Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis
Benedictus Henricus Merkelbach (1871–1942)
Summa Theologiae Moralis ad mentem D. Thomae et ad normam iuris novi
First published 1935
Volume I (De principiis) of Benedictus Henricus Merkelbach's Summa theologiae moralis sets out the foundations of Catholic moral theology within a Thomistic framework. It treats human acts, conscience, law, sin, and merit in relation to the canon law of its period. The present edition follows the Paris text published by Desclée de Brouwer in 1935 and includes the Latin text with an English translation. It comprises the first volume of the three-volume Summa.
Prologus
Introductio I: Theologia Moralis Generalis: Introductio
Tractatus I: Tractatus de ultimo actu humanorum fine seu de beatitudine
Introductio
Quaestio I: DE FINE ULTIMO IN COMMUNI
Quaestio II: DE BEATITUDINE OBIECTIVA
Quaestio III: DE BEATITUDINE FORMALI
Quaestio IV: DE QUALITATIBUS BEATITUDINIS
Quaestio V: DE MODO OBTINENDI BEATITUDINEM
Tractatus II: De actibus humanis in se
Introductio
Pars I: De actibus humanis secundum esse materiale et psychologicum
§ I: De conditione actuum humanorum
Caput I: De elemento subiectivo actus humani
Quaestio I: De voluntario
Articulus I: De voluntario in se
Articulus II: De voluntario tum positivo et directo, tum negativo et indirecto
Articulus III: De voluntario in se et in causa
Quaestio II: De impedimentis voluntarii seu de involuntario
Articulus I: De violentia
Articulus II: De metu
Articulus III: De concupiscentia
Articulus IV: De ignorantia
Quaestio III: De libero
Quaestio IV: De impedimentis liberi
Articulus I: De passionibus
Articulus II: De habitu et consuetudine
Articulus III: De impedimentis liberi remotioribus
Caput II: De elemento obiectivo actus humani
Quaestio I: De elemento essentiali seu obiecto
Quaestio II: De elemento accidentali seu de circumstantiis
§ II: De distinctione actuum humanorum
Quaestio I: De actibus elicitis
Quaestio II: De actibus imperatis
Pars II: De actibus humanis secundum esse morale
§ I: De moralitate actus humani in genere
Quaestio I: De essentia et speciebus moralitatis
Quaestio II: De fundamentis moralitatis
Articulus I: De intrinseca differentia boni inter et mali
Articulus II: De norma moralitatis
Articulus III: De fundamento obiectivo moralitatis
Articulus IV: De falsis systematibus circa fundamenta moralitatis
Articulus V: De facultate apprehensiva moralitatis
Quaestio III: De principiis seu fontibus moralitatis
Quaestio IV: De distinctione specifica inter actum bonum et malum
Quaestio V: De distinctione specifica inter varios actus bonos vel malos
Articulus I: De obiecto
Articulus II: De circumstantiis
Articulus III: De fine
§ II: De moralitate actuum humanorum in specie
Quaestio I: De bonitate et malitia actus interioris
Quaestio II: De bonitate et malitia actus exterioris
Quaestio III: De bonitate et malitia effectus externi
Quaestio IV: De bonitate et malitia passionum
Quaestio V: De bonitate et malitia circumstantiarum
Pars III: De actibus humanis secundum esse supernaturale et meritorium
Quaestio I: De merito praesertim supernaturali
Quaestio II: De conditionibus meriti supernaturalis
Tractatus III: De conscientia in generali
Introductio
Quaestio I: De conscientia morali secundum se in esse psychologico
Quaestio II: De conscientia prout est regula actuum moralium
Articulus I: De rectitudine conscientiae
Articulus II: De conscientiae certitudine
Quaestio III: De conscientia christiana prout est regula actuum supernaturalium
Tractatus IV: De legibus in genere
Introductio
§ I: De lege secundum esse psychologicum
Pars I: De lege in genere
Quaestio I: De ipsa lege in se
Articulus I: De essentia legis
Articulus II: De promulgatione legis
Quaestio II: De distinctione legum
Quaestio III: De effectibus legis
Articulus I: De vi directivâ seu obligatione legis
Articulus II: De vi coactivâ seu sanctione legis
Pars II: De lege aeterna quae est fundamentum omnis legis
S. Th. I-II, q. 91, a. 1.
238. Thesis. There exists an eternal law. — It is proved : Law is an ordinance of reason in the principle that governs the community. But assuming that the world is governed by divine providence, the whole community of the universe is ruled by divine reason. Therefore the very reason ordaining the governance of things, which is in God as in the prince of the universe, has the character of law. But divine reason conceives nothing in time but from eternity. Therefore such a law is eternal. Cf. Job XXXVIII-XXXIX ; Prov. VIII-IX ; Wis. VI-XII ; Ps. CXVIII.
Nor may one say that it is not law, since it is not promulgated. For promulgation is not of the essence of law ; moreover although the eternal law is not passively promulgated on the part of the term, i.e. the hearing creature (in the second act), it is nevertheless actively promulgated on the part of God promulgating (in the first act) because it has all that is required on the part of God for promulgation1.
Quaestio I: De essentia legis aeternae
S. Th. I-II, q. 93, a. 1.
239. Thesis. The eternal law is rightly defined by S. Augustine, l. 22, c. Faustum, c. 29 : the reason or will of God commanding that the natural order be preserved, forbidding it to be disturbed ; and by S. Thomas : the reason of divine wisdom according as it is directive of all acts and motions in order to the common good of the whole universe.
- Law, namely, essentially is in the legislator (n. 221).
It is proved : Just as in an artist there pre-exists the concept or reason of those things which are made by art, and this is called the idea or exemplar of the things to be made, so in a governor there must pre-exist the concept or reason of the order of those things which are to be done by those who are governed, and this reason, ordination and conception of the acts of subjects by the governor is called law. But God by his wisdom is the maker of all things of which he is the artificer ; he is also the governor of all acts and motions. Whence just as the reason or conception of divine wisdom, inasmuch as through it all things are created, has the character of an idea or exemplar, so the reason of divine wisdom ordering and moving all things to their due end, the good of the whole universe, obtains the character of law.
240. The eternal law therefore differs :
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from the divine idea : the latter is the exemplar of things to be made, the former is the order of things to be governed, inflecting on them necessity or obligation ; whence the idea is supposed by the law, because a thing must be made before it is governed ;
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from providence : a) because law has the force of obliging, not providence ; b) because law regards the good of the whole universe, providence also the particular good of each one ; c) providence is, as it were, the conclusion of the law and follows it : the latter delivers rules in general for the governance of the world, providence, as a part of prudence, disposes according to law in particular about the motions of creatures.
Quaestio II: De potestate legis aeternae
S. Th. I-II, q. 93, a. 3-6.
241. Thesis. From the eternal law all others are derived. — It is proved :
In ordered movers, the power of the second mover is derived from the power of the first mover, because the second does not move except inasmuch as it is moved by the first ; whence in a well-ordered state the reason of governance is derived from the first governor to the secondary ones, and in an art the reason of the things to be made is derived from the architect to the inferior artificers. But the eternal law is the reason of governance in the first and supreme governor.
Therefore all the reasons of governance, or laws, in the inferior governors are derived from the eternal law.
For : a) Human reason, in order that it be the rule of the will and of human acts, has [its force] from the divine reason or eternal law, of which it is a participation (q. 19, a. 4) ; therefore if a law ought to be conformed to reason, much more to the eternal law.
b) The first is indeed the measure of others. But the eternal law, or divine reason, precedes every other reason or law as a source. Therefore it is the first rule of every reason and law. And therefore honesty is to be esteemed chiefly from commensuration to that rule.
The eternal law, namely, is law by essence ; all others are law by participation, which are derived from it and indeed in a threefold way :
1° they are derived from the eternal law as from an exemplar cause, because all laws, in order that they be just, must be conformed to right reason and so to the eternal law, so that from the eternal law they have that they are a norm of rectitude ;
2° they are derived from the eternal law as from an efficient cause from which they have the force of obliging, because every inferior legislative power is from God, according to that of Rom. XIII, 1 : There is no power except from God : so from the eternal law they have that they are a norm of obligation.
Both of these the divine wisdom signified when it said (Prov. VIII, 15-16) : « By me kings reign (as to the second : power) and lawgivers decree what is just (as to the first : rectitude) ; by me princes rule and the mighty decree justice ». Hence all laws also
3° depend on and are derived from the eternal law as from a directive and actually regulative cause, because the eternal law, by means of the light of reason, directs legislators, so that they may see what laws according to diverse circumstances are to be instituted : so from the eternal law they have that they are actually instituted.
242. To the eternal law are subject all things that are subject to divine governance :
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All natural things, whether necessary or contingent : for God has given not only to intellectual creatures a rule (which is a principle of acting), imprinting on their mind the knowledge of the divine precept, but to the whole nature principles and constituted [them] to their proper acts ; and therefore he is said to command the whole nature. Thus all the motions and actions of the whole nature are subject to the eternal law inasmuch as all creatures are inclined and moved by divine providence ; likewise the defects that occur in nature against the order of one or another particular cause, because these do not occur against the order of the first cause but are also subject to divine providence, from which nothing escapes.
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All human things : for men are subject to the eternal law, not only as to the inclination to that which is conformed to the eternal law, but also because they have knowledge of the law : the wicked, imperfectly, in whom the natural inclination to virtue is corrupted by a vicious habit, and the natural knowledge of good is darkened by passions and vices ; the good, however, perfectly, because in them to the natural inclination to good is added the interior motive of grace and virtue, and to the natural knowledge of good is added the knowledge of faith and the gift of wisdom. Hence the good always act according to the law (in act or in habit), but the wicked often act against it ; yet insofar as they fall away from it on the part of action, so much the more are they subject to it on the part of passion, because so much the more must they be punished according to it1.
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But those things which pertain to the divine nature or essence are not subject : for these are really the eternal law itself. For the act of the mind does not really differ from God himself ; but nothing can be subject to itself.
Nor does it stand in the way that God is held not to do a moral evil, e.g. to lie : for he is not held to this by the force of any law prohibiting it, but by reason of the repugnance which arises from his nature and perfection, inasmuch as if he did evil or lied, he would not be God. Whence it is said that « God is to himself a law » (I, q. 21, a. 1, ad 2), not properly because nothing can be subject to itself, but because he is of himself right without law, as if he were to himself a law.
Quaestio III: De mutabilitate legis aeternae
S. Th. I-II, q. 93, a. 2.
243. The eternal law in itself is immutable, but its knowledge in us is mutable. The eternal law, because it is the essence of God, cannot be known in itself except by God and by the blessed, but all rational creatures are able to know it according to a certain irradiation of it greater or lesser. For every knowledge of truth is an irradiation and participation of the divine truth and consequently of the eternal law ; but truth all know in some measure, more or less, at least as to the common principles of natural law, and consequently also the eternal law.
Hence although the eternal law in itself is immutable, its knowledge can nevertheless be increased or diminished in individuals, according as they know in greater or lesser measure other laws which are a participation of it, as will be said below.