Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. I-II, q. 109, a. 5 and 6 ; q. 114, a. 2.

188. Necessity of supernatural acts. — Since in the present order we are destined not to a natural but to a supernatural end, the divine one, it is not sufficient that we place morally honest acts proportioned to the natural end, but it is necessary that we place acts conformed to the supernatural end, which are supernatural and of the divine order: a) From the principle or subjective element; for eternal life, namely the intuitive and beatific vision of God, exceeds the proportion of our nature; but acts cannot exceed the proportion of their principle; therefore by his nature man cannot produce acts proportioned to eternal life, but for this a higher principle is required elevating him, which is grace.

b) Also from the formal object or motive, which is the objective element. Here the principle holds: Acts are specified by the object. For just as an act is not morally good unless the object is conformed to the honest end and as such is known and intended, so an act will not be supernaturally good unless the object is considered as conformed to the supernatural end and is intended from a supernatural motive; — in other words, no one can tend toward the supernatural end except by willing it, no one contracts supernatural goodness unless he wills it; otherwise he would not direct himself to the end in a human way, but would merely incline toward it.

Hence a twofold goodness or moral being can be had in human acts:

1. natural, which is the intrinsic tendency of the act toward the object as simply honest, and consequently as conformed to God as the natural end, to be contemplated by our powers as much as we can;

2. supernatural, which is the intrinsic tendency of the act toward the object as conformed to God the supernatural end, to be seen in himself, indeed the intrinsic dignity of the act toward the divine eternal life, to be led with God in heaven.

In supernatural acts therefore the material element is the moral goodness itself; the supernaturality of the act both on the part of the object and on the part of the principle is the formal element.

189. State of the question. — In a supernatural act can be considered

a) the subjective element or principle, namely grace, and this pertains to dogmatic theology, namely to the treatise on grace;

b) the objective element or object, which is something particular, and therefore pertains to special morals, and is spoken of in the treatises on the individual virtues in particular;

Summa Theologiae Moralis I — 12 c) the very tendency toward the end. For every thing reaches its end by its operation, which is the perfectly efficient cause of the end itself when this does not exceed the power of the agent; otherwise it is a dispositive, or even moral, cause, inasmuch as it provides something for which the obtaining of the end is expected from the gift of another. Now eternal life exceeds the nature of man. Therefore the human act is only a dispositive and moral cause of eternal life, both meritorious, and satisfactory, and impetratory.

Moreover, the satisfactory and impetratory causality belongs to human acts from a particular virtue of penance or religion, and therefore in special morals this is spoken of where these virtues are treated; but the causality of merit belongs to all supernatural acts as such, if they are placed in the due conditions. It pertains, indeed, to the treatise on grace inasmuch as it is considered as the effect of cooperating grace, but it also pertains to general morals and to the treatise on human acts, inasmuch as it is the property of a human act and it is a debt and obligatory for our acts to merit eternal life. And therefore we must know the required conditions in order that we may be able to fulfill the said obligation.

S. Th. I-II, q. 21, a. 3 and 4 ; q. 114, a. 1, 2, 5-10.

190. Merit etymologically is derived from the word merces (reward), and therefore designates a service or laborious work done for the benefit of another, which is wont to be done only by hirelings for a stipend or reward. In the broadest sense it signifies whatever is sufficient, suitable, worthy for obtaining something, or that which demands something, and so it is also said of inanimate things, e. g., of a painting; — more properly it is a human work to which retribution is due from some justice strictly or broadly so called, and so it is also said of an evil work (Mt. XVI, 26 ; Iob. VI, 2 ; Hebr. X, 29 ; Eccli. XVI, 14, 15); — in the strict sense however it is a good work done in service or benefit of another and therefore worthy of reward and retribution.

It can be considered in the abstract and in the concrete: in the concrete it is the work of virtue to which a reward is due, a work worthy of retribution; in the abstract it is the property of a human act, namely the moral value of a work by virtue of which it is worthy that something be given back to the one working, the goodness existing in the human act because of which it is worthy of praise and reward, or the dignity of the work and therefore the right or title in the one working for retribution.

191. The philosophical foundation of merit is in the exigence of the order of nature, or in the natural law by virtue of which an active being's own proper good is its own and therefore ought to accrue to it, since it has the very perfection of the entity as its end. Whence, when a free person has chosen an act in service or for the benefit of another person, that person has provided something which is his own; whence it is equitable and just that the other should give back something good, compensating the good provided (II-II, q. 106, a. 3; I, q. 65, a. 2). But if equality is required and rendered, merit is from justice properly so called; otherwise from equity and fitness, friendship, and liberality, which in some way pertain to justice.

On the contrary, since each man in relation to his ultimate end is of the same dignity, as being of his own right, and therefore is not a mere means subordinated to others, but exists for his own good, he cannot be deprived of his order to his own good without justice demanding recompense of punishment. Whence S. Thomas (q. 21, a. 3): he who « acts to the profit (emolumentum) or harm (damnum, detrimentum) of another », « acquires merit or demerit in relation to retribution which is made according to justice ».

192. Division of merit. — A. By reason of the one rewarding, merit is civil when the work is done for the benefit or service either of an individual or of society; — and moral when it is done in service of God.

a) As to civil merit:

1. An act directed toward the good (or evil) of an individual person has merit (or demerit) directly with the person, indirectly with the society on which the good of the person, who is in some way its part and member, redounds.

2. An act directed toward the good (or evil) of society has merit primarily with the society, secondarily with the individual members insofar as they are members.

3. An act directed toward the good (or evil) of the agent himself has no merit with the agent himself (because justice is toward another), but can indirectly have the notion of merit with society (q. 21, a. 3).

b) Every human act has moral merit (or demerit) with God, inasmuch as it tends toward the profit (or detriment) not of God himself but of his honor and of the order established by him; — and indeed: 1) By reason of God himself: for God is the ultimate end of man. But to the ultimate end is due that all acts be referred to it. Therefore he who does an evil act not referrible to God does not preserve the honor which is due to the ultimate end, and vice versa.

2. By reason of society, whose God is ruler and guardian: God is the governor and ruler of the whole universe. But he who rules a community has care of the common good and must give retribution for those things which are done well or ill in society. Therefore human acts have merit or demerit with God; otherwise it would have to be said that he does not care about human acts (a. 4).

B. By reason of the reward, merit is natural, which proceeds from the powers of nature, and expects only a natural reward; whence if it is in service of God, it is done in relation to God as the natural end; — another is supernatural, which is done by the powers of grace in relation to God as the supernatural end, and merits a supernatural reward, namely the good of eternal life. It is also called theological.

They differ in that the first follows upon every good act by reason of its goodness, the second by some relation of justice to God from whom, at least from fittingness, it merits at least a temporal good, and therefore it imports a reward from the very notion of the act; — the other imports a reward to be given back not only from the very notion of the act but also from the state of the person working, and therefore it belongs only to supernatural acts and indeed of the just man alone, to whom eternal life itself or some other good in relation to eternal life is due as a reward¹. Here we treat only of supernatural merit.

C. By reason of dignity, merit is: Either simply so called or of condignity, to which the reward is due from justice, to which it has equal value and equal dignity or condignity. It is a work whose value equals the value of the reward because there is equality between merit and reward according to right estimation: equality therefore not always material or quantitative, but moral, which is called of virtue and proportion, just as between seed and the fruit that is born from it (q. 114, a. 3, ad 3). — Or it is merit of congruity and in a certain respect, to which in no way is retribution made from justice, but only from a certain fitness and equity and friendship or liberality of the giver the gift is bestowed which befits the giver; and therefore it does not infallibly obtain the reward, unless the one rewarding has promised, and then not from justice but from fidelity. It is a work whose value does not equal the value of the reward because equality between reward and merit is lacking.

In the former merit there is an exigence for the reward, in the other only a fittingness. The former can be compared to the stipend that is owed to a soldier and the wage that is owed to a servant; the latter to an honorary distinction (e. g., an equestrian order) which the prince not from justice nor altogether gratuitously bestows on a soldier for deeds bravely done, a gratification or gift that inferiors or servants have received for more or less supererogatory services. This division is not univocal but analogous.

193. What can man merit? — Of condignity the just man can merit for himself the increase of habitual grace, the remission of venial sin, heavenly glory and its increase. Of congruity he can merit for himself infallibly actual graces, the first excepted.

Christ alone could merit for others of condignity, as head of all men. Of congruity a man can merit for others but not infallibly: actual graces including the first, habitual grace and its increase, the remission of sin, and eternal life.

These are proved in the treatise on grace. Cf. S. Thomas I-II, q. 114.

S. Th. I-II, q. 114, a. 1, 2, 3, 4.

194. Thesis. For the supernatural condign merit of eternal life itself, seven conditions are required: A. On the part of the work or act, that it be

1. voluntary and free, and indeed freely elective, i. e., not only free from coercion but also from intrinsic necessity (cf. prop. 3 of Jansenius condemned): for merit is the property of a moral act, which is the more moral the more voluntary and free it is. Moreover, retribution is not owed to anyone, except because he himself contributes from his own in service of the one rewarding; but no one properly contributes from his own except that of which he is the master; and man is not the master of his act except the one he freely does;

2. good or honest (Mt. VI, 1 sq.) at least formally, for with God infinitely holy nothing is worthy of reward except what is good and right; for the rest, if evil merits anything, it is not reward but punishment;

3. supernatural and therefore placed from grace, otherwise it would not be proportioned to a supernatural reward of eternal life (C. Trid. sess. 6, c. 16);

4. likewise done in service of God the supernatural end, otherwise there would be no reason why retribution should be expected from God himself: it is, however, done in service of God inasmuch as it is referred to and commanded by charity toward God. Cf. I Cor. II, 9; X, 31; Col. III, 17; Mt. X, 39-42; XIX, 29; Mc. IX, 40; Lc. IX, 48, Gal. V, 6, 14; — S. Th. I-II, q. 114, a. 4.

B. On the part of the one working:

5. the state of wayfarer: for he who has reached the end and goal and possesses it can no longer move himself toward it or tend toward it or approach it more; therefore he cannot merit it. The state of the way has its end with temporal life, as we know with certitude from revelation, and from the faith of the universal Church (II Cor. V, 10; Hebr. IX, 27; Mt. XXV, 1 sq.; Ioh. IX, 4; Lc. XVI, 9, 22; Gal. VI, 10);

6. the state of grace (props. 12, 15, 17, 18 of Baius condemned; C. Araus. II, can. 18; C. Trid. sess. 6, c. 16, can. 32): for the value and dignity of the work is chiefly from the dignity of the one working (Gen. IV, 4); if therefore he himself is not worthy of eternal life through habitual sanctifying grace, he is not fit to place works worthy of eternal life (Ioh. XV, 4).

C. On the part of God rewarding:

7. the acceptance or pre-ordination of the work as reward, and as it were a promise, at least implicitly contained in the bestowal of grace. Not that the good work has intrinsic value or condignity from this acceptance, but because beyond the condignity which it has from grace, an ordination or promise of accepting merits and of giving back a reward is necessary, in order that he who from grace has worked well may have a right to the reward and God may be obliged to render it to him from justice. Among men no one from justice is bound to reward a service, however worthy of price, unless he has accepted it and thus has taken on at least tacitly the obligation of rewarding. But acceptance is required much more on the part of God, who of himself is not obliged by any works of men to give back a reward, both because our services are already owed to him, since they are his, and because they confer no profit of utility, and because we have every power of operating and the very act of our operation from God; therefore in no way can God be our debtor. But, with the ordination or promise added, he is already debtor of himself, and is bound not toward us but toward himself, inasmuch as he owes to his own wisdom, fidelity, and will to fulfill in creatures what by free will he has determined to give them, and according to the proportion of works to bestow the reward established for the works (Iac. I, 12; II, 5; Mt. XX; I Tim. IV, 8; Hebr. X, 36; C. Trid. sess. 6, c. 16). The condignity therefore depends on the internal value of the work, with the acceptance of God presupposed: this does not deny the value of the work but brings it about that the work, which by reason of its value is worthy of reward, this reward is now actually due from God from justice (a. 1).

Hence there does not exist strict justice between God and men according to absolute equality, because our works can confer nothing on God, since the whole goodness of them (being, power, and the very operating) is freely bestowed by his ordination so that he can claim them for himself (a. 1); this ordination being posited, however, if the meritorious value of the works is attended to according to the virtue of the Holy Spirit moving us toward eternal life and according to the dignity of the grace by which man is a partaker of the divine nature and an adoptive son to whom the inheritance of eternal life is due, there is equality of strict justice between the work and the reward promised by God, so that the work is of the same order and of equal value with the reward of eternal life and divine just as it is itself (a. 3). Whence eternal life, by comparison with the proximate cause, namely the works of the just, is a reward owed from justice; but by comparison with the remote cause, namely the power of operating and grace from divine ordination, it is a gift of mercy (C. Trid. sess. 6, c. 16 and sess. 14, c. 8).

195. How meritorious works must be ordered in service of God. — Not all explain this in the same way:

a) Some, like Suarez, deny that a formal ordination of charity is required, saying that every act done from any supernatural motive of its nature implicitly tends toward the supernatural end, and therefore is equal to it in moral estimation and meritorious.

b) Better, however, with the Thomists and Bellarmine it is said that this suffices for merit of congruity; but for merit of condignity an influx from an act of charity is required: for by this we strictly merit the attainment of the end by which we tend toward the end, the Supreme Good as such; but this we do through charity alone, by which we tend toward the Supreme Good in itself. — In practice, however, this opinion does not differ so much from the preceding, because the influx of charity is always present: 1) by way of object or motive: for the act of charity, once exercised and not retracted by mortal sin, refers all following acts of the whole life to God the supernatural end, and, if perhaps not all honest acts, at least all that are proportioned to the supernatural end and from motive and principle are supernatural; 2) also by way of principle, because supernatural acts of virtue do not proceed from grace except through the mediation of charity, just as they do not proceed from a power except through the command of the will, which command proceeds from charity.

c) Indeed, very probably many further say that by this single act of charity all honest acts are referred to the supernatural end, and therefore are done from the motive and principle of charity and thus are supernatural and meritorious, so that in the just man, with charity acting, the act is either supernaturally good and meritorious, or a venial sin. Which would seem to be the opinion of S. Thomas, Q. D. de Malo 2, a. 5, ad 7, and II Sent. d. 40, q. 1, a. 5¹.

d) For this, however, as some have thought (Ballerini, Noldin, Vermeersch), the mere presence of the habit of charity is not sufficient, but the exercise of it is required, because, as S. Thomas says, in II Sent. d. 40, q. 1, a. 5, ad 6, « from this that one is in the habit no one merits, but from this that he actually operates ».

e) Some finally, like S. Bonaventure and S. Alphonsus, require that the act of charity be repeated more often, e. g., every day or every week, or even for each series of actions; and on account of the probability of this opinion it is to be advised that it be exercised more often¹.

196. Degrees of merit. — Saving acts are not equally, but more or less meritorious, according as the conditions of merit are verified more or less. Hence, other things being equal, greater merit is made

1. the more dignified the person acting is, according to the supernatural dignity of habitual sanctifying grace by which man is pleasing to God;

2. the more voluntary the work is, i. e., it proceeds from a more prompt will and is done with greater intensity; and the more free, i. e., the more the agent contributes from his own and from his own dominion;

3. the more the work is informed by charity, namely the more expressly, proximately, and actually it is referred to God; whence it is an excellent practice often to exercise the act of charity and to offer works to God to increase merit, and also to increase charity itself, the root of merit;

4. the more the work is better according to species, excellence, nobility of moral goodness, which nobility depends on the object; e. g., an act is better which regards a more excellent virtue, which has a superior end, which pertains to more virtues. A precept, therefore, does not hinder merit, indeed obedience increases merit because it adds the goodness of a new virtue;

5. and therefore the more the work is difficult in itself: intrinsic difficulty namely which is from the greatness and arduousness of the work itself and from the elevation of its proper object increases merit, because something is so much the better the more it is raised above the powers of man; — but the extrinsic difficulty of labor, which the agent experiences in the good work and which arises from a defect of the agent and of a prompt will, does not increase but rather diminishes. Otherwise the more someone would advance in virtue and experience less difficulty, the less merit he would have. Accidentally, however, a special difficulty on the part of the agent can be the occasion that someone tends toward the good with greater attention and greater effort of will (q. 114, a. 4, ad 2); and then merit is increased not because of the difficulty but because of the intensity of the will.

197. Remark. — For the congruity of merit in relation to some supernatural retribution, the same conditions are required, except the state of grace, the influx of charity, and the promise of God; — this promise, however, as well as the state of grace, are required for merit of congruity more strictly so called and infallible, which namely consists in a friendly right to some reward, without there ever being required a work to reward equality.