to the subjects without fruit. In which case the obligation does not fail directly from the non-acceptance of the people, but indirectly from the tacit or presumed consent of the legislator, who is judged, if he does not urge the law, not to wish the ruin of souls. But when such a law is considered to be revoked cannot be determined generally, but is left to the judgment of the prudent.

In difference from Roman Law, present-day civil law, because it denies all force to custom, does not admit that after promulgation the law be suspended by recourse to the legislator, nor that it cease by non-reception or by not being brought into use ; whence a consent of the legislator cannot be supposed.

On the Division of Human Law.

S. Th. I-II, q. 95, a. 4.

277. Manifold division. — « Each thing can of itself be divided according to that which is contained in its notion... Now there are many things in the notion of human law, according to any one of which human law can properly and of itself be divided.

1° It is of the notion of human law that it is derived from natural law... and according to this positive law is divided into the law of nations and civil law, according to the two ways in which something is derived from natural law (n. 271). For to the law of nations pertain those things which are derived from natural law as conclusions from principles, as just purchases, sales, and other things of this kind without which men cannot live together ; which is of natural law because man is by nature a social animal... But those things which are derived from natural law by way of particular determination, pertain to civil law, inasmuch as each state determines something accommodated to itself.

2° It is of the notion of human law that it be ordered to the common good of the city ; and according to this human law can be divided according to the diversity of those who specially devote themselves to the common good, such as priests,... princes,... and soldiers,... and therefore to these men certain special laws are fitted.

3° It is of the notion of human law that it be instituted by the governor of the city community... and according to this human laws are distinguished according to the diverse regimes of cities. Of which one... is kingdom, when namely the city is governed by one, and according to this the constitutions of princes are taken. Another regime is aristocracy, i.e. the rule of the best or of the optimates, and according to this the responses of the prudent and also the senatusconsulta are taken. Another regime is oligarchy, i.e. the rule of the rich and powerful, and according to this the praetorian law is taken... Another is that of the people ; which is named democracy, and according to this the plebiscita are taken. Another is tyrannical, which is altogether corrupt ; whence from this no law is taken. There is also a regime mixed from these, which is the best, and according to this is taken the law « which the elders together with the people enacted » (or the deputies of the people together with the prince) (cf. q. 105, a. 1).

4° It is of the notion of human law that it be directive of human acts ; and according to this, according to the diverse things about which laws are enacted, laws are distinguished... because of the things about which they are ». So S. Thomas q. 95, a. 4.

278. Division of present-day law. — Present-day human laws, according to the jurists, are divided according to the diverse persons and things about which they treat, and are reduced to a threefold kind :

a) Some constitute public law (law of the state) which is also called political and administrative law : it regards principally the state of the commonwealth, the social functions and institutions, and the relations between the commonwealth, or its institutions, and the citizens.

Thus the Constitution or fundamental law, the laws which govern the municipalities, provinces, the organization and administration of justice, worship, the army, the elections of deputies, the public treasury, the laws of taxes and fiscal matters¹.

b) Some constitute private law or civil law in the stricter sense : it is principally concerned with those things which pertain to the utility of individuals, and with the rights and relations of citizens to one another. Thus the civil code, the commercial code or for business, and various laws about the dominion of property, including literary and industrial².

c) Some constitute penal law, which chiefly regards crimes, delicts and transgressions or contraventions. Thus the penal code, and various penal and disciplinary laws³.

To civil law rather than to penal pertain those laws which are called social and are sometimes named new law, which namely are concerned with the utilities and rights of some class of citizens and with the relations between diverse classes⁴.

To penal law rather than to civil or administrative law pertain the codes or laws which govern fields and rural estates, forests, hunting and fishing, or the sale of certain things⁵.

ON THE POWER OF HUMAN LAW.